arXiv · quant-ph/0106056
Stability of mixed Nash equilibria in symmetric quantum games
Abstract
In bi-matrix games the Bishop-Cannings theorem of the classical evolutionary game theory does not permit pure evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) when a mixed ESS exists. We find the necessary form of two-qubit initial quantum states when a switch-over to a quantum version of the game also changes the evolutionary stability of a mixed symmetric Nash equilibrium.
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A. Iqbal, A. H. Toor. 2004-07-06. Stability of mixed Nash equilibria in symmetric quantum games. https://searcharxiv.com/abs/quant-ph/0106056
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