arXiv subjects

Andrea Tacchetti

Publications and source records attributed to Andrea Tacchetti.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2025

Language Agents as Digital Representatives in Collective Decision-Making

Consider the process of collective decision-making, in which a group of individuals interactively select a preferred outcome from among a universe of alternatives. In this context, "representation" is the activity of making an individual's preferences present in the process via participation by a proxy agent -- i.e. their "representative". To this end, learned models of human behavior have the potential to fill this role, with practical implications for multi-agent scenario studies and mechanism design. In this work, we investigate the possibility of training \textit{language agents} to behave in the capacity of representatives of human agents, appropriately expressing the preferences of those individuals whom they stand for. First, we formalize the setting of \textit{collective decision-making} -- as the episodic process of interaction between a group of agents and a decision mechanism. On this basis, we then formalize the problem of \textit{digital representation} -- as the simulation of an agent's behavior to yield equivalent outcomes from the mechanism. Finally, we conduct an empirical case study in the setting of \textit{consensus-finding} among diverse humans, and demonstrate the feasibility of fine-tuning large language models to act as digital representatives.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

Using deep reinforcement learning to promote sustainable human behaviour on a common pool resource problem

A canonical social dilemma arises when finite resources are allocated to a group of people, who can choose to either reciprocate with interest, or keep the proceeds for themselves. What resource allocation mechanisms will encourage levels of reciprocation that sustain the commons? Here, in an iterated multiplayer trust game, we use deep reinforcement learning (RL) to design an allocation mechanism that endogenously promotes sustainable contributions from human participants to a common pool resource. We first trained neural networks to behave like human players, creating a stimulated economy that allowed us to study how different mechanisms influenced the dynamics of receipt and reciprocation. We then used RL to train a social planner to maximise aggregate return to players. The social planner discovered a redistributive policy that led to a large surplus and an inclusive economy, in which players made roughly equal gains. The RL agent increased human surplus over baseline mechanisms based on unrestricted welfare or conditional cooperation, by conditioning its generosity on available resources and temporarily sanctioning defectors by allocating fewer resources to them. Examining the AI policy allowed us to develop an explainable mechanism that performed similarly and was more popular among players. Deep reinforcement learning can be used to discover mechanisms that promote sustainable human behaviour.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2024

Rethinking Teacher-Student Curriculum Learning through the Cooperative Mechanics of Experience

Teacher-Student Curriculum Learning (TSCL) is a curriculum learning framework that draws inspiration from human cultural transmission and learning. It involves a teacher algorithm shaping the learning process of a learner algorithm by exposing it to controlled experiences. Despite its success, understanding the conditions under which TSCL is effective remains challenging. In this paper, we propose a data-centric perspective to analyze the underlying mechanics of the teacher-student interactions in TSCL. We leverage cooperative game theory to describe how the composition of the set of experiences presented by the teacher to the learner, as well as their order, influences the performance of the curriculum that is found by TSCL approaches. To do so, we demonstrate that for every TSCL problem, an equivalent cooperative game exists, and several key components of the TSCL framework can be reinterpreted using game-theoretic principles. Through experiments covering supervised learning, reinforcement learning, and classical games, we estimate the cooperative values of experiences and use value-proportional curriculum mechanisms to construct curricula, even in cases where TSCL struggles. The framework and experimental setup we present in this work represents a novel foundation for a deeper exploration of TSCL, shedding light on its underlying mechanisms and providing insights into its broader applicability in machine learning.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

Gemma: Open Models Based on Gemini Research and Technology

This work introduces Gemma, a family of lightweight, state-of-the art open models built from the research and technology used to create Gemini models. Gemma models demonstrate strong performance across academic benchmarks for language understanding, reasoning, and safety. We release two sizes of models (2 billion and 7 billion parameters), and provide both pretrained and fine-tuned checkpoints. Gemma outperforms similarly sized open models on 11 out of 18 text-based tasks, and we present comprehensive evaluations of safety and responsibility aspects of the models, alongside a detailed description of model development. We believe the responsible release of LLMs is critical for improving the safety of frontier models, and for enabling the next wave of LLM innovations.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2024

Gemini 1.5: Unlocking multimodal understanding across millions of tokens of context

In this report, we introduce the Gemini 1.5 family of models, representing the next generation of highly compute-efficient multimodal models capable of recalling and reasoning over fine-grained information from millions of tokens of context, including multiple long documents and hours of video and audio. The family includes two new models: (1) an updated Gemini 1.5 Pro, which exceeds the February version on the great majority of capabilities and benchmarks; (2) Gemini 1.5 Flash, a more lightweight variant designed for efficiency with minimal regression in quality. Gemini 1.5 models achieve near-perfect recall on long-context retrieval tasks across modalities, improve the state-of-the-art in long-document QA, long-video QA and long-context ASR, and match or surpass Gemini 1.0 Ultra's state-of-the-art performance across a broad set of benchmarks. Studying the limits of Gemini 1.5's long-context ability, we find continued improvement in next-token prediction and near-perfect retrieval (>99%) up to at least 10M tokens, a generational leap over existing models such as Claude 3.0 (200k) and GPT-4 Turbo (128k). Finally, we highlight real-world use cases, such as Gemini 1.5 collaborating with professionals on completing their tasks achieving 26 to 75% time savings across 10 different job categories, as well as surprising new capabilities of large language models at the frontier; when given a grammar manual for Kalamang, a language with fewer than 200 speakers worldwide, the model learns to translate English to Kalamang at a similar level to a person who learned from the same content.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2023

Scaling Opponent Shaping to High Dimensional Games

In multi-agent settings with mixed incentives, methods developed for zero-sum games have been shown to lead to detrimental outcomes. To address this issue, opponent shaping (OS) methods explicitly learn to influence the learning dynamics of co-players and empirically lead to improved individual and collective outcomes. However, OS methods have only been evaluated in low-dimensional environments due to the challenges associated with estimating higher-order derivatives or scaling model-free meta-learning. Alternative methods that scale to more complex settings either converge to undesirable solutions or rely on unrealistic assumptions about the environment or co-players. In this paper, we successfully scale an OS-based approach to general-sum games with temporally-extended actions and long-time horizons for the first time. After analysing the representations of the meta-state and history used by previous algorithms, we propose a simplified version called Shaper. We show empirically that Shaper leads to improved individual and collective outcomes in a range of challenging settings from literature. We further formalize a technique previously implicit in the literature, and analyse its contribution to opponent shaping. We show empirically that this technique is helpful for the functioning of prior methods in certain environments. Lastly, we show that previous environments, such as the CoinGame, are inadequate for analysing temporally-extended general-sum interactions.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2023

Generative Adversarial Equilibrium Solvers

We introduce the use of generative adversarial learning to compute equilibria in general game-theoretic settings, specifically the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in pseudo-games, and its specific instantiation as the competitive equilibrium (CE) in Arrow-Debreu competitive economies. Pseudo-games are a generalization of games in which players' actions affect not only the payoffs of other players but also their feasible action spaces. Although the computation of GNE and CE is intractable in the worst-case, i.e., PPAD-hard, in practice, many applications only require solutions with high accuracy in expectation over a distribution of problem instances. We introduce Generative Adversarial Equilibrium Solvers (GAES): a family of generative adversarial neural networks that can learn GNE and CE from only a sample of problem instances. We provide computational and sample complexity bounds, and apply the framework to finding Nash equilibria in normal-form games, CE in Arrow-Debreu competitive economies, and GNE in an environmental economic model of the Kyoto mechanism.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Learning Truthful, Efficient, and Welfare Maximizing Auction Rules

From social networks to supply chains, more and more aspects of how humans, firms and organizations interact is mediated by artificial learning agents. As the influence of machine learning systems grows, it is paramount that we study how to imbue our modern institutions with our own values and principles. Here we consider the problem of allocating goods to buyers who have preferences over them in settings where the seller's aim is not to maximize their monetary gains, but rather to advance some notion of social welfare (e.g. the government trying to award construction licenses for hospitals or schools). This problem has a long history in economics, and solutions take the form of auction rules. Researchers have proposed reliable auction rules that work in extremely general settings, and in the presence of information asymmetry and strategic buyers. However, these protocols require significant payments from participants resulting in low aggregate welfare. Here we address this shortcoming by casting auction rule design as a statistical learning problem, and trade generality for participant welfare effectively and automatically with a novel deep learning network architecture and auction representation. Our analysis shows that our auction rules outperform state-of-the art approaches in terms of participants welfare, applicability, robustness.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2022

Turbocharging Solution Concepts: Solving NEs, CEs and CCEs with Neural Equilibrium Solvers

Solution concepts such as Nash Equilibria, Correlated Equilibria, and Coarse Correlated Equilibria are useful components for many multiagent machine learning algorithms. Unfortunately, solving a normal-form game could take prohibitive or non-deterministic time to converge, and could fail. We introduce the Neural Equilibrium Solver which utilizes a special equivariant neural network architecture to approximately solve the space of all games of fixed shape, buying speed and determinism. We define a flexible equilibrium selection framework, that is capable of uniquely selecting an equilibrium that minimizes relative entropy, or maximizes welfare. The network is trained without needing to generate any supervised training data. We show remarkable zero-shot generalization to larger games. We argue that such a network is a powerful component for many possible multiagent algorithms.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2022

Developing, Evaluating and Scaling Learning Agents in Multi-Agent Environments

The Game Theory & Multi-Agent team at DeepMind studies several aspects of multi-agent learning ranging from computing approximations to fundamental concepts in game theory to simulating social dilemmas in rich spatial environments and training 3-d humanoids in difficult team coordination tasks. A signature aim of our group is to use the resources and expertise made available to us at DeepMind in deep reinforcement learning to explore multi-agent systems in complex environments and use these benchmarks to advance our understanding. Here, we summarise the recent work of our team and present a taxonomy that we feel highlights many important open challenges in multi-agent research.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2022

HCMD-zero: Learning Value Aligned Mechanisms from Data

Artificial learning agents are mediating a larger and larger number of interactions among humans, firms, and organizations, and the intersection between mechanism design and machine learning has been heavily investigated in recent years. However, mechanism design methods often make strong assumptions on how participants behave (e.g. rationality), on the kind of knowledge designers have access to a priori (e.g. access to strong baseline mechanisms), or on what the goal of the mechanism should be (e.g. total welfare). Here we introduce HCMD-zero, a general purpose method to construct mechanisms making none of these three assumptions. HCMD-zero learns to mediate interactions among participants and adjusts the mechanism parameters to make itself more likely to be preferred by participants. It does so by remaining engaged in an electoral contest with copies of itself, thereby accessing direct feedback from participants. We test our method on a stylized resource allocation game that highlights the tension between productivity, equality and the temptation to free ride. HCMD-zero produces a mechanism that is preferred by human participants over a strong baseline, it does so automatically, without requiring prior knowledge, and using human behavioral trajectories sparingly and effectively. Our analysis shows HCMD-zero consistently makes the mechanism policy more and more likely to be preferred by human participants over the course of training, and that it results in a mechanism with an interpretable and intuitive policy.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2022

The Good Shepherd: An Oracle Agent for Mechanism Design

From social networks to traffic routing, artificial learning agents are playing a central role in modern institutions. We must therefore understand how to leverage these systems to foster outcomes and behaviors that align with our own values and aspirations. While multiagent learning has received considerable attention in recent years, artificial agents have been primarily evaluated when interacting with fixed, non-learning co-players. While this evaluation scheme has merit, it fails to capture the dynamics faced by institutions that must deal with adaptive and continually learning constituents. Here we address this limitation, and construct agents ("mechanisms") that perform well when evaluated over the learning trajectory of their adaptive co-players ("participants"). The algorithm we propose consists of two nested learning loops: an inner loop where participants learn to best respond to fixed mechanisms; and an outer loop where the mechanism agent updates its policy based on experience. We report the performance of our mechanism agents when paired with both artificial learning agents and humans as co-players. Our results show that our mechanisms are able to shepherd the participants strategies towards favorable outcomes, indicating a path for modern institutions to effectively and automatically influence the strategies and behaviors of their constituents.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2022

D3C: Reducing the Price of Anarchy in Multi-Agent Learning

In multiagent systems, the complex interaction of fixed incentives can lead agents to outcomes that are poor (inefficient) not only for the group, but also for each individual. Price of anarchy is a technical, game-theoretic definition that quantifies the inefficiency arising in these scenarios -- it compares the welfare that can be achieved through perfect coordination against that achieved by self-interested agents at a Nash equilibrium. We derive a differentiable, upper bound on a price of anarchy that agents can cheaply estimate during learning. Equipped with this estimator, agents can adjust their incentives in a way that improves the efficiency incurred at a Nash equilibrium. Agents do so by learning to mix their reward (equiv. negative loss) with that of other agents by following the gradient of our derived upper bound. We refer to this approach as D3C. In the case where agent incentives are differentiable, D3C resembles the celebrated Win-Stay, Lose-Shift strategy from behavioral game theory, thereby establishing a connection between the global goal of maximum welfare and an established agent-centric learning rule. In the non-differentiable setting, as is common in multiagent reinforcement learning, we show the upper bound can be reduced via evolutionary strategies, until a compromise is reached in a distributed fashion. We demonstrate that D3C improves outcomes for each agent and the group as a whole on several social dilemmas including a traffic network exhibiting Braess's paradox, a prisoner's dilemma, and several multiagent domains.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2022

Sample-based Approximation of Nash in Large Many-Player Games via Gradient Descent

Nash equilibrium is a central concept in game theory. Several Nash solvers exist, yet none scale to normal-form games with many actions and many players, especially those with payoff tensors too big to be stored in memory. In this work, we propose an approach that iteratively improves an approximation to a Nash equilibrium through joint play. It accomplishes this by tracing a previously established homotopy that defines a continuum of equilibria for the game regularized with decaying levels of entropy. This continuum asymptotically approaches the limiting logit equilibrium, proven by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) to be unique in almost all games, thereby partially circumventing the well-known equilibrium selection problem of many-player games. To encourage iterates to remain near this path, we efficiently minimize average deviation incentive via stochastic gradient descent, intelligently sampling entries in the payoff tensor as needed. Monte Carlo estimates of the stochastic gradient from joint play are biased due to the appearance of a nonlinear max operator in the objective, so we introduce additional innovations to the algorithm to alleviate gradient bias. The descent process can also be viewed as repeatedly constructing and reacting to a polymatrix approximation to the game. In these ways, our proposed approach, average deviation incentive descent with adaptive sampling (ADIDAS), is most similar to three classical approaches, namely homotopy-type, Lyapunov, and iterative polymatrix solvers. The lack of local convergence guarantees for biased gradient descent prevents guaranteed convergence to Nash, however, we demonstrate through extensive experiments the ability of this approach to approximate a unique Nash in normal-form games with as many as seven players and twenty one actions (several billion outcomes) that are orders of magnitude larger than those possible with prior algorithms.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Human-centered mechanism design with Democratic AI

Building artificial intelligence (AI) that aligns with human values is an unsolved problem. Here, we developed a human-in-the-loop research pipeline called Democratic AI, in which reinforcement learning is used to design a social mechanism that humans prefer by majority. A large group of humans played an online investment game that involved deciding whether to keep a monetary endowment or to share it with others for collective benefit. Shared revenue was returned to players under two different redistribution mechanisms, one designed by the AI and the other by humans. The AI discovered a mechanism that redressed initial wealth imbalance, sanctioned free riders, and successfully won the majority vote. By optimizing for human preferences, Democratic AI may be a promising method for value-aligned policy innovation.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2022

Learning to Play No-Press Diplomacy with Best Response Policy Iteration

Recent advances in deep reinforcement learning (RL) have led to considerable progress in many 2-player zero-sum games, such as Go, Poker and Starcraft. The purely adversarial nature of such games allows for conceptually simple and principled application of RL methods. However real-world settings are many-agent, and agent interactions are complex mixtures of common-interest and competitive aspects. We consider Diplomacy, a 7-player board game designed to accentuate dilemmas resulting from many-agent interactions. It also features a large combinatorial action space and simultaneous moves, which are challenging for RL algorithms. We propose a simple yet effective approximate best response operator, designed to handle large combinatorial action spaces and simultaneous moves. We also introduce a family of policy iteration methods that approximate fictitious play. With these methods, we successfully apply RL to Diplomacy: we show that our agents convincingly outperform the previous state-of-the-art, and game theoretic equilibrium analysis shows that the new process yields consistent improvements.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2020

Should I tear down this wall? Optimizing social metrics by evaluating novel actions

One of the fundamental challenges of governance is deciding when and how to intervene in multi-agent systems in order to impact group-wide metrics of success. This is particularly challenging when proposed interventions are novel and expensive. For example, one may wish to modify a building's layout to improve the efficiency of its escape route. Evaluating such interventions would generally require access to an elaborate simulator, which must be constructed ad-hoc for each environment, and can be prohibitively costly or inaccurate. Here we examine a simple alternative: Optimize By Observational Extrapolation (OBOE). The idea is to use observed behavioural trajectories, without any interventions, to learn predictive models mapping environment states to individual agent outcomes, and then use these to evaluate and select changes. We evaluate OBOE in socially complex gridworld environments and consider novel physical interventions that our models were not trained on. We show that neural network models trained to predict agent returns on baseline environments are effective at selecting among the interventions. Thus, OBOE can provide guidance for challenging questions like: "which wall should I tear down in order to minimize the Gini index of this group?"

cs.MA↗

arXiv2018

Relational inductive biases, deep learning, and graph networks

Artificial intelligence (AI) has undergone a renaissance recently, making major progress in key domains such as vision, language, control, and decision-making. This has been due, in part, to cheap data and cheap compute resources, which have fit the natural strengths of deep learning. However, many defining characteristics of human intelligence, which developed under much different pressures, remain out of reach for current approaches. In particular, generalizing beyond one's experiences--a hallmark of human intelligence from infancy--remains a formidable challenge for modern AI. The following is part position paper, part review, and part unification. We argue that combinatorial generalization must be a top priority for AI to achieve human-like abilities, and that structured representations and computations are key to realizing this objective. Just as biology uses nature and nurture cooperatively, we reject the false choice between "hand-engineering" and "end-to-end" learning, and instead advocate for an approach which benefits from their complementary strengths. We explore how using relational inductive biases within deep learning architectures can facilitate learning about entities, relations, and rules for composing them. We present a new building block for the AI toolkit with a strong relational inductive bias--the graph network--which generalizes and extends various approaches for neural networks that operate on graphs, and provides a straightforward interface for manipulating structured knowledge and producing structured behaviors. We discuss how graph networks can support relational reasoning and combinatorial generalization, laying the foundation for more sophisticated, interpretable, and flexible patterns of reasoning. As a companion to this paper, we have released an open-source software library for building graph networks, with demonstrations of how to use them in practice.

cs.LG↗