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Anupam Datta

Publications and source records attributed to Anupam Datta.

At least 55 records · Page 3Linked to original sources
arXiv2018

Latent Factor Interpretations for Collaborative Filtering

Many machine learning systems utilize latent factors as internal representations for making predictions. Since these latent factors are largely uninterpreted, however, predictions made using them are opaque. Collaborative filtering via matrix factorization is a prime example of such an algorithm that uses uninterpreted latent features, and yet has seen widespread adoption for many recommendation tasks. We present Latent Factor Interpretation (LFI), a method for interpreting models by leveraging interpretations of latent factors in terms of human-understandable features. The interpretation of latent factors can then replace the uninterpreted latent factors, resulting in a new model that expresses predictions in terms of interpretable features. This new model can then be interpreted using recently developed model explanation techniques. In this paper we develop LFI for collaborative filtering based recommender systems. We illustrate the use of LFI interpretations on the MovieLens dataset, integrating auxiliary features from IMDB and DB tropes, and show that latent factors can be predicted with sufficient accuracy for replicating the predictions of the true model.

cs.IR↗
arXiv2018

Supervising Feature Influence

Causal influence measures for machine learnt classifiers shed light on the reasons behind classification, and aid in identifying influential input features and revealing their biases. However, such analyses involve evaluating the classifier using datapoints that may be atypical of its training distribution. Standard methods for training classifiers that minimize empirical risk do not constrain the behavior of the classifier on such datapoints. As a result, training to minimize empirical risk does not distinguish among classifiers that agree on predictions in the training distribution but have wildly different causal influences. We term this problem covariate shift in causal testing and formally characterize conditions under which it arises. As a solution to this problem, we propose a novel active learning algorithm that constrains the influence measures of the trained model. We prove that any two predictors whose errors are close on both the original training distribution and the distribution of atypical points are guaranteed to have causal influences that are also close. Further, we empirically demonstrate with synthetic labelers that our algorithm trains models that (i) have similar causal influences as the labeler's model, and (ii) generalize better to out-of-distribution points while (iii) retaining their accuracy on in-distribution points.

cs.LG↗
arXiv2017

Case Study: Explaining Diabetic Retinopathy Detection Deep CNNs via Integrated Gradients

In this report, we applied integrated gradients to explaining a neural network for diabetic retinopathy detection. The integrated gradient is an attribution method which measures the contributions of input to the quantity of interest. We explored some new ways for applying this method such as explaining intermediate layers, filtering out unimportant units by their attribution value and generating contrary samples. Moreover, the visualization results extend the use of diabetic retinopathy detection model from merely predicting to assisting finding potential lesions.

cs.AI↗
arXiv2017

Use Privacy in Data-Driven Systems: Theory and Experiments with Machine Learnt Programs

This paper presents an approach to formalizing and enforcing a class of use privacy properties in data-driven systems. In contrast to prior work, we focus on use restrictions on proxies (i.e. strong predictors) of protected information types. Our definition relates proxy use to intermediate computations that occur in a program, and identify two essential properties that characterize this behavior: 1) its result is strongly associated with the protected information type in question, and 2) it is likely to causally affect the final output of the program. For a specific instantiation of this definition, we present a program analysis technique that detects instances of proxy use in a model, and provides a witness that identifies which parts of the corresponding program exhibit the behavior. Recognizing that not all instances of proxy use of a protected information type are inappropriate, we make use of a normative judgment oracle that makes this inappropriateness determination for a given witness. Our repair algorithm uses the witness of an inappropriate proxy use to transform the model into one that provably does not exhibit proxy use, while avoiding changes that unduly affect classification accuracy. Using a corpus of social datasets, our evaluation shows that these algorithms are able to detect proxy use instances that would be difficult to find using existing techniques, and subsequently remove them while maintaining acceptable classification performance.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2017

Proxy Non-Discrimination in Data-Driven Systems

Machine learnt systems inherit biases against protected classes, historically disparaged groups, from training data. Usually, these biases are not explicit, they rely on subtle correlations discovered by training algorithms, and are therefore difficult to detect. We formalize proxy discrimination in data-driven systems, a class of properties indicative of bias, as the presence of protected class correlates that have causal influence on the system's output. We evaluate an implementation on a corpus of social datasets, demonstrating how to validate systems against these properties and to repair violations where they occur.

cs.CY↗
arXiv2016

Towards Human Computable Passwords

An interesting challenge for the cryptography community is to design authentication protocols that are so simple that a human can execute them without relying on a fully trusted computer. We propose several candidate authentication protocols for a setting in which the human user can only receive assistance from a semi-trusted computer --- a computer that stores information and performs computations correctly but does not provide confidentiality. Our schemes use a semi-trusted computer to store and display public challenges $C_i\in[n]^k$. The human user memorizes a random secret mapping $σ:[n]\rightarrow\mathbb{Z}_d$ and authenticates by computing responses $f(σ(C_i))$ to a sequence of public challenges where $f:\mathbb{Z}_d^k\rightarrow\mathbb{Z}_d$ is a function that is easy for the human to evaluate. We prove that any statistical adversary needs to sample $m=\tildeΩ(n^{s(f)})$ challenge-response pairs to recover $σ$, for a security parameter $s(f)$ that depends on two key properties of $f$. To obtain our results, we apply the general hypercontractivity theorem to lower bound the statistical dimension of the distribution over challenge-response pairs induced by $f$ and $σ$. Our lower bounds apply to arbitrary functions $f $ (not just to functions that are easy for a human to evaluate), and generalize recent results of Feldman et al. As an application, we propose a family of human computable password functions $f_{k_1,k_2}$ in which the user needs to perform $2k_1+2k_2+1$ primitive operations (e.g., adding two digits or remembering $σ(i)$), and we show that $s(f) = \min\{k_1+1, (k_2+1)/2\}$. For these schemes, we prove that forging passwords is equivalent to recovering the secret mapping. Thus, our human computable password schemes can maintain strong security guarantees even after an adversary has observed the user login to many different accounts.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2016

CASH: A Cost Asymmetric Secure Hash Algorithm for Optimal Password Protection

An adversary who has obtained the cryptographic hash of a user's password can mount an offline attack to crack the password by comparing this hash value with the cryptographic hashes of likely password guesses. This offline attacker is limited only by the resources he is willing to invest to crack the password. Key-stretching tools can help mitigate the threat of offline attacks by making each password guess more expensive for the adversary to verify. However, key-stretching increases authentication costs for a legitimate authentication server. We introduce a novel Stackelberg game model which captures the essential elements of this interaction between a defender and an offline attacker. We then introduce Cost Asymmetric Secure Hash (CASH), a randomized key-stretching mechanism that minimizes the fraction of passwords that would be cracked by a rational offline attacker without increasing amortized authentication costs for the legitimate authentication server. CASH is motivated by the observation that the legitimate authentication server will typically run the authentication procedure to verify a correct password, while an offline adversary will typically use incorrect password guesses. By using randomization we can ensure that the amortized cost of running CASH to verify a correct password guess is significantly smaller than the cost of rejecting an incorrect password. Using our Stackelberg game framework we can quantify the quality of the underlying CASH running time distribution in terms of the fraction of passwords that a rational offline adversary would crack. We provide an efficient algorithm to compute high quality CASH distributions for the defender. Finally, we analyze CASH using empirical data from two large scale password frequency datasets. Our analysis shows that CASH can significantly reduce (up to $50\%$) the fraction of password cracked by a rational offline adversary.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2016

Information Flow for Security in Control Systems

This paper considers the development of information flow analyses to support resilient design and active detection of adversaries in cyber physical systems (CPS). The area of CPS security, though well studied, suffers from fragmentation. In this paper, we consider control systems as an abstraction of CPS. Here, we extend the notion of information flow analysis, a well established set of methods developed in software security, to obtain a unified framework that captures and extends system theoretic results in control system security. In particular, we propose the Kullback Liebler (KL) divergence as a causal measure of information flow, which quantifies the effect of adversarial inputs on sensor outputs. We show that the proposed measure characterizes the resilience of control systems to specific attack strategies by relating the KL divergence to optimal detection techniques. We then relate information flows to stealthy attack scenarios where an adversary can bypass detection. Finally, this article examines active detection mechanisms where a defender intelligently manipulates control inputs or the system itself in order to elicit information flows from an attacker's malicious behavior. In all previous cases, we demonstrate an ability to investigate and extend existing results by utilizing the proposed information flow analyses.

eess.SY↗
arXiv2015

A Symbolic Logic with Concrete Bounds for Cryptographic Protocols

We present a formal logic for quantitative reasoning about security properties of network protocols. The system allows us to derive concrete security bounds that can be used to choose key lengths and other security parameters. We provide axioms for reasoning about digital signatures and random nonces, with security properties based on the concrete security of signature schemes and pseudorandom number generators (PRG). The formal logic supports first-order reasoning and reasoning about protocol invariants, taking concrete security bounds into account. Proofs constructed in our logic also provide conventional asymptotic security guarantees because of the way that concrete bounds accumulate in proofs. As an illustrative example, we use the formal logic to prove an authentication property with concrete bounds of a signature-based challenge-response protocol.

cs.LO↗
arXiv2015

Equivalence-based Security for Querying Encrypted Databases: Theory and Application to Privacy Policy Audits

Motivated by the problem of simultaneously preserving confidentiality and usability of data outsourced to third-party clouds, we present two different database encryption schemes that largely hide data but reveal enough information to support a wide-range of relational queries. We provide a security definition for database encryption that captures confidentiality based on a notion of equivalence of databases from the adversary's perspective. As a specific application, we adapt an existing algorithm for finding violations of privacy policies to run on logs encrypted under our schemes and observe low to moderate overheads.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2015

Program Actions as Actual Causes: A Building Block for Accountability

Protocols for tasks such as authentication, electronic voting, and secure multiparty computation ensure desirable security properties if agents follow their prescribed programs. However, if some agents deviate from their prescribed programs and a security property is violated, it is important to hold agents accountable by determining which deviations actually caused the violation. Motivated by these applications, we initiate a formal study of program actions as actual causes. Specifically, we define in an interacting program model what it means for a set of program actions to be an actual cause of a violation. We present a sound technique for establishing program actions as actual causes. We demonstrate the value of this formalism in two ways. First, we prove that violations of a specific class of safety properties always have an actual cause. Thus, our definition applies to relevant security properties. Second, we provide a cause analysis of a representative protocol designed to address weaknesses in the current public key certification infrastructure.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2015

Influence in Classification via Cooperative Game Theory

A dataset has been classified by some unknown classifier into two types of points. What were the most important factors in determining the classification outcome? In this work, we employ an axiomatic approach in order to uniquely characterize an influence measure: a function that, given a set of classified points, outputs a value for each feature corresponding to its influence in determining the classification outcome. We show that our influence measure takes on an intuitive form when the unknown classifier is linear. Finally, we employ our influence measure in order to analyze the effects of user profiling on Google's online display advertising.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2015

Automated Experiments on Ad Privacy Settings: A Tale of Opacity, Choice, and Discrimination

To partly address people's concerns over web tracking, Google has created the Ad Settings webpage to provide information about and some choice over the profiles Google creates on users. We present AdFisher, an automated tool that explores how user behaviors, Google's ads, and Ad Settings interact. AdFisher can run browser-based experiments and analyze data using machine learning and significance tests. Our tool uses a rigorous experimental design and statistical analysis to ensure the statistical soundness of our results. We use AdFisher to find that the Ad Settings was opaque about some features of a user's profile, that it does provide some choice on ads, and that these choices can lead to seemingly discriminatory ads. In particular, we found that visiting webpages associated with substance abuse changed the ads shown but not the settings page. We also found that setting the gender to female resulted in getting fewer instances of an ad related to high paying jobs than setting it to male. We cannot determine who caused these findings due to our limited visibility into the ad ecosystem, which includes Google, advertisers, websites, and users. Nevertheless, these results can form the starting point for deeper investigations by either the companies themselves or by regulatory bodies.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2015

Audit Games with Multiple Defender Resources

Modern organizations (e.g., hospitals, social networks, government agencies) rely heavily on audit to detect and punish insiders who inappropriately access and disclose confidential information. Recent work on audit games models the strategic interaction between an auditor with a single audit resource and auditees as a Stackelberg game, augmenting associated well-studied security games with a configurable punishment parameter. We significantly generalize this audit game model to account for multiple audit resources where each resource is restricted to audit a subset of all potential violations, thus enabling application to practical auditing scenarios. We provide an FPTAS that computes an approximately optimal solution to the resulting non-convex optimization problem. The main technical novelty is in the design and correctness proof of an optimization transformation that enables the construction of this FPTAS. In addition, we experimentally demonstrate that this transformation significantly speeds up computation of solutions for a class of audit games and security games.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2015

System M: A Program Logic for Code Sandboxing and Identification

Security-sensitive applications that execute untrusted code often check the code's integrity by comparing its syntax to a known good value or sandbox the code to contain its effects. System M is a new program logic for reasoning about such security-sensitive applications. System M extends Hoare Type Theory (HTT) to trace safety properties and, additionally, contains two new reasoning principles. First, its type system internalizes logical equality, facilitating reasoning about applications that check code integrity. Second, a confinement rule assigns an effect type to a computation based solely on knowledge of the computation's sandbox. We prove the soundness of system M relative to a step-indexed trace-based semantic model. We illustrate both new reasoning principles of system M by verifying the main integrity property of the design of Memoir, a previously proposed trusted computing system for ensuring state continuity of isolated security-sensitive applications.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2014

A Methodology for Information Flow Experiments

Information flow analysis has largely ignored the setting where the analyst has neither control over nor a complete model of the analyzed system. We formalize such limited information flow analyses and study an instance of it: detecting the usage of data by websites. We prove that these problems are ones of causal inference. Leveraging this connection, we push beyond traditional information flow analysis to provide a systematic methodology based on experimental science and statistical analysis. Our methodology allows us to systematize prior works in the area viewing them as instances of a general approach. Our systematic study leads to practical advice for improving work on detecting data usage, a previously unformalized area. We illustrate these concepts with a series of experiments collecting data on the use of information by websites, which we statistically analyze.

cs.CR↗