arXiv subjects

Ashish R. Hota

Publications and source records attributed to Ashish R. Hota.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2023

Energy Consumption of Electric Vehicles: Effect of Lateral Dynamics

Current research on energy related problems such as eco-routing, eco-driving and range prediction for electric vehicles (EVs) primarily considers the effect of longitudinal dynamics on EV energy consumption. However, real-world driving includes longitudinal as well as lateral motion. Therefore, it is important to understand the effects of lateral dynamics on battery energy consumption. This paper conducts an analysis of the stated effect and validates its significance through simulations. Specifically, this study demonstrates that inclusion of the effect of lateral dynamics can improve accuracy and reliability of solutions in eco-routing, eco-driving and range prediction applications.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2023

Coupled Evolutionary Behavioral and Disease Dynamics under Reinfection Risk

We study the interplay between epidemic dynamics and human decision making for epidemics that involve reinfection risk; in particular, the susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) and the susceptible-infected-recovered-infected (SIRI) epidemic models. In the proposed game-theoretic setting, individuals choose whether to adopt protection or not based on the trade-off between the cost of adopting protection and the risk of infection; the latter depends on the current prevalence of the epidemic and the fraction of individuals who adopt protection in the entire population. We define the coupled epidemic-behavioral dynamics by modeling the evolution of individual protection adoption behavior according to the replicator dynamics. For the SIS epidemic, we fully characterize the equilibria and their stability properties. We further analyze the coupled dynamics under timescale separation when individual behavior evolves faster than the epidemic, and characterize the equilibria of the resulting discontinuous hybrid dynamical system for both SIS and SIRI models. Numerical results illustrate how the coupled dynamics exhibits oscillatory behavior and convergence to sliding mode solutions under suitable parameter regimes.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2022

Data-Driven Risk-sensitive Model Predictive Control for Safe Navigation in Multi-Robot Systems

Safe navigation is a fundamental challenge in multi-robot systems due to the uncertainty surrounding the future trajectory of the robots that act as obstacles for each other. In this work, we propose a principled data-driven approach where each robot repeatedly solves a finite horizon optimization problem subject to collision avoidance constraints with latter being formulated as distributionally robust conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) of the distance between the agent and a polyhedral obstacle geometry. Specifically, the CVaR constraints are required to hold for all distributions that are close to the empirical distribution constructed from observed samples of prediction error collected during execution. The generality of the approach allows us to robustify against prediction errors that arise under commonly imposed assumptions in both distributed and decentralized settings. We derive tractable finite-dimensional approximations of this class of constraints by leveraging convex and minmax duality results for Wasserstein distributionally robust optimization problems. The effectiveness of the proposed approach is illustrated in a multi-drone navigation setting implemented in Gazebo platform.

cs.RO↗

arXiv2022

Data-driven distributionally robust optimization over a network via distributed semi-infinite programming

This paper focuses on solving a data-driven distributionally robust optimization problem over a network of agents. The agents aim to minimize the worst-case expected cost computed over a Wasserstein ambiguity set that is centered at the empirical distribution. The samples of the uncertainty are distributed across the agents. Our approach consists of reformulating the problem as a semi-infinite program and then designing a distributed algorithm that solves a generic semi-infinite problem that has the same information structure as the reformulated problem. In particular, the decision variables consist of both local ones that agents are free to optimize over and global ones where they need to agree on. Our distributed algorithm is an iterative procedure that combines the notions of distributed ADMM and the cutting-surface method. We show that the iterates converge asymptotically to a solution of the distributionally robust problem to any pre-specified accuracy. Simulations illustrate our results.

math.OC↗

arXiv2022

Epidemic Propagation under Evolutionary Behavioral Dynamics: Stability and Bifurcation Analysis

We consider the class of SIS epidemic models in which a large population of individuals chooses whether to adopt protection or to remain unprotected as the epidemic evolves. For a susceptible individual, adopting protection reduces the probability of becoming infected but it comes with a cost that is weighed with the instantaneous risk of becoming infected. An infected individual adopting protection transmits a new infection with a smaller probability compared to an unprotected infected individual. We focus on the replicator evolutionary dynamics to model the evolution of protection decisions by susceptible and infected subpopulations. We completely characterize the existence and local stability of the equilibria of the resulting coupled epidemic and replicator dynamics. We further show how the stability of different equilibrium points gets exchanged as certain parameters change. Finally, we investigate the system behavior under timescale separation between the epidemic and the evolutionary dynamics.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2021

Impacts of Game-Theoretic Activation on Epidemic Spread over Dynamical Networks

We investigate the evolution of epidemics over dynamical networks when nodes choose to interact with others in a selfish and decentralized manner. Specifically, we analyze the susceptible-asymptomatic-infected-recovered (SAIR) epidemic in the framework of activity-driven networks with heterogeneous node degrees and time-varying activation rates, and derive both individual and degree-based mean-field approximations of the exact state evolution. We then present a game-theoretic model where nodes choose their activation probabilities in a strategic manner using current state information as feedback, and characterize the quantal response equilibrium (QRE) of the proposed setting. We then consider the activity-driven susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) epidemic model, characterize equilibrium activation probabilities and analyze epidemic evolution in closed-loop. Our numerical results provide compelling insights into epidemic evolution under game-theoretic activation. Specifically, for the SAIR epidemic, we show that under suitable conditions, the epidemic can persist, as any decrease in infected proportion is counteracted by an increase in activity rates by the nodes. For the SIS epidemic, we show that in regimes where there is an endemic state, the infected proportion could be significantly smaller under game-theoretic activation if the loss upon infection is sufficiently high.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2021

A Dynamic Population Model of Strategic Interaction and Migration under Epidemic Risk

In this paper, we show how a dynamic population game can model the strategic interaction and migration decisions made by a large population of agents in response to epidemic prevalence. Specifically, we consider a modified susceptible-asymptomatic-infected-recovered (SAIR) epidemic model over multiple zones. Agents choose whether to activate (i.e., interact with others), how many other agents to interact with, and which zone to move to in a time-scale which is comparable with the epidemic evolution. We define and analyze the notion of equilibrium in this game, and investigate the transient behavior of the epidemic spread in a range of numerical case studies, providing insights on the effects of the agents' degree of future awareness, strategic migration decisions, as well as different levels of lockdown and other interventions. One of our key findings is that the strategic behavior of agents plays an important role in the progression of the epidemic and can be exploited in order to design suitable epidemic control measures.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2021

A Closed-Loop Framework for Inference, Prediction and Control of SIR Epidemics on Networks

Motivated by the ongoing pandemic COVID-19, we propose a closed-loop framework that combines inference from testing data, learning the parameters of the dynamics and optimal resource allocation for controlling the spread of the susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) epidemic on networks. Our framework incorporates several key factors present in testing data, such as the fact that high risk individuals are more likely to undergo testing. We then present two tractable optimization problems to evaluate the trade-off between controlling the growth-rate of the epidemic and the cost of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs). We illustrate the significance of the proposed closed-loop framework via extensive simulations and analysis of real, publicly-available testing data for COVID-19. Our results illustrate the significance of early testing and the emergence of a second wave of infections if NPIs are prematurely withdrawn.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2020

Consistency of Distributionally Robust Risk- and Chance-Constrained Optimization under Wasserstein Ambiguity Sets

We study stochastic optimization problems with chance and risk constraints, where in the latter, risk is quantified in terms of the conditional value-at-risk (CVaR). We consider the distributionally robust versions of these problems, where the constraints are required to hold for a family of distributions constructed from the observed realizations of the uncertainty via the Wasserstein distance. Our main results establish that if the samples are drawn independently from an underlying distribution and the problems satisfy suitable technical assumptions, then the optimal value and optimizers of the distributionally robust versions of these problems converge to the respective quantities of the original problems, as the sample size increases.

math.OC↗

arXiv2020

Wasserstein Distributionally Robust Look-Ahead Economic Dispatch

We consider the problem of look-ahead economic dispatch (LAED) with uncertain renewable energy generation. The goal of this problem is to minimize the cost of conventional energy generation subject to uncertain operational constraints. The risk of violating these constraints must be below a given threshold for a family of probability distributions with characteristics similar to observed past data or predictions. We present two data-driven approaches based on two novel mathematical reformulations of this distributionally robust decision problem. The first one is a tractable convex program in which the uncertain constraints are defined via the distributionally robust conditional-value-at-risk. The second one is a scalable robust optimization program that yields an approximate distributionally robust chance-constrained LAED. Numerical experiments on the IEEE 39-bus system with real solar production data and forecasts illustrate the effectiveness of these approaches. We discuss how system operators should tune these techniques in order to seek the desired robustness-performance trade-off and we compare their computational scalability.

math.OC↗

arXiv2020

A Generalized SIS Epidemic Model on Temporal Networks with Asymptomatic Carriers and Comments on Decay Ratio

We study the class of SIS epidemics on temporal networks and propose a new activity-driven and adaptive epidemic model that captures the impact of asymptomatic and infectious individuals in the network. In the proposed model, referred to as the A-SIYS epidemic, each node can be in three possible states: susceptible, infected without symptoms or asymptomatic and infected with symptoms or symptomatic. Both asymptomatic and symptomatic individuals are infectious. We show that the proposed A-SIYS epidemic captures several well-established epidemic models as special cases and obtain sufficient conditions under which the disease gets eradicated by resorting to mean-field approximations. In addition, we highlight a potential inaccuracy in the derivation of the upper bound on the decay ratio in the activity-driven adaptive SIS (A-SIS) model in (Ogura et. al., 2019) and present a more general version of their result. We numerically illustrate the evolution of the fraction of infected nodes in the A-SIS epidemic model and show that the bound in (Ogura et. al., 2019) often fails to capture the behavior of the epidemic in contrast with our results.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2020

Behavioral and Game-Theoretic Security Investments in Interdependent Systems Modeled by Attack Graphs

We consider a system consisting of multiple interdependent assets, and a set of defenders, each responsible for securing a subset of the assets against an attacker. The interdependencies between the assets are captured by an attack graph, where an edge from one asset to another indicates that if the former asset is compromised, an attack can be launched on the latter asset. Each edge has an associated probability of successful attack, which can be reduced via security investments by the defenders. In such scenarios, we investigate the security investments that arise under certain features of human decision-making that have been identified in behavioral economics. In particular, humans have been shown to perceive probabilities in a nonlinear manner, typically overweighting low probabilities and underweighting high probabilities. We show that suboptimal investments can arise under such weighting in certain network topologies. We also show that pure strategy Nash equilibria exist in settings with multiple (behavioral) defenders, and study the inefficiency of the equilibrium investments by behavioral defenders compared to a centralized socially optimal solution.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2020

Controlling Human Utilization of Failure-Prone Systems via Taxes

We consider a game-theoretic model where individuals compete over a shared failure-prone system or resource. We investigate the effectiveness of a taxation mechanism in controlling the utilization of the resource at the Nash equilibrium when the decision-makers have behavioral risk preferences, captured by prospect theory. We first observe that heterogeneous prospect-theoretic risk preferences can lead to counter-intuitive outcomes. In particular, for resources that exhibit network effects, utilization can increase under taxation and there may not exist a tax rate that achieves the socially optimal level of utilization. We identify conditions under which utilization is monotone and continuous, and then characterize the range of utilizations that can be achieved by a suitable choice of tax rate. We further show that resource utilization is higher when players are charged differentiated tax rates compared to the case when all players are charged an identical tax rate, under suitable assumptions.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

Game-Theoretic Vaccination Against Networked SIS Epidemics and Impacts of Human Decision-Making

We study decentralized protection strategies against Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) epidemics on networks. We consider a population game framework where nodes choose whether or not to vaccinate themselves, and the epidemic risk is defined as the infection probability at the endemic state of the epidemic under a degree-based mean-field approximation. Motivated by studies in behavioral economics showing that humans perceive probabilities and risks in a nonlinear fashion, we specifically examine the impacts of such misperceptions on the Nash equilibrium protection strategies. We first establish the existence and uniqueness of a threshold equilibrium where nodes with degrees larger than a certain threshold vaccinate. When the vaccination cost is sufficiently high, we show that behavioral biases cause fewer players to vaccinate, and vice versa. We quantify this effect for a class of networks with power-law degree distributions by proving tight bounds on the ratio of equilibrium thresholds under behavioral and true perceptions of probabilities. We further characterize the socially optimal vaccination policy and investigate the inefficiency of Nash equilibrium.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2018

Data-Driven Chance Constrained Optimization under Wasserstein Ambiguity Sets

We present a data-driven approach for distributionally robust chance constrained optimization problems (DRCCPs). We consider the case where the decision maker has access to a finite number of samples or realizations of the uncertainty. The chance constraint is then required to hold for all distributions that are close to the empirical distribution constructed from the samples (where the distance between two distributions is defined via the Wasserstein metric). We first reformulate DRCCPs under data-driven Wasserstein ambiguity sets and a general class of constraint functions. When the feasibility set of the chance constraint program is replaced by its convex inner approximation, we present a convex reformulation of the program and show its tractability when the constraint function is affine in both the decision variable and the uncertainty. For constraint functions concave in the uncertainty, we show that a cutting-surface algorithm converges to an approximate solution of the convex inner approximation of DRCCPs. Finally, for constraint functions convex in the uncertainty, we compare the feasibility set with other sample-based approaches for chance constrained programs.

math.OC↗

arXiv2018

Game-Theoretic Choice of Curing Rates Against Networked SIS Epidemics by Human Decision-Makers

We study networks of human decision-makers who independently decide how to protect themselves against Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) epidemics. Motivated by studies in behavioral economics showing that humans perceive probabilities in a nonlinear fashion, we examine the impacts of such misperceptions on the equilibrium protection strategies. In our setting, nodes choose their curing rates to minimize the infection probability under the degree-based mean-field approximation of the SIS epidemic plus the cost of their selected curing rate. We establish the existence of a degree based equilibrium under both true and nonlinear perceptions of infection probabilities (under suitable assumptions). When the per-unit cost of curing rate is sufficiently high, we show that true expectation minimizers choose the curing rate to be zero at the equilibrium, while curing rate is nonzero under nonlinear probability weighting.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2016

Interdependent Security Games on Networks under Behavioral Probability Weighting

We consider a class of interdependent security games on networks where each node chooses a personal level of security investment. The attack probability experienced by a node is a function of her own investment and the investment by her neighbors in the network. Most of the existing work in these settings considers players who are risk-neutral. In contrast, studies in behavioral decision theory have shown that individuals often deviate from risk-neutral behavior while making decisions under uncertainty. In particular, the true probabilities associated with uncertain outcomes are often transformed into perceived probabilities in a highly nonlinear fashion by the users, which then influence their decisions. In this paper, we investigate the effects of such behavioral probability weightings by the nodes on their optimal investment strategies and the resulting security risk profiles that arise at the Nash equilibria of interdependent network security games. We characterize graph topologies that achieve the largest and smallest worst case average attack probabilities at Nash equilibria in Total Effort games, and equilibrium investments in Weakest Link and Best Shot games.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2016

Fragility of the Commons under Prospect-Theoretic Risk Attitudes

We study a common-pool resource game where the resource experiences failure with a probability that grows with the aggregate investment in the resource. To capture decision making under such uncertainty, we model each player's risk preference according to the value function from prospect theory. We show the existence and uniqueness of a pure Nash equilibrium when the players have heterogeneous risk preferences and under certain assumptions on the rate of return and failure probability of the resource. Greater competition, vis-a-vis the number of players, increases the failure probability at the Nash equilibrium; we quantify this effect by obtaining bounds on the ratio of the failure probability at the Nash equilibrium to the failure probability under investment by a single user. We further show that heterogeneity in attitudes towards loss aversion leads to higher failure probability of the resource at the equilibrium.

cs.GT↗