Asymmetric Perturbation in Solving Bilinear Saddle-Point Optimization
This paper proposes asymmetric perturbation, where only one player's payoff function is perturbed, for solving bilinear saddle-point optimization problems, commonly arising in minimax problems, game theory, and constrained optimization. Symmetric perturbation is known to require decreasing its strength to ensure convergence to a solution, i.e., an equilibrium in the original game, resulting in a slower rate. First, with asymmetric perturbation, we show that, for a sufficiently small perturbation strength, the equilibrium strategy of the asymmetrically perturbed game coincides with an equilibrium strategy of the original unperturbed game. Second, building on this coincidence, we construct a learning algorithm with a linear last-iterate convergence rate. Third, motivated by the fact that the coincidence relies on the perturbation strength being sufficiently small, we also provide a parameter-free variant, retaining the linear rate. Finally, we empirically demonstrate fast convergence toward equilibria in both normal-form and extensive-form games.