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Atsushi Iwasaki

Publications and source records attributed to Atsushi Iwasaki.

23 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

A new randomness test solving problems of Discrete Fourier Transform Test

Discrete Fourier Transform Test (DFTT), which is a randomness test included in NIST SP800-22, has a problem. It is that theoretical reference distribution of the test statistic has not been derived. In this paper, we propose a new test using variance of power spectrum as the test statistic, whose reference distribution can be theoretically derived. The purpose of DFTT is to detect periodic features and that of the proposed test is the same. We make some experiments and show that the proposed test has stronger detection power than DFTT.

stat.ME↗

Further improving security of Vector Stream Cipher

Vector Stream Cipher (VSC) is a stream cipher which consists of permutation polynomial over a ring of modulo $2^w$. The algorithm for generating key stream is very simple and the encryption is very fast. Some theoretical attacks for VSC have been reported so far since the invention of VSC in 2004. Then, the authors proposed some improvements and developed "Vector Stream Cipher 2.0 (VSC 2.0)" to be immune against the theoretical attacks. In this paper, we propose further improvement of VSC 2.0 to publish as a new chaos cipher "Vector Stream Cipher 2.1 (VSC2.1)". VSC 2.1 is faster and more secure than VSC 2.0. Our result suggests that permutation polynomials over a ring of modulo $2^w$ are useful for cryptography.

cs.IT↗

One-stroke polynomials over a ring of modulo $2^w$

Permutation polynomials over a ring of modulo $2^w$ are compatible with digital computers and digital signal processors, and so they are in particular expected to be useful for cryptography and pseudo random number generator. In general, the period of the polynomial should be long in such fields. In this paper, we derive the necessary and sufficient condition which specify one-stroke polynomials which are permutation polynomials whose periods are maximized.

cs.IT↗

Three Theorems on odd degree Chebyshev polynomials and more generalized permutation polynomials over a ring of module $2^w$

Odd degree Chebyshev polynomials over a ring of modulo $2^w$ have two kinds of period. One is an "orbital period". Odd degree Chebyshev polynomials are bijection over the ring. Therefore, when an odd degree Chebyshev polynomial iterate affecting a factor of the ring, we can observe an orbit over the ring. The "orbital period" is a period of the orbit. The other is a "degree period". It is observed when changing the degree of Chebyshev polynomials with a fixed argument of polynomials. Both kinds of period have not been completely studied. In this paper, we clarify completely both of them. The knowledge about them enables us to efficiently solve degree decision problem of Chebyshev polynomial over the ring, and so a key-exchange protocol with Chebyshev polynomial over the ring is not secure. In addition, we generalize the discussion and show that a key-exchange protocol with more generalized permutation polynomials which belong to a certain class is not secure.

cs.IT↗

False-name-proof Mechanisms for Hiring a Team

We study the problem of hiring a team of selfish agents to perform a task. Each agent is assumed to own one or more elements of a set system, and the auctioneer is trying to purchase a feasible solution by conducting an auction. Our goal is to design auctions that are truthful and false-name-proof, meaning that it is in the agents' best interest to reveal ownership of all elements (which may not be known to the auctioneer a priori) as well as their true incurred costs. We first propose and analyze a false-name-proof mechanism for the special case where each agent owns only one element in reality, but may pretend that this element is in fact a set of multiple elements. We prove that its frugality ratio is bounded by $2^n$, which, up to constants, matches a lower bound of $Ω(2^n)$ for all false-name-proof mechanisms in this scenario. We then propose a second mechanism for the general case in which agents may own multiple elements. It requires the auctioneer to choose a reserve cost a priori, and thus does not always purchase a solution. In return, it is false-name-proof even when agents own multiple elements. We experimentally evaluate the payment (as well as social surplus) of the second mechanism through simulation.

cs.GT↗