arXiv subjects

Barbara Franci

Publications and source records attributed to Barbara Franci.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Asymmetric regularization mechanism for GAN training with Variational Inequalities

We formulate the training of generative adversarial networks (GANs) as a Nash equilibrium seeking problem. To stabilize the training process and find a Nash equilibrium, we propose an asymmetric regularization mechanism based on the classic Tikhonov step and on a novel zero-centered gradient penalty. Under smoothness and a local identifiability condition induced by a Gauss-Newton Gramian, we obtain explicit Lipschitz and (strong)-monotonicity constants for the regularized operator. These constants ensure last-iterate linear convergence of a single-call Extrapolation-from-the-Past (EFTP) method. Empirical simulations on an academic example show that, even when strong monotonicity cannot be achieved, the asymmetric regularization is enough to converge to an equilibrium and stabilize the trajectory.

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arXiv2025

Finite-sample guarantees for data-driven forward-backward operator methods

We establish finite sample certificates on the quality of solutions produced by data-based forward-backward (FB) operator splitting schemes. As frequently happens in stochastic regimes, we consider the problem of finding a zero of the sum of two operators, where one is either unavailable in closed form or computationally expensive to evaluate, and shall therefore be approximated using a finite number of noisy oracle samples. Under the lens of algorithmic stability, we then derive probabilistic bounds on the distance between a true zero and the FB output without making specific assumptions about the underlying data distribution. We show that under weaker conditions ensuring the convergence of FB schemes, stability bounds grow proportionally to the number of iterations. Conversely, stronger assumptions yield stability guarantees that are independent of the iteration count. We then specialize our results to a popular FB stochastic Nash equilibrium seeking algorithm and validate our theoretical bounds on a control problem for smart grids, where the energy price uncertainty is approximated by means of historical data.

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arXiv2025

Actively learning equilibria in Nash games with misleading information

We develop a scheme based on active learning to compute equilibria in a generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP). Specifically, an external observer (or entity), with little knowledge on the multi-agent process at hand, collects sensible data by probing the agents' best-response (BR) mappings, which are then used to recursively update local parametric estimates of these mappings. Unlike [1], we consider the realistic case in which the agents share corrupted information with the external entity for, e.g., protecting their privacy. Inspired by a popular approach in stochastic optimization, we endow the external observer with an inexact proximal scheme for updating the local BR proxies. This technique will prove key to establishing the convergence of our scheme under standard assumptions, thereby enabling the external observer to predict an equilibrium strategy even when relying on masked information.

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arXiv2024

A Gauss-Seidel method for solving multi-leader-multi-follower games

We design a computational approach to find equilibria in a class of Nash games possessing a hierarchical structure. By using tools from mixed-integer optimization and the characterization of variational equilibria in terms of the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we propose a mixed-integer game formulation for solving this challenging class of problems. Besides providing an equivalent reformulation, we design a proximal Gauss--Seidel method with global convergence guarantees in case the game enjoys a potential structure. We finally corroborate the numerical performance of the algorithm on a novel instance of the ride-hail market problem.

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arXiv2023

On data-driven Wasserstein distributionally robust Nash equilibrium problems with heterogeneous uncertainty

We study stochastic Nash equilibrium problems subject to heterogeneous uncertainty on the expected valued cost functions of the individual agents, where we assume no prior knowledge of the underlying probability distributions of the uncertain variables. To account for this lack of knowledge, we consider an ambiguity set around the empirical probability distribution under the Wasserstein metric. We then show that, under mild assumptions, finite-sample guarantees on the probability that any resulting distributionally robust Nash equilibrium is also robust with respect to the true probability distributions with high confidence can be obtained. Furthermore, by recasting the game as a distributionally robust variational inequality, we establish asymptotic consistency of the set of data-driven distributionally robust equilibria to the solution set of the original game. Finally, we recast the distributionally robust Nash game as a finite-dimensional Nash equilibrium problem. We illustrate the proposed distributionally robust reformulation via numerical experiments of stochastic peer-to-peer electricity markets and Nash-Cournot games.

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arXiv2023

Distributionally robust stability of payoff allocations in stochastic coalitional games

We consider multi-agent coalitional games with uncertainty in the coalitional values. We provide a novel methodology to study the stability of the grand coalition in the case where each coalition constructs ambiguity sets for the (possibly) unknown probability distribution of the uncertainty. As a less conservative solution concept compared to worst-case approaches for coalitional stability, we consider a stochastic version of the so-called core set, i.e., the expected value core. Unfortunately, without exact knowledge of the probability distribution, the evaluation of the expected value core is an extremely challenging task. Hence, we propose the concept of distributionaly robust (DR) core. Leveraging tools from data-driven DR optimization under the Wasserstein distance, we provide finite-sample guarantees that any allocation which lies in the DR core is also stable with respect to the true probability distribution. Furthermore, we show that as the number of samples grows unbounded, the DR core converges almost surely to the true expected value core. We dedicate the last section to the computational tractability of finding an allocation in the DR core.

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arXiv2022

Proximal-like algorithms for equilibrium seeking in mixed-integer Nash equilibrium problems

We consider potential games with mixed-integer variables, for which we propose two distributed, proximal-like equilibrium seeking algorithms. Specifically, we focus on two scenarios: i) the underlying game is generalized ordinal and the agents update through iterations by choosing an exact optimal strategy; ii) the game admits an exact potential and the agents adopt approximated optimal responses. By exploiting the properties of integer-compatible regularization functions used as penalty terms, we show that both algorithms converge to either an exact or an $\epsilon$-approximate equilibrium. We corroborate our findings on a numerical instance of a Cournot oligopoly model.

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arXiv2022

A stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium model for platforms competition in the ride-hail market

The presence of uncertainties in the ride-hailing market complicates the pricing strategies of on-demand platforms that compete each other to offer a mobility service while striving to maximize their profit. Looking at this problem as a stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium problem (SGNEP), we design a distributed, stochastic equilibrium seeking algorithm with Tikhonov regularization to find an optimal pricing strategy. Remarkably, the proposed iterative scheme does not require an increasing (possibly infinite) number of samples of the random variable to perform the stochastic approximation, thus making it appealing from a practical perspective. Moreover, we show that the algorithm returns a Nash equilibrium under mere monotonicity assumption and a careful choice of the step size sequence, obtained by exploiting the specific structure of the SGNEP at hand. We finally corroborate our results on a numerical instance of the on-demand ride-hailing market.

math.OC↗

arXiv2022

Mini-batch stochastic three-operator splitting for distributed optimization

We consider a network of agents, each with its own private cost consisting of a sum of two possibly nonsmooth convex functions, one of which is composed with a linear operator. At every iteration each agent performs local calculations and can only communicate with its neighbors. The challenging aspect of our study is that the smooth part of the private cost function is given as an expected value and agents only have access to this part of the problem formulation via a heavy-tailed stochastic oracle. To tackle such sampling-based optimization problems, we propose a stochastic extension of the triangular pre-conditioned primal-dual algorithm. We demonstrate almost sure convergence of the scheme and validate the performance of the method via numerical experiments.

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arXiv2021

Convergence of sequences: a survey

Convergent sequences of real numbers play a fundamental role in many different problems in system theory, e.g., in Lyapunov stability analysis, as well as in optimization theory and computational game theory. In this survey, we provide an overview of the literature on convergence theorems and their connection with Fejer monotonicity in the deterministic and stochastic settings, and we show how to exploit these results.

math.OC↗

arXiv2021

Forward-Backward algorithms for stochastic Nash equilibrium seeking in restricted strongly and strictly monotone games

We study stochastic Nash equilibrium problems with expected valued cost functions whose pseudogradient satisfies restricted monotonicity properties which hold only with respect to the solution. We propose a forward-backward algorithm and prove its convergence under restricted strong monotonicity, restricted strict monotonicity and restricted cocoercivity of the pseudogradient mapping. To approximate the expected value, we use either a finite number of samples and a vanishing step size or an increasing number of samples with a constant step. Numerical simulations show that our proposed algorithm might be faster than the available algorithms.

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arXiv2021

Stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium seeking in merely monotone games

We solve the stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium (SGNE) problem in merely monotone games with expected value cost functions. Specifically, we present the first distributed SGNE seeking algorithm for monotone games that requires one proximal computation (e.g., one projection step) and one pseudogradient evaluation per iteration. Our main contribution is to extend the relaxed forward-backward operator splitting by Malitsky (Mathematical Programming, 2019) to the stochastic case and in turn to show almost sure convergence to a SGNE when the expected value of the pseudogradient is approximated by the average over a number of random samples.

math.OC↗

arXiv2021

Stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium seeking under partial-decision information

We consider for the first time a stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium problem, i.e., with expected-value cost functions and joint feasibility constraints, under partial-decision information, meaning that the agents communicate only with some trusted neighbours. We propose several distributed algorithms for network games and aggregative games that we show being special instances of a preconditioned forward-backward splitting method. We prove that the algorithms converge to a generalized Nash equilibrium when the forward operator is restricted cocoercive by using the stochastic approximation scheme with variance reduction to estimate the expected value of the pseudogradient.

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arXiv2021

Training Generative Adversarial Networks via stochastic Nash games

Generative adversarial networks (GANs) are a class of generative models with two antagonistic neural networks: a generator and a discriminator. These two neural networks compete against each other through an adversarial process that can be modeled as a stochastic Nash equilibrium problem. Since the associated training process is challenging, it is fundamental to design reliable algorithms to compute an equilibrium. In this paper, we propose a stochastic relaxed forward-backward (SRFB) algorithm for GANs and we show convergence to an exact solution when an increasing number of data is available. We also show convergence of an averaged variant of the SRFB algorithm to a neighborhood of the solution when only few samples are available. In both cases, convergence is guaranteed when the pseudogradient mapping of the game is monotone. This assumption is among the weakest known in the literature. Moreover, we apply our algorithm to the image generation problem.

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arXiv2021

A privacy-preserving distributed computational approach for distributed locational marginal prices

An important issue in today's electricity markets is the management of flexibilities offered by new practices, such as smart home appliances or electric vehicles. By inducing changes in the behavior of residential electric utilities, demand response (DR) seeks to adjust the demand of power to the supply for increased grid stability and better integration of renewable energies. A key role in DR is played by emergent independent entities called load aggregators (LAs). We develop a new decentralized algorithm to solve a convex relaxation of the classical Alternative Current Optimal Power Flow (ACOPF) problem, which relies on local information only. Each computational step can be performed in an entirely privacy-preserving manner, and system-wide coordination is achieved via node-specific distribution locational marginal prices (DLMPs). We demonstrate the efficiency of our approach on a 15-bus radial distribution network.

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arXiv2021

A relaxed-inertial forward-backward-forward algorithm for Stochastic Generalized Nash equilibrium seeking

In this paper we propose a new operator splitting algorithm for distributed Nash equilibrium seeking under stochastic uncertainty, featuring relaxation and inertial effects. Our work is inspired by recent deterministic operator splitting methods, designed for solving structured monotone inclusion problems. The algorithm is derived from a forward-backward-forward scheme for solving structured monotone inclusion problems featuring a Lipschitz continuous and monotone game operator. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first distributed (generalized) Nash equilibrium seeking algorithm featuring acceleration techniques in stochastic Nash games without assuming cocoercivity. Numerical examples illustrate the effect of inertia and relaxation on the performance of our proposed algorithm.

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arXiv2021

Distributed projected-reflected-gradient algorithms for stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium problems

We consider the stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium problem (SGNEP) with joint feasibility constraints and expected-value cost functions. We propose a distributed stochastic projected reflected gradient algorithm and show its almost sure convergence when the pseudogradient mapping is monotone and the solution is unique. The algorithm is based on monotone operator splitting methods tailored for SGNEPs when the expected-value pseudogradient mapping is approximated at each iteration via an increasing number of samples of the random variable. Finally, we show that a preconditioned variant of our proposed algorithm has convergence guarantees when the pseudogradient mapping is cocoercive.

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arXiv2020

A game-theoretic approach for Generative Adversarial Networks

Generative adversarial networks (GANs) are a class of generative models, known for producing accurate samples. The key feature of GANs is that there are two antagonistic neural networks: the generator and the discriminator. The main bottleneck for their implementation is that the neural networks are very hard to train. One way to improve their performance is to design reliable algorithms for the adversarial process. Since the training can be cast as a stochastic Nash equilibrium problem, we rewrite it as a variational inequality and introduce an algorithm to compute an approximate solution. Specifically, we propose a stochastic relaxed forward-backward algorithm for GANs. We prove that when the pseudogradient mapping of the game is monotone, we have convergence to an exact solution or in a neighbourhood of it.

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