SearcharxivSearch

arXiv subjects

Ben Bucknall

Publications and source records attributed to Ben Bucknall.

18 recordsLinked to original sources

Silent Updates: Measuring and Closing the Post-Deployment Disclosure Gap

Deployed foundation models are often not static systems, with providers able to modify system behavior through fine-tuning, classifier updates, system prompt revisions, retrieval changes, and routing changes. These updates can be made silently -- that is, without public disclosure, a version increment, or re-evaluation. Such silent updates challenge a core assumption behind current AI governance frameworks that an externally verifiable chain of custody links the model referred to in evaluation results or a system card to the model served to users. In this paper, we examine post-deployment disclosure practices across first-party API providers and inference hosts to establish the extent to which a chain of custody exists in practice. We find that providers commonly publish substantial safety documentation, including quantitative evaluations and version-specific reports, but no provider in our sample published information allowing an external party to verify that the artifact being served is the same one referred to in this documentation. We introduce the Silent Updates Scorecard, a public instrument for measuring post-deployment disclosure practices across providers and hosts, and preliminary results for a sample of nine first-party API providers and seven third-party inference hosts. We also propose a Three-Part Behavioral Trigger System for determining when post-deployment modifications to a system motivate disclosure or re-evaluation obligations.

cs.CY

Underwriting the Agent Economy: The Blueprint for an AI Insurance Stack

From maritime trade to commercial nuclear power, insurance has been the enabler of major economic and technological developments by pricing risk, limiting downside, and spreading best practices. The emerging AI agent economy, projected to handle trillions of dollars in transactions by 2030, looks to be the next such development. Yet insurers' exposure to AI agent risk currently sits largely unpriced across existing insurance lines; between this silent coverage and growing exclusions, coverage is not fit for purpose. Furthermore, insurability is trending the wrong way: AI agent capabilities appear to be outpacing reliability, leading to rising incident severity; concentration among a few foundation model providers threatens correlated losses; and traditional actuarial modeling will struggle to keep pace with a technology evolving as rapidly as frontier AI. This report argues that affirmative AI coverage with limits in the billions is achievable by 2030, but only with industry-wide coordination. Drawing on successful historical precedents such as Underwriters Laboratories, the Closed Claims Project, and others, we lay out an eight-component AI insurance stack spanning incident data collection, catastrophe modeling, standards, contract design, risk selection, pricing, monitoring, and claims management. Building out this infrastructure is what will enable insurers to cover and manage AI agent risk sustainably and at scale. Finally, we discuss coverage for catastrophic risk from frontier AI ("AI CAT"), including CBRN, critical infrastructure collapse, and loss of control scenarios. Addressing these tail risks will require purpose-built instruments, potentially including a frontier model developer mutual, catastrophe bonds, bespoke liability regimes, and government backstops.

cs.CY

The 2026 Singapore Consensus on Global AI Safety Research Priorities

Frontier AI capabilities and autonomy are advancing rapidly. A growing number of real-world incidents make a trusted AI ecosystem essential to embracing AI with confidence. The 2026 Singapore Consensus is an outcome of the second International Scientific Exchange on AI Safety, bringing together over 100 contributors spanning 13 countries from frontier developers, government safety institutes, academia, and civil society. Building on the 2025 report, it presents a global understanding of technical AI safety research problems of top priority, now with a dedicated focus on societal resilience and on managing the risks of increasingly autonomous AI agents.

cs.CY

Prioritization of Risks from Artificial Intelligence: A Delphi Study of 272 International Experts

Artificial intelligence poses many risks, ranging from familiar present-day harms to unprecedented and potentially catastrophic ones. Effective risk management requires prioritization: we must understand which risks are most severe, who is most vulnerable, and who is most responsible for addressing them. We report results from a three-round Delphi study conducted late 2025 with 272 international AI experts. Experts rated 24 AI risks on harm probability and severity, sector and actor vulnerability, actor responsibility, and overall concern. Experts estimated the five most severe harms in the next 5 years were likely to come from dangerous capabilities, competitive dynamics, weapons & cyberattacks (including CBRNE), power centralization, and false information. In a business-as-usual scenario, experts judged 18 of 24 risks as having a more than 10% probability of catastrophic outcomes (e.g., more than 1 million deaths or more than USD 100B in financial loss) in the next 5 years (2025-2030). In a scenario where pragmatic mitigations are implemented, experts still judged five risks as having a more than 10% probability of catastrophic outcomes: dangerous capabilities, weapons & cyberattacks, environmental harm, inequality & unemployment, and power centralization. All 24 risks were judged as being more than 5% likely to cause catastrophic outcomes. AI users and the general public were judged the most vulnerable to these risks, but experts assigned the highest responsibility for addressing them to general-purpose AI developers and governance actors (including governments, regulators, and standards bodies). Across most risks, experts identified information, finance, and national security as the most vulnerable sectors. These findings can guide AI risk prioritization and clarify expert expectations about who should bear responsibility for mitigation.

cs.CY

International AI Safety Report 2026

The International AI Safety Report 2026 synthesises the current scientific evidence on the capabilities, emerging risks, and safety of general-purpose AI systems. The report series was mandated by the nations attending the AI Safety Summit in Bletchley, UK. 29 nations, the UN, the OECD, and the EU each nominated a representative to the report's Expert Advisory Panel. Over 100 AI experts contributed, representing diverse perspectives and disciplines. Led by the Report's Chair, these independent experts collectively had full discretion over the report's content.

cs.CY

Frontier AI Auditing: Toward Rigorous Third-Party Assessment of Safety and Security Practices at Leading AI Companies

We outline a vision for frontier AI auditing, which we define as rigorous third-party verification of frontier AI developers' safety and security claims, and evaluation of their systems and practices against relevant standards, based on deep, secure access to non-public information. Frontier AI audits should not be limited to a company's publicly deployed products, but should instead consider the full range of organization-level safety and security risks, including internal deployment of AI systems, information security practices, and safety decision-making processes. We describe four AI Assurance Levels (AALs), the higher levels of which provide greater confidence in audit findings. We recommend AAL-1 as a baseline for frontier AI generally, and AAL-2 as a near-term goal for the most advanced subset of frontier AI developers. Achieving the vision we outline will require (1) ensuring high quality standards for frontier AI auditing, so it does not devolve into a checkbox exercise or lag behind changes in the industry; (2) growing the ecosystem of audit providers at a rapid pace without compromising quality; (3) accelerating adoption of frontier AI auditing by clarifying and strengthening incentives; and (4) achieving technical readiness for high AI Assurance Levels so they can be applied when needed.

cs.CY

International AI Safety Report 2025: Second Key Update: Technical Safeguards and Risk Management

This second update to the 2025 International AI Safety Report assesses new developments in general-purpose AI risk management over the past year. It examines how researchers, public institutions, and AI developers are approaching risk management for general-purpose AI. In recent months, for example, three leading AI developers applied enhanced safeguards to their new models, as their internal pre-deployment testing could not rule out the possibility that these models could be misused to help create biological weapons. Beyond specific precautionary measures, there have been a range of other advances in techniques for making AI models and systems more reliable and resistant to misuse. These include new approaches in adversarial training, data curation, and monitoring systems. In parallel, institutional frameworks that operationalise and formalise these technical capabilities are starting to emerge: the number of companies publishing Frontier AI Safety Frameworks more than doubled in 2025, and governments and international organisations have established a small number of governance frameworks for general-purpose AI, focusing largely on transparency and risk assessment.

cs.CY

International AI Safety Report 2025: First Key Update: Capabilities and Risk Implications

Since the publication of the first International AI Safety Report, AI capabilities have continued to improve across key domains. New training techniques that teach AI systems to reason step-by-step and inference-time enhancements have primarily driven these advances, rather than simply training larger models. As a result, general-purpose AI systems can solve more complex problems in a range of domains, from scientific research to software development. Their performance on benchmarks that measure performance in coding, mathematics, and answering expert-level science questions has continued to improve, though reliability challenges persist, with systems excelling on some tasks while failing completely on others. These capability improvements also have implications for multiple risks, including risks from biological weapons and cyber attacks. Finally, they pose new challenges for monitoring and controllability. This update examines how AI capabilities have improved since the first Report, then focuses on key risk areas where substantial new evidence warrants updated assessments.

cs.CY

Open Challenges in Multi-Agent Security: Towards Secure Systems of Interacting AI Agents

AI agents are beginning to interact with each other directly and across internet platforms and physical environments, creating security challenges beyond traditional cybersecurity and AI safety frameworks. Free-form protocols are essential for AI's task generalization but enable new threats like secret collusion and coordinated swarm attacks. Network effects can rapidly spread privacy breaches, disinformation, jailbreaks, and data poisoning, while multi-agent dispersion and stealth optimization help adversaries evade oversight - creating novel persistent threats at a systemic level. Despite their critical importance, these security challenges remain understudied, with research fragmented across disparate fields including AI security, multi-agent learning, complex systems, cybersecurity, game theory, distributed systems, and technical AI governance. We introduce multi-agent security, a new field dedicated to securing networks of AI agents against threats that emerge or amplify through their interactions - whether direct or indirect via shared environments - with each other, humans, and institutions, and characterise fundamental security-utility and security-security trade-offs across both distributed and decentralised settings. Our preliminary work (1) taxonomizes the threat landscape arising from interacting AI agents, (2) offers applications to multi-agent security for work across diffuse subfields, and (3) proposes a unified research agenda addressing open challenges in designing secure agent systems and interaction environments. By identifying these gaps, we aim to guide research in this critical area to unlock the socioeconomic potential of large-scale agent deployment, foster public trust, and mitigate national security risks in critical infrastructure and defense contexts.

cs.CR

In Which Areas of Technical AI Safety Could Geopolitical Rivals Cooperate?

International cooperation is common in AI research, including between geopolitical rivals. While many experts advocate for greater international cooperation on AI safety to address shared global risks, some view cooperation on AI with suspicion, arguing that it can pose unacceptable risks to national security. However, the extent to which cooperation on AI safety poses such risks, as well as provides benefits, depends on the specific area of cooperation. In this paper, we consider technical factors that impact the risks of international cooperation on AI safety research, focusing on the degree to which such cooperation can advance dangerous capabilities, result in the sharing of sensitive information, or provide opportunities for harm. We begin by why nations historically cooperate on strategic technologies and analyse current US-China cooperation in AI as a case study. We further argue that existing frameworks for managing associated risks can be supplemented with consideration of key risks specific to cooperation on technical AI safety research. Through our analysis, we find that research into AI verification mechanisms and shared protocols may be suitable areas for such cooperation. Through this analysis we aim to help researchers and governments identify and mitigate the risks of international cooperation on AI safety research, so that the benefits of cooperation can be fully realised.

cs.CY

Position: Ensuring mutual privacy is necessary for effective external evaluation of proprietary AI systems

The external evaluation of AI systems is increasingly recognised as a crucial approach for understanding their potential risks. However, facilitating external evaluation in practice faces significant challenges in balancing evaluators' need for system access with AI developers' privacy and security concerns. Additionally, evaluators have reason to protect their own privacy - for example, in order to maintain the integrity of held-out test sets. We refer to the challenge of ensuring both developers' and evaluators' privacy as one of providing mutual privacy. In this position paper, we argue that (i) addressing this mutual privacy challenge is essential for effective external evaluation of AI systems, and (ii) current methods for facilitating external evaluation inadequately address this challenge, particularly when it comes to preserving evaluators' privacy. In making these arguments, we formalise the mutual privacy problem; examine the privacy and access requirements of both model owners and evaluators; and explore potential solutions to this challenge, including through the application of cryptographic and hardware-based approaches.

cs.CY

Emerging Practices in Frontier AI Safety Frameworks

As part of the Frontier AI Safety Commitments agreed to at the 2024 AI Seoul Summit, many AI developers agreed to publish a safety framework outlining how they will manage potential severe risks associated with their systems. This paper summarises current thinking from companies, governments, and researchers on how to write an effective safety framework. We outline three core areas of a safety framework - risk identification and assessment, risk mitigation, and governance - and identify emerging practices within each area. As safety frameworks are novel and rapidly developing, we hope that this paper can serve both as an overview of work to date and as a starting point for further discussion and innovation.

cs.CY

Open Problems in Machine Unlearning for AI Safety

As AI systems become more capable, widely deployed, and increasingly autonomous in critical areas such as cybersecurity, biological research, and healthcare, ensuring their safety and alignment with human values is paramount. Machine unlearning -- the ability to selectively forget or suppress specific types of knowledge -- has shown promise for privacy and data removal tasks, which has been the primary focus of existing research. More recently, its potential application to AI safety has gained attention. In this paper, we identify key limitations that prevent unlearning from serving as a comprehensive solution for AI safety, particularly in managing dual-use knowledge in sensitive domains like cybersecurity and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) safety. In these contexts, information can be both beneficial and harmful, and models may combine seemingly harmless information for harmful purposes -- unlearning this information could strongly affect beneficial uses. We provide an overview of inherent constraints and open problems, including the broader side effects of unlearning dangerous knowledge, as well as previously unexplored tensions between unlearning and existing safety mechanisms. Finally, we investigate challenges related to evaluation, robustness, and the preservation of safety features during unlearning. By mapping these limitations and open challenges, we aim to guide future research toward realistic applications of unlearning within a broader AI safety framework, acknowledging its limitations and highlighting areas where alternative approaches may be required.

cs.LG

Position Paper: Model Access should be a Key Concern in AI Governance

The downstream use cases, benefits, and risks of AI systems depend significantly on the access afforded to the system, and to whom. However, the downstream implications of different access styles are not well understood, making it difficult for decision-makers to govern model access responsibly. Consequently, we spotlight Model Access Governance, an emerging field focused on helping organisations and governments make responsible, evidence-based access decisions. We outline the motivation for developing this field by highlighting the risks of misgoverning model access, the limitations of existing research on the topic, and the opportunity for impact. We then make four sets of recommendations, aimed at helping AI evaluation organisations, frontier AI companies, governments and international bodies build consensus around empirically-driven access governance.

cs.CY

Open Problems in Technical AI Governance

AI progress is creating a growing range of risks and opportunities, but it is often unclear how they should be navigated. In many cases, the barriers and uncertainties faced are at least partly technical. Technical AI governance, referring to technical analysis and tools for supporting the effective governance of AI, seeks to address such challenges. It can help to (a) identify areas where intervention is needed, (b) identify and assess the efficacy of potential governance actions, and (c) enhance governance options by designing mechanisms for enforcement, incentivization, or compliance. In this paper, we explain what technical AI governance is, why it is important, and present a taxonomy and incomplete catalog of its open problems. This paper is intended as a resource for technical researchers or research funders looking to contribute to AI governance.

cs.CY

Position Paper: Technical Research and Talent is Needed for Effective AI Governance

In light of recent advancements in AI capabilities and the increasingly widespread integration of AI systems into society, governments worldwide are actively seeking to mitigate the potential harms and risks associated with these technologies through regulation and other governance tools. However, there exist significant gaps between governance aspirations and the current state of the technical tooling necessary for their realisation. In this position paper, we survey policy documents published by public-sector institutions in the EU, US, and China to highlight specific areas of disconnect between the technical requirements necessary for enacting proposed policy actions, and the current technical state of the art. Our analysis motivates a call for tighter integration of the AI/ML research community within AI governance in order to i) catalyse technical research aimed at bridging the gap between current and supposed technical underpinnings of regulatory action, as well as ii) increase the level of technical expertise within governing institutions so as to inform and guide effective governance of AI.

cs.CY

Hazards from Increasingly Accessible Fine-Tuning of Downloadable Foundation Models

Public release of the weights of pretrained foundation models, otherwise known as downloadable access \citep{solaiman_gradient_2023}, enables fine-tuning without the prohibitive expense of pretraining. Our work argues that increasingly accessible fine-tuning of downloadable models may increase hazards. First, we highlight research to improve the accessibility of fine-tuning. We split our discussion into research that A) reduces the computational cost of fine-tuning and B) improves the ability to share that cost across more actors. Second, we argue that increasingly accessible fine-tuning methods may increase hazard through facilitating malicious use and making oversight of models with potentially dangerous capabilities more difficult. Third, we discuss potential mitigatory measures, as well as benefits of more accessible fine-tuning. Given substantial remaining uncertainty about hazards, we conclude by emphasizing the urgent need for the development of mitigations.

cs.LG

Open-Sourcing Highly Capable Foundation Models: An evaluation of risks, benefits, and alternative methods for pursuing open-source objectives

Recent decisions by leading AI labs to either open-source their models or to restrict access to their models has sparked debate about whether, and how, increasingly capable AI models should be shared. Open-sourcing in AI typically refers to making model architecture and weights freely and publicly accessible for anyone to modify, study, build on, and use. This offers advantages such as enabling external oversight, accelerating progress, and decentralizing control over AI development and use. However, it also presents a growing potential for misuse and unintended consequences. This paper offers an examination of the risks and benefits of open-sourcing highly capable foundation models. While open-sourcing has historically provided substantial net benefits for most software and AI development processes, we argue that for some highly capable foundation models likely to be developed in the near future, open-sourcing may pose sufficiently extreme risks to outweigh the benefits. In such a case, highly capable foundation models should not be open-sourced, at least not initially. Alternative strategies, including non-open-source model sharing options, are explored. The paper concludes with recommendations for developers, standard-setting bodies, and governments for establishing safe and responsible model sharing practices and preserving open-source benefits where safe.

cs.CY