arXiv subjects

Boi Faltings

Publications and source records attributed to Boi Faltings.

78 records · Page 5Linked to original sources

arXiv2017

Peer Truth Serum: Incentives for Crowdsourcing Measurements and Opinions

Modern decision making tools are based on statistical analysis of abundant data, which is often collected by querying multiple individuals. We consider data collection through crowdsourcing, where independent and self-interested agents, non-experts, report measurements, such as sensor readings, opinions, such as product reviews, or answers to human intelligence tasks. Since the accuracy of information is positively correlated with the effort invested in obtaining it, self-interested agents tend to report low-quality data. Therefore, there is a need for incentives that cover the cost of effort, while discouraging random reports. We propose a novel incentive mechanism called Peer Truth Serum that encourages truthful and accurate reporting, showing that it is the unique mechanism to satisfy a combination of desirable properties.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2014

Personalized News Recommendation with Context Trees

The profusion of online news articles makes it difficult to find interesting articles, a problem that can be assuaged by using a recommender system to bring the most relevant news stories to readers. However, news recommendation is challenging because the most relevant articles are often new content seen by few users. In addition, they are subject to trends and preference changes over time, and in many cases we do not have sufficient information to profile the reader. In this paper, we introduce a class of news recommendation systems based on context trees. They can provide high-quality news recommendation to anonymous visitors based on present browsing behaviour. We show that context-tree recommender systems provide good prediction accuracy and recommendation novelty, and they are sufficiently flexible to capture the unique properties of news articles.

cs.IR↗

arXiv2014

Protecting Privacy through Distributed Computation in Multi-agent Decision Making

As large-scale theft of data from corporate servers is becoming increasingly common, it becomes interesting to examine alternatives to the paradigm of centralizing sensitive data into large databases. Instead, one could use cryptography and distributed computation so that sensitive data can be supplied and processed in encrypted form, and only the final result is made known. In this paper, we examine how such a paradigm can be used to implement constraint satisfaction, a technique that can solve a broad class of AI problems such as resource allocation, planning, scheduling, and diagnosis. Most previous work on privacy in constraint satisfaction only attempted to protect specific types of information, in particular the feasibility of particular combinations of decisions. We formalize and extend these restricted notions of privacy by introducing four types of private information, including the feasibility of decisions and the final decisions made, but also the identities of the participants and the topology of the problem. We present distributed algorithms that allow computing solutions to constraint satisfaction problems while maintaining these four types of privacy. We formally prove the privacy properties of these algorithms, and show experiments that compare their respective performance on benchmark problems.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2014

Decentralized Anti-coordination Through Multi-agent Learning

To achieve an optimal outcome in many situations, agents need to choose distinct actions from one another. This is the case notably in many resource allocation problems, where a single resource can only be used by one agent at a time. How shall a designer of a multi-agent system program its identical agents to behave each in a different way? From a game theoretic perspective, such situations lead to undesirable Nash equilibria. For example consider a resource allocation game in that two players compete for an exclusive access to a single resource. It has three Nash equilibria. The two pure-strategy NE are efficient, but not fair. The one mixed-strategy NE is fair, but not efficient. Aumanns notion of correlated equilibrium fixes this problem: It assumes a correlation device that suggests each agent an action to take. However, such a "smart" coordination device might not be available. We propose using a randomly chosen, "stupid" integer coordination signal. "Smart" agents learn which action they should use for each value of the coordination signal. We present a multi-agent learning algorithm that converges in polynomial number of steps to a correlated equilibrium of a channel allocation game, a variant of the resource allocation game. We show that the agents learn to play for each coordination signal value a randomly chosen pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the game. Therefore, the outcome is an efficient correlated equilibrium. This CE becomes more fair as the number of the available coordination signal values increases.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2014

Mechanisms for Making Crowds Truthful

We consider schemes for obtaining truthful reports on a common but hidden signal from large groups of rational, self-interested agents. One example are online feedback mechanisms, where users provide observations about the quality of a product or service so that other users can have an accurate idea of what quality they can expect. However, (i) providing such feedback is costly, and (ii) there are many motivations for providing incorrect feedback. Both problems can be addressed by reward schemes which (i) cover the cost of obtaining and reporting feedback, and (ii) maximize the expected reward of a rational agent who reports truthfully. We address the design of such incentive-compatible rewards for feedback generated in environments with pure adverse selection. Here, the correlation between the true knowledge of an agent and her beliefs regarding the likelihoods of reports of other agents can be exploited to make honest reporting a Nash equilibrium. In this paper we extend existing methods for designing incentive-compatible rewards by also considering collusion. We analyze different scenarios, where, for example, some or all of the agents collude. For each scenario we investigate whether a collusion-resistant, incentive-compatible reward scheme exists, and use automated mechanism design to specify an algorithm for deriving an efficient reward mechanism.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2007

Branch-and-Prune Search Strategies for Numerical Constraint Solving

When solving numerical constraints such as nonlinear equations and inequalities, solvers often exploit pruning techniques, which remove redundant value combinations from the domains of variables, at pruning steps. To find the complete solution set, most of these solvers alternate the pruning steps with branching steps, which split each problem into subproblems. This forms the so-called branch-and-prune framework, well known among the approaches for solving numerical constraints. The basic branch-and-prune search strategy that uses domain bisections in place of the branching steps is called the bisection search. In general, the bisection search works well in case (i) the solutions are isolated, but it can be improved further in case (ii) there are continuums of solutions (this often occurs when inequalities are involved). In this paper, we propose a new branch-and-prune search strategy along with several variants, which not only allow yielding better branching decisions in the latter case, but also work as well as the bisection search does in the former case. These new search algorithms enable us to employ various pruning techniques in the construction of inner and outer approximations of the solution set. Our experiments show that these algorithms speed up the solving process often by one order of magnitude or more when solving problems with continuums of solutions, while keeping the same performance as the bisection search when the solutions are isolated.

cs.AI↗