arXiv subjects

Brendan Lucier

Publications and source records attributed to Brendan Lucier.

At least 55 records · Page 3Linked to original sources

arXiv2020

Maximizing Welfare with Incentive-Aware Evaluation Mechanisms

Motivated by applications such as college admission and insurance rate determination, we propose an evaluation problem where the inputs are controlled by strategic individuals who can modify their features at a cost. A learner can only partially observe the features, and aims to classify individuals with respect to a quality score. The goal is to design an evaluation mechanism that maximizes the overall quality score, i.e., welfare, in the population, taking any strategic updating into account. We further study the algorithmic aspect of finding the welfare maximizing evaluation mechanism under two specific settings in our model. When scores are linear and mechanisms use linear scoring rules on the observable features, we show that the optimal evaluation mechanism is an appropriate projection of the quality score. When mechanisms must use linear thresholds, we design a polynomial time algorithm with a (1/4)-approximation guarantee when the underlying feature distribution is sufficiently smooth and admits an oracle for finding dense regions. We extend our results to settings where the prior distribution is unknown and must be learned from samples.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

Escaping Cannibalization? Correlation-Robust Pricing for a Unit-Demand Buyer

We consider a robust version of the revenue maximization problem, where a single seller wishes to sell $n$ items to a single unit-demand buyer. In this robust version, the seller knows the buyer's marginal value distribution for each item separately, but not the joint distribution, and prices the items to maximize revenue in the worst case over all compatible correlation structures. We devise a computationally efficient (polynomial in the support size of the marginals) algorithm that computes the worst-case joint distribution for any choice of item prices. And yet, in sharp contrast to the additive buyer case (Carroll, 2017), we show that it is NP-hard to approximate the optimal choice of prices to within any factor better than $n^{1/2-ε}$. For the special case of marginal distributions that satisfy the monotone hazard rate property, we show how to guarantee a constant fraction of the optimal worst-case revenue using item pricing; this pricing equates revenue across all possible correlations and can be computed efficiently.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer

We consider a monopolist seller with $n$ heterogeneous items, facing a single buyer. The buyer has a value for each item drawn independently according to (non-identical) distributions, and her value for a set of items is additive. The seller aims to maximize his revenue. We suggest using the a-priori better of two simple pricing methods: selling the items separately, each at its optimal price, and bundling together, in which the entire set of items is sold as one bundle at its optimal price. We show that for any distribution, this mechanism achieves a constant-factor approximation to the optimal revenue. Beyond its simplicity, this is the first computationally tractable mechanism to obtain a constant-factor approximation for this multi-parameter problem. We additionally discuss extensions to multiple buyers and to valuations that are correlated across items.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions with No Overbidding

We study equilibria in two-buyer sequential second-price (or first-price) auctions for identical goods. Buyers have weakly decreasing incremental values, and we make a behavioural no-overbidding assumption: the buyers do not bid above their incremental values. Structurally, we show equilibria are intrinsically linked to a greedy bidding strategy. We then prove three results. First, any equilibrium consists of three phases: a competitive phase, a competition reduction phase and a monopsony phase. In particular, there is a time after which one buyer exhibits monopsonistic behaviours. Second, the declining price anomaly holds: prices weakly decrease over time at any equilibrium in the no-overbidding game, a fact previously known for equilibria with overbidding. Third, the price of anarchy of the sequential auction is exactly $1 - 1/e$.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

An O(log log m) Prophet Inequality for Subadditive Combinatorial Auctions

Prophet inequalities compare the expected performance of an online algorithm for a stochastic optimization problem to the expected optimal solution in hindsight. They are a major alternative to classic worst-case competitive analysis, of particular importance in the design and analysis of simple (posted-price) incentive compatible mechanisms with provable approximation guarantees. A central open problem in this area concerns subadditive combinatorial auctions. Here $n$ agents with subadditive valuation functions compete for the assignment of $m$ items. The goal is to find an allocation of the items that maximizes the total value of the assignment. The question is whether there exists a prophet inequality for this problem that significantly beats the best known approximation factor of $O(\log m)$. We make major progress on this question by providing an $O(\log \log m)$ prophet inequality. Our proof goes through a novel primal-dual approach. It is also constructive, resulting in an online policy that takes the form of static and anonymous item prices that can be computed in polynomial time given appropriate query access to the valuations. As an application of our approach, we construct a simple and incentive compatible mechanism based on posted prices that achieves an $O(\log \log m)$ approximation to the optimal revenue for subadditive valuations under an item-independence assumption.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

Black-box Methods for Restoring Monotonicity

In many practical applications, heuristic or approximation algorithms are used to efficiently solve the task at hand. However their solutions frequently do not satisfy natural monotonicity properties of optimal solutions. In this work we develop algorithms that are able to restore monotonicity in the parameters of interest. Specifically, given oracle access to a (possibly non-monotone) multi-dimensional real-valued function $f$, we provide an algorithm that restores monotonicity while degrading the expected value of the function by at most $\varepsilon$. The number of queries required is at most logarithmic in $1/\varepsilon$ and exponential in the number of parameters. We also give a lower bound showing that this exponential dependence is necessary. Finally, we obtain improved query complexity bounds for restoring the weaker property of $k$-marginal monotonicity. Under this property, every $k$-dimensional projection of the function $f$ is required to be monotone. The query complexity we obtain only scales exponentially with $k$.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2019

Reducing Inefficiency in Carbon Auctions with Imperfect Competition

We study auctions for carbon licenses, a policy tool used to control the social cost of pollution. Each identical license grants the right to produce a unit of pollution. Each buyer (i.e., firm that pollutes during the manufacturing process) enjoys a decreasing marginal value for licenses, but society suffers an increasing marginal cost for each license distributed. The seller (i.e., the government) can choose a number of licenses to put up for auction, and wishes to maximize the societal welfare: the total economic value of the buyers minus the social cost. Motivated by emission license markets deployed in practice, we focus on uniform price auctions with a price floor and/or price ceiling. The seller has distributional information about the market, and their goal is to tune the auction parameters to maximize expected welfare. The target benchmark is the maximum expected welfare achievable by any such auction under truth-telling behavior. Unfortunately, the uniform price auction is not truthful, and strategic behavior can significantly reduce (even below zero) the welfare of a given auction configuration. We describe a subclass of "safe-price'" auctions for which the welfare at any Bayes-Nash equilibrium will approximate the welfare under truth-telling behavior. We then show that the better of a safe-price auction, or a truthful auction that allocates licenses to only a single buyer, will approximate the target benchmark. In particular, we show how to choose a number of licenses and a price floor so that the worst-case welfare, at any equilibrium, is a constant approximation to the best achievable welfare under truth-telling after excluding the welfare contribution of a single buyer.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

Procrastinating with Confidence: Near-Optimal, Anytime, Adaptive Algorithm Configuration

Algorithm configuration methods optimize the performance of a parameterized heuristic algorithm on a given distribution of problem instances. Recent work introduced an algorithm configuration procedure ("Structured Procrastination") that provably achieves near optimal performance with high probability and with nearly minimal runtime in the worst case. It also offers an $\textit{anytime}$ property: it keeps tightening its optimality guarantees the longer it is run. Unfortunately, Structured Procrastination is not $\textit{adaptive}$ to characteristics of the parameterized algorithm: it treats every input like the worst case. Follow-up work ("LeapsAndBounds") achieves adaptivity but trades away the anytime property. This paper introduces a new algorithm, "Structured Procrastination with Confidence", that preserves the near-optimality and anytime properties of Structured Procrastination while adding adaptivity. In particular, the new algorithm will perform dramatically faster in settings where many algorithm configurations perform poorly. We show empirically both that such settings arise frequently in practice and that the anytime property is useful for finding good configurations quickly.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2019

Prophets, Secretaries, and Maximizing the Probability of Choosing the Best

Suppose a customer is faced with a sequence of fluctuating prices, such as for airfare or a product sold by a large online retailer. Given distributional information about what price they might face each day, how should they choose when to purchase in order to maximize the likelihood of getting the best price in retrospect? This is related to the classical secretary problem, but with values drawn from known distributions. In their pioneering work, Gilbert and Mosteller [\textit{J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 1966}] showed that when the values are drawn i.i.d., there is a thresholding algorithm that selects the best value with probability approximately $0.5801$. However, the more general problem with non-identical distributions has remained unsolved. In this paper we provide an algorithm for the case of non-identical distributions that selects the maximum element with probability $1/e$, and we show that this is tight. We further show that if the observations arrive in a random order, this barrier of $1/e$ can be broken using a static threshold algorithm, and we show that our success probability is the best possible for any single-threshold algorithm under random observation order. Moreover, we prove that one can achieve a strictly better success probability using more general multi-threshold algorithms, unlike the non-random-order case. Along the way, we show that the best achievable success probability for the random-order case matches that of the i.i.d.\ case, which is approximately $0.5801$, under a "no-superstars" condition that no single distribution is very likely ex ante to generate the maximum value. We also extend our results to the problem of selecting one of the $k$ best values.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2019

The Complexity of Black-Box Mechanism Design with Priors

We study black-box reductions from mechanism design to algorithm design for welfare maximization in settings of incomplete information. Given oracle access to an algorithm for an underlying optimization problem, the goal is to simulate an incentive compatible mechanism. The mechanism will be evaluated on its expected welfare, relative to the algorithm provided, and its complexity is measured by the time (and queries) needed to simulate the mechanism on any input. While it is known that black-box reductions are not possible in many prior-free settings, settings with priors appear more promising: there are known reductions for Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) mechanism design for general classes of welfare maximization problems. This dichotomy begs the question: which mechanism design problems admit black-box reductions, and which do not? Our main result is that black-box mechanism design is impossible under two of the simplest settings not captured by known positive results. First, for the problem of allocating $n$ goods to a single buyer whose valuation is additive and independent across the goods, subject to a downward-closed constraint on feasible allocations, we show that there is no polytime (in $n$) BIC black-box reduction for expected welfare maximization. Second, for the setting of multiple single-parameter agents---where polytime BIC reductions are known---we show that no polytime reductions exist when the incentive requirement is tightened to Max-In-Distributional-Range. In each case, we show that achieving a sub-polynomial approximation to the expected welfare requires exponentially many queries, even when the set of feasible allocations is known to be downward-closed.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

Online Pandora's Boxes and Bandits

We consider online variations of the Pandora's box problem (Weitzman. 1979), a standard model for understanding issues related to the cost of acquiring information for decision-making. Our problem generalizes both the classic Pandora's box problem and the prophet inequality framework. Boxes are presented online, each with a random value and cost drew jointly from some known distribution. Pandora chooses online whether to open each box given its cost, and then chooses irrevocably whether to keep the revealed prize or pass on it. We aim for approximation algorithms against adversaries that can choose the largest prize over any opened box, and use optimal offline policies to decide which boxes to open (without knowledge of the value inside). We consider variations where Pandora can collect multiple prizes subject to feasibility constraints, such as cardinality, matroid, or knapsack constraints. We also consider variations related to classic multi-armed bandit problems from reinforcement learning. Our results use a reduction-based framework where we separate the issues of the cost of acquiring information from the online decision process of which prizes to keep. Our work shows that in many scenarios, Pandora can achieve a good approximation to the best possible performance.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2018

Optimal Data Acquisition for Statistical Estimation

We consider a data analyst's problem of purchasing data from strategic agents to compute an unbiased estimate of a statistic of interest. Agents incur private costs to reveal their data and the costs can be arbitrarily correlated with their data. Once revealed, data are verifiable. This paper focuses on linear unbiased estimators. We design an individually rational and incentive compatible mechanism that optimizes the worst-case mean-squared error of the estimation, where the worst-case is over the unknown correlation between costs and data, subject to a budget constraint in expectation. We characterize the form of the optimal mechanism in closed-form. We further extend our results to acquiring data for estimating a parameter in regression analysis, where private costs can correlate with the values of the dependent variable but not with the values of the independent variables.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2017

Combinatorial Assortment Optimization

Assortment optimization refers to the problem of designing a slate of products to offer potential customers, such as stocking the shelves in a convenience store. The price of each product is fixed in advance, and a probabilistic choice function describes which product a customer will choose from any given subset. We introduce the combinatorial assortment problem, where each customer may select a bundle of products. We consider a model of consumer choice where the relative value of different bundles is described by a valuation function, while individual customers may differ in their absolute willingness to pay, and study the complexity of the resulting optimization problem. We show that any sub-polynomial approximation to the problem requires exponentially many demand queries when the valuation function is XOS, and that no FPTAS exists even for succinctly-representable submodular valuations. On the positive side, we show how to obtain constant approximations under a "well-priced" condition, where each product's price is sufficiently high. We also provide an exact algorithm for $k$-additive valuations, and show how to extend our results to a learning setting where the seller must infer the customers' preferences from their purchasing behavior.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2017

Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Non-Stochastic Inputs

We present a general framework for stochastic online maximization problems with combinatorial feasibility constraints. The framework establishes prophet inequalities by constructing price-based online approximation algorithms, a natural extension of threshold algorithms for settings beyond binary selection. Our analysis takes the form of an extension theorem: we derive sufficient conditions on prices when all weights are known in advance, then prove that the resulting approximation guarantees extend directly to stochastic settings. Our framework unifies and simplifies much of the existing literature on prophet inequalities and posted price mechanisms, and is used to derive new and improved results for combinatorial markets (with and without complements), multi-dimensional matroids, and sparse packing problems. Finally, we highlight a surprising connection between the smoothness framework for bounding the price of anarchy of mechanisms and our framework, and show that many smooth mechanisms can be recast as posted price mechanisms with comparable performance guarantees.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2017

Robust Optimization for Non-Convex Objectives

We consider robust optimization problems, where the goal is to optimize in the worst case over a class of objective functions. We develop a reduction from robust improper optimization to Bayesian optimization: given an oracle that returns $α$-approximate solutions for distributions over objectives, we compute a distribution over solutions that is $α$-approximate in the worst case. We show that de-randomizing this solution is NP-hard in general, but can be done for a broad class of statistical learning tasks. We apply our results to robust neural network training and submodular optimization. We evaluate our approach experimentally on corrupted character classification, and robust influence maximization in networks.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2017

Beating 1-1/e for Ordered Prophets

Hill and Kertz studied the prophet inequality on iid distributions [The Annals of Probability 1982]. They proved a theoretical bound of $1-\frac{1}{e}$ on the approximation factor of their algorithm. They conjectured that the best approximation factor for arbitrarily large n is $\frac{1}{1+1/e} \approx 0.731$. This conjecture remained open prior to this paper for over 30 years. In this paper we present a threshold-based algorithm for the prophet inequality with n iid distributions. Using a nontrivial and novel approach we show that our algorithm is a 0.738-approximation algorithm. By beating the bound of $\frac{1}{1+1/e}$, this refutes the conjecture of Hill and Kertz. Moreover, we generalize our results to non-iid distributions and discuss its applications in mechanism design.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2017

Exponential Segregation in a Two-Dimensional Schelling Model with Tolerant Individuals

We prove that the two-dimensional Schelling segregation model yields monochromatic regions of size exponential in the area of individuals' neighborhoods, provided that the tolerance parameter is a constant strictly less than 1/2 but sufficiently close to it. Our analysis makes use of a connection with the first-passage percolation model from the theory of stochastic processes.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2017

From Duels to Battefields: Computing Equilibria of Blotto and Other Games

We study the problem of computing Nash equilibria of zero-sum games. Many natural zero-sum games have exponentially many strategies, but highly structured payoffs. For example, in the well-studied Colonel Blotto game (introduced by Borel in 1921), players must divide a pool of troops among a set of battlefields with the goal of winning (i.e., having more troops in) a majority. The Colonel Blotto game is commonly used for analyzing a wide range of applications from the U.S presidential election, to innovative technology competitions, to advertisement, to sports. However, because of the size of the strategy space, standard methods for computing equilibria of zero-sum games fail to be computationally feasible. Indeed, despite its importance, only a few solutions for special variants of the problem are known. In this paper we show how to compute equilibria of Colonel Blotto games. Moreover, our approach takes the form of a general reduction: to find a Nash equilibrium of a zero-sum game, it suffices to design a separation oracle for the strategy polytope of any bilinear game that is payoff-equivalent. We then apply this technique to obtain the first polytime algorithms for a variety of games. In addition to Colonel Blotto, we also show how to compute equilibria in an infinite-strategy variant called the General Lotto game; this involves showing how to prune the strategy space to a finite subset before applying our reduction. We also consider the class of dueling games, first introduced by Immorlica et al. (2011). We show that our approach provably extends the class of dueling games for which equilibria can be computed: we introduce a new dueling game, the matching duel, on which prior methods fail to be computationally feasible but upon which our reduction can be applied.

cs.GT↗