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César Barilla

Publications and source records attributed to César Barilla.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

Ancestral origins of environmental (in)attention

How does the climatic experience of past generations affect today's attitudes towards environmental issues? Using empirical evidence spanning multiple contemporary surveys and ethnic group level cultural records, we show that the intensity of ancestral climate anomalies has a persistent effect on the perceived stakes of environmental considerations in decision-making. The relationship is U-shaped: descendants of groups who faced more stable or more volatile climates attribute higher importance to environmental concerns, with a dip at intermediate levels. Consistent with a cultural transmission channel, environmental content in folklore and other cultural narratives displays the same U-shape. We propose a general model in which environmental attention is a costly choice made before climate conditions are realized, and perceptions of its stakes are shaped by realized gains and losses through an evolutionary process. Because attention is chosen ex ante, selection pressure is coarse: it only disciplines perceptions through average payoffs under the specific climate distribution a group experiences, generating heterogeneous bias across ethnic groups. When environmental attention serves two functions, using typical conditions effectively and protecting against extreme events, the model rationalizes the U-shaped dependence of perceived stakes on ancestral climate anomalies.

econ.GN↗

When and what to learn in a changing world

A decision-maker periodically acquires information about a changing state, controlling both the timing and content of updates. I characterize optimal policies using a decomposition of the dynamic problem into optimal stopping and static information acquisition. Eventually, information acquisition either stops or follows a simple cycle in which updates occur at regular intervals to restore prescribed levels of relative certainty. This enables precise analysis of long run dynamics across environments. As fixed costs of information vanish, belief changes become lumpy: it is optimal to either wait or acquire information so as to exactly confirm the current belief until rare news prompts a sudden change. The long run solution admits a closed-form characterization in terms of the "virtual flow payoff". I highlight an illustrative application to portfolio diversification.

econ.TH↗

The Dynamics of Instability

We study a model in which two players with opposing interests try to alter a status quo through instability-generating actions. We show that instability can be used to secure longer-term durable changes, even if it is costly to generate and does not generate short-term gains. In equilibrium, instability generated by a player decreases when the status quo favors them more. Equilibrium always exhibits a region of stable states in which the status quo persists. As players' threat power increases, this region shrinks, ultimately collapsing to a single stable state that is supported via a deterrence mechanism. There is long-run path-dependency and inequity: although instability eventually leads to a stable state, it typically selects the least favorable one for the initially disadvantaged player.

econ.TH↗