arXiv subjects

Chuan Yu

Publications and source records attributed to Chuan Yu.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2025

Mem-PAL: Towards Memory-based Personalized Dialogue Assistants for Long-term User-Agent Interaction

With the rise of smart personal devices, service-oriented human-agent interactions have become increasingly prevalent. This trend highlights the need for personalized dialogue assistants that can understand user-specific traits to accurately interpret requirements and tailor responses to individual preferences. However, existing approaches often overlook the complexities of long-term interactions and fail to capture users' subjective characteristics. To address these gaps, we present PAL-Bench, a new benchmark designed to evaluate the personalization capabilities of service-oriented assistants in long-term user-agent interactions. In the absence of available real-world data, we develop a multi-step LLM-based synthesis pipeline, which is further verified and refined by human annotators. This process yields PAL-Set, the first Chinese dataset comprising multi-session user logs and dialogue histories, which serves as the foundation for PAL-Bench. Furthermore, to improve personalized service-oriented interactions, we propose H$^2$Memory, a hierarchical and heterogeneous memory framework that incorporates retrieval-augmented generation to improve personalized response generation. Comprehensive experiments on both our PAL-Bench and an external dataset demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed memory framework.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2025

Beyond Advertising: Mechanism Design for Platform-Wide Marketing Service "QuanZhanTui"

On e-commerce platforms, sellers typically bid for impressions from ad traffic to promote their products. However, for most sellers, the majority of their sales come from organic traffic. Consequently, the relationship between their ad spending and total sales remains uncertain, resulting in operational inefficiency. To address this issue, e-commerce platforms have recently introduced a novel platform-wide marketing service known as QuanZhanTui, which has reportedly enhanced marketing efficiency for sellers and driven substantial revenue growth for platforms. QuanZhanTui allows sellers to bid for impressions from the platform's entire traffic to boost their total sales without compromising the platform's user experience. In this paper, we investigate the mechanism design problem that arises from QuanZhanTui. The problem is formulated as a multi-objective optimization to balance sellers' welfare and platform's user experience. We first introduce the stock-constrained value maximizer model, which reflects sellers' dual requirements on marketing efficiency and platform-wide ROI. Then, we propose the Liquid Payment Auction (LPA), an auction designed to optimize the balanced objectives while accounting for sellers' requirements in the auto-bidding environment. It employs a simple payment rule based on sellers' liquid welfare, providing a clearer link between their investment and total sales. Under mild assumptions, we theoretically prove desirable properties of LPA, such as optimality and incentive compatibility. Extensive experiments demonstrate LPA's superior performance over conventional auctions in QuanZhanTui.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Permutation Equivariant Model-based Offline Reinforcement Learning for Auto-bidding

Reinforcement learning (RL) for auto-bidding has shifted from using simplistic offline simulators (Simulation-based RL Bidding, SRLB) to offline RL on fixed real datasets (Offline RL Bidding, ORLB). However, ORLB policies are limited by the dataset's state space coverage, offering modest gains. While SRLB expands state coverage, its simulator-reality gap risks misleading policies. This paper introduces Model-based RL Bidding (MRLB), which learns an environment model from real data to bridge this gap. MRLB trains policies using both real and model-generated data, expanding state coverage beyond ORLB. To ensure model reliability, we propose: 1) A permutation equivariant model architecture for better generalization, and 2) A robust offline Q-learning method that pessimistically penalizes model errors. These form the Permutation Equivariant Model-based Offline RL (PE-MORL) algorithm. Real-world experiments show that PE-MORL outperforms state-of-the-art auto-bidding methods.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

MBCT: Tree-Based Feature-Aware Binning for Individual Uncertainty Calibration

Most machine learning classifiers only concern classification accuracy, while certain applications (such as medical diagnosis, meteorological forecasting, and computation advertising) require the model to predict the true probability, known as a calibrated estimate. In previous work, researchers have developed several calibration methods to post-process the outputs of a predictor to obtain calibrated values, such as binning and scaling methods. Compared with scaling, binning methods are shown to have distribution-free theoretical guarantees, which motivates us to prefer binning methods for calibration. However, we notice that existing binning methods have several drawbacks: (a) the binning scheme only considers the original prediction values, thus limiting the calibration performance; and (b) the binning approach is non-individual, mapping multiple samples in a bin to the same value, and thus is not suitable for order-sensitive applications. In this paper, we propose a feature-aware binning framework, called Multiple Boosting Calibration Trees (MBCT), along with a multi-view calibration loss to tackle the above issues. Our MBCT optimizes the binning scheme by the tree structures of features, and adopts a linear function in a tree node to achieve individual calibration. Our MBCT is non-monotonic, and has the potential to improve order accuracy, due to its learnable binning scheme and the individual calibration. We conduct comprehensive experiments on three datasets in different fields. Results show that our method outperforms all competing models in terms of both calibration error and order accuracy. We also conduct simulation experiments, justifying that the proposed multi-view calibration loss is a better metric in modeling calibration error.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

An Adaptable Budget Planner for Enhancing Budget-Constrained Auto-Bidding in Online Advertising

In online advertising, advertisers commonly utilize auto-bidding services to bid for impression opportunities. A typical objective of the auto-bidder is to optimize the advertiser's cumulative value of winning impressions within specified budget constraints. However, such a problem is challenging due to the complex bidding environment faced by diverse advertisers. To address this challenge, we introduce ABPlanner, a few-shot adaptable budget planner designed to improve budget-constrained auto-bidding. ABPlanner is based on a hierarchical bidding framework that decomposes the bidding process into shorter, manageable stages. Within this framework, ABPlanner allocates the budget across all stages, allowing a low-level auto-bidder to bids based on the budget allocation plan. The adaptability of ABPlanner is achieved through a sequential decision-making approach, inspired by in-context reinforcement learning. For each advertiser, ABPlanner adjusts the budget allocation plan episode by episode, using data from previous episodes as prompt for current decisions. This enables ABPlanner to quickly adapt to different advertisers with few-shot data, providing a sample-efficient solution. Extensive simulation experiments and real-world A/B testing validate the effectiveness of ABPlanner, demonstrating its capability to enhance the cumulative value achieved by auto-bidders.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

AuctionNet: A Novel Benchmark for Decision-Making in Large-Scale Games

Decision-making in large-scale games is an essential research area in artificial intelligence (AI) with significant real-world impact. However, the limited access to realistic large-scale game environments has hindered research progress in this area. In this paper, we present AuctionNet, a benchmark for bid decision-making in large-scale ad auctions derived from a real-world online advertising platform. AuctionNet is composed of three parts: an ad auction environment, a pre-generated dataset based on the environment, and performance evaluations of several baseline bid decision-making algorithms. More specifically, the environment effectively replicates the integrity and complexity of real-world ad auctions through the interaction of several modules: the ad opportunity generation module employs deep generative networks to bridge the gap between simulated and real-world data while mitigating the risk of sensitive data exposure; the bidding module implements diverse auto-bidding agents trained with different decision-making algorithms; and the auction module is anchored in the classic Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction but also allows for customization of auction mechanisms as needed. To facilitate research and provide insights into the environment, we have also pre-generated a substantial dataset based on the environment. The dataset contains 10 million ad opportunities, 48 diverse auto-bidding agents, and over 500 million auction records. Performance evaluations of baseline algorithms such as linear programming, reinforcement learning, and generative models for bid decision-making are also presented as a part of AuctionNet. We believe that AuctionNet is applicable not only to research on bid decision-making in ad auctions but also to the general area of decision-making in large-scale games.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2024

AIGB: Generative Auto-bidding via Conditional Diffusion Modeling

Auto-bidding plays a crucial role in facilitating online advertising by automatically providing bids for advertisers. Reinforcement learning (RL) has gained popularity for auto-bidding. However, most current RL auto-bidding methods are modeled through the Markovian Decision Process (MDP), which assumes the Markovian state transition. This assumption restricts the ability to perform in long horizon scenarios and makes the model unstable when dealing with highly random online advertising environments. To tackle this issue, this paper introduces AI-Generated Bidding (AIGB), a novel paradigm for auto-bidding through generative modeling. In this paradigm, we propose DiffBid, a conditional diffusion modeling approach for bid generation. DiffBid directly models the correlation between the return and the entire trajectory, effectively avoiding error propagation across time steps in long horizons. Additionally, DiffBid offers a versatile approach for generating trajectories that maximize given targets while adhering to specific constraints. Extensive experiments conducted on the real-world dataset and online A/B test on Alibaba advertising platform demonstrate the effectiveness of DiffBid, achieving 2.81% increase in GMV and 3.36% increase in ROI.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

CUSIDE-T: Chunking, Simulating Future and Decoding for Transducer based Streaming ASR

Streaming automatic speech recognition (ASR) is very important for many real-world ASR applications. However, a notable challenge for streaming ASR systems lies in balancing operational performance against latency constraint. Recently, a method of chunking, simulating future context and decoding, called CUSIDE, has been proposed for connectionist temporal classification (CTC) based streaming ASR, which obtains a good balance between reduced latency and high recognition accuracy. In this paper, we present CUSIDE-T, which successfully adapts the CUSIDE method over the recurrent neural network transducer (RNN-T) ASR architecture, instead of being based on the CTC architecture. We also incorporate language model rescoring in CUSIDE-T to further enhance accuracy, while only bringing a small additional latency. Extensive experiments are conducted over the AISHELL-1, WenetSpeech and SpeechIO datasets, comparing CUSIDE-T and U2++ (both based on RNN-T). U2++ is an existing counterpart of chunk based streaming ASR method. It is shown that CUSIDE-T achieves superior accuracy performance for streaming ASR, with equal settings of latency.

cs.SD↗

arXiv2024

Automated Deterministic Auction Design with Objective Decomposition

Identifying high-revenue mechanisms that are both dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) and individually rational (IR) is a fundamental challenge in auction design. While theoretical approaches have encountered bottlenecks in multi-item auctions, there has been much empirical progress in automated designing such mechanisms using machine learning. However, existing research primarily focuses on randomized auctions, with less attention given to the more practical deterministic auctions. Therefore, this paper investigates the automated design of deterministic auctions and introduces OD-VVCA, an objective decomposition approach for automated designing Virtual Valuations Combinatorial Auctions (VVCAs). Firstly, we restrict our mechanism to deterministic VVCAs, which are inherently DSIC and IR. Afterward, we utilize a parallelizable dynamic programming algorithm to compute the allocation and revenue outcomes of a VVCA efficiently. We then decompose the revenue objective function into continuous and piecewise constant discontinuous components, optimizing each using distinct methods. Extensive experiments show that OD-VVCA achieves high revenue in multi-item auctions, especially in large-scale settings where it outperforms both randomized and deterministic baselines, indicating its efficacy and scalability.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Trajectory-wise Iterative Reinforcement Learning Framework for Auto-bidding

In online advertising, advertisers participate in ad auctions to acquire ad opportunities, often by utilizing auto-bidding tools provided by demand-side platforms (DSPs). The current auto-bidding algorithms typically employ reinforcement learning (RL). However, due to safety concerns, most RL-based auto-bidding policies are trained in simulation, leading to a performance degradation when deployed in online environments. To narrow this gap, we can deploy multiple auto-bidding agents in parallel to collect a large interaction dataset. Offline RL algorithms can then be utilized to train a new policy. The trained policy can subsequently be deployed for further data collection, resulting in an iterative training framework, which we refer to as iterative offline RL. In this work, we identify the performance bottleneck of this iterative offline RL framework, which originates from the ineffective exploration and exploitation caused by the inherent conservatism of offline RL algorithms. To overcome this bottleneck, we propose Trajectory-wise Exploration and Exploitation (TEE), which introduces a novel data collecting and data utilization method for iterative offline RL from a trajectory perspective. Furthermore, to ensure the safety of online exploration while preserving the dataset quality for TEE, we propose Safe Exploration by Adaptive Action Selection (SEAS). Both offline experiments and real-world experiments on Alibaba display advertising platform demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed method.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2024

XAV: A High-Performance Regular Expression Matching Engine for Packet Processing

Regular expression matching is the core function of various network security applications such as network intrusion detection systems. With the network bandwidth increases, it is a great challenge to implement regular expression matching for line rate packet processing. To this end, a novel scheme named XAV targeting high-performance regular expression matching is proposed in this paper. XAV first employs anchor DFA to tackle the state explosion problem of DFA. Then based on anchor DFA, two techniques including pre-filtering and regex decomposition are utilized to improve the average time complexity. Through implementing XAV with an FPGA-CPU architecture, comprehensive experiments show that a high matching throughput of up to 75 Gbps can be achieved for the large and complex Snort rule-set. Compared to state-of-the-art software schemes, XAV achieves two orders of magnitude of performance improvement. While compared to state-of-the-art FPGA-based schemes, XAV achieves more than 2.5x performance improvement with the same hardware resource consumption.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2024

MEBS: Multi-task End-to-end Bid Shading for Multi-slot Display Advertising

Online bidding and auction are crucial aspects of the online advertising industry. Conventionally, there is only one slot for ad display and most current studies focus on it. Nowadays, multi-slot display advertising is gradually becoming popular where many ads could be displayed in a list and shown as a whole to users. However, multi-slot display advertising leads to different cost-effectiveness. Advertisers have the incentive to adjust bid prices so as to win the most economical ad positions. In this study, we introduce bid shading into multi-slot display advertising for bid price adjustment with a Multi-task End-to-end Bid Shading(MEBS) method. We prove the optimality of our method theoretically and examine its performance experimentally. Through extensive offline and online experiments, we demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our method, and we obtain a 7.01% lift in Gross Merchandise Volume, a 7.42% lift in Return on Investment, and a 3.26% lift in ad buy count.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Learning against Non-credible Auctions

The standard framework of online bidding algorithm design assumes that the seller commits himself to faithfully implementing the rules of the adopted auction. However, the seller may attempt to cheat in execution to increase his revenue if the auction belongs to the class of non-credible auctions. For example, in a second-price auction, the seller could create a fake bid between the highest bid and the second highest bid. This paper focuses on one such case of online bidding in repeated second-price auctions. At each time $t$, the winner with bid $b_t$ is charged not the highest competing bid $d_t$ but a manipulated price $p_t = α_0 d_t + (1-α_0) b_t$, where the parameter $α_0 \in [0, 1]$ in essence measures the seller's credibility. Unlike classic repeated-auction settings where the bidder has access to samples $(d_s)_{s=1}^{t-1}$, she can only receive mixed signals of $(b_s)_{s=1}^{t-1}$, $(d_s)_{s=1}^{t-1}$ and $α_0$ in this problem. The task for the bidder is to learn not only the bid distributions of her competitors but also the seller's credibility. We establish regret lower bounds in various information models and provide corresponding online bidding algorithms that can achieve near-optimal performance. Specifically, we consider three cases of prior information based on whether the credibility $α_0$ and the distribution of the highest competing bids are known. Our goal is to characterize the landscape of online bidding in non-credible auctions and understand the impact of the seller's credibility on online bidding algorithm design under different information structures.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Truthful Auctions for Automated Bidding in Online Advertising

Automated bidding, an emerging intelligent decision making paradigm powered by machine learning, has become popular in online advertising. Advertisers in automated bidding evaluate the cumulative utilities and have private financial constraints over multiple ad auctions in a long-term period. Based on these distinct features, we consider a new ad auction model for automated bidding: the values of advertisers are public while the financial constraints, such as budget and return on investment (ROI) rate, are private types. We derive the truthfulness conditions with respect to private constraints for this multi-dimensional setting, and demonstrate any feasible allocation rule could be equivalently reduced to a series of non-decreasing functions on budget. However, the resulted allocation mapped from these non-decreasing functions generally follows an irregular shape, making it difficult to obtain a closed-form expression for the auction objective. To overcome this design difficulty, we propose a family of truthful automated bidding auction with personalized rank scores, similar to the Generalized Second-Price (GSP) auction. The intuition behind our design is to leverage personalized rank scores as the criteria to allocate items, and compute a critical ROI to transform the constraints on budget to the same dimension as ROI. The experimental results demonstrate that the proposed auction mechanism outperforms the widely used ad auctions, such as first-price auction and second-price auction, in various automated bidding environments.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Learning Optimal Deterministic Auctions with Correlated Valuation Distributions

In mechanism design, it is challenging to design the optimal auction with correlated values in general settings. Although value distribution can be further exploited to improve revenue, the complex correlation structure makes it hard to acquire in practice. Data-driven auction mechanisms, powered by machine learning, enable to design auctions directly from historical auction data, without relying on specific value distributions. In this work, we design a learning-based auction, which can encode the correlation of values into the rank score of each bidder, and further adjust the ranking rule to approach the optimal revenue. We strictly guarantee the property of strategy-proofness by encoding game theoretical conditions into the neural network structure. Furthermore, all operations in the designed auctions are differentiable to enable an end-to-end training paradigm. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed auction mechanism can represent almost any strategy-proof auction mechanism, and outperforms the auction mechanisms wildly used in the correlated value settings.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Utility Maximizer or Value Maximizer: Mechanism Design for Mixed Bidders in Online Advertising

Digital advertising constitutes one of the main revenue sources for online platforms. In recent years, some advertisers tend to adopt auto-bidding tools to facilitate advertising performance optimization, making the classical \emph{utility maximizer} model in auction theory not fit well. Some recent studies proposed a new model, called \emph{value maximizer}, for auto-bidding advertisers with return-on-investment (ROI) constraints. However, the model of either utility maximizer or value maximizer could only characterize partial advertisers in real-world advertising platforms. In a mixed environment where utility maximizers and value maximizers coexist, the truthful ad auction design would be challenging since bidders could manipulate both their values and affiliated classes, leading to a multi-parameter mechanism design problem. In this work, we address this issue by proposing a payment rule which combines the corresponding ones in classical VCG and GSP mechanisms in a novel way. Based on this payment rule, we propose a truthful auction mechanism with an approximation ratio of $2$ on social welfare, which is close to the lower bound of at least $\frac{5}{4}$ that we also prove. The designed auction mechanism is a generalization of VCG for utility maximizers and GSP for value maximizers.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Hierarchically Constrained Adaptive Ad Exposure in Feeds

A contemporary feed application usually provides blended results of organic items and sponsored items~(ads) to users. Conventionally, ads are exposed at fixed positions. Such a static exposure strategy is inefficient due to ignoring users' personalized preferences towards ads. To this end, adaptive ad exposure has become an appealing strategy to boost the overall performance of the feed. However, existing approaches to implementing the adaptive ad exposure still suffer from several limitations: 1) they usually fall into sub-optimal solutions because of only focusing on request-level optimization without consideration of the long-term application-level performance and constraints, 2) they neglect the necessity of keeping the game-theoretical properties of ad auctions, which may lead to anarchy in bidding, and 3) they can hardly be deployed in large-scale applications due to high computational complexity. In this paper, we focus on long-term performance optimization under hierarchical constraints in feeds and formulate the adaptive ad exposure as a Dynamic Knapsack Problem. We propose an effective approach: Hierarchically Constrained Adaptive Ad Exposure~(HCA2E). We present that HCA2E possesses desired game-theoretical properties, computational efficiency, and performance robustness. Comprehensive offline and online experiments on a leading e-commerce application demonstrate the significant performance superiority of HCA2E over representative baselines. HCA2E has also been deployed on this application to serve millions of daily users.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2022

Sustainable Online Reinforcement Learning for Auto-bidding

Recently, auto-bidding technique has become an essential tool to increase the revenue of advertisers. Facing the complex and ever-changing bidding environments in the real-world advertising system (RAS), state-of-the-art auto-bidding policies usually leverage reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms to generate real-time bids on behalf of the advertisers. Due to safety concerns, it was believed that the RL training process can only be carried out in an offline virtual advertising system (VAS) that is built based on the historical data generated in the RAS. In this paper, we argue that there exists significant gaps between the VAS and RAS, making the RL training process suffer from the problem of inconsistency between online and offline (IBOO). Firstly, we formally define the IBOO and systematically analyze its causes and influences. Then, to avoid the IBOO, we propose a sustainable online RL (SORL) framework that trains the auto-bidding policy by directly interacting with the RAS, instead of learning in the VAS. Specifically, based on our proof of the Lipschitz smooth property of the Q function, we design a safe and efficient online exploration (SER) policy for continuously collecting data from the RAS. Meanwhile, we derive the theoretical lower bound on the safety of the SER policy. We also develop a variance-suppressed conservative Q-learning (V-CQL) method to effectively and stably learn the auto-bidding policy with the collected data. Finally, extensive simulated and real-world experiments validate the superiority of our approach over the state-of-the-art auto-bidding algorithm.

cs.LG↗