arXiv subjects

Constantine Sorokin

Publications and source records attributed to Constantine Sorokin.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Breaking the Chain: Division Norms and Criminal Deterrence

In organized crime, membership moves fastest, deterrence capacity moves more slowly, and division norms move slowest. We model this in three stages: division norms fix how every possible coalition divides its proceeds; the authority then attaches deterrence capacity to named members before knowing which coalition will form; membership adjusts last, around whoever remains undeterred. Under population-monotone division, the minimum deterrence budget is the cost of a shortest dismantling path, removing one member at a time. When the Shapley value is population monotone, it uniquely maximizes this budget by making every path equally costly.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2026

Suppression and Empowerment in Contests

We study a tractable two-player contest built on a truncated cubic contest success function. Its defining feature is a strategic-feedback parameter whose sign determines whether a leading player's effort lowers (suppression) or raises (empowerment) the marginal effectiveness of the trailing player's effort; standard lottery contests impose suppression by construction. The benchmark yields closed-form mixed equilibria under complete information and a unique affine Bayesian Nash equilibrium under IID private information. Expected effort is typically single-peaked in the feedback parameter. Uncertainty lowers effort under suppression but raises it under empowerment, and the same asymmetry governs information disclosure: an effort-maximizing designer withholds information under suppression and discloses fully under empowerment. Several familiar conclusions of contest theory turn out to reflect suppressive benchmarks rather than contests as such.

econ.TH↗

arXiv2018

Multidimensional free-mobility equilibrium: Tiebout revisited

The paper provides consistent mathematical framework for seminal Tiebout free-mobility model (1956). Our setting supports continuum of consumers with multidimensional preferences and finite number of strategic public good providers. We accommodate the most general assumptions: providers' production function may have variable returns to scale, our framework is rich enough to incorporate possible externalities, spillovers, scale economies, network effects, etc.; consumers utility may depend on choice of other agents in almost arbitrary way. We focus on equilibrium existence, however the questions of efficiency and stability are not left behind. The model can also be applied in several related fields, most notably in political economy.

math.OC↗