arXiv subjects

Constantinos Daskalakis

Publications and source records attributed to Constantinos Daskalakis.

At least 109 records · Page 6Linked to original sources

arXiv2016

Revenue Maximization and Ex-Post Budget Constraints

We consider the problem of a revenue-maximizing seller with m items for sale to n additive bidders with hard budget constraints, assuming that the seller has some prior distribution over bidder values and budgets. The prior may be correlated across items and budgets of the same bidder, but is assumed independent across bidders. We target mechanisms that are Bayesian Incentive Compatible, but that are ex-post Individually Rational and ex-post budget respecting. Virtually no such mechanisms are known that satisfy all these conditions and guarantee any revenue approximation, even with just a single item. We provide a computationally efficient mechanism that is a $3$-approximation with respect to all BIC, ex-post IR, and ex-post budget respecting mechanisms. Note that the problem is NP-hard to approximate better than a factor of 16/15, even in the case where the prior is a point mass \cite{ChakrabartyGoel}. We further characterize the optimal mechanism in this setting, showing that it can be interpreted as a distribution over virtual welfare maximizers. We prove our results by making use of a black-box reduction from mechanism to algorithm design developed by \cite{CaiDW13b}. Our main technical contribution is a computationally efficient $3$-approximation algorithm for the algorithmic problem that results by an application of their framework to this problem. The algorithmic problem has a mixed-sign objective and is NP-hard to optimize exactly, so it is surprising that a computationally efficient approximation is possible at all. In the case of a single item ($m=1$), the algorithmic problem can be solved exactly via exhaustive search, leading to a computationally efficient exact algorithm and a stronger characterization of the optimal mechanism as a distribution over virtual value maximizers.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2016

Learning in Auctions: Regret is Hard, Envy is Easy

A line of recent work provides welfare guarantees of simple combinatorial auction formats, such as selling m items via simultaneous second price auctions (SiSPAs) (Christodoulou et al. 2008, Bhawalkar and Roughgarden 2011, Feldman et al. 2013). These guarantees hold even when the auctions are repeatedly executed and players use no-regret learning algorithms. Unfortunately, off-the-shelf no-regret algorithms for these auctions are computationally inefficient as the number of actions is exponential. We show that this obstacle is insurmountable: there are no polynomial-time no-regret algorithms for SiSPAs, unless RP$\supseteq$ NP, even when the bidders are unit-demand. Our lower bound raises the question of how good outcomes polynomially-bounded bidders may discover in such auctions. To answer this question, we propose a novel concept of learning in auctions, termed "no-envy learning." This notion is founded upon Walrasian equilibrium, and we show that it is both efficiently implementable and results in approximately optimal welfare, even when the bidders have fractionally subadditive (XOS) valuations (assuming demand oracles) or coverage valuations (without demand oracles). No-envy learning outcomes are a relaxation of no-regret outcomes, which maintain their approximate welfare optimality while endowing them with computational tractability. Our results extend to other auction formats that have been studied in the literature via the smoothness paradigm. Our results for XOS valuations are enabled by a novel Follow-The-Perturbed-Leader algorithm for settings where the number of experts is infinite, and the payoff function of the learner is non-linear. This algorithm has applications outside of auction settings, such as in security games. Our result for coverage valuations is based on a novel use of convex rounding schemes and a reduction to online convex optimization.

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arXiv2015

Optimal Testing for Properties of Distributions

Given samples from an unknown distribution $p$, is it possible to distinguish whether $p$ belongs to some class of distributions $\mathcal{C}$ versus $p$ being far from every distribution in $\mathcal{C}$? This fundamental question has received tremendous attention in statistics, focusing primarily on asymptotic analysis, and more recently in information theory and theoretical computer science, where the emphasis has been on small sample size and computational complexity. Nevertheless, even for basic properties of distributions such as monotonicity, log-concavity, unimodality, independence, and monotone-hazard rate, the optimal sample complexity is unknown. We provide a general approach via which we obtain sample-optimal and computationally efficient testers for all these distribution families. At the core of our approach is an algorithm which solves the following problem: Given samples from an unknown distribution $p$, and a known distribution $q$, are $p$ and $q$ close in $χ^2$-distance, or far in total variation distance? The optimality of our testers is established by providing matching lower bounds with respect to both $n$ and $\varepsilon$. Finally, a necessary building block for our testers and an important byproduct of our work are the first known computationally efficient proper learners for discrete log-concave and monotone hazard rate distributions.

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arXiv2015

On the Structure, Covering, and Learning of Poisson Multinomial Distributions

An $(n,k)$-Poisson Multinomial Distribution (PMD) is the distribution of the sum of $n$ independent random vectors supported on the set ${\cal B}_k=\{e_1,\ldots,e_k\}$ of standard basis vectors in $\mathbb{R}^k$. We prove a structural characterization of these distributions, showing that, for all $\varepsilon >0$, any $(n, k)$-Poisson multinomial random vector is $\varepsilon$-close, in total variation distance, to the sum of a discretized multidimensional Gaussian and an independent $(\text{poly}(k/\varepsilon), k)$-Poisson multinomial random vector. Our structural characterization extends the multi-dimensional CLT of Valiant and Valiant, by simultaneously applying to all approximation requirements $\varepsilon$. In particular, it overcomes factors depending on $\log n$ and, importantly, the minimum eigenvalue of the PMD's covariance matrix from the distance to a multidimensional Gaussian random variable. We use our structural characterization to obtain an $\varepsilon$-cover, in total variation distance, of the set of all $(n, k)$-PMDs, significantly improving the cover size of Daskalakis and Papadimitriou, and obtaining the same qualitative dependence of the cover size on $n$ and $\varepsilon$ as the $k=2$ cover of Daskalakis and Papadimitriou. We further exploit this structure to show that $(n,k)$-PMDs can be learned to within $\varepsilon$ in total variation distance from $\tilde{O}_k(1/\varepsilon^2)$ samples, which is near-optimal in terms of dependence on $\varepsilon$ and independent of $n$. In particular, our result generalizes the single-dimensional result of Daskalakis, Diakonikolas, and Servedio for Poisson Binomials to arbitrary dimension.

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arXiv2015

Optimum Statistical Estimation with Strategic Data Sources

We propose an optimum mechanism for providing monetary incentives to the data sources of a statistical estimator such as linear regression, so that high quality data is provided at low cost, in the sense that the sum of payments and estimation error is minimized. The mechanism applies to a broad range of estimators, including linear and polynomial regression, kernel regression, and, under some additional assumptions, ridge regression. It also generalizes to several objectives, including minimizing estimation error subject to budget constraints. Besides our concrete results for regression problems, we contribute a mechanism design framework through which to design and analyze statistical estimators whose examples are supplied by workers with cost for labeling said examples.

stat.ML↗

arXiv2015

Optimal Pricing is Hard

We show that computing the revenue-optimal deterministic auction in unit-demand single-buyer Bayesian settings, i.e. the optimal item-pricing, is computationally hard even in single-item settings where the buyer's value distribution is a sum of independently distributed attributes, or multi-item settings where the buyer's values for the items are independent. We also show that it is intractable to optimally price the grand bundle of multiple items for an additive bidder whose values for the items are independent. These difficulties stem from implicit definitions of a value distribution. We provide three instances of how different properties of implicit distributions can lead to intractability: the first is a #P-hardness proof, while the remaining two are reductions from the SQRT-SUM problem of Garey, Graham, and Johnson. While simple pricing schemes can oftentimes approximate the best scheme in revenue, they can have drastically different underlying structure. We argue therefore that either the specification of the input distribution must be highly restricted in format, or it is necessary for the goal to be mere approximation to the optimal scheme's revenue instead of computing properties of the scheme itself.

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arXiv2015

Mechanism Design via Optimal Transport

Optimal mechanisms have been provided in quite general multi-item settings, as long as each bidder's type distribution is given explicitly by listing every type in the support along with its associated probability. In the implicit setting, e.g. when the bidders have additive valuations with independent and/or continuous values for the items, these results do not apply, and it was recently shown that exact revenue optimization is intractable, even when there is only one bidder. Even for item distributions with special structure, optimal mechanisms have been surprisingly rare and the problem is challenging even in the two-item case. In this paper, we provide a framework for designing optimal mechanisms using optimal transport theory and duality theory. We instantiate our framework to obtain conditions under which only pricing the grand bundle is optimal in multi-item settings (complementing the work of [Manelli and Vincent 2006], as well as to characterize optimal two-item mechanisms. We use our results to derive closed-form descriptions of the optimal mechanism in several two-item settings, exhibiting also a setting where a continuum of lotteries is necessary for revenue optimization but a closed-form representation of the mechanism can still be found efficiently using our framework.

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arXiv2015

Learning Poisson Binomial Distributions

We consider a basic problem in unsupervised learning: learning an unknown \emph{Poisson Binomial Distribution}. A Poisson Binomial Distribution (PBD) over $\{0,1,\dots,n\}$ is the distribution of a sum of $n$ independent Bernoulli random variables which may have arbitrary, potentially non-equal, expectations. These distributions were first studied by S. Poisson in 1837 \cite{Poisson:37} and are a natural $n$-parameter generalization of the familiar Binomial Distribution. Surprisingly, prior to our work this basic learning problem was poorly understood, and known results for it were far from optimal. We essentially settle the complexity of the learning problem for this basic class of distributions. As our first main result we give a highly efficient algorithm which learns to $\eps$-accuracy (with respect to the total variation distance) using $\tilde{O}(1/\eps^3)$ samples \emph{independent of $n$}. The running time of the algorithm is \emph{quasilinear} in the size of its input data, i.e., $\tilde{O}(\log(n)/\eps^3)$ bit-operations. (Observe that each draw from the distribution is a $\log(n)$-bit string.) Our second main result is a {\em proper} learning algorithm that learns to $\eps$-accuracy using $\tilde{O}(1/\eps^2)$ samples, and runs in time $(1/\eps)^{\poly (\log (1/\eps))} \cdot \log n$. This is nearly optimal, since any algorithm {for this problem} must use $Ω(1/\eps^2)$ samples. We also give positive and negative results for some extensions of this learning problem to weighted sums of independent Bernoulli random variables.

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arXiv2014

A Counter-Example to Karlin's Strong Conjecture for Fictitious Play

Fictitious play is a natural dynamic for equilibrium play in zero-sum games, proposed by [Brown 1949], and shown to converge by [Robinson 1951]. Samuel Karlin conjectured in 1959 that fictitious play converges at rate $O(1/\sqrt{t})$ with the number of steps $t$. We disprove this conjecture showing that, when the payoff matrix of the row player is the $n \times n$ identity matrix, fictitious play may converge with rate as slow as $Ω(t^{-1/n})$.

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arXiv2014

Extreme-Value Theorems for Optimal Multidimensional Pricing

We provide a near-optimal, computationally efficient algorithm for the unit-demand pricing problem, where a seller wants to price n items to optimize revenue against a unit-demand buyer whose values for the items are independently drawn from known distributions. For any chosen accuracy eps>0 and item values bounded in [0,1], our algorithm achieves revenue that is optimal up to an additive error of at most eps, in polynomial time. For values sampled from Monotone Hazard Rate (MHR) distributions, we achieve a (1-eps)-fraction of the optimal revenue in polynomial time, while for values sampled from regular distributions the same revenue guarantees are achieved in quasi-polynomial time. Our algorithm for bounded distributions applies probabilistic techniques to understand the statistical properties of revenue distributions, obtaining a reduction in the search space of the algorithm via dynamic programming. Adapting this approach to MHR and regular distributions requires the proof of novel extreme value theorems for such distributions. As a byproduct, our techniques establish structural properties of approximately-optimal and near-optimal solutions. We show that, for values independently distributed according to MHR distributions, pricing all items at the same price achieves a constant fraction of the optimal revenue. Moreover, for all eps >0, g(1/eps) distinct prices suffice to obtain a (1-eps)-fraction of the optimal revenue, where g(1/eps) is quadratic in 1/eps and independent of n. Similarly, for all eps>0 and n>0, at most g(1/(eps log n)) distinct prices suffice if the values are independently distributed according to regular distributions, where g() is a polynomial function. Finally, when the values are i.i.d. from some MHR distribution, we show that, if n is a sufficiently large function of 1/eps, a single price suffices to achieve a (1-eps)-fraction of the optimal revenue.

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arXiv2014

Testing Poisson Binomial Distributions

A Poisson Binomial distribution over $n$ variables is the distribution of the sum of $n$ independent Bernoullis. We provide a sample near-optimal algorithm for testing whether a distribution $P$ supported on $\{0,...,n\}$ to which we have sample access is a Poisson Binomial distribution, or far from all Poisson Binomial distributions. The sample complexity of our algorithm is $O(n^{1/4})$ to which we provide a matching lower bound. We note that our sample complexity improves quadratically upon that of the naive "learn followed by tolerant-test" approach, while instance optimal identity testing [VV14] is not applicable since we are looking to simultaneously test against a whole family of distributions.

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arXiv2014

Sparse Covers for Sums of Indicators

For all $n, ε>0$, we show that the set of Poisson Binomial distributions on $n$ variables admits a proper $ε$-cover in total variation distance of size $n^2+n \cdot (1/ε)^{O(\log^2 (1/ε))}$, which can also be computed in polynomial time. We discuss the implications of our construction for approximation algorithms and the computation of approximate Nash equilibria in anonymous games.

stat.CO↗

arXiv2014

Learning $k$-Modal Distributions via Testing

A $k$-modal probability distribution over the discrete domain $\{1,...,n\}$ is one whose histogram has at most $k$ "peaks" and "valleys." Such distributions are natural generalizations of monotone ($k=0$) and unimodal ($k=1$) probability distributions, which have been intensively studied in probability theory and statistics. In this paper we consider the problem of \emph{learning} (i.e., performing density estimation of) an unknown $k$-modal distribution with respect to the $L_1$ distance. The learning algorithm is given access to independent samples drawn from an unknown $k$-modal distribution $p$, and it must output a hypothesis distribution $\widehat{p}$ such that with high probability the total variation distance between $p$ and $\widehat{p}$ is at most $ε.$ Our main goal is to obtain \emph{computationally efficient} algorithms for this problem that use (close to) an information-theoretically optimal number of samples. We give an efficient algorithm for this problem that runs in time $\mathrm{poly}(k,\log(n),1/ε)$. For $k \leq \tilde{O}(\log n)$, the number of samples used by our algorithm is very close (within an $\tilde{O}(\log(1/ε))$ factor) to being information-theoretically optimal. Prior to this work computationally efficient algorithms were known only for the cases $k=0,1$ \cite{Birge:87b,Birge:97}. A novel feature of our approach is that our learning algorithm crucially uses a new algorithm for \emph{property testing of probability distributions} as a key subroutine. The learning algorithm uses the property tester to efficiently decompose the $k$-modal distribution into $k$ (near-)monotone distributions, which are easier to learn.

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arXiv2014

Bayesian Truthful Mechanisms for Job Scheduling from Bi-criterion Approximation Algorithms

We provide polynomial-time approximately optimal Bayesian mechanisms for makespan minimization on unrelated machines as well as for max-min fair allocations of indivisible goods, with approximation factors of $2$ and $\min\{m-k+1, \tilde{O}(\sqrt{k})\}$ respectively, matching the approximation ratios of best known polynomial-time \emph{algorithms} (for max-min fairness, the latter claim is true for certain ratios of the number of goods $m$ to people $k$). Our mechanisms are obtained by establishing a polynomial-time approximation-sensitive reduction from the problem of designing approximately optimal {\em mechanisms} for some arbitrary objective ${\cal O}$ to that of designing bi-criterion approximation {\em algorithms} for the same objective ${\cal O}$ plus a linear allocation cost term. Our reduction is itself enabled by extending the celebrated "equivalence of separation and optimization"[GLSS81,KP80] to also accommodate bi-criterion approximations. Moreover, to apply the reduction to the specific problems of makespan and max-min fairness we develop polynomial-time bi-criterion approximation algorithms for makespan minimization with costs and max-min fairness with costs, adapting the algorithms of [ST93], [BD05] and [AS07] to the type of bi-criterion approximation that is required by the reduction.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2014

Faster and Sample Near-Optimal Algorithms for Proper Learning Mixtures of Gaussians

We provide an algorithm for properly learning mixtures of two single-dimensional Gaussians without any separability assumptions. Given $\tilde{O}(1/\varepsilon^2)$ samples from an unknown mixture, our algorithm outputs a mixture that is $\varepsilon$-close in total variation distance, in time $\tilde{O}(1/\varepsilon^5)$. Our sample complexity is optimal up to logarithmic factors, and significantly improves upon both Kalai et al., whose algorithm has a prohibitive dependence on $1/\varepsilon$, and Feldman et al., whose algorithm requires bounds on the mixture parameters and depends pseudo-polynomially in these parameters. One of our main contributions is an improved and generalized algorithm for selecting a good candidate distribution from among competing hypotheses. Namely, given a collection of $N$ hypotheses containing at least one candidate that is $\varepsilon$-close to an unknown distribution, our algorithm outputs a candidate which is $O(\varepsilon)$-close to the distribution. The algorithm requires ${O}(\log{N}/\varepsilon^2)$ samples from the unknown distribution and ${O}(N \log N/\varepsilon^2)$ time, which improves previous such results (such as the Scheffé estimator) from a quadratic dependence of the running time on $N$ to quasilinear. Given the wide use of such results for the purpose of hypothesis selection, our improved algorithm implies immediate improvements to any such use.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2013

How good is the Chord algorithm?

The Chord algorithm is a popular, simple method for the succinct approximation of curves, which is widely used, under different names, in a variety of areas, such as, multiobjective and parametric optimization, computational geometry, and graphics. We analyze the performance of the Chord algorithm, as compared to the optimal approximation that achieves a desired accuracy with the minimum number of points. We prove sharp upper and lower bounds, both in the worst case and average case setting.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2013

A Polynomial-time Approximation Scheme for Fault-tolerant Distributed Storage

We consider a problem which has received considerable attention in systems literature because of its applications to routing in delay tolerant networks and replica placement in distributed storage systems. In abstract terms the problem can be stated as follows: Given a random variable $X$ generated by a known product distribution over $\{0,1\}^n$ and a target value $0 \leq θ\leq 1$, output a non-negative vector $w$, with $\|w\|_1 \le 1$, which maximizes the probability of the event $w \cdot X \ge θ$. This is a challenging non-convex optimization problem for which even computing the value $\Pr[w \cdot X \ge θ]$ of a proposed solution vector $w$ is #P-hard. We provide an additive EPTAS for this problem which, for constant-bounded product distributions, runs in $ \poly(n) \cdot 2^{\poly(1/\eps)}$ time and outputs an $\eps$-approximately optimal solution vector $w$ for this problem. Our approach is inspired by, and extends, recent structural results from the complexity-theoretic study of linear threshold functions. Furthermore, in spite of the objective function being non-smooth, we give a \emph{unicriterion} PTAS while previous work for such objective functions has typically led to a \emph{bicriterion} PTAS. We believe our techniques may be applicable to get unicriterion PTAS for other non-smooth objective functions.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2013

Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization: Approximation Algorithms and other Generalizations

It was recently shown in [http://arxiv.org/abs/1207.5518] that revenue optimization can be computationally efficiently reduced to welfare optimization in all multi-dimensional Bayesian auction problems with arbitrary (possibly combinatorial) feasibility constraints and independent additive bidders with arbitrary (possibly combinatorial) demand constraints. This reduction provides a poly-time solution to the optimal mechanism design problem in all auction settings where welfare optimization can be solved efficiently, but it is fragile to approximation and cannot provide solutions to settings where welfare maximization can only be tractably approximated. In this paper, we extend the reduction to accommodate approximation algorithms, providing an approximation preserving reduction from (truthful) revenue maximization to (not necessarily truthful) welfare maximization. The mechanisms output by our reduction choose allocations via black-box calls to welfare approximation on randomly selected inputs, thereby generalizing also our earlier structural results on optimal multi-dimensional mechanisms to approximately optimal mechanisms. Unlike [http://arxiv.org/abs/1207.5518], our results here are obtained through novel uses of the Ellipsoid algorithm and other optimization techniques over {\em non-convex regions}.

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