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Constantinos Daskalakis

Publications and source records attributed to Constantinos Daskalakis.

At least 127 records · Page 7Linked to original sources
arXiv2013

Understanding Incentives: Mechanism Design becomes Algorithm Design

We provide a computationally efficient black-box reduction from mechanism design to algorithm design in very general settings. Specifically, we give an approximation-preserving reduction from truthfully maximizing \emph{any} objective under \emph{arbitrary} feasibility constraints with \emph{arbitrary} bidder types to (not necessarily truthfully) maximizing the same objective plus virtual welfare (under the same feasibility constraints). Our reduction is based on a fundamentally new approach: we describe a mechanism's behavior indirectly only in terms of the expected value it awards bidders for certain behavior, and never directly access the allocation rule at all. Applying our new approach to revenue, we exhibit settings where our reduction holds \emph{both ways}. That is, we also provide an approximation-sensitive reduction from (non-truthfully) maximizing virtual welfare to (truthfully) maximizing revenue, and therefore the two problems are computationally equivalent. With this equivalence in hand, we show that both problems are NP-hard to approximate within any polynomial factor, even for a single monotone submodular bidder. We further demonstrate the applicability of our reduction by providing a truthful mechanism maximizing fractional max-min fairness. This is the first instance of a truthful mechanism that optimizes a non-linear objective.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2013

The Complexity of Optimal Mechanism Design

Myerson's seminal work provides a computationally efficient revenue-optimal auction for selling one item to multiple bidders. Generalizing this work to selling multiple items at once has been a central question in economics and algorithmic game theory, but its complexity has remained poorly understood. We answer this question by showing that a revenue-optimal auction in multi-item settings cannot be found and implemented computationally efficiently, unless ZPP contains P^#P. This is true even for a single additive bidder whose values for the items are independently distributed on two rational numbers with rational probabilities. Our result is very general: we show that it is hard to compute any encoding of an optimal auction of any format (direct or indirect, truthful or non-truthful) that can be implemented in expected polynomial time. In particular, under well-believed complexity-theoretic assumptions, revenue-optimization in very simple multi-item settings can only be tractably approximated. We note that our hardness result applies to randomized mechanisms in a very simple setting, and is not an artifact of introducing combinatorial structure to the problem by allowing correlation among item values, introducing combinatorial valuations, or requiring the mechanism to be deterministic (whose structure is readily combinatorial). Our proof is enabled by a flow-interpretation of the solutions of an exponential-size linear program for revenue maximization with an additional supermodularity constraint.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2013

Alignment-free phylogenetic reconstruction: Sample complexity via a branching process analysis

We present an efficient phylogenetic reconstruction algorithm allowing insertions and deletions which provably achieves a sequence-length requirement (or sample complexity) growing polynomially in the number of taxa. Our algorithm is distance-based, that is, it relies on pairwise sequence comparisons. More importantly, our approach largely bypasses the difficult problem of multiple sequence alignment.

math.PR↗
arXiv2012

Connectivity and equilibrium in random games

We study how the structure of the interaction graph of a game affects the existence of pure Nash equilibria. In particular, for a fixed interaction graph, we are interested in whether there are pure Nash equilibria arising when random utility tables are assigned to the players. We provide conditions for the structure of the graph under which equilibria are likely to exist and complementary conditions which make the existence of equilibria highly unlikely. Our results have immediate implications for many deterministic graphs and generalize known results for random games on the complete graph. In particular, our results imply that the probability that bounded degree graphs have pure Nash equilibria is exponentially small in the size of the graph and yield a simple algorithm that finds small nonexistence certificates for a large family of graphs. Then we show that in any strongly connected graph of n vertices with expansion $(1+Ω(1))\log_2(n)$ the distribution of the number of equilibria approaches the Poisson distribution with parameter 1, asymptotically as $n \to +\infty$.

math.PR↗
arXiv2012

Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization

We provide a reduction from revenue maximization to welfare maximization in multi-dimensional Bayesian auctions with arbitrary (possibly combinatorial) feasibility constraints and independent bidders with arbitrary (possibly combinatorial) demand constraints, appropriately extending Myerson's result to this setting. We also show that every feasible Bayesian auction can be implemented as a distribution over virtual VCG allocation rules. A virtual VCG allocation rule has the following simple form: Every bidder's type t_i is transformed into a virtual type f_i(t_i), via a bidder-specific function. Then, the allocation maximizing virtual welfare is chosen. Using this characterization, we show how to find and run the revenue-optimal auction given only black box access to an implementation of the VCG allocation rule. We generalize this result to arbitrarily correlated bidders, introducing the notion of a second-order VCG allocation rule. We obtain our reduction from revenue to welfare optimization via two algorithmic results on reduced forms in settings with arbitrary feasibility and demand constraints. First, we provide a separation oracle for determining feasibility of a reduced form. Second, we provide a geometric algorithm to decompose any feasible reduced form into a distribution over virtual VCG allocation rules. In addition, we show how to execute both algorithms given only black box access to an implementation of the VCG allocation rule. Our results are computationally efficient for all multi-dimensional settings where the bidders are additive. In this case, our mechanisms run in time polynomial in the total number of bidder types, but not type profiles. For generic correlated distributions, this is the natural description complexity of the problem. The runtime can be further improved to poly(#items, #bidders) in item-symmetric settings by making use of recent techniques.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2011

Testing $k$-Modal Distributions: Optimal Algorithms via Reductions

We give highly efficient algorithms, and almost matching lower bounds, for a range of basic statistical problems that involve testing and estimating the L_1 distance between two k-modal distributions $p$ and $q$ over the discrete domain $\{1,\dots,n\}$. More precisely, we consider the following four problems: given sample access to an unknown k-modal distribution $p$, Testing identity to a known or unknown distribution: 1. Determine whether $p = q$ (for an explicitly given k-modal distribution $q$) versus $p$ is $\eps$-far from $q$; 2. Determine whether $p=q$ (where $q$ is available via sample access) versus $p$ is $\eps$-far from $q$; Estimating $L_1$ distance ("tolerant testing'') against a known or unknown distribution: 3. Approximate $d_{TV}(p,q)$ to within additive $\eps$ where $q$ is an explicitly given k-modal distribution $q$; 4. Approximate $d_{TV}(p,q)$ to within additive $\eps$ where $q$ is available via sample access. For each of these four problems we give sub-logarithmic sample algorithms, that we show are tight up to additive $\poly(k)$ and multiplicative $\polylog\log n+\polylog k$ factors. Thus our bounds significantly improve the previous results of \cite{BKR:04}, which were for testing identity of distributions (items (1) and (2) above) in the special cases k=0 (monotone distributions) and k=1 (unimodal distributions) and required $O((\log n)^3)$ samples. As our main conceptual contribution, we introduce a new reduction-based approach for distribution-testing problems that lets us obtain all the above results in a unified way. Roughly speaking, this approach enables us to transform various distribution testing problems for k-modal distributions over $\{1,\dots,n\}$ to the corresponding distribution testing problems for unrestricted distributions over a much smaller domain $\{1,\dots,\ell\}$ where $\ell = O(k \log n).$

cs.DS↗
arXiv2011

On Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design

We efficiently solve the optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design problem for independent bidders with arbitrary demand constraints when either the number of bidders is a constant or the number of items is a constant. In the first setting, we need that each bidder's values for the items are sampled from a possibly correlated, item-symmetric distribution, allowing different distributions for each bidder. In the second setting, we allow the values of each bidder for the items to be arbitrarily correlated, but assume that the distribution of bidder types is bidder-symmetric. For all eps>0, we obtain an additive eps-approximation, when the value distributions are bounded, or a multiplicative (1-eps)-approximation when the value distributions are unbounded, but satisfy the Monotone Hazard Rate condition, covering a widely studied class of distributions in Economics. Our runtime is polynomial in max{#items,#bidders}, and not the size of the support of the joint distribution of all bidders' values for all items, which is typically exponential in both the number of items and the number of bidders. Our mechanisms are randomized, explicitly price bundles, and can sometimes accommodate budget constraints. Our results are enabled by establishing several new tools and structural properties of Bayesian mechanisms. We provide a symmetrization technique turning any truthful mechanism into one that has the same revenue and respects all symmetries in the underlying value distributions. We also prove that item-symmetric mechanisms satisfy a natural monotonicity property which, unlike cyclic-monotonicity, can be harnessed algorithmically. Finally, we provide a technique that turns any given eps-BIC mechanism (i.e. one where incentive constraints are violated by eps) into a truly-BIC mechanism at the cost of O(sqrt{eps}) revenue. We expect our tools to be used beyond the settings we consider here.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2011

Learning transformed product distributions

We consider the problem of learning an unknown product distribution $X$ over $\{0,1\}^n$ using samples $f(X)$ where $f$ is a \emph{known} transformation function. Each choice of a transformation function $f$ specifies a learning problem in this framework. Information-theoretic arguments show that for every transformation function $f$ the corresponding learning problem can be solved to accuracy $\eps$, using $\tilde{O}(n/\eps^2)$ examples, by a generic algorithm whose running time may be exponential in $n.$ We show that this learning problem can be computationally intractable even for constant $\eps$ and rather simple transformation functions. Moreover, the above sample complexity bound is nearly optimal for the general problem, as we give a simple explicit linear transformation function $f(x)=w \cdot x$ with integer weights $w_i \leq n$ and prove that the corresponding learning problem requires $Ω(n)$ samples. As our main positive result we give a highly efficient algorithm for learning a sum of independent unknown Bernoulli random variables, corresponding to the transformation function $f(x)= \sum_{i=1}^n x_i$. Our algorithm learns to $\eps$-accuracy in poly$(n)$ time, using a surprising poly$(1/\eps)$ number of samples that is independent of $n.$ We also give an efficient algorithm that uses $\log n \cdot \poly(1/\eps)$ samples but has running time that is only $\poly(\log n, 1/\eps).$

cs.LG↗
arXiv2011

On Oblivious PTAS's for Nash Equilibrium

If a game has a Nash equilibrium with probability values that are either zero or Omega(1) then this equilibrium can be found exhaustively in polynomial time. Somewhat surprisingly, we show that there is a PTAS for the games whose equilibria are guaranteed to have small-O(1/n)-values, and therefore large-Omega(n)-supports. We also point out that there is a PTAS for games with sparse payoff matrices, which are known to be PPAD-complete to solve exactly. Both algorithms are of a special kind that we call oblivious: The algorithm just samples a fixed distribution on pairs of mixed strategies, and the game is only used to determine whether the sampled strategies comprise an eps-Nash equilibrium; the answer is yes with inverse polynomial probability. These results bring about the question: Is there an oblivious PTAS for Nash equilibrium in general games? We answer this question in the negative; our lower bound comes close to the quasi-polynomial upper bound of [Lipton, Markakis, Mehta 2003]. Another recent PTAS for anonymous games is also oblivious in a weaker sense appropriate for this class of games (it samples from a fixed distribution on unordered collections of mixed strategies), but its runtime is exponential in 1/eps. We prove that any oblivious PTAS for anonymous games with two strategies and three player types must have 1/eps^c in the exponent of the running time for some c>1/3, rendering the algorithm in [Daskalakis 2008] essentially optimal within oblivious algorithms. In contrast, we devise a poly(n) (1/eps)^O(log^2(1/eps)) non-oblivious PTAS for anonymous games with 2 strategies and any bounded number of player types. Our algorithm is based on the construction of a sparse (and efficiently computable) eps-cover of the set of all possible sums of n independent indicators, under the total variation distance. The size of the cover is poly(n) (1/ eps^{O(log^2 (1/eps))}.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2009

Global Alignment of Molecular Sequences via Ancestral State Reconstruction

Molecular phylogenetic techniques do not generally account for such common evolutionary events as site insertions and deletions (known as indels). Instead tree building algorithms and ancestral state inference procedures typically rely on substitution-only models of sequence evolution. In practice these methods are extended beyond this simplified setting with the use of heuristics that produce global alignments of the input sequences--an important problem which has no rigorous model-based solution. In this paper we consider a new version of the multiple sequence alignment in the context of stochastic indel models. More precisely, we introduce the following {\em trace reconstruction problem on a tree} (TRPT): a binary sequence is broadcast through a tree channel where we allow substitutions, deletions, and insertions; we seek to reconstruct the original sequence from the sequences received at the leaves of the tree. We give a recursive procedure for this problem with strong reconstruction guarantees at low mutation rates, providing also an alignment of the sequences at the leaves of the tree. The TRPT problem without indels has been studied in previous work (Mossel 2004, Daskalakis et al. 2006) as a bootstrapping step towards obtaining optimal phylogenetic reconstruction methods. The present work sets up a framework for extending these works to evolutionary models with indels.

math.PR↗
arXiv2009

Phylogenies without Branch Bounds: Contracting the Short, Pruning the Deep

We introduce a new phylogenetic reconstruction algorithm which, unlike most previous rigorous inference techniques, does not rely on assumptions regarding the branch lengths or the depth of the tree. The algorithm returns a forest which is guaranteed to contain all edges that are: 1) sufficiently long and 2) sufficiently close to the leaves. How much of the true tree is recovered depends on the sequence length provided. The algorithm is distance-based and runs in polynomial time.

q-bio.PE↗
arXiv2009

Evolutionary Trees and the Ising Model on the Bethe Lattice: a Proof of Steel's Conjecture

A major task of evolutionary biology is the reconstruction of phylogenetic trees from molecular data. The evolutionary model is given by a Markov chain on a tree. Given samples from the leaves of the Markov chain, the goal is to reconstruct the leaf-labelled tree. It is well known that in order to reconstruct a tree on $n$ leaves, sample sequences of length $Ω(\log n)$ are needed. It was conjectured by M. Steel that for the CFN/Ising evolutionary model, if the mutation probability on all edges of the tree is less than $p^{\ast} = (\sqrt{2}-1)/2^{3/2}$, then the tree can be recovered from sequences of length $O(\log n)$. The value $p^{\ast}$ is given by the transition point for the extremality of the free Gibbs measure for the Ising model on the binary tree. Steel's conjecture was proven by the second author in the special case where the tree is "balanced." The second author also proved that if all edges have mutation probability larger than $p^{\ast}$ then the length needed is $n^{Ω(1)}$. Here we show that Steel's conjecture holds true for general trees by giving a reconstruction algorithm that recovers the tree from $O(\log n)$-length sequences when the mutation probabilities are discretized and less than $p^\ast$. Our proof and results demonstrate that extremality of the free Gibbs measure on the infinite binary tree, which has been studied before in probability, statistical physics and computer science, determines how distinguishable are Gibbs measures on finite binary trees.

math.PR↗
arXiv2008

An Efficient PTAS for Two-Strategy Anonymous Games

We present a novel polynomial time approximation scheme for two-strategy anonymous games, in which the players' utility functions, although potentially different, do not differentiate among the identities of the other players. Our algorithm computes an $eps$-approximate Nash equilibrium of an $n$-player 2-strategy anonymous game in time $poly(n) (1/eps)^{O(1/eps^2)}$, which significantly improves upon the running time $n^{O(1/eps^2)}$ required by the algorithm of Daskalakis & Papadimitriou, 2007. The improved running time is based on a new structural understanding of approximate Nash equilibria: We show that, for any $eps$, there exists an $eps$-approximate Nash equilibrium in which either only $O(1/eps^3)$ players randomize, or all players who randomize use the same mixed strategy. To show this result we employ tools from the literature on Stein's Method.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2008

Discretized Multinomial Distributions and Nash Equilibria in Anonymous Games

We show that there is a polynomial-time approximation scheme for computing Nash equilibria in anonymous games with any fixed number of strategies (a very broad and important class of games), extending the two-strategy result of Daskalakis and Papadimitriou 2007. The approximation guarantee follows from a probabilistic result of more general interest: The distribution of the sum of n independent unit vectors with values ranging over {e1, e2, ...,ek}, where ei is the unit vector along dimension i of the k-dimensional Euclidean space, can be approximated by the distribution of the sum of another set of independent unit vectors whose probabilities of obtaining each value are multiples of 1/z for some integer z, and so that the variational distance of the two distributions is at most eps, where eps is bounded by an inverse polynomial in z and a function of k, but with no dependence on n. Our probabilistic result specifies the construction of a surprisingly sparse eps-cover -- under the total variation distance -- of the set of distributions of sums of independent unit vectors, which is of interest on its own right.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2008

Probabilistic Analysis of Linear Programming Decoding

We initiate the probabilistic analysis of linear programming (LP) decoding of low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes. Specifically, we show that for a random LDPC code ensemble, the linear programming decoder of Feldman et al. succeeds in correcting a constant fraction of errors with high probability. The fraction of correctable errors guaranteed by our analysis surpasses previous non-asymptotic results for LDPC codes, and in particular exceeds the best previous finite-length result on LP decoding by a factor greater than ten. This improvement stems in part from our analysis of probabilistic bit-flipping channels, as opposed to adversarial channels. At the core of our analysis is a novel combinatorial characterization of LP decoding success, based on the notion of a generalized matching. An interesting by-product of our analysis is to establish the existence of ``probabilistic expansion'' in random bipartite graphs, in which one requires only that almost every (as opposed to every) set of a certain size expands, for sets much larger than in the classical worst-case setting.

cs.IT↗
arXiv2008

On the Complexity of Nash Equilibria of Action-Graph Games

We consider the problem of computing Nash Equilibria of action-graph games (AGGs). AGGs, introduced by Bhat and Leyton-Brown, is a succinct representation of games that encapsulates both "local" dependencies as in graphical games, and partial indifference to other agents' identities as in anonymous games, which occur in many natural settings. This is achieved by specifying a graph on the set of actions, so that the payoff of an agent for selecting a strategy depends only on the number of agents playing each of the neighboring strategies in the action graph. We present a Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme for computing mixed Nash equilibria of AGGs with constant treewidth and a constant number of agent types (and an arbitrary number of strategies), together with hardness results for the cases when either the treewidth or the number of agent types is unconstrained. In particular, we show that even if the action graph is a tree, but the number of agent-types is unconstrained, it is NP-complete to decide the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and PPAD-complete to compute a mixed Nash equilibrium (even an approximate one); similarly for symmetric AGGs (all agents belong to a single type), if we allow arbitrary treewidth. These hardness results suggest that, in some sense, our PTAS is as strong of a positive result as one can expect.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2007

Computing Equilibria in Anonymous Games

We present efficient approximation algorithms for finding Nash equilibria in anonymous games, that is, games in which the players utilities, though different, do not differentiate between other players. Our results pertain to such games with many players but few strategies. We show that any such game has an approximate pure Nash equilibrium, computable in polynomial time, with approximation O(s^2 L), where s is the number of strategies and L is the Lipschitz constant of the utilities. Finally, we show that there is a PTAS for finding an epsilon

cs.GT↗