arXiv subjects

Corinna Hertweck

Publications and source records attributed to Corinna Hertweck.

9 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Prompt Revision as a Source of Cultural Bias in Text-to-Image Systems

Commercial text-to-image systems silently revise user prompts before generating images, a step users typically cannot disable or even see. Yet, existing audits of cultural bias examine only the final images and treat generation as a single pipeline, so they cannot tell where the bias originates. We introduce WORLDVIEW, a multilingual benchmark of 8,960 prompts across 15 languages and 31 language-context pairings. Using it, we audit the revision layer in three systems (DALL-E-3, Imagen-4, GPT-Image-1.5) through a three-step analysis of how heavily it marks each cultural context, whether it flattens that context into a narrow vocabulary, and whether that vocabulary is stereotypical. Relative to a no-context English baseline, the US is the least-marked context, while non-Western and non-Anglophone contexts are marked far more heavily, flattened into narrow vocabularies applied across topically diverse prompts, and reduced to recognizable cultural stereotypes. Comparing images from original versus revised prompts on models without a revision layer, we identify the layer itself as a previously undocumented, causal source of this stereotyping. To locate cultural bias, and fix it, we must audit the system as deployed, not the model alone.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2024

What's Distributive Justice Got to Do with It? Rethinking Algorithmic Fairness from the Perspective of Approximate Justice

In the field of algorithmic fairness, many fairness criteria have been proposed. Oftentimes, their proposal is only accompanied by a loose link to ideas from moral philosophy -- which makes it difficult to understand when the proposed criteria should be used to evaluate the fairness of a decision-making system. More recently, researchers have thus retroactively tried to tie existing fairness criteria to philosophical concepts. Group fairness criteria have typically been linked to egalitarianism, a theory of distributive justice. This makes it tempting to believe that fairness criteria mathematically represent ideals of distributive justice and this is indeed how they are typically portrayed. In this paper, we will discuss why the current approach of linking algorithmic fairness and distributive justice is too simplistic and, hence, insufficient. We argue that in the context of imperfect decision-making systems -- which is what we deal with in algorithmic fairness -- we should not only care about what the ideal distribution of benefits/harms among individuals would look like but also about how deviations from said ideal are distributed. Our claim is that algorithmic fairness is concerned with unfairness in these deviations. This requires us to rethink the way in which we, as algorithmic fairness researchers, view distributive justice and use fairness criteria.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2023

Distributive Justice as the Foundational Premise of Fair ML: Unification, Extension, and Interpretation of Group Fairness Metrics

Group fairness metrics are an established way of assessing the fairness of prediction-based decision-making systems. However, these metrics are still insufficiently linked to philosophical theories, and their moral meaning is often unclear. In this paper, we propose a comprehensive framework for group fairness metrics, which links them to more theories of distributive justice. The different group fairness metrics differ in their choices about how to measure the benefit or harm of a decision for the affected individuals, and what moral claims to benefits are assumed. Our unifying framework reveals the normative choices associated with standard group fairness metrics and allows an interpretation of their moral substance. In addition, this broader view provides a structure for the expansion of standard fairness metrics that we find in the literature. This expansion allows addressing several criticisms of standard group fairness metrics, specifically: (1) they are parity-based, i.e., they demand some form of equality between groups, which may sometimes be detrimental to marginalized groups; (2) they only compare decisions across groups but not the resulting consequences for these groups; and (3) the full breadth of the distributive justice literature is not sufficiently represented.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2023

A Justice-Based Framework for the Analysis of Algorithmic Fairness-Utility Trade-Offs

In prediction-based decision-making systems, different perspectives can be at odds: The short-term business goals of the decision makers are often in conflict with the decision subjects' wish to be treated fairly. Balancing these two perspectives is a question of values. However, these values are often hidden in the technicalities of the implementation of the decision-making system. In this paper, we propose a framework to make these value-laden choices clearly visible. We focus on a setting in which we want to find decision rules that balance the perspective of the decision maker and of the decision subjects. We provide an approach to formalize both perspectives, i.e., to assess the utility of the decision maker and the fairness towards the decision subjects. In both cases, the idea is to elicit values from decision makers and decision subjects that are then turned into something measurable. For the fairness evaluation, we build on well-known theories of distributive justice and on the algorithmic literature to ask what a fair distribution of utility (or welfare) looks like. This allows us to derive a fairness score that we then compare to the decision maker's utility. As we focus on a setting in which we are given a trained model and have to choose a decision rule, we use the concept of Pareto efficiency to compare decision rules. Our proposed framework can both guide the implementation of a decision-making system and help with audits, as it allows us to resurface the values implemented in a decision-making system.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2022

People are not coins. Morally distinct types of predictions necessitate different fairness constraints

A recent paper (Hedden 2021) has argued that most of the group fairness constraints discussed in the machine learning literature are not necessary conditions for the fairness of predictions, and hence that there are no genuine fairness metrics. This is proven by discussing a special case of a fair prediction. In our paper, we show that Hedden 's argument does not hold for the most common kind of predictions used in data science, which are about people and based on data from similar people; we call these human-group-based practices. We argue that there is a morally salient distinction between human-group-based practices and those that are based on data of only one person, which we call human-individual-based practices. Thus, what may be a necessary condition for the fairness of human-group-based practices may not be a necessary condition for the fairness of human-individual-based practices, on which Hedden 's argument is based. Accordingly, the group fairness metrics discussed in the machine learning literature may still be relevant for most applications of prediction-based decision making.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2022

Gradual (In)Compatibility of Fairness Criteria

Impossibility results show that important fairness measures (independence, separation, sufficiency) cannot be satisfied at the same time under reasonable assumptions. This paper explores whether we can satisfy and/or improve these fairness measures simultaneously to a certain degree. We introduce information-theoretic formulations of the fairness measures and define degrees of fairness based on these formulations. The information-theoretic formulations suggest unexplored theoretical relations between the three fairness measures. In the experimental part, we use the information-theoretic expressions as regularizers to obtain fairness-regularized predictors for three standard datasets. Our experiments show that a) fairness regularization directly increases fairness measures, in line with existing work, and b) some fairness regularizations indirectly increase other fairness measures, as suggested by our theoretical findings. This establishes that it is possible to increase the degree to which some fairness measures are satisfied at the same time -- some fairness measures are gradually compatible.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2021

A Systematic Approach to Group Fairness in Automated Decision Making

While the field of algorithmic fairness has brought forth many ways to measure and improve the fairness of machine learning models, these findings are still not widely used in practice. We suspect that one reason for this is that the field of algorithmic fairness came up with a lot of definitions of fairness, which are difficult to navigate. The goal of this paper is to provide data scientists with an accessible introduction to group fairness metrics and to give some insight into the philosophical reasoning for caring about these metrics. We will do this by considering in which sense socio-demographic groups are compared for making a statement on fairness.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2021

On the Moral Justification of Statistical Parity

A crucial but often neglected aspect of algorithmic fairness is the question of how we justify enforcing a certain fairness metric from a moral perspective. When fairness metrics are proposed, they are typically argued for by highlighting their mathematical properties. Rarely are the moral assumptions beneath the metric explained. Our aim in this paper is to consider the moral aspects associated with the statistical fairness criterion of independence (statistical parity). To this end, we consider previous work, which discusses the two worldviews "What You See Is What You Get" (WYSIWYG) and "We're All Equal" (WAE) and by doing so provides some guidance for clarifying the possible assumptions in the design of algorithms. We present an extension of this work, which centers on morality. The most natural moral extension is that independence needs to be fulfilled if and only if differences in predictive features (e.g. high school grades and standardized test scores are predictive of performance at university) between socio-demographic groups are caused by unjust social disparities or measurement errors. Through two counterexamples, we demonstrate that this extension is not universally true. This means that the question of whether independence should be used or not cannot be satisfactorily answered by only considering the justness of differences in the predictive features.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2020

Towards Data-Driven Affirmative Action Policies under Uncertainty

In this paper, we study university admissions under a centralized system that uses grades and standardized test scores to match applicants to university programs. We consider affirmative action policies that seek to increase the number of admitted applicants from underrepresented groups. Since such a policy has to be announced before the start of the application period, there is uncertainty about the score distribution of the students applying to each program. This poses a difficult challenge for policy-makers. We explore the possibility of using a predictive model trained on historical data to help optimize the parameters of such policies.

cs.CY↗