arXiv subjects

Daigo Shishika

Publications and source records attributed to Daigo Shishika.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Deception and Counter Deception in Adversarial Graph Traversal Game

We study deception in adversarial graph traversal, where a mobile agent seeks to reach a goal with minimum cost while an adversary alters edge costs to increase the total traversal cost. Unlike prior works that assume fixed observer-deceiver roles, we model this problem with two-sided incomplete information in which both players possess private information and update beliefs from observed actions. To solve the resulting indefinite-horizon game, we develop an adaptation of the Extensive-Form Double Oracle (XDO) algorithm. While the standard XDO algorithm is designed for finite games, the proposed adaptation ensures bounded computation despite endogenous game termination. We show that the proposed algorithm terminates in finite time and returns an epsilon-Nash equilibrium. Finally, we use Value of Information to characterize the deceptive and counter-deceptive behaviors that emerge from equilibrium strategies.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2026

Linear Programming Approach to Deceptive Path Planning Game with Goal Selection

In adversarial settings, a mobile agent may strategically plan its motion to influence an opponent's inference about its intended goal. We study deceptive path planning in a scenario where a mobile agent aims to reach a privately selected goal while an adversarial observer allocates limited defensive resources based on the observed trajectory. Unlike classical path-planning and goal-recognition approaches that model observers as passive inference process, our game-theoretic formulation models them as strategic decision-makers. For the resulting dynamic asymmetric-information game, we develop an efficient solution method that combines a linear programming formulation with the Double Oracle algorithm. To evaluate performance, we introduce metrics that quantify both the risk and the effectiveness of deception and provide illustrative numerical examples.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2026

Asymmetric-Information Resource Allocation Games: An LP Approach to Purposeful Deception

In this work, we introduce the Deceptive Resource Allocation Game (DRAG), which studies purposeful deception within a Bayesian game framework. In DRAG, a Defender allocates resources across the true asset and several decoys to influence an Attacker's beliefs and actions, with the goal of diverting the Attacker away from the true asset. We seek to characterize purposeful deception, whereby the Defender deceives only when doing so improves its performance. To this end, we solve for the Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (PBNE) of the corresponding game. We show that, despite the coupled belief-policy interdependence, the problem admits an efficient, non-iterative linear programming formulation. Numerical results demonstrate that the resulting policies naturally balance effective allocation and belief manipulation, giving rise to purposeful and emergent deceptive behaviors.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Optimal Hiding with Partial Information of the Seeker's Route

We consider a hide-and-seek game between a Hider and a Seeker over a finite set of locations. The Hider chooses one location to conceal a stationary treasure, while the Seeker visits the locations sequentially along a route. As the search progresses, the Hider observes a prefix of the Seeker's route. After observing this information, the Hider has the option to relocate the treasure at most once to another unvisited location by paying a switching cost. We study two seeker models. In the first, the Seeker is unaware of the fact that the Hider can relocate. In the second, the Seeker select its route while accounting for the possibility that the Hider observes its path and reallocates. For the restricted case, we define the value-of-information created by the reveal and derive upper bounds in terms of the switching cost using a worst-case evaluation over routes. We also show that seeker awareness reduces the game value, with the difference between the restricted and feedback models bounded by the entry-wise gap between the corresponding payoff matrices. Numerical examples show how this benefit decreases as the switching cost increases and as the reveal occurs later along the route.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2026

Forecast-Aware Cooperative Planning on Temporal Graphs under Stochastic Adversarial Risk

Cooperative multi-robot missions often require teams of robots to traverse environments where traversal risk evolves due to adversary patrols or shifting hazards with stochastic dynamics. While support coordination--where robots assist teammates in traversing risky regions--can significantly reduce mission costs, its effectiveness depends on the team's ability to anticipate future risk. Existing support-based frameworks assume static risk landscapes and therefore fail to account for predictable temporal trends in risk evolution. We propose a forecast-aware cooperative planning framework that integrates stochastic risk forecasting with anticipatory support allocation on temporal graphs. By modeling adversary dynamics as a first-order Markov stay-move process over graph edges, we propagate the resulting edge-occupancy probabilities forward in time to generate time-indexed edge-risk forecasts. These forecasts guide the proactive allocation of support positions to forecasted risky edges for effective support coordination, while also informing joint robot path planning. Experimental results demonstrate that our approach consistently reduces total expected team cost compared to non-anticipatory baselines, approaching the performance of an oracle planner.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2026

Game-Theory-Assisted Reinforcement Learning for Border Defense: Early Termination based on Analytical Solutions

Game theory provides the gold standard for analyzing adversarial engagements, offering strong optimality guarantees. However, these guarantees often become brittle when assumptions such as perfect information are violated. Reinforcement learning (RL), by contrast, is adaptive but can be sample-inefficient in large, complex domains. This paper introduces a hybrid approach that leverages game-theoretic insights to improve RL training efficiency. We study a border defense game with limited perceptual range, where defender performance depends on both search and pursuit strategies, making classical differential game solutions inapplicable. Our method employs the Apollonius Circle (AC) to compute equilibrium in the post-detection phase, enabling early termination of RL episodes without learning pursuit dynamics. This allows RL to concentrate on learning search strategies while guaranteeing optimal continuation after detection. Across single- and multi-defender settings, this early termination method yields 10-20% higher rewards, faster convergence, and more efficient search trajectories. Extensive experiments validate these findings and demonstrate the overall effectiveness of our approach.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Target Defense Using a Turret and Mobile Defender Team

A scenario is considered wherein a stationary, turn constrained agent (Turret) and a mobile agent (Defender) cooperate to protect the former from an adversarial mobile agent (Attacker). The Attacker wishes to reach the Turret prior to getting captured by either the Defender or Turret, if possible. Meanwhile, the Defender and Turret seek to capture the Attacker as far from the Turret as possible. This scenario is formulated as a differential game and solved using a geometric approach. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the Turret-Defender team winning and the Attacker winning are given. In the case of the Turret-Defender team winning equilibrium strategies for the min max terminal distance of the Attacker to the Turret are given. Three cases arise corresponding to solo capture by the Defender, solo capture by the Turret, and capture simultaneously by both Turret and Defender.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2025

Deceptive Path Planning: A Bayesian Game Approach

This paper investigates how an autonomous agent can transmit information through its motion in an adversarial setting. We consider scenarios where an agent must reach its goal while deceiving an intelligent observer about its destination. We model this interaction as a dynamic Bayesian game between a mobile Attacker with a privately known goal and a Defender who infers the Attacker's intent to allocate defensive resources effectively. We use Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (PBNE) as our solution concept and propose a computationally efficient approach to find it. In the resulting equilibrium, the Defender employs a simple Markovian strategy, while the Attacker strategically balances deception and goal efficiency by stochastically mixing shortest and non-shortest paths to manipulate the Defender's beliefs. Numerical experiments demonstrate the advantages of our PBNE-based strategies over existing methods based on one-sided optimization.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2024

Heterogeneous Team Coordination on Partially Observable Graphs with Realistic Communication

Team Coordination on Graphs with Risky Edges (\textsc{tcgre}) is a recently proposed problem, in which robots find paths to their goals while considering possible coordination to reduce overall team cost. However, \textsc{tcgre} assumes that the \emph{entire} environment is available to a \emph{homogeneous} robot team with \emph{ubiquitous} communication. In this paper, we study an extended version of \textsc{tcgre}, called \textsc{hpr-tcgre}, with three relaxations: Heterogeneous robots, Partial observability, and Realistic communication. To this end, we form a new combinatorial optimization problem on top of \textsc{tcgre}. After analysis, we divide it into two sub-problems, one for robots moving individually, another for robots in groups, depending on their communication availability. Then, we develop an algorithm that exploits real-time partial maps to solve local shortest path(s) problems, with a A*-like sub-goal(s) assignment mechanism that explores potential coordination opportunities for global interests. Extensive experiments indicate that our algorithm is able to produce team coordination behaviors in order to reduce overall cost even with our three relaxations.

cs.RO↗

arXiv2024

Heterogeneous Roles against Assignment Based Policies in Two vs Two Target Defense Game

In this paper, we consider a target defense game in which the attacker team seeks to reach a high-value target while the defender team seeks to prevent that by capturing them away from the target. To address the curse of dimensionality, a popular approach to solve such team-vs-team game is to decompose it into a set of one-vs-one games. Such an approximation assumes independence between teammates assigned to different one-vs-one games, ignoring the possibility of a richer set of cooperative behaviors, ultimately leading to suboptimality. In this paper, we provide teammate-aware strategies for the attacker team and show that they can outperform the assignment-based strategy, if the defenders still employ an assignment-based strategy. More specifically, the attacker strategy involves heterogeneous roles where one attacker actively intercepts a defender to help its teammate reach the target. We provide sufficient conditions under which such a strategy benefits the attackers, and we validate the results using numerical simulations.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2024

Multi-Robot Coordination Induced in an Adversarial Graph-Traversal Game

This paper presents a game theoretic formulation of a graph traversal problem, with applications to robots moving through hazardous environments in the presence of an adversary, as in military and security scenarios. The blue team of robots moves in an environment modeled by a time-varying graph, attempting to reach some goal with minimum cost, while the red team controls how the graph changes to maximize the cost. The problem is formulated as a stochastic game, so that Nash equilibrium strategies can be computed numerically. Bounds are provided for the game value, with a guarantee that it solves the original problem. Numerical simulations demonstrate the results and the effectiveness of this method, particularly showing the benefit of mixing actions for both players, as well as beneficial coordinated behavior, where blue robots split up and/or synchronize to traverse risky edges.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Learning Coordinated Maneuver in Adversarial Environments

This paper aims to solve the coordination of a team of robots traversing a route in the presence of adversaries with random positions. Our goal is to minimize the overall cost of the team, which is determined by (i) the accumulated risk when robots stay in adversary-impacted zones and (ii) the mission completion time. During traversal, robots can reduce their speed and act as a `guard' (the slower, the better), which will decrease the risks certain adversary incurs. This leads to a trade-off between the robots' guarding behaviors and their travel speeds. The formulated problem is highly non-convex and cannot be efficiently solved by existing algorithms. Our approach includes a theoretical analysis of the robots' behaviors for the single-adversary case. As the scale of the problem expands, solving the optimal solution using optimization approaches is challenging, therefore, we employ reinforcement learning techniques by developing new encoding and policy-generating methods. Simulations demonstrate that our learning methods can efficiently produce team coordination behaviors. We discuss the reasoning behind these behaviors and explain why they reduce the overall team cost.

cs.RO↗

arXiv2024

Guarding a Target Area from a Heterogeneous Group of Cooperative Attackers

In this paper, we investigate a multi-agent target guarding problem in which a single defender seeks to capture multiple attackers aiming to reach a high-value target area. In contrast to previous studies, the attackers herein are assumed to be heterogeneous in the sense that they have not only different speeds but also different weights representing their respective degrees of importance (e.g., the amount of allocated resources). The objective of the attacker team is to jointly minimize the weighted sum of their final levels of proximity to the target area, whereas the defender aims to maximize the same value. Using geometric arguments, we construct candidate equilibrium control policies that require the solution of a (possibly nonconvex) optimization problem. Subsequently, we validate the optimality of the candidate control policies using parametric optimization techniques. Lastly, we provide numerical examples to illustrate how cooperative behaviors emerge within the attacker team due to their heterogeneity.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2024

Deception in Differential Games: Information Limiting Strategy to Induce Dilemma

Can deception exist in differential games? We provide a case study for a Turret-Attacker differential game, where two Attackers seek to score points by reaching a target region while a Turret tries to minimize the score by aligning itself with the Attackers before they reach the target. In contrast to the original problem solved with complete information, we assume that the Turret only has partial information about the maximum speed of the Attackers. We investigate whether there is any incentive for the Attackers to move slower than their maximum speed in order to ``deceive'' the Turret into taking suboptimal actions. We first describe the existence of a dilemma that the Turret may face. Then we derive a set of initial conditions from which the Attackers can force the Turret into a situation where it must take a guess.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Bi-CL: A Reinforcement Learning Framework for Robots Coordination Through Bi-level Optimization

In multi-robot systems, achieving coordinated missions remains a significant challenge due to the coupled nature of coordination behaviors and the lack of global information for individual robots. To mitigate these challenges, this paper introduces a novel approach, Bi-level Coordination Learning (Bi-CL), that leverages a bi-level optimization structure within a centralized training and decentralized execution paradigm. Our bi-level reformulation decomposes the original problem into a reinforcement learning level with reduced action space, and an imitation learning level that gains demonstrations from a global optimizer. Both levels contribute to improved learning efficiency and scalability. We note that robots' incomplete information leads to mismatches between the two levels of learning models. To address this, Bi-CL further integrates an alignment penalty mechanism, aiming to minimize the discrepancy between the two levels without degrading their training efficiency. We introduce a running example to conceptualize the problem formulation and apply Bi-CL to two variations of this example: route-based and graph-based scenarios. Simulation results demonstrate that Bi-CL can learn more efficiently and achieve comparable performance with traditional multi-agent reinforcement learning baselines for multi-robot coordination.

cs.RO↗

arXiv2024

Team Coordination on Graphs: Problem, Analysis, and Algorithms

Team Coordination on Graphs with Risky Edges (TCGRE) is a recently emerged problem, in which a robot team collectively reduces graph traversal cost through support from one robot to another when the latter traverses a risky edge. Resembling the traditional Multi-Agent Path Finding (MAPF) problem, both classical and learning-based methods have been proposed to solve TCGRE, however, they lacked either computational efficiency or optimality assurance. In this paper, we reformulate TCGRE as a constrained optimization problem and perform a rigorous mathematical analysis. Our theoretical analysis shows the NP-hardness of TCGRE by reduction from the Maximum 3D Matching problem and that efficient decomposition is a key to tackle this combinatorial optimization problem. Furthermore, we design three classes of algorithms to solve TCGRE, i.e., Joint State Graph (JSG) based, coordination based, and receding-horizon sub-team based solutions. Each of these proposed algorithms enjoy different provable optimality and efficiency characteristics that are demonstrated in our extensive experiments.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2024

Scaling Team Coordination on Graphs with Reinforcement Learning

This paper studies Reinforcement Learning (RL) techniques to enable team coordination behaviors in graph environments with support actions among teammates to reduce the costs of traversing certain risky edges in a centralized manner. While classical approaches can solve this non-standard multi-agent path planning problem by converting the original Environment Graph (EG) into a Joint State Graph (JSG) to implicitly incorporate the support actions, those methods do not scale well to large graphs and teams. To address this curse of dimensionality, we propose to use RL to enable agents to learn such graph traversal and teammate supporting behaviors in a data-driven manner. Specifically, through a new formulation of the team coordination on graphs with risky edges problem into Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) with a novel state and action space, we investigate how RL can solve it in two paradigms: First, we use RL for a team of agents to learn how to coordinate and reach the goal with minimal cost on a single EG. We show that RL efficiently solves problems with up to 20/4 or 25/3 nodes/agents, using a fraction of the time needed for JSG to solve such complex problems; Second, we learn a general RL policy for any $N$-node EGs to produce efficient supporting behaviors. We present extensive experiments and compare our RL approaches against their classical counterparts.

cs.RO↗

arXiv2024

Optimal Evasion from a Sensing-Limited Pursuer

This paper investigates a partial-information pursuit evasion game in which the Pursuer has a limited-range sensor to detect the Evader. Given a fixed final time, we derive the optimal evasion strategy for the Evader to maximize its distance from the pursuer at the end. Our analysis reveals that in certain parametric regimes, the optimal Evasion strategy involves a 'risky' maneuver, where the Evader's trajectory comes extremely close to the pursuer's sensing boundary before moving behind the Pursuer. Additionally, we explore a special case in which the Pursuer can choose the final time. In this scenario, we determine a (Nash) equilibrium pair for both the final time and the evasion strategy.

cs.GT↗