arXiv subjects

Daniel Ben-Levi

Publications and source records attributed to Daniel Ben-Levi.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Mirage Probes: How Vision Models Fake Visual Understanding

Vision-language models (VLMs) can answer image-based questions confidently, and often correctly, even when no image is provided. This mirage behavior inflates benchmark scores without reflecting visual grounding. Prior work treats this as a single failure mode. We argue it is two. Using Mirage Probes, a contrastive probing framework that pairs paraphrased question variants with matched mirage and non-mirage labels on the same image, we show that mirage behavior is linearly decodable from internal activations across residual stream, MLP, post-attention, and attention-head sites in two open-source VLMs. We demonstrate that a Naive Bayes text baseline cannot recover this signal, ruling out surface lexical confounds. Cross-benchmark separability patterns, together with a novel Prior Harnessing Index (PHI) measuring how much a model can answer from text alone, expose two distinct regimes: textual biases, where the model answers from language priors without engaging visual representations, and spurious images, where it constructs false visual content in latent space and answers as if grounded. The distinction has direct mitigation consequences: text-distribution cleaning can address the first regime but cannot reach the second, since spurious-image mirages live in the model's visual representations rather than its text. Faithful visual grounding will require interventions at the representational level.

cs.CV↗

arXiv2025

Proactive defense against LLM Jailbreak

The proliferation of powerful large language models (LLMs) has necessitated robust safety alignment, yet these models remain vulnerable to evolving adversarial attacks, including multi-turn jailbreaks that iteratively search for successful queries. Current defenses, which are primarily reactive and static, often fail to handle these iterative attacks. In this paper, we introduce ProAct, a novel proactive defense framework designed to disrupt and mislead these iterative search jailbreak methods. Our core idea is to intentionally mislead these jailbreak methods into thinking that the model has been jailbroken with "spurious responses". These misleading responses provide false signals to the attacker's internal optimization loop, causing the adversarial search to terminate prematurely and effectively jailbreaking the jailbreak. By conducting extensive experiments across state-of-the-art LLMs, jailbreaking frameworks, and safety benchmarks, we demonstrate that our method consistently and significantly reduces attack success rates by up to 94% without affecting utility. When combined with other defense fraeworks, it further reduces the latest attack strategies' success rate to 0%. ProActrepresents an orthogonal defense strategy that serves as an additional guardrail to enhance LLM safety against the most effective jailbreaking attacks.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2024

Diversity Helps Jailbreak Large Language Models

We have uncovered a powerful jailbreak technique that leverages large language models' ability to diverge from prior context, enabling them to bypass safety constraints and generate harmful outputs. By simply instructing the LLM to deviate and obfuscate previous attacks, our method dramatically outperforms existing approaches, achieving up to a 62.83% higher success rate in compromising ten leading chatbots, including GPT-4, Gemini, and Llama, while using only 12.9% of the queries. This revelation exposes a critical flaw in current LLM safety training, suggesting that existing methods may merely mask vulnerabilities rather than eliminate them. Our findings sound an urgent alarm for the need to revolutionize testing methodologies to ensure robust and reliable LLM security.

cs.CL↗