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Donghwa Seo

Publications and source records attributed to Donghwa Seo.

3 recordsLinked to original sources

When Cross-Venue Agreement Is Not Price Discovery: Disclosure Frontiers for 24/7 Equity-Perpetual Oracles

Crypto-listed equity perpetuals trade while the primary cash market is closed, yet still need a mark for margin, funding, and liquidation. We model the closed-window mark as the fixed point of an oracle operator with two blocks: external anchoring and self/peer derivative reference. From marks and proxies alone the two are observationally equivalent: every reduced form admits infinitely many topology decompositions, and a path-law argument extends this to the full mark dynamics, so lead-lag and information-share estimators have power equal to size. Disclosure breaks the tie -- disclosed diagonal adjustment identifies the normalized topology, and disclosed support with forbidden anchors gives a row-level test that identifies, falsifies, or leaves a positive-dimensional class under a rank condition and finite-sample tolerance. Empirically, a disclosed OKX row survives pre-open falsification while a pure-external baseline shows the test's limited power, and an eight-week deep-closed panel with cash-reopen validation bounds the live-external content of closure variance. Cross-venue agreement is not price discovery unless disclosure or the cash reopen breaks the equivalence class.

q-fin.TR

Mind the Gap in the Mining Game

We analyze intentional block delays (mining gaps) in Proof-of-Work blockchain systems, where miners strategically balance mining rewards against operational costs. Using a game-theoretic model, we derive a Nash equilibrium with optimal mining strategies and establish necessary and sufficient conditions for mining gap existence. We demonstrate that mining gaps, when combined with difficulty adjustment algorithms, can destabilize the system. We propose conditions to address sustainability concerns as block rewards decrease and reliance on transaction fees increases. Our findings are illustrated through a two-player game simulation and an analysis of the Bitcoin network, providing insights for blockchain design and policy. This work contributes to understanding strategic mining behavior and its impact on blockchain stability and efficiency.

q-fin.GN

Strategic Users in a Priority Queue with Bulk Service on Blockchains

This paper analyzes transaction fees on blockchains by considering that they form a priority queue and users play a queueing game. Using an M/G^K/1 priority queue model, we provide new insights into the dynamics governing transaction fees and their impact on user behavior. We derive semi-closed form expressions for steady-state quantities and extend the relationship between user delay costs and transaction fees to general block generation times. We apply the model to the Bitcoin network and simulate user responses under various scenarios. Cross-chain analysis across Bitcoin, Dogecoin, and Litecoin reveals similarities in normalized cost structures.

q-fin.TR