arXiv subjects

Dylan Hadfield-Menell

Publications and source records attributed to Dylan Hadfield-Menell.

At least 55 records · Page 3Linked to original sources

arXiv2023

Measuring the Success of Diffusion Models at Imitating Human Artists

Modern diffusion models have set the state-of-the-art in AI image generation. Their success is due, in part, to training on Internet-scale data which often includes copyrighted work. This prompts questions about the extent to which these models learn from, imitate, or copy the work of human artists. This work suggests that tying copyright liability to the capabilities of the model may be useful given the evolving ecosystem of generative models. Specifically, much of the legal analysis of copyright and generative systems focuses on the use of protected data for training. As a result, the connections between data, training, and the system are often obscured. In our approach, we consider simple image classification techniques to measure a model's ability to imitate specific artists. Specifically, we use Contrastive Language-Image Pretrained (CLIP) encoders to classify images in a zero-shot fashion. Our process first prompts a model to imitate a specific artist. Then, we test whether CLIP can be used to reclassify the artist (or the artist's work) from the imitation. If these tests match the imitation back to the original artist, this suggests the model can imitate that artist's expression. Our approach is simple and quantitative. Furthermore, it uses standard techniques and does not require additional training. We demonstrate our approach with an audit of Stable Diffusion's capacity to imitate 70 professional digital artists with copyrighted work online. When Stable Diffusion is prompted to imitate an artist from this set, we find that the artist can be identified from the imitation with an average accuracy of 81.0%. Finally, we also show that a sample of the artist's work can be matched to these imitation images with a high degree of statistical reliability. Overall, these results suggest that Stable Diffusion is broadly successful at imitating individual human artists.

cs.CV↗

arXiv2023

Diagnostics for Deep Neural Networks with Automated Copy/Paste Attacks

This paper considers the problem of helping humans exercise scalable oversight over deep neural networks (DNNs). Adversarial examples can be useful by helping to reveal weaknesses in DNNs, but they can be difficult to interpret or draw actionable conclusions from. Some previous works have proposed using human-interpretable adversarial attacks including copy/paste attacks in which one natural image pasted into another causes an unexpected misclassification. We build on these with two contributions. First, we introduce Search for Natural Adversarial Features Using Embeddings (SNAFUE) which offers a fully automated method for finding copy/paste attacks. Second, we use SNAFUE to red team an ImageNet classifier. We reproduce copy/paste attacks from previous works and find hundreds of other easily-describable vulnerabilities, all without a human in the loop. Code is available at https://github.com/thestephencasper/snafue

cs.LG↗

arXiv2023

Recommending to Strategic Users

Recommendation systems are pervasive in the digital economy. An important assumption in many deployed systems is that user consumption reflects user preferences in a static sense: users consume the content they like with no other considerations in mind. However, as we document in a large-scale online survey, users do choose content strategically to influence the types of content they get recommended in the future. We model this user behavior as a two-stage noisy signalling game between the recommendation system and users: the recommendation system initially commits to a recommendation policy, presents content to the users during a cold start phase which the users choose to strategically consume in order to affect the types of content they will be recommended in a recommendation phase. We show that in equilibrium, users engage in behaviors that accentuate their differences to users of different preference profiles. In addition, (statistical) minorities out of fear of losing their minority content exposition may not consume content that is liked by mainstream users. We next propose three interventions that may improve recommendation quality (both on average and for minorities) when taking into account strategic consumption: (1) Adopting a recommendation system policy that uses preferences from a prior, (2) Communicating to users that universally liked ("mainstream") content will not be used as basis of recommendation, and (3) Serving content that is personalized-enough yet expected to be liked in the beginning. Finally, we describe a methodology to inform applied theory modeling with survey results.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2022

How to talk so AI will learn: Instructions, descriptions, and autonomy

From the earliest years of our lives, humans use language to express our beliefs and desires. Being able to talk to artificial agents about our preferences would thus fulfill a central goal of value alignment. Yet today, we lack computational models explaining such language use. To address this challenge, we formalize learning from language in a contextual bandit setting and ask how a human might communicate preferences over behaviors. We study two distinct types of language: $\textit{instructions}$, which provide information about the desired policy, and $\textit{descriptions}$, which provide information about the reward function. We show that the agent's degree of autonomy determines which form of language is optimal: instructions are better in low-autonomy settings, but descriptions are better when the agent will need to act independently. We then define a pragmatic listener agent that robustly infers the speaker's reward function by reasoning about $\textit{how}$ the speaker expresses themselves. We validate our models with a behavioral experiment, demonstrating that (1) our speaker model predicts human behavior, and (2) our pragmatic listener successfully recovers humans' reward functions. Finally, we show that this form of social learning can integrate with and reduce regret in traditional reinforcement learning. We hope these insights facilitate a shift from developing agents that $\textit{obey}$ language to agents that $\textit{learn}$ from it.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2022

Towards Psychologically-Grounded Dynamic Preference Models

Designing recommendation systems that serve content aligned with time varying preferences requires proper accounting of the feedback effects of recommendations on human behavior and psychological condition. We argue that modeling the influence of recommendations on people's preferences must be grounded in psychologically plausible models. We contribute a methodology for developing grounded dynamic preference models. We demonstrate this method with models that capture three classic effects from the psychology literature: Mere-Exposure, Operant Conditioning, and Hedonic Adaptation. We conduct simulation-based studies to show that the psychological models manifest distinct behaviors that can inform system design. Our study has two direct implications for dynamic user modeling in recommendation systems. First, the methodology we outline is broadly applicable for psychologically grounding dynamic preference models. It allows us to critique recent contributions based on their limited discussion of psychological foundation and their implausible predictions. Second, we discuss implications of dynamic preference models for recommendation systems evaluation and design. In an example, we show that engagement and diversity metrics may be unable to capture desirable recommendation system performance.

cs.IR↗

arXiv2022

Building Human Values into Recommender Systems: An Interdisciplinary Synthesis

Recommender systems are the algorithms which select, filter, and personalize content across many of the worlds largest platforms and apps. As such, their positive and negative effects on individuals and on societies have been extensively theorized and studied. Our overarching question is how to ensure that recommender systems enact the values of the individuals and societies that they serve. Addressing this question in a principled fashion requires technical knowledge of recommender design and operation, and also critically depends on insights from diverse fields including social science, ethics, economics, psychology, policy and law. This paper is a multidisciplinary effort to synthesize theory and practice from different perspectives, with the goal of providing a shared language, articulating current design approaches, and identifying open problems. It is not a comprehensive survey of this large space, but a set of highlights identified by our diverse author cohort. We collect a set of values that seem most relevant to recommender systems operating across different domains, then examine them from the perspectives of current industry practice, measurement, product design, and policy approaches. Important open problems include multi-stakeholder processes for defining values and resolving trade-offs, better values-driven measurements, recommender controls that people use, non-behavioral algorithmic feedback, optimization for long-term outcomes, causal inference of recommender effects, academic-industry research collaborations, and interdisciplinary policy-making.

cs.IR↗

arXiv2022

Estimating and Penalizing Induced Preference Shifts in Recommender Systems

The content that a recommender system (RS) shows to users influences them. Therefore, when choosing a recommender to deploy, one is implicitly also choosing to induce specific internal states in users. Even more, systems trained via long-horizon optimization will have direct incentives to manipulate users: in this work, we focus on the incentive to shift user preferences so they are easier to satisfy. We argue that - before deployment - system designers should: estimate the shifts a recommender would induce; evaluate whether such shifts would be undesirable; and perhaps even actively optimize to avoid problematic shifts. These steps involve two challenging ingredients: estimation requires anticipating how hypothetical algorithms would influence user preferences if deployed - we do this by using historical user interaction data to train a predictive user model which implicitly contains their preference dynamics; evaluation and optimization additionally require metrics to assess whether such influences are manipulative or otherwise unwanted - we use the notion of "safe shifts", that define a trust region within which behavior is safe: for instance, the natural way in which users would shift without interference from the system could be deemed "safe". In simulated experiments, we show that our learned preference dynamics model is effective in estimating user preferences and how they would respond to new recommenders. Additionally, we show that recommenders that optimize for staying in the trust region can avoid manipulative behaviors while still generating engagement.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2022

Linguistic communication as (inverse) reward design

Natural language is an intuitive and expressive way to communicate reward information to autonomous agents. It encompasses everything from concrete instructions to abstract descriptions of the world. Despite this, natural language is often challenging to learn from: it is difficult for machine learning methods to make appropriate inferences from such a wide range of input. This paper proposes a generalization of reward design as a unifying principle to ground linguistic communication: speakers choose utterances to maximize expected rewards from the listener's future behaviors. We first extend reward design to incorporate reasoning about unknown future states in a linear bandit setting. We then define a speaker model which chooses utterances according to this objective. Simulations show that short-horizon speakers (reasoning primarily about a single, known state) tend to use instructions, while long-horizon speakers (reasoning primarily about unknown, future states) tend to describe the reward function. We then define a pragmatic listener which performs inverse reward design by jointly inferring the speaker's latent horizon and rewards. Our findings suggest that this extension of reward design to linguistic communication, including the notion of a latent speaker horizon, is a promising direction for achieving more robust alignment outcomes from natural language supervision.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2021

Guided Imitation of Task and Motion Planning

While modern policy optimization methods can do complex manipulation from sensory data, they struggle on problems with extended time horizons and multiple sub-goals. On the other hand, task and motion planning (TAMP) methods scale to long horizons but they are computationally expensive and need to precisely track world state. We propose a method that draws on the strength of both methods: we train a policy to imitate a TAMP solver's output. This produces a feed-forward policy that can accomplish multi-step tasks from sensory data. First, we build an asynchronous distributed TAMP solver that can produce supervision data fast enough for imitation learning. Then, we propose a hierarchical policy architecture that lets us use partially trained control policies to speed up the TAMP solver. In robotic manipulation tasks with 7-DoF joint control, the partially trained policies reduce the time needed for planning by a factor of up to 2.6. Among these tasks, we can learn a policy that solves the RoboSuite 4-object pick-place task 88% of the time from object pose observations and a policy that solves the RoboDesk 9-goal benchmark 79% of the time from RGB images (averaged across the 9 disparate tasks).

cs.RO↗

arXiv2021

What are you optimizing for? Aligning Recommender Systems with Human Values

We describe cases where real recommender systems were modified in the service of various human values such as diversity, fairness, well-being, time well spent, and factual accuracy. From this we identify the current practice of values engineering: the creation of classifiers from human-created data with value-based labels. This has worked in practice for a variety of issues, but problems are addressed one at a time, and users and other stakeholders have seldom been involved. Instead, we look to AI alignment work for approaches that could learn complex values directly from stakeholders, and identify four major directions: useful measures of alignment, participatory design and operation, interactive value learning, and informed deliberative judgments.

cs.IR↗

arXiv2021

When Curation Becomes Creation: Algorithms, Microcontent, and the Vanishing Distinction between Platforms and Creators

Ever since social activity on the Internet began migrating from the wilds of the open web to the walled gardens erected by so-called platforms, debates have raged about the responsibilities that these platforms ought to bear. And yet, despite intense scrutiny from the news media and grassroots movements of outraged users, platforms continue to operate, from a legal standpoint, on the friendliest terms. Under the current regulatory framework, platforms simultaneously benefit from: (1) broad discretion to organize (and censor) content however they choose; (2) powerful algorithms for curating a practically limitless supply of user-posted microcontent according to whatever ends they wish; and (3) absolution from the sorts of liability born by creators of the underlying content. In this paper, we contest the very validity of the platform-creator distinction, arguing that it is ill-adapted to the modern social media landscape where, in a real sense, platforms are creating derivative media products. We argue that any coherent regulatory framework must adapt to this reality, recognizing the subtle continuum of activities that span the curation-creation spectrum, providing a finer system of categorization and clearer guidance for precisely when platforms assume the responsibilities associated with content creation.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2021

Consequences of Misaligned AI

AI systems often rely on two key components: a specified goal or reward function and an optimization algorithm to compute the optimal behavior for that goal. This approach is intended to provide value for a principal: the user on whose behalf the agent acts. The objectives given to these agents often refer to a partial specification of the principal's goals. We consider the cost of this incompleteness by analyzing a model of a principal and an agent in a resource constrained world where the $L$ attributes of the state correspond to different sources of utility for the principal. We assume that the reward function given to the agent only has support on $J < L$ attributes. The contributions of our paper are as follows: 1) we propose a novel model of an incomplete principal-agent problem from artificial intelligence; 2) we provide necessary and sufficient conditions under which indefinitely optimizing for any incomplete proxy objective leads to arbitrarily low overall utility; and 3) we show how modifying the setup to allow reward functions that reference the full state or allowing the principal to update the proxy objective over time can lead to higher utility solutions. The results in this paper argue that we should view the design of reward functions as an interactive and dynamic process and identifies a theoretical scenario where some degree of interactivity is desirable.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2020

Multi-Principal Assistance Games: Definition and Collegial Mechanisms

We introduce the concept of a multi-principal assistance game (MPAG), and circumvent an obstacle in social choice theory, Gibbard's theorem, by using a sufficiently collegial preference inference mechanism. In an MPAG, a single agent assists N human principals who may have widely different preferences. MPAGs generalize assistance games, also known as cooperative inverse reinforcement learning games. We analyze in particular a generalization of apprenticeship learning in which the humans first perform some work to obtain utility and demonstrate their preferences, and then the robot acts to further maximize the sum of human payoffs. We show in this setting that if the game is sufficiently collegial, i.e. if the humans are responsible for obtaining a sufficient fraction of the rewards through their own actions, then their preferences are straightforwardly revealed through their work. This revelation mechanism is non-dictatorial, does not limit the possible outcomes to two alternatives, and is dominant-strategy incentive-compatible.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2020

Inverse Reward Design

Autonomous agents optimize the reward function we give them. What they don't know is how hard it is for us to design a reward function that actually captures what we want. When designing the reward, we might think of some specific training scenarios, and make sure that the reward will lead to the right behavior in those scenarios. Inevitably, agents encounter new scenarios (e.g., new types of terrain) where optimizing that same reward may lead to undesired behavior. Our insight is that reward functions are merely observations about what the designer actually wants, and that they should be interpreted in the context in which they were designed. We introduce inverse reward design (IRD) as the problem of inferring the true objective based on the designed reward and the training MDP. We introduce approximate methods for solving IRD problems, and use their solution to plan risk-averse behavior in test MDPs. Empirical results suggest that this approach can help alleviate negative side effects of misspecified reward functions and mitigate reward hacking.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2020

Multi-Principal Assistance Games

Assistance games (also known as cooperative inverse reinforcement learning games) have been proposed as a model for beneficial AI, wherein a robotic agent must act on behalf of a human principal but is initially uncertain about the humans payoff function. This paper studies multi-principal assistance games, which cover the more general case in which the robot acts on behalf of N humans who may have widely differing payoffs. Impossibility theorems in social choice theory and voting theory can be applied to such games, suggesting that strategic behavior by the human principals may complicate the robots task in learning their payoffs. We analyze in particular a bandit apprentice game in which the humans act first to demonstrate their individual preferences for the arms and then the robot acts to maximize the sum of human payoffs. We explore the extent to which the cost of choosing suboptimal arms reduces the incentive to mislead, a form of natural mechanism design. In this context we propose a social choice method that uses shared control of a system to combine preference inference with social welfare optimization.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2020

Conservative Agency via Attainable Utility Preservation

Reward functions are easy to misspecify; although designers can make corrections after observing mistakes, an agent pursuing a misspecified reward function can irreversibly change the state of its environment. If that change precludes optimization of the correctly specified reward function, then correction is futile. For example, a robotic factory assistant could break expensive equipment due to a reward misspecification; even if the designers immediately correct the reward function, the damage is done. To mitigate this risk, we introduce an approach that balances optimization of the primary reward function with preservation of the ability to optimize auxiliary reward functions. Surprisingly, even when the auxiliary reward functions are randomly generated and therefore uninformative about the correctly specified reward function, this approach induces conservative, effective behavior.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2020

On the Utility of Model Learning in HRI

Fundamental to robotics is the debate between model-based and model-free learning: should the robot build an explicit model of the world, or learn a policy directly? In the context of HRI, part of the world to be modeled is the human. One option is for the robot to treat the human as a black box and learn a policy for how they act directly. But it can also model the human as an agent, and rely on a "theory of mind" to guide or bias the learning (grey box). We contribute a characterization of the performance of these methods for an autonomous driving task under the optimistic case of having an ideal theory of mind, as well as under different scenarios in which the assumptions behind the robot's theory of mind for the human are wrong, as they inevitably will be in practice.

cs.RO↗

arXiv2020

Silly rules improve the capacity of agents to learn stable enforcement and compliance behaviors

How can societies learn to enforce and comply with social norms? Here we investigate the learning dynamics and emergence of compliance and enforcement of social norms in a foraging game, implemented in a multi-agent reinforcement learning setting. In this spatiotemporally extended game, individuals are incentivized to implement complex berry-foraging policies and punish transgressions against social taboos covering specific berry types. We show that agents benefit when eating poisonous berries is taboo, meaning the behavior is punished by other agents, as this helps overcome a credit-assignment problem in discovering delayed health effects. Critically, however, we also show that introducing an additional taboo, which results in punishment for eating a harmless berry, improves the rate and stability with which agents learn to punish taboo violations and comply with taboos. Counterintuitively, our results show that an arbitrary taboo (a "silly rule") can enhance social learning dynamics and achieve better outcomes in the middle stages of learning. We discuss the results in the context of studying normativity as a group-level emergent phenomenon.

cs.MA↗