arXiv subjects

Dylan Hadfield-Menell

Publications and source records attributed to Dylan Hadfield-Menell.

68 records · Page 4Linked to original sources

arXiv2019

Active Inverse Reward Design

Designers of AI agents often iterate on the reward function in a trial-and-error process until they get the desired behavior, but this only guarantees good behavior in the training environment. We propose structuring this process as a series of queries asking the user to compare between different reward functions. Thus we can actively select queries for maximum informativeness about the true reward. In contrast to approaches asking the designer for optimal behavior, this allows us to gather additional information by eliciting preferences between suboptimal behaviors. After each query, we need to update the posterior over the true reward function from observing the proxy reward function chosen by the designer. The recently proposed Inverse Reward Design (IRD) enables this. Our approach substantially outperforms IRD in test environments. In particular, it can query the designer about interpretable, linear reward functions and still infer non-linear ones.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2019

An Extensible Interactive Interface for Agent Design

In artificial intelligence, we often specify tasks through a reward function. While this works well in some settings, many tasks are hard to specify this way. In deep reinforcement learning, for example, directly specifying a reward as a function of a high-dimensional observation is challenging. Instead, we present an interface for specifying tasks interactively using demonstrations. Our approach defines a set of increasingly complex policies. The interface allows the user to switch between these policies at fixed intervals to generate demonstrations of novel, more complex, tasks. We train new policies based on these demonstrations and repeat the process. We present a case study of our approach in the Lunar Lander domain, and show that this simple approach can quickly learn a successful landing policy and outperforms an existing comparison-based deep RL method.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2019

Adversarial Training with Voronoi Constraints

Adversarial examples are a pervasive phenomenon of machine learning models where seemingly imperceptible perturbations to the input lead to misclassifications for otherwise statistically accurate models. We propose a geometric framework, drawing on tools from the manifold reconstruction literature, to analyze the high-dimensional geometry of adversarial examples. In particular, we highlight the importance of codimension: for low-dimensional data manifolds embedded in high-dimensional space there are many directions off the manifold in which an adversary could construct adversarial examples. Adversarial examples are a natural consequence of learning a decision boundary that classifies the low-dimensional data manifold well, but classifies points near the manifold incorrectly. Using our geometric framework we prove that adversarial training is sample inefficient, and show sufficient sampling conditions under which nearest neighbor classifiers and ball-based adversarial training are robust. Finally we introduce adversarial training with Voronoi constraints, which replaces the norm ball constraint with the Voronoi cell for each point in the training set. We show that adversarial training with Voronoi constraints produces robust models which significantly improve over the state-of-the-art on MNIST and are competitive on CIFAR-10.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2019

The Assistive Multi-Armed Bandit

Learning preferences implicit in the choices humans make is a well studied problem in both economics and computer science. However, most work makes the assumption that humans are acting (noisily) optimally with respect to their preferences. Such approaches can fail when people are themselves learning about what they want. In this work, we introduce the assistive multi-armed bandit, where a robot assists a human playing a bandit task to maximize cumulative reward. In this problem, the human does not know the reward function but can learn it through the rewards received from arm pulls; the robot only observes which arms the human pulls but not the reward associated with each pull. We offer sufficient and necessary conditions for successfully assisting the human in this framework. Surprisingly, better human performance in isolation does not necessarily lead to better performance when assisted by the robot: a human policy can do better by effectively communicating its observed rewards to the robot. We conduct proof-of-concept experiments that support these results. We see this work as contributing towards a theory behind algorithms for human-robot interaction.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2018

Human-AI Learning Performance in Multi-Armed Bandits

People frequently face challenging decision-making problems in which outcomes are uncertain or unknown. Artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms exist that can outperform humans at learning such tasks. Thus, there is an opportunity for AI agents to assist people in learning these tasks more effectively. In this work, we use a multi-armed bandit as a controlled setting in which to explore this direction. We pair humans with a selection of agents and observe how well each human-agent team performs. We find that team performance can beat both human and agent performance in isolation. Interestingly, we also find that an agent's performance in isolation does not necessarily correlate with the human-agent team's performance. A drop in agent performance can lead to a disproportionately large drop in team performance, or in some settings can even improve team performance. Pairing a human with an agent that performs slightly better than them can make them perform much better, while pairing them with an agent that performs the same can make them them perform much worse. Further, our results suggest that people have different exploration strategies and might perform better with agents that match their strategy. Overall, optimizing human-agent team performance requires going beyond optimizing agent performance, to understanding how the agent's suggestions will influence human decision-making.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2018

On the Geometry of Adversarial Examples

Adversarial examples are a pervasive phenomenon of machine learning models where seemingly imperceptible perturbations to the input lead to misclassifications for otherwise statistically accurate models. We propose a geometric framework, drawing on tools from the manifold reconstruction literature, to analyze the high-dimensional geometry of adversarial examples. In particular, we highlight the importance of codimension: for low-dimensional data manifolds embedded in high-dimensional space there are many directions off the manifold in which to construct adversarial examples. Adversarial examples are a natural consequence of learning a decision boundary that classifies the low-dimensional data manifold well, but classifies points near the manifold incorrectly. Using our geometric framework we prove (1) a tradeoff between robustness under different norms, (2) that adversarial training in balls around the data is sample inefficient, and (3) sufficient sampling conditions under which nearest neighbor classifiers and ball-based adversarial training are robust.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2018

Legible Normativity for AI Alignment: The Value of Silly Rules

It has become commonplace to assert that autonomous agents will have to be built to follow human rules of behavior--social norms and laws. But human laws and norms are complex and culturally varied systems, in many cases agents will have to learn the rules. This requires autonomous agents to have models of how human rule systems work so that they can make reliable predictions about rules. In this paper we contribute to the building of such models by analyzing an overlooked distinction between important rules and what we call silly rules--rules with no discernible direct impact on welfare. We show that silly rules render a normative system both more robust and more adaptable in response to shocks to perceived stability. They make normativity more legible for humans, and can increase legibility for AI systems as well. For AI systems to integrate into human normative systems, we suggest, it may be important for them to have models that include representations of silly rules.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2018

An Efficient, Generalized Bellman Update For Cooperative Inverse Reinforcement Learning

Our goal is for AI systems to correctly identify and act according to their human user's objectives. Cooperative Inverse Reinforcement Learning (CIRL) formalizes this value alignment problem as a two-player game between a human and robot, in which only the human knows the parameters of the reward function: the robot needs to learn them as the interaction unfolds. Previous work showed that CIRL can be solved as a POMDP, but with an action space size exponential in the size of the reward parameter space. In this work, we exploit a specific property of CIRL---the human is a full information agent---to derive an optimality-preserving modification to the standard Bellman update; this reduces the complexity of the problem by an exponential factor and allows us to relax CIRL's assumption of human rationality. We apply this update to a variety of POMDP solvers and find that it enables us to scale CIRL to non-trivial problems, with larger reward parameter spaces, and larger action spaces for both robot and human. In solutions to these larger problems, the human exhibits pedagogic (teaching) behavior, while the robot interprets it as such and attains higher value for the human.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2018

Simplifying Reward Design through Divide-and-Conquer

Designing a good reward function is essential to robot planning and reinforcement learning, but it can also be challenging and frustrating. The reward needs to work across multiple different environments, and that often requires many iterations of tuning. We introduce a novel divide-and-conquer approach that enables the designer to specify a reward separately for each environment. By treating these separate reward functions as observations about the underlying true reward, we derive an approach to infer a common reward across all environments. We conduct user studies in an abstract grid world domain and in a motion planning domain for a 7-DOF manipulator that measure user effort and solution quality. We show that our method is faster, easier to use, and produces a higher quality solution than the typical method of designing a reward jointly across all environments. We additionally conduct a series of experiments that measure the sensitivity of these results to different properties of the reward design task, such as the number of environments, the number of feasible solutions per environment, and the fraction of the total features that vary within each environment. We find that independent reward design outperforms the standard, joint, reward design process but works best when the design problem can be divided into simpler subproblems.

cs.RO↗

arXiv2018

Incomplete Contracting and AI Alignment

We suggest that the analysis of incomplete contracting developed by law and economics researchers can provide a useful framework for understanding the AI alignment problem and help to generate a systematic approach to finding solutions. We first provide an overview of the incomplete contracting literature and explore parallels between this work and the problem of AI alignment. As we emphasize, misalignment between principal and agent is a core focus of economic analysis. We highlight some technical results from the economics literature on incomplete contracts that may provide insights for AI alignment researchers. Our core contribution, however, is to bring to bear an insight that economists have been urged to absorb from legal scholars and other behavioral scientists: the fact that human contracting is supported by substantial amounts of external structure, such as generally available institutions (culture, law) that can supply implied terms to fill the gaps in incomplete contracts. We propose a research agenda for AI alignment work that focuses on the problem of how to build AI that can replicate the human cognitive processes that connect individual incomplete contracts with this supporting external structure.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2018

Pragmatic-Pedagogic Value Alignment

As intelligent systems gain autonomy and capability, it becomes vital to ensure that their objectives match those of their human users; this is known as the value-alignment problem. In robotics, value alignment is key to the design of collaborative robots that can integrate into human workflows, successfully inferring and adapting to their users' objectives as they go. We argue that a meaningful solution to value alignment must combine multi-agent decision theory with rich mathematical models of human cognition, enabling robots to tap into people's natural collaborative capabilities. We present a solution to the cooperative inverse reinforcement learning (CIRL) dynamic game based on well-established cognitive models of decision making and theory of mind. The solution captures a key reciprocity relation: the human will not plan her actions in isolation, but rather reason pedagogically about how the robot might learn from them; the robot, in turn, can anticipate this and interpret the human's actions pragmatically. To our knowledge, this work constitutes the first formal analysis of value alignment grounded in empirically validated cognitive models.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2018

Expressive Robot Motion Timing

Our goal is to enable robots to \emph{time} their motion in a way that is purposefully expressive of their internal states, making them more transparent to people. We start by investigating what types of states motion timing is capable of expressing, focusing on robot manipulation and keeping the path constant while systematically varying the timing. We find that users naturally pick up on certain properties of the robot (like confidence), of the motion (like naturalness), or of the task (like the weight of the object that the robot is carrying). We then conduct a hypothesis-driven experiment to tease out the directions and magnitudes of these effects, and use our findings to develop candidate mathematical models for how users make these inferences from the timing. We find a strong correlation between the models and real user data, suggesting that robots can leverage these models to autonomously optimize the timing of their motion to be expressive.

cs.RO↗

arXiv2017

The Off-Switch Game

It is clear that one of the primary tools we can use to mitigate the potential risk from a misbehaving AI system is the ability to turn the system off. As the capabilities of AI systems improve, it is important to ensure that such systems do not adopt subgoals that prevent a human from switching them off. This is a challenge because many formulations of rational agents create strong incentives for self-preservation. This is not caused by a built-in instinct, but because a rational agent will maximize expected utility and cannot achieve whatever objective it has been given if it is dead. Our goal is to study the incentives an agent has to allow itself to be switched off. We analyze a simple game between a human H and a robot R, where H can press R's off switch but R can disable the off switch. A traditional agent takes its reward function for granted: we show that such agents have an incentive to disable the off switch, except in the special case where H is perfectly rational. Our key insight is that for R to want to preserve its off switch, it needs to be uncertain about the utility associated with the outcome, and to treat H's actions as important observations about that utility. (R also has no incentive to switch itself off in this setting.) We conclude that giving machines an appropriate level of uncertainty about their objectives leads to safer designs, and we argue that this setting is a useful generalization of the classical AI paradigm of rational agents.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2017

Should Robots be Obedient?

Intuitively, obedience -- following the order that a human gives -- seems like a good property for a robot to have. But, we humans are not perfect and we may give orders that are not best aligned to our preferences. We show that when a human is not perfectly rational then a robot that tries to infer and act according to the human's underlying preferences can always perform better than a robot that simply follows the human's literal order. Thus, there is a tradeoff between the obedience of a robot and the value it can attain for its owner. We investigate how this tradeoff is impacted by the way the robot infers the human's preferences, showing that some methods err more on the side of obedience than others. We then analyze how performance degrades when the robot has a misspecified model of the features that the human cares about or the level of rationality of the human. Finally, we study how robots can start detecting such model misspecification. Overall, our work suggests that there might be a middle ground in which robots intelligently decide when to obey human orders, but err on the side of obedience.

cs.AI↗