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Eilon Solan

Publications and source records attributed to Eilon Solan.

63 records · Page 4Linked to original sources
arXiv2010

Lowest Unique Bid Auctions

We consider a class of auctions (Lowest Unique Bid Auctions) that have achieved a considerable success on the Internet. Bids are made in cents (of euro) and every bidder can bid as many numbers as she wants. The lowest unique bid wins the auction. Every bid has a fixed cost, and once a participant makes a bid, she gets to know whether her bid was unique and whether it was the lowest unique. Information is updated in real time, but every bidder sees only what's relevant to the bids she made. We show that the observed behavior in these auctions differs considerably from what theory would prescribe if all bidders were fully rational. We show that the seller makes money, which would not be the case with rational bidders, and some bidders win the auctions quite often. We describe a possible strategy for these bidders.

math.PR↗
arXiv2009

Borel Games with Lower-Semi-Continuous Payoffs

We prove that every two-player non-zero-sum Borel game with lower-semi-continuous payoffs admits a subgame-perfect $\ep$-equilibrium. This result complements Example 3 in Solan and Vieille (2003), which shows that a subgame-perfect $\ep$-equilibrium need not exists when the payoffs are not lower-semi-continuous.

math.PR↗
arXiv2009

Bandit problems with Levy payoff processes

We study two-armed Levy bandits in continuous-time, which have one safe arm that yields a constant payoff s, and one risky arm that can be either of type High or Low; both types yield stochastic payoffs generated by a Levy process. The expectation of the Levy process when the arm is High is greater than s, and lower than s if the arm is Low. The decision maker (DM) has to choose, at any given time t, the fraction of resource to be allocated to each arm over the time interval [t,t+dt). We show that under proper conditions on the Levy processes, there is a unique optimal strategy, which is a cut-off strategy, and we provide an explicit formula for the cut-off and the optimal payoff, as a function of the data of the problem. We also examine the case where the DM has incorrect prior over the type of the risky arm, and we calculate the expected payoff gained by a DM who plays the optimal strategy that corresponds to the incorrect prior. In addition, we study two applications of the results: (a) we show how to price information in two-armed Levy bandit problem, and (b) we investigate who fares better in two-armed bandit problems: an optimist who assigns to High a probability higher than the true probability, or a pessimist who assigns to High a probability lower than the true probability.

math.PR↗
arXiv2009

Equilibrium payoffs in finite games

We study the structure of the set of equilibrium payoffs in finite games, both for Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium. A nonempty subset of R^2 is shown to be the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of a bimatrix game if and only if it is a finite union of rectangles. Furthermore, we show that for any nonempty finite union of rectangles U and any polytope P in R^2 containing U, there exists a bimatrix game with U as set of Nash equilibrium payoffs and P as set of correlated equilibrium payoffs. The n-player case and the robustness of this result to perturbation of the payoff matrices are also studied.

math.OC↗
arXiv2005

Approximating a sequence of observations by a simple process

Given an arbitrary long but finite sequence of observations from a finite set, we construct a simple process that approximates the sequence, in the sense that with high probability the empirical frequency, as well as the empirical one-step transitions along a realization from the approximating process, are close to that of the given sequence. We generalize the result to the case where the one-step transitions are required to be in given polyhedra.

math.ST↗
arXiv2004

Two-player nonZero-sum stopping games in discrete time

We prove that every two-player nonzero-sum stopping game in discrete time admits an ε-equilibrium in randomized strategies for every ε>0. We use a stochastic variation of Ramsey's theorem, which enables us to reduce the problem to that of studying properties of ε-equilibria in a simple class of stochastic games with finite state space.

math.PR↗
arXiv2003

Stopping games in continuous time

We study two-player zero-sum stopping games in continuous time and infinite horizon. We prove that the value in randomized stopping times exists as soon as the payoff processes are right-continuous. In particular, as opposed to existing literature, we do not assume any conditions on the relations between the payoff processes. We also show that both players have simple epsilon- optimal randomized stopping times; namely, randomized stopping times which are small perturbations of non-randomized stopping times.

math.OC↗
arXiv2003

Perturbed Markov Chains

We study irreducible time-homogenous Markov chains with finite state space in discrete time. We obtain results on the sensitivity of the stationary distribution and other statistical quantities with respect to perturbations of the transition matrix. We define a new closeness relation between transition matrices, and use graph-theoretic techniques, in contrast with the matrix analysis techniques previously used.

math.PR↗