arXiv subjects

Eitan Altman

Publications and source records attributed to Eitan Altman.

At least 55 records · Page 3Linked to original sources

arXiv2015

Decentralized Protection Strategies against SIS Epidemics in Networks

Defining an optimal protection strategy against viruses, spam propagation or any other kind of contamination process is an important feature for designing new networks and architectures. In this work, we consider decentralized optimal protection strategies when a virus is propagating over a network through a SIS epidemic process. We assume that each node in the network can fully protect itself from infection at a constant cost, or the node can use recovery software, once it is infected. We model our system using a game theoretic framework and find pure, mixed equilibria, and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) in several network topologies. Further, we propose both a decentralized algorithm and an iterative procedure to compute a pure equilibrium in the general case of a multiple communities network. Finally, we evaluate the algorithms and give numerical illustrations of all our results.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2014

Altruism in groups: an evolutionary games approach

We revisit in this paper the relation between evolution of species and the mathematical tool of evolutionary games, which has been used to model and predict it. We indicate known shortcoming of this model that restricts the capacity of evolutionary games to model groups of individuals that share a common gene or a common fitness function. In this paper we provide a new concept to remedy this shortcoming in the standard evolutionary games in order to cover this kind of behavior. Further, we explore the relationship between this new concept and Nash equilibrium or ESS. We indicate through the study of some example in the biology as Hawk and Dove game, Stag Hunt Game and Prisoner Dilemma, that when taking into account a utility that is common to a group of individuals, the equilibrium structure may change dramatically. We also study the multiple access control in slotted Aloha based wireless networks. We analyze the impact of the altruism behavior on the performance at the equilibrium.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2014

Green Broadcast Transmission in Cellular Networks: A Game Theoretic Approach

This paper addresses the mobile assignment problem in a multi-cell broadcast transmission seeking minimal total power consumption by considering both transmission and operational powers. While the large scale nature of the problem entails to find distributed solutions, game theory appears to be a natural tool. We propose a novel distributed algorithm based on group formation games, called \textit{the hedonic decision algorithm}. This formalism is constructive: a new class of group formation games is introduced where the utility of players within a group is separable and symmetric being a generalized version of parity-affiliation games. The proposed hedonic decision algorithm is also suitable for any set-covering problem. To evaluate the performance of our algorithm, we propose other approaches to which our algorithm is compared. We first develop a centralized recursive algorithm called \textit{the hold minimum} being able to find the optimal assignments. However, because of the NP-hard complexity of the mobile assignment problem, we propose a centralized polynomial-time heuristic algorithm called \textit{the column control} producing near-optimal solutions when the operational power costs of base stations are taken into account. Starting from this efficient centralized approach, a \textit{distributed column control algorithm} is also proposed and compared to \textit{the hedonic decision algorithm}. We also implement the nearest base station algorithm which is very simple and intuitive and efficiently manage fast-moving users served by macro BSs. Extensive simulation results are provided and highlight the relative performance of these algorithms. The simulated scenarios are done according to Poisson point processes for both mobiles and base stations.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2014

Flow Level QoE of Video Streaming in Wireless Networks

The Quality of Experience (QoE) of streaming service is often degraded by frequent playback interruptions. To mitigate the interruptions, the media player prefetches streaming contents before starting playback, at a cost of delay. We study the QoE of streaming from the perspective of flow dynamics. First, a framework is developed for QoE when streaming users join the network randomly and leave after downloading completion. We compute the distribution of prefetching delay using partial differential equations (PDEs), and the probability generating function of playout buffer starvations using ordinary differential equations (ODEs) for CBR streaming. Second, we extend our framework to characterize the throughput variation caused by opportunistic scheduling at the base station, and the playback variation of VBR streaming. Our study reveals that the flow dynamics is the fundamental reason of playback starvation. The QoE of streaming service is dominated by the first moments such as the average throughput of opportunistic scheduling and the mean playback rate. While the variances of throughput and playback rate have very limited impact on starvation behavior.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2014

Modelling View-count Dynamics in YouTube

The goal of this paper is to study the behaviour of view-count in YouTube. We first propose several bio-inspired models for the evolution of the view-count of YouTube videos. We show, using a large set of empirical data, that the view-count for 90% of videos in YouTube can indeed be associated to at least one of these models, with a Mean Error which does not exceed 5%. We derive automatic ways of classifying the view-count curve into one of these models and of extracting the most suitable parameters of the model. We study empirically the impact of videos' popularity and category on the evolution of its view-count. We finally use the above classification along with the automatic parameters extraction in order to predict the evolution of videos' view-count.

cs.SI↗

arXiv2014

Self Organizing strategies for enhanced ICIC (eICIC)

Small cells have been identified as an effective solution for coping with the important traffic increase that is expected in the coming years. But this solution is accompanied by additional interference that needs to be mitigated. The enhanced Inter Cell Interference Coordination (eICIC) feature has been introduced to address the interference problem. eICIC involves two parameters which need to be optimized, namely the Cell Range Extension (CRE) of the small cells and the ABS ratio (ABSr) which defines a mute ratio for the macro cell to reduce the interference it produces. In this paper we propose self-optimizing algorithms for the eICIC. The CRE is adjusted by means of load balancing algorithm. The ABSr parameter is optimized by maximizing a proportional fair utility of user throughputs. The convergence of the algorithms is proven using stochastic approximation theorems. Numerical simulations illustrate the important performance gain brought about by the different algorithms.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2014

Multilevel Pricing Schemes in a Deregulated Wireless Network Market

Typically the cost of a product, a good or a service has many components. Those components come from different complex steps in the supply chain of the product from sourcing to distribution. This economic point of view also takes place in the determination of goods and services in wireless networks. Indeed, before transmitting customer data, a network operator has to lease some frequency range from a spectrum owner and also has to establish agreements with electricity suppliers. The goal of this paper is to compare two pricing schemes, namely a power-based and a flat rate, and give a possible explanation why flat rate pricing schemes are more common than power based pricing ones in a deregulated wireless market. We suggest a hierarchical game-theoretical model of a three level supply chain: the end users, the service provider and the spectrum owner. The end users intend to transmit data on a wireless network. The amount of traffic sent by the end users depends on the available frequency bandwidth as well as the price they have to pay for their transmission. A natural question arises for the service provider: how to design an efficient pricing scheme in order to maximize his profit. Moreover he has to take into account the lease charge he has to pay to the spectrum owner and how many frequency bandwidth to rent. The spectrum owner itself also looks for maximizing its profit and has to determine the lease price to the service provider. The equilibrium at each level of our supply chain model are established and several properties are investigated. In particular, in the case of a power-based pricing scheme, the service provider and the spectrum owner tend to share the gross provider profit. Whereas, considering the flat rate pricing scheme, if the end users are going to exploit the network intensively, then the tariffs of the suppliers (spectrum owner and service provider) explode.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2013

Differential Games of Competition in Online Content Diffusion

Access to online contents represents a large share of the Internet traffic. Most such contents are multimedia items which are user-generated, i.e., posted online by the contents' owners. In this paper we focus on how those who provide contents can leverage online platforms in order to profit from their large base of potential viewers. Actually, platforms like Vimeo or YouTube provide tools to accelerate the dissemination of contents, i.e., recommendation lists and other re-ranking mechanisms. Hence, the popularity of a content can be increased by paying a cost for advertisement: doing so, it will appear with some priority in the recommendation lists and will be accessed more frequently by the platform users. Ultimately, such acceleration mechanism engenders a competition among online contents to gain popularity. In this context, our focus is on the structure of the acceleration strategies which a content provider should use in order to optimally promote a content given a certain daily budget. Such a best response indeed depends on the strategies adopted by competing content providers. Also, it is a function of the potential popularity of a content and the fee paid for the platform advertisement service. We formulate the problem as a differential game and we solve it for the infinite horizon case by deriving the structure of certain Nash equilibria of the game.

cs.SI↗

arXiv2013

Analysis of Buffer Starvation with Application to Objective QoE Optimization of Streaming Services

Our purpose in this paper is to characterize buffer starvations for streaming services. The buffer is modeled as an M/M/1 queue, plus the consideration of bursty arrivals. When the buffer is empty, the service restarts after a certain amount of packets are \emph{prefetched}. With this goal, we propose two approaches to obtain the \emph{exact distribution} of the number of buffer starvations, one of which is based on \emph{Ballot theorem}, and the other uses recursive equations. The Ballot theorem approach gives an explicit result. We extend this approach to the scenario with a constant playback rate using Tàkacs Ballot theorem. The recursive approach, though not offering an explicit result, can obtain the distribution of starvations with non-independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) arrival process in which an ON/OFF bursty arrival process is considered in this work. We further compute the starvation probability as a function of the amount of prefetched packets for a large number of files via a fluid analysis. Among many potential applications of starvation analysis, we show how to apply it to optimize the objective quality of experience (QoE) of media streaming, by exploiting the tradeoff between startup/rebuffering delay and starvations.

cs.PF↗

arXiv2013

Regulation of off-network pricing in a nonneutral network

Representatives of several Internet service providers (ISPs) have expressed their wish to see a substantial change in the pricing policies of the Internet. In particular, they would like to see content providers (CPs) pay for use of the network, given the large amount of resources they use. This would be in clear violation of the "network neutrality" principle that had characterized the development of the wireline Internet. Our first goal in this paper is to propose and study possible ways of implementing such payments and of regulating their amount. We introduce a model that includes the users' behavior, the utilities of the ISP and of the CPs, and the monetary flow that involves the content users, the ISP and CP, and in particular, the CP's revenues from advertisements. We consider various game models and study the resulting equilibria; they are all combinations of a noncooperative game (in which the ISPs and CPs determine how much they will charge the users) with a "cooperative" one on how the CP and the ISP share the payments. We include in our model a possible asymmetric weighting parameter (that varies between zero to one). We also study equilibria that arise when one of the CPs colludes with the ISP. We also study two dynamic game models and study the convergence of prices to the equilibrium values.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2013

Distributed coordination of self-organizing mechanisms in communication networks

The fast development of the Self-Organizing Network (SON) technology in mobile networks renders the problem of coordinating SON functionalities operating simultaneously critical. SON functionalities can be viewed as control loops that may need to be coordinated to guarantee conflict free operation, to enforce stability of the network and to achieve performance gain. This paper proposes a distributed solution for coordinating SON functionalities. It uses Rosen's concave games framework in conjunction with convex optimization. The SON functionalities are modeled as linear Ordinary Differential Equation (ODE)s. The stability of the system is first evaluated using a basic control theory approach. The coordination solution consists in finding a linear map (called coordination matrix) that stabilizes the system of SON functionalities. It is proven that the solution remains valid in a noisy environment using Stochastic Approximation. A practical example involving three different SON functionalities deployed in Base Stations (BSs) of a Long Term Evolution (LTE) network demonstrates the usefulness of the proposed method.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2013

Coding for Caches in the Plane

We consider wireless caches located in the plane according to general point process and specialize the results for the homogeneous Poisson process. A large data file is stored at the caches, which have limited storage capabilities. Hence, they can only store parts of the data. Clients can contact the caches to retrieve the data. We compare the expected cost of obtaining the complete data under uncoded as well as coded data allocation strategies. It is shown that for the general class of cost measures where the cost of retrieving data is increasing with the distance between client and caches, coded allocation outperforms uncoded allocation. The improvement offered by coding is quantified for two more specific classes of performance measures. Finally, our results are validated by computing the costs of the allocation strategies for the case that caches coincide with currently deployed mobile base stations.

cs.NI↗

arXiv2013

Flow-level performance of random wireless networks

We study the flow-level performance of random wireless networks. The locations of base stations (BSs) follow a Poisson point process. The number and positions of active users are dynamic. We associate a queue to each BS. The performance and stability of a BS depend on its load. In some cases, the full distribution of the load can be derived. Otherwise we derive formulas for the first and second moments. Networks on the line and on the plane are considered. Our model is generic enough to include features of recent wireless networks such as 4G (LTE) networks. In dense networks, we show that the inter-cell interference power becomes normally distributed, simplifying many computations. Numerical experiments demonstrate that in cases of practical interest, the loads distribution can be well approximated by a gamma distribution with known mean and variance.

cs.IT↗

arXiv2013

Automated Dynamic Offset Applied to Cell Association

In this paper, we develop a hierarchical Bayesian game framework for automated dynamic offset selection. Users compete to maximize their throughput by picking the best locally serving radio access network (RAN) with respect to their own measurement, their demand and a partial statistical channel state information (CSI) of other users. In particular, we investigate the properties of a Stackelberg game, in which the base station is a player on its own. We derive analytically the utilities related to the channel quality perceived by users to obtain the equilibria. We study the Price of Anarchy (PoA) of such system, where the PoA is the ratio of the social welfare attained when a network planner chooses policies to maximize social welfare versus the social welfare attained in Nash/Stackeleberg equilibrium when users choose their policies strategically. We show by means of a Stackelberg formulation, how the operator, by sending appropriate information about the state of the channel, can configure a dynamic offset that optimizes its global utility while users maximize their individual utilities. The proposed hierarchical decision approach for wireless networks can reach a good trade-off between the global network performance at the equilibrium and the requested amount of signaling. Typically, it is shown that when the network goal is orthogonal to user's goal, this can lead the users to a misleading association problem.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2013

The Coalitional Switch off Game of Service Providers

This paper studies a significant problem in green networking called switching off base stations in case of cooperating service providers by means of stochastic geometric and coalitional game tools. The coalitional game herein considered is played by service providers who cooperate in switching off base stations. When they cooperate, any mobile is associated to the nearest BS of any service provider. Given a Poisson point process deployment model of nodes over an area and switching off base stations with some probability, it is proved that the distribution of signal to interference plus noise ratio remains unchanged while the transmission power is increased up to preserving the quality of service. The coalitional game behavior of a typical player is called to be \emph{hedonic} if the gain of any player depends solely on the members of the coalition to which the player belongs, thus, the coalitions form as a result of the preferences of the players over their possible coalitions' set. We also introduce a novel concept which is called the Nash-stable core containing those gain allocation methods that result in Nash-stable partitions. By this way, we always guarantee Nash stability. We study the non-emptiness of the Nash-stable core. Assuming the choice of a coalition is performed only by one player in a point of time, we prove that the Nash-stable core is non-empty when a player chooses its coalition in its turn, the player gains zero utility if the chosen coalition is visited before by itself.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2013

Network Non-Neutrality through Preferential Signaling

One of the central issues in the debate on network neutrality has been whether one should allow or prevent preferential treatment by an internet service provider (ISP) of traffic according to its origin. This raised the question of whether to allow an ISP to have exclusive agreement with a content provider (CP). In this paper we consider discrimination in the opposite direction. We study the impact that a CP can have on the benefits of several competing ISPs by sharing private information concerning the demand for its content. More precisely, we consider ISPs that compete over access to one common CP. Each ISP selects the price that it charges its subscribers for accessing the content. The CP is assumed to have private information about demand for its content, and in particular, about the inverse demand function corresponding to the content. The competing ISPs are assumed to have knowledge on only the statistical distribution of these functions. We derive in this paper models for studying the impact that the CP can have on the utilities of the ISPs by favoring one of them by exclusively revealing its private information. We also consider the case where CP can charge ISPs for providing such information. We propose two mechanisms based on {\em weighted proportional fairness} for payment between ISPs and CP. Finally, we compare the social utility resulting from these mechanisms with the optimal social utility by introducing a performance metric termed as {\em price of partial bargaining}

cs.GT↗

arXiv2012

Emergence of Equilibria from Individual Strategies in Online Content Diffusion

Social scientists have observed that human behavior in society can often be modeled as corresponding to a threshold type policy. A new behavior would propagate by a procedure in which an individual adopts the new behavior if the fraction of his neighbors or friends having adopted the new behavior exceeds some threshold. In this paper we study the question of whether the emergence of threshold policies may be modeled as a result of some rational process which would describe the behavior of non-cooperative rational members of some social network. We focus on situations in which individuals take the decision whether to access or not some content, based on the number of views that the content has. Our analysis aims at understanding not only the behavior of individuals, but also the way in which information about the quality of a given content can be deduced from view counts when only part of the viewers that access the content are informed about its quality. In this paper we present a game formulation for the behavior of individuals using a meanfield model: the number of individuals is approximated by a continuum of atomless players and for which the Wardrop equilibrium is the solution concept. We derive conditions on the problem's parameters that result indeed in the emergence of threshold equilibria policies. But we also identify some parameters in which other structures are obtained for the equilibrium behavior of individuals.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2012

Coordination of autonomic functionalities in communications networks

Future communication networks are expected to feature autonomic (or self-organizing) mechanisms to ease deployment (self-configuration), tune parameters automatically (self-optimization) and repair the network (self-healing). Self-organizing mechanisms have been designed as stand-alone entities, even though multiple mechanisms will run in parallel in operational networks. An efficient coordination mechanism will be the major enabler for large scale deployment of self-organizing networks. We model self-organizing mechanisms as control loops, and study the conditions for stability when running control loops in parallel. Based on control theory and Lyapunov stability, we propose a coordination mechanism to stabilize the system, which can be implemented in a distributed fashion. The mechanism remains valid in the presence of measurement noise via stochastic approximation. Instability and coordination in the context of wireless networks are illustrated with two examples and the influence of network geometry is investigated. We are essentially concerned with linear systems, and the applicability of our results for non-linear systems is discussed.

cs.NI↗