arXiv subjects

Fahad Saleh

Publications and source records attributed to Fahad Saleh.

4 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Market Inefficiency in Cryptoasset Markets

We demonstrate market inefficiency in cryptoasset markets. Our approach examines investments that share a dominant risk factor but differ in their exposure to a secondary risk. We derive equilibrium restrictions that must hold regardless of how investors price either risk. Our empirical results strongly reject these necessary equilibrium restrictions. The rejection implies market inefficiency that cannot be attributed to mispriced risk, suggesting the presence of frictions that impede capital reallocation.

q-fin.TR↗

arXiv2025

PoliFi Tokens and the Trump Effect

Cryptoassets launched by political figures, e.g., political finance (PoliFi) tokens, have recently attracted attention. Chief among them are the eponymous tokens backed by the 47th president and first lady of the United States, TRUMPandMELANIA. We empirically analyze both, and study their impact on the broad decentralized finance (DeFi) ecosystem. Via a comparative longitudinal study, we uncover a "Trump Effect": the behavior of these tokens correlates positively with presidential approval ratings, whereas the same tight coupling does not extend to other cryptoassets and administrations. We additionally quantify the ecosystemic impact, finding that the fervor surrounding the two assets was accompanied by capital flows towards associated platforms like the Solana blockchain, which also enjoyed record volumes and fee expenditure.

physics.soc-ph↗

arXiv2024

MEV Capture and Decentralization in Execution Tickets

We provide an economic model of Execution Tickets and use it to study the ability of the Ethereum protocol to capture MEV from block construction. We demonstrate that Execution Tickets extract all MEV when all buyers are homogeneous, risk neutral and face no capital costs. We also show that MEV capture decreases with risk aversion and capital costs. Moreover, when buyers are heterogeneous, MEV capture can be especially low and a single dominant buyer can extract much of the MEV. This adverse effect can be partially mitigated by the presence of a Proposer Builder Separation (PBS) mechanism, which gives ET buyers access to a market of specialized builders, but in practice centralization vectors still persist. With PBS, ETs are concentrated among those with the highest ex-ante MEV extraction ability and lowest cost of capital. We show how it is possible that large investors that are not builders but have substantial advantage in capital cost can come to dominate the ET market.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Time is Money: Strategic Timing Games in Proof-of-Stake Protocols

We propose a model suggesting that honest-but-rational consensus participants may play timing games, and strategically delay their block proposal to optimize MEV capture, while still ensuring the proposal's timely inclusion in the canonical chain. In this context, ensuring economic fairness among consensus participants is critical to preserving decentralization. We contend that a model grounded in honest-but-rational consensus participation provides a more accurate portrayal of behavior in economically incentivized systems such as blockchain protocols. We empirically investigate timing games on the Ethereum network and demonstrate that while timing games are worth playing, they are not currently being exploited by consensus participants. By quantifying the marginal value of time, we uncover strong evidence pointing towards their future potential, despite the limited exploitation of MEV capture observed at present.

cs.GT↗