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Feng Fu

Publications and source records attributed to Feng Fu.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Exploration stabilizes learning dynamics and promotes cooperation in stochastic games

Understanding and stabilizing collective learning dynamics is a central challenge in stochastic games. Although exploration is widely used in learning algorithms, its effects on the coupled dynamics of agents and their environment remain insufficiently understood. In this work, we derive analytical equations for entropy-regularized actor-critic learning in stochastic games by separating the timescales of value estimation and policy adaptation. Without exploration, the system preserves a weighted volume in the policy phase space, ruling out asymptotically stable fully mixed equilibria. We provide a unified characterization of exploration's effects on objective curvature, preference dynamics in log-ratio coordinates, and the forgetting of past action preferences. Exploration reduces local volume expansion and can stabilize learning dynamics. In a two-state Matching Pennies game, it suppresses chaotic learning and promotes convergence to a mixed equilibrium. In a Prisoner's Dilemma with environmental feedback, intermediate exploration eliminates the defective attractor and expands the basin of attraction of the cooperative equilibrium. Our findings reveal how exploration shapes collective behavior, informing the design of cooperative and resilient multi-agent systems.

physics.soc-ph↗

Learning Dynamics of the Influencer's Game in Resource Landscapes

Across domains as varied as ecology, economics, and online platforms, individuals are incentivized to position themselves within resource-rich strategy spaces. In this work we introduce a new spatial game framework called the influencer's game. Within this new framework players' strategies are represented as positions within a trait space. Players then receive a share of a portion of a resource based on their relative influence at that resource's points traits. For the influencer's game, we show that there is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium that exists under strict log-concavity of the influence kernel. Using the unique equilibrium we show that the stability of the system depends on the influence kernel's parameters, number of players, and the resource distribution shape. For any dimension we demonstrate a stability threshold that depends on both the scatter and curvature of the players. When this threshold is crossed, the symmetric equilibrium destabilizes and gives way to a variety of bifurcation types; including, specialist clusters, limit cycles, and sub-games that reproduce the larger game's structure. We ground these results using real-world data for resources as a demonstration of the game's application. Finally we extend the game dynamics to use multi-agent reinforcement learning and further show that the predicted bifurcation structure persists under partial observability and discretized strategy spaces. In all, the influencer's game provides a novel framework for predicting when competitive pressure drives convergence versus fragmentation with possible applications across domains.

cs.GT↗

Evolution of cooperation in multiplex interaction networks

Across biological and social systems, preferential interactions among similar individuals can promote cooperation. To account for real-world interactions unfolding across multiple, simultaneous dimensions, we develop a framework for the evolution of cooperation in multiplex networks. Each layer is defined by a distinct phenotypic trait, with homophily favoring encounters between similar partners. We derive analytical conditions for natural selection to favor cooperation when phenotypes are independent or exhibit epistasis, allowing for different modes of mutation coupling. Despite payoffs being aggregated across layers, the cooperation conditions separate by layer under weak selection. Each condition depends on local payoffs and a structure coefficient determined by the effective number of phenotypes and the mutation rates. Epistasis restricts the phenotypes available on a layer and can thus shift its strategy distribution relative to that of its isolated counterpart. We show that phenotypic diversity fosters cooperation by partitioning populations into assortative niches. Furthermore, in finite populations, intensifying the prisoner's dilemma shifts the dependence of cooperation on strategy mutation from a monotonic decrease, through a U-shaped response, to a monotonic increase. Beyond weak selection, simulations show that accumulated payoffs across layers can alter mean cooperation relative to isolated systems even when phenotypes are independent. Our study unravels how homophily based on multiple phenotypes can shape the evolution of cooperation in heterogeneous populations.

q-bio.PE↗

Retweeting patterns reveal partisan asymmetries in information sharing and signal state-level electoral outcomes in the 2020 US presidential election

As social media has become a primary source of political information, concerns are growing that online information consumption may intensify political polarization and reshape democratic processes. Yet how large-scale online information consumption organizes polarized political ecosystems and relates to offline voting remains unclear. Here we reconstruct partisan information ecosystems from more than 500 million tweets generated during the 2020 US presidential election, integrating information diffusion across media outlets, influencers, and social peers. Contrary to the conventional expectation that broader information exposure promotes moderation, we find that retweeting a wider range of political information is associated with stronger political polarization. We further show systematic asymmetries in political information ecosystems: the Republican ecosystem is highly concentrated and ideologically biased, whereas the Democratic ecosystem is more dispersed and primarily organized around relatively moderate left-leaning sources. Finally, we demonstrate that several shared retweeting signatures robustly map onto state-level electoral outcomes despite cross-state heterogeneity. Our findings reveal asymmetric political information ecosystems as a key organizing principle of online political communication and identify collective retweeting patterns as a scalable signal of real-world voting behaviours.

physics.soc-ph↗

Evolutionary games on networks with negative edge-based environmental feedback

Environmental feedback can fundamentally alter the game payoff structure underlying the evolution of cooperation. How feedback-evolving games interact with population structure under non-weak selection remains incompletely understood. We study an evolutionary game on networks in which each edge has a binary environmental state that determines the payoff matrix used by the two connected individuals. By assumption, cooperation tends to improve the local environment, which in turn favors defection, thereby creating negative feedback between strategies coupled with the environmental condition. We analyze the model under strong selection using a mean-field approximation, a pair approximation that tracks both strategy pairs and edge environments, and agent-based simulations. In well-mixed populations, the feedback can generate bistability between full cooperation and full defection, as well as sustained oscillations arising through a Hopf bifurcation. Sparse networks (i.e., with low nodes' degrees) can eliminate bistability, suppress oscillations, and produce stable intermediate levels of cooperation. The pair approximation captures these effects and generally agrees more closely with simulations on sparse networks than the mean-field approximation. Our results show that edge-based environmental feedback and network structure, such as density of edges, interact to determine whether the fraction of cooperators stabilizes or oscillates over time.

physics.soc-ph↗

Learning to cooperate in a changing world: How caring about the future promotes cooperation across scales

In social dilemmas, individuals need to forgo short-term temptations to achieve synergistic collective outcomes through cooperation. Previous work has examined mechanisms through which cooperation can evolve, including direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, environmental stochasticity, network reciprocity, and demographic stochasticity. These mechanisms have largely been studied under natural selection or social learning, where strategies with higher payoffs are more likely to spread. It is equally important to study cooperation under self-learning, where individuals adapt through their own experiences. Here, we focus on multi-agent reinforcement learning and derive analytical conditions under which these mechanisms stabilize cooperation under learning dynamics across scales. We find that reinforcement learning can steer self-interested individuals toward cooperation when they value the future over short-term temptation. Our work provides a unified approach to identifying the determinants of learning to cooperate in a changing world, thereby paving the way for the advancement of cooperative artificial intelligence.

physics.soc-ph↗

When groups attract: coevolutionary dynamics of cooperation and individual- and group-based imitating rules

Success-driven imitation is a fundamental aspect of social learning, yet group interactions beyond pairwise require more subtle imitating rules since success can be observed at either the group or individual level. How such heuristic imitating rules based on these distinct levels of social information compete and coevolve with collective behavior, particularly cooperation, remains poorly understood. Here, we address this issue by studying the coevolutionary dynamics of cooperation in public goods games and individual- and group-based imitating rules on hypergraphs. We distinguish three rules according to whether payoff-biased imitation operates at the individual level, the group level, or both. Our results identify a mutual reinforcement between cooperation and group-biased imitation: preferentially learning from successful groups promotes cooperation, while cooperators in turn favor group-biased imitation. We confirm this synergy between cooperation and group-biased imitation across diverse synthetic and empirical higher-order network populations. We further show that the subtle scale and organization of group interactions critically shape this coevolution, with intermediate group sizes providing the greatest advantage for cooperation. Our results reveal how learning whom to imitate can jointly evolve to shape collective cooperation.

physics.soc-ph↗

Modeling microbiome dynamics on social networks: how between-host transmission shapes within-host evolution

A social network perspective on the human microbiome is crucial for understanding how the interplay between within-host microbial dynamics and between-host transmission influences microbial community stability, host metabolism, and population health and nutrition. Here, we provide a mathematical and numerical analysis of human-associated microbial communities in dyadic social ties and within a small network. By utilizing a generalized Lotka-Volterra model, we simulate within-host dynamics while incorporating inter-host microbial sharing driven by social interactions. Furthermore, the study accounts for individual variability in microbial behavior across different hosts. Our work identifies the conditions under which microbial sharing can have long-lasting effects, offering insights into how social networks shape the human microbiome.

physics.soc-ph↗

Modeling Duelling Contagions of True and False Information in the Face of Inherent Individual biases

Advanced digital communication has revolutionized how people create and consume information, making information diffusion an important topic of research for domains from public health to national security. Real-world scenarios of information diffusion often involve competing narratives - true and false - spreading simultaneously. We propose a novel agent-based co-diffusion model, grounded in "complex-contagion" and "spiral of silence" theories, to capture how network dynamics exploit cognitive biases to shape such interactions. Our findings reveal that manipulative narratives dominate when early spreaders hold them. These network dynamics further exploit inherent cognitive biases to amplify information diffusion regardless of veracity. Further, while favourable previous experience strengthen collective optimism, unfavourable experiences attenuate optimism only modestly. However, we found that early seeding of agents with lower self-censorship not only constrains the spread of manipulation but can also lead to dominance of well-informed populance. This has implications for policies that aim to facilitate healthier discourse, strengthen social cohesion, and ensure equitable access to reliable information.

cs.SI↗

When minor issues matter: symmetries, pluralism, and polarization in similarity-based opinion dynamics

Understanding how opinions evolve through social interactions is crucial for mitigating polarization. Existing opinion-dynamics models incorporate both attractive and repulsive interactions but typically assume that all issues are equally important. We develop and analyze a stochastic agent-based model where issues carry heterogeneous weights that influence both social affinity and the likelihood of opinion change. Surprisingly, introducing even a single issue with arbitrarily small weight can destabilize otherwise stable states, increasing convergence times by orders of magnitude. To explain these dynamics, we derive a mean-field approach and characterize the equilibrium symmetries governing consensus, polarization, and persistent pluralism. A complete classification of these symmetries for up to five issues reveals that polarization increases when importance is concentrated on a small number of issues. Conversely, distributing importance more broadly across issues promotes diversity of opinions and reduces polarization. Our symmetry-based framework highlights how issue salience and social tolerance jointly shape collective opinion evolution.

physics.soc-ph↗

Stereotyping by strategy standing diversifies cooperation patterns in indirect reciprocity

Indirect reciprocity explains how cooperation evolves through social reputations. People observe others, assign reputations, and condition their future actions on these assignments. This process is cognitively demanding, and stereotyping offers a simpler alternative by replacing individual-level reputation with group-level information. Theoretical models commonly implement stereotyping through exogenously given group labels. In real societies, however, group-level impressions may be associated with observable patterns of behavior. Here we propose a framework of stereotyping by strategy standing, in which mutants may condition their actions on the overall reputation level associated with a resident strategy rather than on the recipient's reputation. We show that this form of stereotyping can diversify stable cooperation in indirect reciprocity. As the strength of stereotyping increases, additional cooperative evolutionarily stable norm-strategy (ESS) pairs emerge in substantial numbers. In particular, we identify eight highly cooperative ESS pairs that become stable under very weak stereotyping. These pairs, which we call the counterparts of the leading eight, share the same social norms as the classical leading eight and differ only in how they prescribe behavior between bad individuals. They are unstable without stereotyping because they can be invaded by their corresponding leading strategies, but they become stable once stereotyping exceeds a critical threshold. Our results suggest that group-level impressions based on strategy standing can provide a coarse-grained informational route to stable cooperation and offer a more behaviorally grounded perspective on how stereotyping affects indirect reciprocity.

physics.soc-ph↗

Indirect reciprocity beyond pairwise interactions

Cooperation in groups underpins collective responses to challenges from climate governance to public goods provision, yet how moral evaluation sustains it remains poorly understood. Indirect reciprocity -- cooperating to build a good reputation -- is well characterized for pairwise interactions, but real collective action requires individuals to be judged against the reputational profile of an entire group. Here we develop a general framework for multiplayer indirect reciprocity and show that stable group cooperation obeys a simple organizing principle: `all good, help; one bad, halt'. This rule is both necessary and sufficient for cooperation to emerge, and it recovers the classical leading eight norms in the pairwise limit. We further show that group structure fundamentally changes reputation dynamics: unlike pairwise models, which are monostable, multiplayer systems exhibit bistability and hysteresis, with a critical tipping point separating cooperative and defective regimes. Assessment of the latent norms of large language models reveals that they shift toward punitive defection when provided with richer social information, yet fail to follow the full logic of `all good, help; one bad, halt'. Our results establish a unifying principle for reputation-based cooperation in groups and provide a benchmark for evaluating cooperative alignment in artificial intelligence.

physics.soc-ph↗

Strategies of cooperation and defection in five large language models

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed to support human decision-making. This use of LLMs has concerning implications, especially when their prescriptions affect the welfare of others. To gauge how LLMs make social decisions, we explore whether five leading models produce sensible strategies in the repeated prisoner's dilemma, which is the main metaphor of reciprocal cooperation. First, we measure the propensity of LLMs to cooperate in a neutral setting, without using language reminiscent of how this game is usually presented. We record to what extent LLMs implement Nash equilibria or other well-known strategy classes. Thereafter, we explore how LLMs adapt their strategies to changes in parameter values. We vary the game's continuation probability, the payoff values, and whether the total number of rounds is commonly known. We also study the effect of different framings. In each case, we test whether the adaptations of the LLMs are in line with basic intuition, theoretical predictions of evolutionary game theory, and experimental evidence from human participants. While all LLMs perform well in many of the tasks, none of them exhibit full consistency over all tasks. We also conduct tournaments between the inferred LLM strategies and study direct interaction between LLMs in games over ten rounds with a known or unknown last round. Our experiments shed light on how current LLMs instantiate reciprocal cooperation.

cs.CY↗

Homophily and wealth inequality shape mitigation behavior in coupled social-climate models

Understanding the role of human behavior in shaping environmental outcomes is crucial for addressing global challenges such as climate change. Environmental systems are influenced not only by natural factors like temperature, but also by human decisions regarding mitigation efforts, which are often based on forecasts or predictions about future environmental conditions. Over time, different outcomes can emerge, including scenarios where the environment deteriorates despite efforts to mitigate, or where successful mitigation leads to environmental resilience. Additionally, fluctuations in the level of human participation in mitigation can occur, reflecting shifts in collective behavior. In this study, we consider a variety of human mitigation decisions, in addition to the feedback loop that is created by changes in human behavior because of environmental changes. While these outcomes are based on simplified models, they offer important insights into the dynamics of human decision-making and the factors that influence effective action in the context of environmental sustainability. This study aims to examine key social dynamics influencing society's response to a worsening climate. While others conclude that homophily prompts greater warming unconditionally, this model finds that homophily can prevent catastrophic effects given a poor initial environmental state. Assuming that poor countries have the resources to do so, a consensus in that class group to defect from the strategy of the rich group (who are generally incentivized to continue ``business as usual'') can frequently prevent the vegetation proportion from converging to 0.

physics.soc-ph↗

Group Cooperation Diverges onto Durable Low versus High Paths: Public Goods Experiments in 134 Honduran Villages

We performed large, lab-in-the-field experiment (2,591 participants across 134 Honduran villages; ten rounds) and tracked how contribution behavior unfolds in fixed, anonymous groups of size five. Contribution separates early into two durable paths, one low and one high, with rare convergence thereafter. High-path players can be identified with strong accuracy early on. Groups that begin with an early majority of above-norm contributors (about 60%) are very likely finish high. The empirical finding of a bifurcation, consistent with the theory, shows that early, high contributions by socially central people steer groups onto, and help keep them on, a high-cooperation path.

stat.AP↗

Reinforcement Learning Dynamics of Network Vaccination and Hysteresis: A Double-Edged Sword for Addressing Vaccine Hesitancy

Mass vaccination remains a long-lasting challenge for disease control and prevention with upticks in vaccine hesitancy worldwide. Here, we introduce an experience-based learning (Q-learning) dynamics model of vaccination behavior in social networks, where agents choose whether or not to vaccinate given environmental feedbacks from their local neighborhood. We focus on how bounded rationality of individuals impacts decision-making of irrational agents in networks. Additionally, we observe hysteresis behavior and bistability with respect to vaccination cost and the Q-learning hyperparameters such as discount rate. Our results offer insight into the complexities of Q-learning and particularly how foresightedness of individuals will help mitigate - or conversely deteriorate, therefore acting as a double-edged sword - collective action problems in important contexts like vaccination. We also find a diversification of uptake choices, with individuals evolving into complete opt-in vs. complete opt-out. Our results have real-world implications for targeting the persistence of vaccine hesitancy using an interdisciplinary computational social science approach integrating social networks, game theory, and learning dynamics.

physics.soc-ph↗

Evolutionary Kuramoto dynamics unravels origins of chimera states in neural populations

Neural synchronization is central to cognition However, incomplete synchronization often produces chimera states where coherent and incoherent dynamics coexist. While previous studies have explored such patterns using networks of coupled oscillators, it remains unclear why neurons commit to communication or how chimera states persist. Here, we investigate the coevolution of neuronal phases and communication strategies on directed, weighted networks, where interaction payoffs depend on phase alignment and may be asymmetric due to unilateral communication. We find that both connection weights and directionality influence the stability of communicative strategies -- and, consequently, full synchronization -- as well as the strategic nature of neuronal interactions. Applying our framework to the C. elegans connectome, we show that emergent payoff structures, such as the snowdrift game, underpin the formation of chimera states. Our computational results demonstrate a promising neurogame-theoretic perspective, leveraging evolutionary graph theory to shed light on mechanisms of neuronal coordination beyond classical synchronization models.

q-bio.NC↗

Evolutionary dynamics of pairwise and group cooperation in heterogeneous social networks

Understanding how cooperation evolves in structured populations remains a fundamental question across diverse disciplines. The problem of cooperation typically involves pairwise or group interactions among individuals. While prior studies have extensively investigated the role of networks in shaping cooperative dynamics, the influence of tie or connection strengths between individuals has not been fully understood. Here, we introduce a quenched mean-field based framework for analyzing both pairwise and group dilemmas on any weighted network, providing interpretable conditions required for favoring cooperation. Our theoretical advances further motivate us to find that the degree-inverse weighted social ties -- reinforcing tie strengths between peripheral nodes while weakening those between hubs -- robustly promote cooperation in both pairwise and group dilemmas. Importantly, this configuration enables heterogeneous networks to outperform homogeneous ones in fixation of cooperation, thereby adding to the conventional view that degree heterogeneity inhibits cooperative behavior under the local stochastic strategy update. We further test the generality of degree-inverse weighted social ties in promoting cooperation on 30,000 random networks and 13 empirical networks drawn from real-world systems. Finally, we unveil the underlying mechanism by examining the formation and evolution of cooperative ties under social ties with degree-inverse weights. Our systematic analyses provide new insights into how the network adjustment of tie strengths can effectively steer structured populations toward cooperative outcomes in biological and social systems.

physics.soc-ph↗