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Feng Fu

Publications and source records attributed to Feng Fu.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

The Niche Connectivity Paradox: Multichrome Contagions Overcome Vaccine Hesitancy more effectively than Monochromacy

The rise of vaccine hesitancy has caused a resurgence of vaccine-preventable diseases such as measles and pertussis, alongside widespread skepticism and refusals of COVID-19 vaccinations. While categorizing individuals as either supportive of or opposed to vaccines provides a convenient dichotomy of vaccine attitudes, vaccine hesitancy is far more complex and dynamic. It involves wavering individuals whose attitudes fluctuate -- those who may exhibit pro-vaccine attitudes at one time and anti-vaccine attitudes at another. Here, we identify and analyze multichrome contagions as potential targets for intervention by leveraging a dataset of known pro-vax and anti-vax Twitter users ($n =135$ million) and a large COVID-19 Twitter dataset ($n = 3.5$ billion; including close analysis of $1,563,472$ unique individuals). We reconstruct an evolving multiplex sentiment landscape using top co-spreading issues, characterizing them as monochrome and multichrome contagions, based on their conceptual overlap with vaccination. We demonstrate switchers as deliberative: they are more moderate, engage with a wider range of topics, and occupy more central positions in their networks. Further examination of their information consumption shows that their discourse often engages with progressive issues such as climate change, which can serve as avenues for multichrome contagion interventions to promote pro-vaccine attitudes. Using data-driven intervention simulations, we demonstrate a paradox of niche connectivity, where multichrome contagions with fragmented, non-overlapping communities generate the highest levels of diffusion for pro-vaccine attitudes. Our work offers insights into harnessing synergistic hitchhiking effect of multichrome contagions to drive desired attitude and behavior changes in network-based interventions, particularly for overcoming vaccine hesitancy.

cs.SI↗

Nonlinear contagion dynamics on dynamical networks: exact solutions ranging from consensus times to evolutionary trajectories

Understanding nonlinear social contagion dynamics on dynamical networks, such as opinion formation, is crucial for gaining new insights into consensus and polarization. Similar to threshold-dependent complex contagions, the nonlinearity in adoption rates poses challenges for mean-field approximations. To address this theoretical gap, we focus on nonlinear binary-opinion dynamics on dynamical networks and analytically derive local configurations, specifically the distribution of opinions within any given focal individual's neighborhood. This exact local configuration of opinions, combined with network degree distributions, allows us to obtain exact solutions for consensus times and evolutionary trajectories. Our counterintuitive results reveal that neither biased assimilation (i.e., nonlinear adoption rates) nor preferences in local network rewiring -- such as in-group bias (preferring like-minded individuals) and the Matthew effect (preferring social hubs) -- can significantly slow down consensus. Among these three social factors, we find that biased assimilation is the most influential in accelerating consensus. Furthermore, our analytical method efficiently and precisely predicts the evolutionary trajectories of adoption curves arising from nonlinear contagion dynamics. Our work paves the way for enabling analytical predictions for general nonlinear contagion dynamics beyond opinion formation.

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Working with Large Language Models to Enhance Messaging Effectiveness for Vaccine Confidence

Vaccine hesitancy and misinformation are significant barriers to achieving widespread vaccination coverage. Smaller public health departments may lack the expertise or resources to craft effective vaccine messaging. This paper explores the potential of ChatGPT-augmented messaging to promote confidence in vaccination uptake. We conducted a survey in which participants chose between pairs of vaccination messages and assessed which was more persuasive and to what extent. In each pair, one message was the original, and the other was augmented by ChatGPT. At the end of the survey, participants were informed that half of the messages had been generated by ChatGPT. They were then asked to provide both quantitative and qualitative responses regarding how knowledge of a message's ChatGPT origin affected their impressions. Overall, ChatGPT-augmented messages were rated slightly higher than the original messages. These messages generally scored better when they were longer. Respondents did not express major concerns about ChatGPT-generated content, nor was there a significant relationship between participants' views on ChatGPT and their message ratings. Notably, there was a correlation between whether a message appeared first or second in a pair and its score. These results point to the potential of ChatGPT to enhance vaccine messaging, suggesting a promising direction for future research on human-AI collaboration in public health communication.

cs.CY↗

Social Imitation Dynamics of Vaccination Driven by Vaccine Effectiveness and Beliefs

Declines in vaccination coverage for vaccine-preventable diseases, such as measles and chickenpox, have enabled their surprising comebacks and pose significant public health challenges in the wake of growing vaccine hesitancy. Vaccine opt-outs and refusals are often fueled by beliefs concerning perceptions of vaccine effectiveness and exaggerated risks. Here, we quantify the impact of competing beliefs -- vaccine-averse versus vaccine-neutral -- on social imitation dynamics of vaccination, alongside the epidemiological dynamics of disease transmission. These beliefs may be pre-existing and fixed, or coevolving attitudes. This interplay among beliefs, behaviors, and disease dynamics demonstrates that individuals are not perfectly rational; rather, they base their vaccine uptake decisions on beliefs, personal experiences, and social influences. We find that the presence of a small proportion of fixed vaccine-averse beliefs can significantly exacerbate the vaccination dilemma, making the tipping point in the hysteresis loop more sensitive to changes in individuals' perceived costs of vaccination and vaccine effectiveness. However, in scenarios where competing beliefs spread concurrently with vaccination behavior, their double-edged impact can lead to self-correction and alignment between vaccine beliefs and behaviors. The results show that coevolution of vaccine beliefs and behaviors makes populations more sensitive to abrupt changes in perceptions of vaccine cost and effectiveness compared to scenarios without beliefs. Our work provides valuable insights into harnessing the social contagion of even vaccine-neutral attitudes to overcome vaccine hesitancy.

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Evolutionary Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning in Group Social Dilemmas

Reinforcement learning (RL) is a powerful machine learning technique that has been successfully applied to a wide variety of problems. However, it can be unpredictable and produce suboptimal results in complicated learning environments. This is especially true when multiple agents learn simultaneously, which creates a complex system that is often analytically intractable. Our work considers the fundamental framework of Q-learning in Public Goods Games, where RL individuals must work together to achieve a common goal. This setting allows us to study the tragedy of the commons and free rider effects in AI cooperation, an emerging field with potential to resolve challenging obstacles to the wider application of artificial intelligence. While this social dilemma has been mainly investigated through traditional and evolutionary game theory, our approach bridges the gap between these two by studying agents with an intermediate level of intelligence. Specifically, we consider the influence of learning parameters on cooperation levels in simulations and a limiting system of differential equations, as well as the effect of evolutionary pressures on exploration rate in both of these models. We find selection for higher and lower levels of exploration, as well as attracting values, and a condition that separates these in a restricted class of games. Our work enhances the theoretical understanding of evolutionary Q-learning, and extends our knowledge of the evolution of machine behavior in social dilemmas.

cs.MA↗

Indirect reciprocity in the public goods game with collective reputations

Indirect reciprocity unveils how social cooperation is founded upon moral systems. Within the frame of dyadic games based on individual reputations, the "leading-eight" strategies distinguish themselves in promoting and sustaining cooperation. However, in the real-world societies, there are widespread interactions at the group level, where individuals need to make a singular action choice when facing multiple individuals with different reputations. Here, through introducing the assessment of collective reputations, we develop a framework that embeds group-level reputation structure into public goods game to study the evolution of group-level indirect reciprocity. We show that changing the criteria of group assessment destabilize the reputation dynamics of leading-eight strategies. In a particular range of social assessment criteria, all leading-eight strategies can break the social dilemma in public goods games and sustain cooperation. Specifically, there exists an optimal, moderately set assessment criterion that is most conducive to promoting cooperation. Moreover, in the evolution of assessment criteria, the preference of the leading-eight strategies for social strictness is inversely correlated with the payoff level. Our work reveals the impact of social strictness on prosocial behavior, highlighting the importance of group-level interactions in the analysis of evolutionary games and complex social dynamics.

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Evolutionary game dynamics with environmental feedback in a network with two communities

Recent developments of eco-evolutionary models have shown that evolving feedbacks between behavioral strategies and the environment of game interactions, leading to changes in the underlying payoff matrix, can impact the underlying population dynamics in various manners. We propose and analyze an eco-evolutionary game dynamics model on a network with two communities such that players interact with other players in the same community and those in the opposite community at different rates. In our model, we consider two-person matrix games with pairwise interactions occurring on individual edges and assume that the environmental state depends on edges rather than on nodes or being globally shared in the population. We analytically determine the equilibria and their stability under a symmetric population structure assumption, and we also numerically study the replicator dynamics of the general model. The model shows rich dynamical behavior, such as multiple transcritical bifurcations, multistability, and anti-synchronous oscillations. Our work offers insights into understanding how the presence of community structure impacts the eco-evolutionary dynamics within and between niches.

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Unbending strategies shepherd cooperation and suppress extortion in spatial populations

Evolutionary game dynamics on networks typically consider the competition among simple strategies such as cooperation and defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma and summarize the effect of population structure as network reciprocity. However, it remains largely unknown regarding the evolutionary dynamics involving multiple powerful strategies typically considered in repeated games, such as the zero-determinant (ZD) strategies that are able to enforce a linear payoff relationship between them and their co-players. Here, we consider the evolutionary dynamics of always cooperate (AllC), extortionate ZD (extortioners), and unbending players in lattice populations based on the commonly used death-birth updating. Out of the class of unbending strategies, we consider a particular candidate, PSO Gambler, a machine-learning-optimized memory-one strategy, which can foster reciprocal cooperation and fairness among extortionate players. We derive analytical results under weak selection and rare mutations, including pairwise fixation probabilities and long-term frequencies of strategies. In the absence of the third unbending type, extortioners can achieve a half-half split in equilibrium with unconditional cooperators for sufficiently large extortion factors. However, the presence of unbending players fundamentally changes the dynamics and tilts the system to favor unbending cooperation. Most surprisingly, extortioners cannot dominate at all regardless of how large their extortion factor is, and the long-term frequency of unbending players is maintained almost as a constant. Our analytical method is applicable to studying the evolutionary dynamics of multiple strategies in structured populations. Our work provides insights into the interplay between network reciprocity and direct reciprocity, revealing the role of unbending strategies in enforcing fairness and suppressing extortion.

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The Other Side of the Coin: Recipient Norms and Their Impact on Indirect Reciprocity and Cooperation

Human cooperation depends on indirect reciprocity. In this work, we explore the concept of indirect reciprocity using a donation game in an infinitely large population. In particular, we examine how updating the reputations of recipients influences cooperation. Our work adds a time-scale parameter for updating donor and recipient reputations. We find a trade-off between the level of cooperation and evolutionary stability influenced by social norms. `Forgiving' recipient norms enhance cooperation but increase susceptibility to defectors, whereas `unforgiving' norms reduce cooperation but defend against invasion by defectors. Expanding to include gossip groups allows us to analyze the evolutionary dynamics of the time-scale parameter, identifying `generous' norms that support cooperation, and `strict' norms that discourage such generosity, ultimately showing vulnerability to defector invasions and potential cooperation collapse.

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Social Dilemma of Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions

In fighting infectious diseases posing a global health threat, ranging from influenza to Zika, non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPI), such as social distancing and face covering, remain mitigation measures public health can resort to. However, the success of NPI lies in sufficiently high levels of collective compliance, otherwise giving rise to waves of infection incidences that are not only driven by pathogen evolution but also changing vigilance in the population. Here we show that compliance with each NPI measure can be highly dynamic and context-dependent during an ongoing epidemic, where individuals may prefer one to another or even do nothing, leading to intricate temporal switching behavior of NPI adoptions. By characterizing dynamic regimes through the perceived costs of NPI measures and their effectiveness in particular regarding face covering and social distancing, our work offers new insights into overcoming barriers in NPI adoptions.

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Determinants of successful disease control through voluntary quarantine dynamics on social networks

In the wake of epidemics, quarantine measures are typically recommended by health authorities or governments to help control the spread of the disease. Compared with mandatory quarantine, voluntary quarantine offers individuals the liberty to decide whether to isolate themselves in case of infection exposure, driven by their personal assessment of the trade-off between economic loss and health risks as well as their own sense of social responsibility and concern for public health. To better understand self-motivated health behavior choices under these factors, here we incorporate voluntary quarantine into an endemic disease model -- the susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) model -- and perform comprehensive agent-based simulations to characterize the resulting behavior-disease interactions in structured populations. We quantify the conditions under which voluntary quarantine will be an effective intervention measure to mitigate disease burden. Furthermore, we demonstrate how individual decision-making factors, including the level of temptation to refrain from quarantine and the degree of social compassion, impact compliance levels of voluntary quarantines and the consequent collective disease mitigation efforts. We find that successful disease control requires either a sufficiently low level of temptation or a sufficiently high degree of social compassion, such that even complete containment of the epidemic is attainable. In addition to well-mixed populations, our simulation results are applicable to other more realistic social networks of contacts, including spatial lattices, small-world networks, and real social networks. Our work offers new insights into the fundamental social dilemma aspect of disease control through non-pharmaceutical interventions, such as voluntary quarantine and isolation, where the collective outcome of individual decision-making is crucial.

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Mathematics of multi-agent learning systems at the interface of game theory and artificial intelligence

Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) and Artificial Intelligence (AI) are two fields that, at first glance, might seem distinct, but they have notable connections and intersections. The former focuses on the evolution of behaviors (or strategies) in a population, where individuals interact with others and update their strategies based on imitation (or social learning). The more successful a strategy is, the more prevalent it becomes over time. The latter, meanwhile, is centered on machine learning algorithms and (deep) neural networks. It is often from a single-agent perspective but increasingly involves multi-agent environments, in which intelligent agents adjust their strategies based on feedback and experience, somewhat akin to the evolutionary process yet distinct in their self-learning capacities. In light of the key components necessary to address real-world problems, including (i) learning and adaptation, (ii) cooperation and competition, (iii) robustness and stability, and altogether (iv) population dynamics of individual agents whose strategies evolve, the cross-fertilization of ideas between both fields will contribute to the advancement of mathematics of multi-agent learning systems, in particular, to the nascent domain of ``collective cooperative intelligence'' bridging evolutionary dynamics and multi-agent reinforcement learning.

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Reinforcement Learning Jazz Improvisation: When Music Meets Game Theory

Live performances of music are always charming, with the unpredictability of improvisation due to the dynamic between musicians and interactions with the audience. Jazz improvisation is a particularly noteworthy example for further investigation from a theoretical perspective. Here, we introduce a novel mathematical game theory model for jazz improvisation, providing a framework for studying music theory and improvisational methodologies. We use computational modeling, mainly reinforcement learning, to explore diverse stochastic improvisational strategies and their paired performance on improvisation. We find that the most effective strategy pair is a strategy that reacts to the most recent payoff (Stepwise Changes) with a reinforcement learning strategy limited to notes in the given chord (Chord-Following Reinforcement Learning). Conversely, a strategy that reacts to the partner's last note and attempts to harmonize with it (Harmony Prediction) strategy pair yields the lowest non-control payoff and highest standard deviation, indicating that picking notes based on immediate reactions to the partner player can yield inconsistent outcomes. On average, the Chord-Following Reinforcement Learning strategy demonstrates the highest mean payoff, while Harmony Prediction exhibits the lowest. Our work lays the foundation for promising applications beyond jazz: including the use of artificial intelligence (AI) models to extract data from audio clips to refine musical reward systems, and training machine learning (ML) models on existing jazz solos to further refine strategies within the game.

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How norms shape the evolution of prosocial behavior. Compassion, Universalizability, Reciprocity, Equity: A C.U.R.E for social dilemmas

How cooperation evolves and particularly maintains at a large scale remains an open problem for improving humanity across domains ranging from climate change to pandemic response. To shed light on how behavioral norms can resolve the social dilemma of cooperation, here we present a formal mathematical model of individuals' decision making under general social norms, encompassing a variety of concerns and motivations an individual may have beyond simply maximizing their own payoffs. Using the canonical game of the Prisoner's Dilemma, we compare four different norms: compassion, universalizability, reciprocity, and equity, to determine which social forces can facilitate the evolution of cooperation, if any. We analyze our model through a variety of limiting cases, including weak selection, low mutation, and large population sizes. This is complemented by computer simulations of population dynamics via a Fisher process, which confirm our theoretical results. We find that the first two norms lead to the emergence of cooperation in a wide range of games, but the latter two do not on their own. Due to its generality, our framework can be used to investigate many more norms, as well as how norms themselves emerge and evolve. Our work complements recent work on fair-minded learning dynamics and provides a useful bottom-up perspective into understanding the impact of top-down social norms on collective cooperative intelligence.

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Too little, too late -- a dynamical systems model for gun-related violence and intervention

In the United States the laws regulating the carrying of firearms in public vary state-to-state. In a highly publicized event, the Governor of New Mexico recently issued an emergency order temporarily banning the carrying of firearms in some areas -- and thus rescinding the right-to-carry law in New Mexico -- after a spate of gun violence, citing a statistical threshold of general societal violence under which right-to-carry laws should be superseded. In this paper we frame this policy intervention as a dynamical systems model that measures the incidence of gun violence as a function of gun prevalence. We show that the Governor's emergency order -- fittingly issued as an emergency health order -- is effectively like trying to stop an epidemic after it has become viral in that with this kind of instantaneous stopping condition, under simple assumptions, such a regulation is too little, too late. On the other hand, a graduated response that scales with increasing violence can drive equilibrium gun prevalence to zero. This is a new mathematical model relating gun violence with gun prevalence which we hope continues to spur attention from the modeling community to bring its tools and techniques to bear on this important and challenging social problem. More importantly, our model, despite its simplicity, exhibits complex dynamics and has substantial research and educational value in promoting the application of mathematics in the social sciences, extending beyond gun control issues.

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Determinants of successful mitigation in coupled social-climate dynamics

Understanding the impact of human behavior is crucial for successful mitigation of climate change across the globe. To shed light onto this issue, here we couple the forest dieback model with human behaviors. Using evolutionary game theory, we build a time-delay system where forest growth is impacted by both temperature and human mitigation choices, the latter being informed by temperature forecasts. Simulations of the coupled system over 200 years show us the varying outcomes: forest dies out and no one is a mitigator, forest dies out and everyone is a mitigator, or the forest survives and everyone is a mitigator. There exist rare cases where no one is a mitigator and yet the forest survives, but with a low coverage. We also find occasional oscillations where the proportion of mitigators vary between 0 and 1. Our results are based on simple models but have profound insights into determinants of behavior changes desired in social-climate dynamics.

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Identifying Bridges and Catalysts for Persistent Cooperation Using Network-Based Approach

The framework of iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) is commonly used to study direct reciprocity and cooperation, with a focus on the assessment of the generosity and reciprocal fairness of an IPD strategy in one-on-one settings. In order to understand the persistence and resilience of reciprocal cooperation, here we study long-term population dynamics of IPD strategies using the Moran process where stochastic dynamics of strategy competition can lead to the rise and fall of cooperation. Although prior work has included a handful of typical IPD strategies in the consideration, it remains largely unclear which type of IPD strategies is pivotal in steering the population away from defection and providing an escape hatch for establishing cooperation. We use a network-based approach to analyze and characterize networks of evolutionary pathways that bridge transient episodes of evolution dominated by depressing defection and ultimately catalyze the evolution of reciprocal cooperation in the long run. We group IPD strategies into three types according to their stationary cooperativity with an unconditional cooperator: the good (fully cooperative), the bad (fully exploitive), and the ugly (in between the former two types). We consider the mutation-selection equilibrium with rare mutations and quantify the impact of the presence versus absence of any given IPD strategy on the resulting population equilibrium. We identify catalysts (certain IPD strategies) as well as bridges (particular evolutionary pathways) that are most crucial for boosting the abundance of good types and suppressing that of bad types or having the highest betweenness centrality. Our work has practical implications and broad applicability to real-world cooperation problems by leveraging catalysts and bridges that are capable of strengthening persistence and resilience.

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Steering control of payoff-maximizing players in adaptive learning dynamics

Evolutionary game theory provides a mathematical foundation for cross-disciplinary fertilization, especially for integrating ideas from artificial intelligence and game theory. Such integration offers a transparent and rigorous approach to complex decision-making problems in a variety of important contexts, ranging from evolutionary computation to machine behavior. Despite the astronomically huge individual behavioral strategy space for interactions in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) games, the so-called Zero-Determinant (ZD) strategies is a set of rather simple memory-one strategies yet can unilaterally set a linear payoff relationship between themselves and their opponent. Although the witting of ZD strategies gives players an upper hand in the IPD games, we find and characterize unbending strategies that can force ZD players to be fair in their own interest. Moreover, our analysis reveals the ubiquity of unbending properties in common IPD strategies which are previously overlooked. In this work, we demonstrate the important steering role of unbending strategies in fostering fairness and cooperation in pairwise interactions. Our results will help bring a new perspective by means of combining game theory and multi-agent learning systems for optimizing winning strategies that are robust to noises, errors, and deceptions in non-zero-sum games.

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