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Feng Fu

Publications and source records attributed to Feng Fu.

At least 55 records · Page 3Linked to original sources
arXiv2023

The satisficing secretary problem: when closed-form solutions meet simulated annealing

The secretary problem has been a focus of extensive study with a variety of extensions that offer useful insights into the theory of optimal stopping. The original solution is to set one stopping threshold that gives rise to an immediately rejected sample $r$ out of the candidate pool of size $n$ and to accept the first candidate that is subsequently interviewed and bests the prior $r$ rejected. In reality, it is not uncommon to draw a line between job candidates to distinguish those above the line vs those below the line. Here we consider such satisficing sectary problem that views suboptimal choices (finding any of the top $d$ candidates) also as hiring success. We use a multiple stopping criteria $(r_1, r_2, \cdots, r_d)$ that sequentially lowers the expectation when the prior selection criteria yields no choice. We calculate the probability of securing the top $d$ candidate in closed form solutions which are in excellent agreement with computer simulations. The exhaustive search for optimal stopping has to deal with large parameter space and thus can quickly incur astronomically large computational times. In light of this, we apply the effective computational method of simulated annealing to find optimal $r_i$ values which performs reasonably well as compared with the exhaustive search despite having significantly less computing time. Our work sheds light on maximizing the likelihood of securing satisficing (suboptimal) outcomes using adaptive search strategy in combination with computation methods.

physics.soc-ph↗
arXiv2022

Population heterogeneity in vaccine coverage impacts epidemic thresholds and bifurcation dynamics

Population heterogeneity, especially in individuals' contact networks, plays an important role in transmission dynamics of infectious diseases. For vaccine-preventable diseases, outstanding issues like vaccine hesitancy and availability of vaccines further lead to nonuniform coverage among groups, not to mention the efficacy of vaccines and the mixing pattern varying from one group to another. As the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic transitions to endemicity, it is of interest and significance to understand the impact of aforementioned population heterogeneity on the emergence and persistence of epidemics. Here we analyze epidemic thresholds and characterize bifurcation dynamics by accounting for heterogeneity caused by group-dependent characteristics, including vaccination rate and efficacy as well as disease transmissibility. Our analysis shows that increases in the difference in vaccination coverage among groups can render multiple equilibria of disease burden to exist even if the overall basic reproductive ratio is below one (also known as backward bifurcation). The presence of other heterogeneity factors such as differences in vaccine efficacy, transmission, mixing pattern, and group size can each exhibit subtle impacts on bifurcation. We find that heterogeneity in vaccine efficacy can undermine the condition for backward bifurcations whereas homophily tends to aggravate disease endemicity. Our results have practical implications for improving public health efforts by addressing the role of population heterogeneity in the spread and control of diseases.

q-bio.PE↗
arXiv2022

Evolutionary games and spatial periodicity

We establish a theoretical framework to address evolutionary dynamics of spatial games under strong selection. As the selection intensity tends to infinity, strategy competition unfolds in the deterministic way of winners taking all. We rigorously prove that the evolutionary process soon or later either enters a cycle and from then on repeats the cycle periodically, or stabilizes at some state almost everywhere. This conclusion holds for any population graph and a large class of finite games. This framework suffices to reveal the underlying mathematical rationale for the kaleidoscopic cooperation of Nowak and May's pioneering work on spatial games: highly symmetric starting configuration causes a very long transient phase covering a large number of extremely beautiful spatial patterns. For all starting configurations, spatial patterns transit definitely over generations, so cooperators and defectors persist definitely. This framework can be extended to explore games including the snowdrift game, the public goods games (with or without loner, punishment), and repeated games on graphs. Aspiration dynamics can also be fully addressed when players deterministically switch strategy for unmet aspirations by virtue of our framework. Our results have potential implications for exploring the dynamics of a large variety of spatially extended systems in biology and physics.

q-bio.PE↗
arXiv2022

Eco-Evolutionary Dynamics of Bimatrix Games

Feedbacks between strategies and the environment are common in social-ecological, evolutionary-ecological, and even psychological-economic systems. Utilizing common resources is always a dilemma for community members, like tragedy of the commons. Here we consider replicator dynamics with feedback-evolving games, where the payoffs switch between two different matrices. Although each payoff matrix on its own represents an environment where cooperators and defectors can't coexist stably, we show that it's possible to design appropriate switching control laws and achieve persistent oscillations of strategy abundance. This result should help guide the widespread problem of population state control in microbial experiments and other social problems with eco-evolutionary feedback loops.

math.DS↗
arXiv2022

The Point of No Return: Evolution of Excess Mutation Rate is Possible Even for Simple Mutation Models

Under constant selection, each trait has a fixed fitness, and small mutation rates allow populations to efficiently exploit the optimal trait. Therefore it is reasonable to expect mutation rates will evolve downwards. However, we find this need not be the case, examining several models of mutation. While upwards evolution of mutation rate has been found with frequency or time dependent fitness, we demonstrate its possibility in a much simpler context. This work uses adaptive dynamics to study the evolution of mutation rate, and the replicator-mutator equation to model trait evolution. Our approach differs from previous studies by considering a wide variety of methods to represent mutation. We use a finite string approach inspired by genetics, as well as a model of local mutation on a discretization of the unit intervals, handling mutation beyond the endpoints in three ways. The main contribution of this work is a demonstration that the evolution of mutation rate can be significantly more complicated than what is usually expected in relatively simple models.

q-bio.PE↗
arXiv2022

The Geometry of Zero-Determinant Strategies

The advent of Zero-Determinant (ZD) strategies has reshaped the study of reciprocity and cooperation in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games. The ramification of ZD strategies has been demonstrated through their ability to unilaterally enforce a linear relationship between their own average payoff and that of their co-player. Common practice conveniently represents this relationship by a straight line in the parametric plot of pairwise payoffs. Yet little attention has been paid to studying the actual geometry of the strategy space of all admissible ZD strategies. Here, our work offers intuitive geometric relationships between different classes of ZD strategies as well as nontrivial geometric interpretations of their specific parameterizations. Adaptive dynamics of ZD strategies further reveals the unforeseen connection between general ZD strategies and the so-called equalizers that can set any co-player's payoff to a fixed value. We show that the class of equalizers forming a hyperplane is the critical equilibrium manifold, only part of which is stable. The same hyperplane is also a separatrix of the cooperation-enhancing region where the optimum response is to increase cooperation for each of the four payoff outcomes. Our results shed light on the simple but elegant geometry of ZD strategies that is previously overlooked.

physics.soc-ph↗
arXiv2022

Spatial Games of Fake News

To curb the spread of fake news on social media platforms, recent studies have considered an online crowdsourcing fact-checking approach as one possible intervention method to reduce misinformation. However, it remains unclear under what conditions crowdsourcing fact-checking efforts deter the spread of misinformation. To address this issue, we model such distributed fact-checking as `peer policing' that will reduce the perceived payoff to share or disseminate false information (fake news) and also reward the spread of trustworthy information (real news). By simulating our model on synthetic square lattices and small-world networks, we show that the presence of social network structure enables fake news spreaders to be self-organized into echo chambers, thereby providing a boost to the efficacy of fake news and thus its resistance to fact-checking efforts. Additionally, to study our model in a more realistic setting, we utilize a Twitter network dataset and study the effectiveness of deliberately choosing specific individuals to be fact-checkers. We find that targeted fact-checking efforts can be highly effective, seeing the same level of success with as little as a fifth of the number of fact-checkers, but it depends on the structure of the network in question. In the limit of weak selection, we obtain closed-form analytical conditions for critical threshold of crowdsourced fact-checking in terms of the payoff values in our fact-checker/fake news game. Our work has practical implications for developing model-based mitigation strategies for controlling the spread of misinformation that interferes with the political discourse.

physics.soc-ph↗
arXiv2022

Outlearning Extortioners by Fair-minded Unbending Strategies

Recent theory shows that extortioners taking advantage of the zero-determinant (ZD) strategy can unilaterally claim an unfair share of the payoffs in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. It is thus suggested that against a fixed extortioner, any adapting co-player should be subdued with full cooperation as their best response. In contrast, recent experiments demonstrate that human players often choose not to accede to extortion out of concern for fairness, actually causing extortioners to suffer more loss than themselves. In light of this, here we reveal fair-minded strategies that are unbending to extortion such that any payoff-maximizing extortioner ultimately will concede in their own interest by offering a fair split in head-to-head matches. We find and characterize multiple general classes of such unbending strategies, including generous zero-determinant strategies and Win-Stay, Lose-Shift as particular examples. When against fixed unbending players, extortioners are forced with consequentially increasing losses whenever intending to demand more unfair share. Our analysis also pivots to the importance of payoff structure in determining the superiority of zero-determinant strategies and in particular their extortion ability. We show that an extortionate ZD player can be even outperformed by, for example, Win-Stay Lose-Shift, if the total payoff of unilateral cooperation is smaller than that of mutual defection. Unbending strategies can be used to outlearn evolutionary extortioners and catalyze the evolution of Tit-for-Tat-like strategies out of ZD players. Our work has implications for promoting fairness and resisting extortion so as to uphold a just and cooperative society.

physics.soc-ph↗
arXiv2022

Highly coordinated nationwide massive travel restrictions are central to effective mitigation and control of COVID-19 outbreaks in China

The COVID-19, the disease caused by the novel coronavirus 2019 (SARS-CoV-2), has caused graving woes across the globe since first reported in the epicenter Wuhan, Hubei, China, December 2019. The spread of COVID-19 in China has been successfully curtailed by massive travel restrictions that put more than 900 million people housebound for more than two months since the lockdown of Wuhan on 23 January 2020 when other provinces in China followed suit. Here, we assess the impact of China's massive lockdowns and travel restrictions reflected by the changes in mobility patterns before and during the lockdown period. We quantify the synchrony of mobility patterns across provinces and within provinces. Using these mobility data, we calibrate movement flow between provinces in combination with an epidemiological compartment model to quantify the effectiveness of lockdowns and reductions in disease transmission. Our analysis demonstrates that the onset and phase of local community transmission in other provinces depends on the cumulative population outflow received from the epicenter Hubei. As such, infections can propagate further into other interconnected places both near and far, thereby necessitating synchronous lockdowns. Moreover, our data-driven modeling analysis shows that lockdowns and consequently reduced mobility lag a certain time to elicit an actual impact on slowing down the spreading and ultimately putting the epidemic under check. In spite of the vastly heterogeneous demographics and epidemiological characteristics across China, mobility data shows that massive travel restrictions have been applied consistently via a top-down approach along with high levels of compliance from the bottom up.

physics.soc-ph↗
arXiv2021

The dual problems of coordination and anti-coordination on random bipartite graphs

In some scenarios ("anti-coordination games"), individuals are better off choosing different actions than their neighbors while in other scenarios ("coordination games"), it is beneficial for individuals to choose the same strategy as their neighbors. Despite having different incentives and resulting population dynamics, it is largely unknown which collective outcome, anti-coordination or coordination, is easier to achieve. To address this issue, we focus on the distributed graph coloring problem on bipartite graphs. We show that with only two strategies, anti-coordination games (2-colorings) and coordination games (uniform colorings) are dual problems that are equally difficult to solve. To prove this, we construct an isomorphism between the Markov chains arising from the corresponding anti-coordination and coordination games under certain specific individual stochastic decision-making rules. Our results provide novel insights into solving collective action problems on networks.

physics.soc-ph↗
arXiv2021

Evolutionary Dynamics of Gig Economy Labor Strategies under Technology, Policy and Market Influence

The emergence of the modern gig economy introduces a new set of employment considerations for firms and laborers that include various trade-offs. With a game-theoretical approach, we examine the influences of technology, policy and markets on firm and worker preferences for gig labor. Theoretically, we present a new extension to the replicator equation and model oscillating dynamics in two-player asymmetric bi-matrix games with time-evolving environments, introducing concepts of the attractor arc, trapping zone and escape. We demonstrate how changing market conditions result in distinct evolutionary patterns for gig-labor preferences across high and low skill work-forces, which we explain through their differing sensitivities to market-driven consumer demand and financial incentives among other considerations. Informing tensions regarding the future of this new employment category, we present a novel payoff framework to analyze the role of technology on the growth of the gig economy. Finally, we explore regulatory implications within the gig economy, demonstrating how intervals of lenient and strict policy alter firm and worker sensitivities between gig and employee labor strategies.

physics.soc-ph↗
arXiv2021

Polarization, Abstention, and the Median Voter Theorem

The median voter theorem has long been the default model of voter behavior and candidate choice. While contemporary work on the distribution of political opinion has emphasized polarization and an increasing gap between the "left" and the "right" in democracies, the median voter theorem presents a model of anti-polarization: competing candidates move to the center of the ideological distribution to maximize vote share, regardless of the underlying ideological distribution of voters. These anti-polar results, however, largely depend on the "singled-peakedness" of voter preferences, an assumption that is rapidly loosing relevance in the age of polarization. This article presents a model of voter choice that examines three potential mechanisms that can undermine this finding: a relative cost of voting that deters voters who are sufficiently indifferent to both candidates, ideologically motivated third-party alternatives that attract extreme voters, and a bimodal distribution of voter ideology. Under reasonable sets of conditions and empirically observed voter opinion distributions, these mechanisms can be sufficient to cause strategically-minded candidates to fail to converge to the center, or to even become more polarized than their electorate.

physics.soc-ph↗
arXiv2021

Immune checkpoint therapy modeling of PD-1/PD-L1 blockades reveals subtle difference in their response dynamics and potential synergy in combination

Immune checkpoint therapy is one of the most promising immunotherapeutic methods that are likely able to give rise to durable treatment response for various cancer types. Despite much progress in the past decade, there are still critical open questions with particular regards to quantifying and predicting the efficacy of treatment and potential optimal regimens for combining different immune-checkpoint blockades. To shed light on this issue, here we develop clinically-relevant, dynamical systems models of cancer immunotherapy with a focus on the immune checkpoint PD-1/PD-L1 blockades. Our model allows the acquisition of adaptive immune resistance in the absence of treatment, whereas immune checkpoint blockades can reverse such resistance and boost anti-tumor activities of effector cells. Our numerical analysis predicts that anti-PD-1 agents are commonly less effective than anti-PD-L1 agents for a wide range of model parameters. We also observe that combination treatment of anti-PD-1 and anti-PD-L1 blockades leads to a desirable synergistic effect. Our modeling framework lays the ground for future data-driven analysis on combination therapeutics of immune-checkpoint treatment regimes and thorough investigation of optimized treatment on a patient-by-patient basis.

q-bio.PE↗
arXiv2021

Random Choices can Facilitate the Solving of Collective Network Coloring Problems by Artificial Agents

Global coordination is required to solve a wide variety of challenging collective action problems from network colorings to the tragedy of the commons. Recent empirical study shows that the presence of a few noisy autonomous agents can greatly improve collective performance of humans in solving networked color coordination games. To provide further analytical insights into the role of behavioral randomness, here we study myopic artificial agents attempt to solve similar network coloring problems using decision update rules that are only based on local information but allow random choices at various stages of their heuristic reasonings. We consider that agents are distributed over a random bipartite network which is guaranteed to be solvable with two colors. Using agent-based simulations and theoretical analysis, we show that the resulting efficacy of resolving color conflicts is dependent on the specific implementation of random behavior of agents, including the fraction of noisy agents and at which decision stage noise is introduced. Moreover, behavioral randomness can be finely tuned to the specific underlying population structure such as network size and average network degree in order to produce advantageous results in finding collective coloring solutions. Our work demonstrates that distributed greedy optimization algorithms exploiting local information should be deployed in combination with occasional exploration via random choices in order to overcome local minima and achieve global coordination.

physics.soc-ph↗
arXiv2020

Oscillatory dynamics in the dilemma of social distancing

Social distancing as one of the main non-pharmaceutical interventions can help slow down the spread of diseases, like in the COVID-19 pandemic. Effective social distancing, unless enforced as drastic lockdowns and mandatory cordon sanitaire, requires consistent strict collective adherence. However, it remains unknown what the determinants for the resultant compliance of social distancing and their impact on disease mitigation are. Here, we incorporate into the epidemiological process with an evolutionary game theory model that governs the evolution of social distancing behavior. In our model, we assume an individual acts in their best interest and their decisions are driven by adaptive social learning of the real-time risk of infection in comparison with the cost of social distancing. We find interesting oscillatory dynamics of social distancing accompanied with waves of infection. Moreover, the oscillatory dynamics are dampened with a nontrivial dependence on model parameters governing decision-makings and gradually cease when the cumulative infections exceed the herd immunity. Compared to the scenario without social distancing, we quantify the degree to which social distancing mitigates the epidemic and its dependence on individuals' responsiveness and rationality in their behavior changes. Our work offers new insights into leveraging human behavior in support of pandemic response.

physics.soc-ph↗
arXiv2020

Eco-evolutionary dynamics with environmental feedback: cooperation in a changing world

Eco-evolutionary game dynamics which characterizes the mutual interactions and the coupled evolutions of strategies and environments has been of growing interests in very recent years. Since such feedback loops widely exist in a range of coevolutionary systems, such as microbial systems, social-ecological system and psychological-economic system, recent modeling frameworks that unveil the oscillating dynamics of social dilemmas have great potential for practical applications. In this perspective article, we overview the latest progress of evolutionary game theory in this direction. We describe both mathematical methods and interdisciplinary applications across different fields. The ideas worthy of further consideration are discussed in prospects, with the central role of promoting cooperations in a changing world.

physics.soc-ph↗
arXiv2020

Understanding Gambling Behavior and Risk Attitudes Using Cryptocurrency-based Casino Blockchain Data

The statistical concept of Gambler's Ruin suggests that gambling has a large amount of risk. Nevertheless, gambling at casinos and gambling on the Internet are both hugely popular activities. In recent years, both prospect theory and lab-controlled experiments have been used to improve our understanding of risk attitudes associated with gambling. Despite theoretical progress, collecting real-life gambling data, which is essential to validate predictions and experimental findings, remains a challenge. To address this issue, we collect publicly available betting data from a \emph{DApp} (decentralized application) on the Ethereum Blockchain, which instantly publishes the outcome of every single bet (consisting of each bet's timestamp, wager, probability of winning, userID, and profit). This online casino is a simple dice game that allows gamblers to tune their own winning probabilities. Thus the dataset is well suited for studying gambling strategies and the complex dynamic of risk attitudes involved in betting decisions. We analyze the dataset through the lens of current probability-theoretic models and discover empirical examples of gambling systems. Our results shed light on understanding the role of risk preferences in human financial behavior and decision-makings beyond gambling.

physics.soc-ph↗
arXiv2020

Evolutionary Kuramoto Dynamics

Common models of synchronizable oscillatory systems consist of a collection of coupled oscillators governed by a collection of differential equations. The ubiquitous Kuramoto models rely on an {\em a priori} fixed connectivity pattern facilitates mutual communication and influence between oscillators. In biological synchronizable systems, like the mammalian suprachaismatic nucleus, enabling communication comes at a cost -- the organism expends energy creating and maintaining the system -- linking their development to evolutionary selection. Here, we introduce and analyze a new evolutionary game theoretic framework modeling the behavior and evolution of systems of coupled oscillators. Each oscillator in our model is characterized by a pair of dynamic behavioral traits: an oscillatory phase and whether they connect and communicate to other oscillators or not. Evolution of the system occurs along these dimensions, allowing oscillators to change their phases and/or their communication strategies. We measure success of mutations by comparing the benefit of phase synchronization to the organism balanced against the cost of creating and maintaining connections between the oscillators. Despite such a simple setup, this system exhibits a wealth of nontrivial behaviors, mimicking different classical games -- the Prisoner's Dilemma, the snowdrift game, and coordination games -- as the landscape of the oscillators changes over time. Despite such complexity, we find a surprisingly simple characterization of synchronization through connectivity and communication: if the benefit of synchronization $B(0)$ is greater than twice the cost $c$, $B(0) > 2c$, the organism will evolve towards complete communication and phase synchronization. Taken together, our model demonstrates possible evolutionary constraints on both the existence of a synchronized oscillatory system and its overall connectivity.

q-bio.PE↗