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Gabriele Farina

Publications and source records attributed to Gabriele Farina.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Fixed Sets and the Hardness of Computing Correlated Equilibria

We show that computing an approximate correlated equilibrium of a polytope game is PPAD-complete, and thus polynomial-time equivalent to finding a Nash equilibrium. This challenges the conventional view in game theory that correlated equilibria are more tractable objects than Nash equilibria. From a conceptual standpoint, we connect correlated equilibria to a natural generalization of fixed points, which we call fixed sets. A fixed set of a continuous function $f$ is a nonempty finite set $S$ such that $S \subseteq \operatorname{conv} f(S)$. Our main technical contribution is to prove that computing a fixed set is PPAD-hard even at inverse polynomial precision.

cs.GT↗

Settling the Support Complexity of Correlated Equilibria

We study the support complexity of approximate correlated equilibria (CE) in two-player games, that is, the minimum number of pure action profiles that must be assigned positive probability to approximate a correlated equilibrium of a two-player matrix game. For $\varepsilon$-approximate coarse correlated equilibria, constant approximation is possible with support $O(\log N/\varepsilon^2)$ in $N\times N$ games. For correlated equilibria, the best known upper bound was $O(\log^2 N/\varepsilon^4)$ [Babichenko et al., 2014, 2017], but whether this bound was tight remained open. We establish a matching lower bound, resolving the open question of Ko and Schvartzman [2017]. Specifically, we show that, already for two-player zero-sum games, for every $1\leq k\leq N^{1/2}$ the worst-case correlated-equilibrium gap achievable by a distribution supported on at most $k$ pure profiles is $$ Θ\left( \min\left\{1,\frac{\sqrt{\log N}}{k^{1/4}}\right\} \right), $$ which implies a $Θ(\log^2 N/\varepsilon^4)$ worst-case support bound. The proof builds on a probabilistic-method construction based on random sign matrices.

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On the Complexity of Correlated Equilibria Beyond Normal-Form Games

Correlated equilibria are a fundamental solution concept in game theory, introduced in seminal work by Robert Aumann in the 1970s. A textbook fact is that correlated equilibria enjoy more desirable computational properties vis-a-vis Nash equilibria: they can be computed in polynomial time in normal-form games via linear programming, and are also amenable to learning via decentralized no-swap-regret dynamics. However, the complexity beyond games of polynomial type---such as extensive-form games, and more broadly concave games---has remained a major open problem, first highlighted by Papadimitriou and Roughgarden (JACM '08). We show that computing an approximate correlated equilibrium of a polytope game is PPAD-complete, and thus polynomial-time equivalent to finding a Nash equilibrium. This challenges the conventional view in game theory that correlated equilibria are more tractable objects than Nash equilibria. Moreover, we establish an unconditional, information-theoretic lower bound ruling out the existence of a strongly sublinear swap regret minimizer: any online learning algorithm requires exponentially many iterations in the dimension $d$ to guarantee at most $1/\text{poly}(d)$ swap regret. To circumvent these hardness results, we examine the complexity of $Φ$-equilibria---tractable relaxations of correlated equilibria. We obtain a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for computing poly-dimensional $Φ$-equilibria in general concave games. We complement this by showing that Contraction-hardness persists even under poly-dimensional swap deviations in the regime where the precision $ε$ is exponentially small. Finally, we show that Contraction-hardness can be bypassed in the canonical setting of concave \emph{quadratic games}, for which we provide a $\text{poly}(d, \log(1/ε))$-time algorithm for computing poly-dimensional $Φ$-equilibria.

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Polynomial-time computation of $\ell_p$-contraction fixed points for even $p$

We give a $\text{poly}(d, p, \log(1/ε))$-time algorithm that computes an $ε$-approximate fixed point of any $\ell_p$-nonexpansive map $f : \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{X}$, where $\mathcal{X} \subset \mathbb R^d$ is a convex compact set and $p$ is an even integer. This is the first algorithm with $\text{poly}(d, \log(1/ε))$ runtime for any fixed $p \ne 2$. Our techniques are based on a computationally efficient version of Sion's theorem for non-compact minmax problems, and extend to more general total search problems that admit low-degree polynomial potentials.

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GAE Falls Short in Imperfect-Information Self-Play Reinforcement Learning

Competitive multi-agent reinforcement learning in imperfect-information games requires agents to act under partial observability and against adversarial opponents, necessitating stochastic policies. While self-play reinforcement learning with Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) has achieved strong empirical success, its standard advantage estimator, generalized advantage estimation, suffers from additional variance due to the sampling of stochastic future actions. This variance is amplified in equilibrium self-play because of the stochastic nature of the equilibrium policy and persists even when the critic is exact. We address this bottleneck by introducing $Q$-boosting, a variance-reduced advantage estimator based on a centralized action-value critic, and propose Variance-Reduced Policy Optimization (VRPO), incorporating this new estimator. The algorithm replaces sampled multi-step backups with a multi-step Expected SARSA$(λ)$ trace, computing policy expectations at each step to average out action-sampling noise, while retaining PPO's clipped objective and on-policy actor updates. Empirically, VRPO achieves strong performance in various games: In mid-sized games where exploitability is computable, VRPO lowers the exact exploitability by more than 15% compared to tuned baselines. In Dou Dizhu, it sets a new state of the art over PerfectDou. In Heads-Up No-Limit Texas Hold'em, it posts a positive win rate against Slumbot without any blueprint raise sizes, search, or subgame solving at test time.

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Tropical Gaussian Anticoncentration: Optimal Instance-Dependent Bounds for Online Learning in Extensive-Form Games

We study the minimax regret of full-information online decision making in extensive-form games. For prediction with expert advice, the optimal regret is $Θ(\sqrt{T\log K})$, where $K$ is the number of experts, or equivalently, the number of normal-form actions. For treeplex strategy spaces, existing efficient algorithms, including KOMWU and online mirror descent with the weight-one dilated entropy regularizer, achieve regret $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{T\log|\mathcal{V}|})$, where $\mathcal{V}$ is the set of reduced normal-form strategies. We prove that this logarithmic dependence is minimax optimal in the worst-case full-information reward model. The main difficulty is that pure plans in a treeplex are not independent experts: their rewards are correlated through the recursive structure of decisions and observations. To capture this correlation, we introduce tropical Gaussian formulae, recursive Gaussian expressions built from maxima and normalized sums which preserve the variance. The index count of such a formula matches the number of reduced normal-form continuation plans in the corresponding subtree. Our main analytic result shows that every log-balanced tropical Gaussian formula with index count $N$ has Gaussian width $Ω(\sqrt{\log N})$. While a direct approach struggles to recover this lower bound, our proof uses a spherical entropy profile to measure scale-dependent separation among the Gaussian directions, and then applies Turán's theorem and Sudakov minoration to obtain the width lower bound. Applying this result to treeplexes gives an oblivious hard distribution with valid transition outcome and Rademacher terminal rewards, establishing a regret lower bound of $Ω(\sqrt{T\log|\mathcal{V}|})$. This matches known upper bounds up to universal constants and shows that the DilEnt/KOMWU dependence on the reduced normal-form complexity is unavoidable.

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Resolvent Ellipsoid for Minty Set Inclusions

We study Minty set inclusion on a compact convex set $\mathcal{X} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^d$ with a set-valued operator $A : \mathcal{X} \rightrightarrows \mathbb{R}^d$. Under the Minty promise, the goal is to compute $x \in \mathcal{X}$ and $u \in A(x)$ such that $\sup_{y \in \mathcal{X}} \langle u, x - y \rangle \le \varepsilon$. Our approach is geometric and we work in the fixed-scale constrained-resolvent oracle model, where a query at anchor $a$ is assumed to return a resolvent point $x^+$ together with the Yosida vector $g_η(a) = (a - x^+)/η$. We prove that each oracle response yields a sharp dichotomy: either the returned point provides an $\varepsilon$-SVI certificate, or the Yosida vector defines a strict separating normal for the Minty set. Thus, a single black-box resolvent query supplies either a certified candidate solution or a valid geometric cut. Combining this separation principle with the ellipsoid method, we obtain RESOLVENT-ELLIPSOID, an algorithm that computes an $\varepsilon$-SVI in $\mathcal{O}\!\left(\operatorname{poly}(d, \log(1/\varepsilon))\right)$ black-box oracle calls to the fixed-scale constrained resolvent. For monotone inclusions, our algorithm gives, to our knowledge, the first $\mathcal{O}\!\left(\mathrm{poly}(d, \log(1/\varepsilon))\right)$ black-box guarantee in the fixed-scale resolvent model.

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Homological Barriers to Stable Learning of First-Order Nash Equilibria

We identify a homological barrier to stable learning of local Nash equilibria, also known as first-order Nash equilibria (FONE), in constrained non-concave differentiable games. We consider continuous deterministic learning dynamics that fix every FONE point and aim to attract all initial conditions to the full FONE set. We show that this convergence guarantee is impossible when the target set has nontrivial positive-degree cohomology, such as that arising from a loop, and the state space is compact and contractible. We exhibit this barrier in a simple non-concave quadratic zero-sum game on a box whose exact FONE set consists of a diagonal six-edge loop and an isolated point. Consequently, no such dynamics can make the full FONE set a stable global attractor. We further show that degree two is the minimal polynomial degree at which this barrier can arise and extend the construction to obtain nontrivial homology in arbitrarily high degrees. Finally, we establish that the barrier persists for sufficiently small approximate-FONE targets under small perturbations, yielding an open, positive-volume family of quadratic zero-sum games with the same homological barrier.

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The Stability of Online Algorithms in Performative Prediction

The use of algorithmic predictions in decision-making leads to a feedback loop where the models we deploy actively influence the data distributions we see, and later use to retrain on. This dynamic was formalized by Perdomo et al. 2020 in their work on performative prediction. Our main result is an unconditional reduction showing that any no-regret algorithm deployed in performative settings converges to a (mixed) performatively stable equilibrium: a solution in which models actively shape data distributions in ways that their own predictions look optimal in hindsight. Prior to our work, all positive results in this area imposed strong restrictions on how models influenced distributions. By using a martingale argument and allowing randomization, we avoid any assumption on how populations respond to predictions and sidestep recent hardness results showing that deterministic stable models are in general PPAD-hard to compute. Lastly, on a more conceptual note, our connection sheds light on why common algorithms, like gradient descent, are naturally stabilizing and prevent runaway feedback loops. We hope our work enables future technical transfer of ideas between online optimization and performativity.

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A Quasipolynomial Algorithm for $\ell_\infty$ Contractions

We give an algorithm for computing an $\eps$-approximate fixed point of any $d$-dimensional nonexpansion with respect to the $\ell_\infty$ norm in time $\log(1/\eps)^{O(\log^2 d)}$. At its core, our method uses a boosting argument to geometrically shrink a search region. Among other consequences, our algorithm implies that simple stochastic games can be solved in quasipolynomial time.

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Breaking the 1/3 Barrier for Approximate Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Bimatrix Games

We give the first unconditional family of polynomial-time algorithms that breaks the $1/3$ approximation barrier for symmetric bimatrix games. For every fixed $δ>0$, an algorithm in this family computes a symmetric $(1-1/\sqrt{2}+δ)$-approximate Nash equilibrium, improving on the previous best guarantee of $(1/3+δ)$ due to Kontogiannis and Spirakis [2011].

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Scalable Decision Making for Games of Imperfect Information

Real-world decision-making generally involves hidden information, that is, information that is unknown to one agent but possessed by another. Unfortunately, the presence of large amounts of hidden information renders established reinforcement learning and search approaches ineffective. Even with multimillion-dollar industrial research efforts, top-human-level play at Stratego---a board wargame with hidden information on a massive scale---has remained beyond the reach of artificial intelligence (AI). Here we introduce Ataraxos, an AI for Stratego based on general techniques that we developed for both self-play reinforcement learning and test-time search under hidden information. Ataraxos defeated the most decorated human Stratego player of all time by a large margin---achieving, to our knowledge, the first superhuman result in the game's history---while consuming orders of magnitude less compute and data than previous efforts. Using the same techniques, we built a superhuman AI for Barrage Stratego and state-of-the-art AIs for Hanabi and dou dizhu, all with low cost and high sample efficiency. The success of this approach across adversarial, cooperative and team games establishes a design pattern for reinforcement learning and search that is effective under large amounts of hidden information, a longstanding desideratum of the field of strategic decision-making.

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A Polynomial-Time Algorithm for Variational Inequalities under the Minty Condition

Solving (Stampacchia) variational inequalities (SVIs) is a foundational problem at the heart of optimization. However, this expressivity comes at the cost of computational hardness. As a result, most research has focused on carving out specific subclasses that elude those intractability barriers. A classical property that goes back to the 1960s is the Minty condition, which postulates that the Minty VI (MVI) problem admits a solution. In this paper, we establish the first polynomial-time algorithm -- with complexity growing polynomially in the dimension $d$ and $\log(1/ε)$ -- for solving $ε$-SVIs for Lipschitz continuous mappings under the Minty condition. Prior approaches either incurred an exponentially worse dependence on $1/ε$ (and other natural parameters of the problem) or made more restrictive assumptions, such as monotonicity. To do so, we introduce a new variant of the ellipsoid algorithm whereby separating hyperplanes are obtained after taking a descent step from the center of the ellipsoid. It succeeds even though the set of SVIs can be nonconvex and not fully dimensional. Moreover, when our algorithm is applied to an instance with no MVI solution and fails to identify an SVI solution, it produces a succinct certificate of MVI infeasibility. We also show that deciding whether the Minty condition holds is $\mathsf{coNP}$-complete, thereby establishing that the disjunction of those two problems is polynomial-time solvable even though each problem is individually intractable. We provide several extensions and new applications of our main results. Most notably, we obtain the first polynomial-time algorithms for computing Nash equilibria in multi-player harmonic games. Finally, in two-player general-sum concave games, we give the first polynomial-time algorithm that outputs either a Nash equilibrium or a strict coarse correlated equilibrium.

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Normal-Form Correlation in Markov Games

There has been a surge of recent work on correlated equilibrium concepts in Markov games. However, existing results focus on concepts weaker than normal-form correlated equilibria (NFCEs), leaving open the more challenging question of computing such equilibria, which goes back to the seminal work of Papadimitriou and Roughgarden (JACM'08). Here, we establish the first efficient algorithm for NFCEs in finite-horizon Markov games with a fixed number of players $n$. In particular, with $S$ states, horizon $H$, and at most $A$ actions per player, it computes an $ε$-NFCE in time $S(AH/ε)^{O(n)}$. This is the first algorithm polynomial in $1/ε$ and the description of the game for NFCEs in an interesting class of problems beyond the normal-form setting. Moreover, under the usual assumption that recommendations are independent across states, we show PPAD-completeness---that is, computational equivalence to Nash equilibria---either in many-player games or when the precision is exponentially small. The key idea behind our approach is to run backward induction on a sequence of auxiliary stage games, but with the twist that in each step we compute a constant-expectation correlated equilibrium. This is a natural refinement of correlated equilibrium in which the conditional expected payoff from obeying is independent of the recommendation. In fact, our reduction goes both ways, establishing an equivalence between constant-expectation CEs and NFCEs in Markov games. For a fixed number of players, we observe that a constant-expectation CE can be computed approximately by combining linear programming with suitable discretization. In contrast, it is PPAD-hard in i) polymatrix (many-player) games at constant precision, and ii) two-player games at exponentially small precision. The latter result follows from an unexpected connection to rank-2 two-player games.

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Exact-Form Regret for Gradient Descent, Mirror Descent and Follow-the-Regularized-Leader

Online gradient descent is usually studied through external regret, where the learner competes with fixed alternatives. Recent work shows that first-order methods control richer action-dependent deviations. We ask for a geometric characterization of the deviations with respect to which online gradient descent, mirror descent, and follow-the-regularized-leader (FTRL) achieve no regret. We identify exactness as the common principle. Exactness means that the relevant displacement field is generated by a scalar potential, or equivalently that the associated one-form is exact in the geometry used by the algorithm. This geometry depends on the algorithm. For gradient descent it is Euclidean geometry, for mirror descent it is the geometry induced by the regularizer, and for FTRL it is the cumulative dual state. Under mild regularity conditions, exactness yields sublinear regret, while nonzero circulation provides the complementary obstruction and leads to linear regret. This gives a unified geometric framework for understanding the deviation classes controlled by these algorithms and reveals that different first-order methods can control genuinely different classes of deviations. These deviation classes have direct consequences for learning, particularly in games. We study the equilibrium notions induced by exact-form deviations and introduce conservative correlated equilibrium, reflecting both the conservative geometry of the underlying displacement fields and the restricted family of deviations available to the players. We characterize its relation to correlated equilibrium, determine when the resulting equilibrium notions coincide and when they separate, and show how these relationships depend on the geometry and the learning algorithm. Overall, this work gives a unified geometric account of what first-order online learning algorithms are no-regret with respect to, beyond fixed comparators.

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Stabilizing Performative Feedback Loops with Minimal Model Deployments

When algorithmic predictions inform people's decisions, the models we deploy are performative and actively shape the data we see. This feedback loop between algorithms and their broader environments introduces a challenge in the mechanics of social prediction: If different predictive models induce different distributions, is it possible to efficiently learn a prediction rule that is optimal for the distribution that it induces? Formally, this solution concept is known as performative stability. A core challenge in learning a performatively stable predictor is that, unlike supervised learning where distributions are fixed, the learner must deploy different predictors and observe their induced distributions. The main contribution of our work is a new algorithmic procedure that, in the high-accuracy regime, finds a performatively stable model in nearly the minimum number of model deployments without making any assumptions regarding how predictions shape distributions. In particular, our procedure succeeds at finding a randomized performatively stable predictor using exponentially fewer model deployments than prior approaches. Our second main contribution is a structural result showing how this recent randomized notion of stability achieved by our algorithm can be derandomized into a single predictor satisfying the prior deterministic notion if one is willing to assume that the loss is well-conditioned and that performative effects are weak, as in early work in this area. On a technical level, our results come from building on an underexplored technical connection between performative stability and expected variational inequalities.

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Constant Individual Regret in General Games

Uncoupled no-regret dynamics provide a decentralized route to equilibrium, but prior guarantees for individual regret retain a polylogarithmic dependence on the horizon. We remove this dependence for every finite $N$-player normal-form game under full-information feedback. We introduce \emph{ECHO-OFTRL}: optimistic follow-the-regularized-leader (OFTRL) equipped with an EMA cascade for high-order optimism (ECHO), where EMA denotes exponential moving average. The algorithm is deterministic and fully uncoupled. If $m_{\max}$ denotes the largest action-set size, then, simultaneously for every horizon $T\geq1$, it guarantees that each of the $N$ players in the game incurs regret upper bounded by $O(\textrm{poly}(N, \log m_{\max}))$. Our algorithm leverages a new form of optimism inspired by modern filter design.

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An Efficient Black-Box Reduction from Online Learning to Multicalibration, and a New Route to $Φ$-Regret Minimization

We give a Gordon-Greenwald-Marks (GGM) style black-box reduction from online learning to online multicalibration. Concretely, we show that to achieve high-dimensional multicalibration with respect to a class of functions $\mathcal{H}$, it suffices to combine any no-regret learner over $\mathcal {H} $ with an expected variational inequality (EVI) solver. We also prove a converse statement showing that efficient multicalibration implies efficient EVI solving, highlighting how EVIs in multicalibration mirror the role of fixed points in the GGM result for $Φ$-regret. This first set of results addresses the high-dimensional analogue of the open question in Garg, Jung, Reingold, and Roth (SODA '24), showing that oracle-efficient online multicalibration with $\sqrt{T}$-type guarantees is possible in full generality. Furthermore, our GGM-style reduction unifies the analyses of existing algorithms, transfers guarantees from online learning to multicalibration for challenging environments with delayed observations or censored outcomes, and yields the first efficient black-box reduction between online learning and multiclass omniprediction. Our second main result is a fine-grained reduction from high-dimensional online multicalibration to (contextual) $Φ$-regret minimization. Together with our first result, this establishes a new route from external regret to $Φ$-regret that bypasses sophisticated fixed-point or semi-separation machinery, dramatically simplifies a result of Daskalakis, Farina, Fishelson, Pipis, and Schneider (STOC '25) while improving rates, and yields new algorithms that are robust to richer deviation classes, such as those belonging to any reproducing kernel Hilbert space.

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