arXiv subjects

Grant Schoenebeck

Publications and source records attributed to Grant Schoenebeck.

57 records · Page 4Linked to original sources

arXiv2010

Constrained Non-Monotone Submodular Maximization: Offline and Secretary Algorithms

Constrained submodular maximization problems have long been studied, with near-optimal results known under a variety of constraints when the submodular function is monotone. The case of non-monotone submodular maximization is less understood: the first approximation algorithms even for the unconstrainted setting were given by Feige et al. (FOCS '07). More recently, Lee et al. (STOC '09, APPROX '09) show how to approximately maximize non-monotone submodular functions when the constraints are given by the intersection of p matroid constraints; their algorithm is based on local-search procedures that consider p-swaps, and hence the running time may be n^Omega(p), implying their algorithm is polynomial-time only for constantly many matroids. In this paper, we give algorithms that work for p-independence systems (which generalize constraints given by the intersection of p matroids), where the running time is poly(n,p). Our algorithm essentially reduces the non-monotone maximization problem to multiple runs of the greedy algorithm previously used in the monotone case. Our idea of using existing algorithms for monotone functions to solve the non-monotone case also works for maximizing a submodular function with respect to a knapsack constraint: we get a simple greedy-based constant-factor approximation for this problem. With these simpler algorithms, we are able to adapt our approach to constrained non-monotone submodular maximization to the (online) secretary setting, where elements arrive one at a time in random order, and the algorithm must make irrevocable decisions about whether or not to select each element as it arrives. We give constant approximations in this secretary setting when the algorithm is constrained subject to a uniform matroid or a partition matroid, and give an O(log k) approximation when it is constrained by a general matroid of rank k.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2010

Optimal Testing of Reed-Muller Codes

We consider the problem of testing if a given function f : F_2^n -> F_2 is close to any degree d polynomial in n variables, also known as the Reed-Muller testing problem. The Gowers norm is based on a natural 2^{d+1}-query test for this property. Alon et al. [AKKLR05] rediscovered this test and showed that it accepts every degree d polynomial with probability 1, while it rejects functions that are Omega(1)-far with probability Omega(1/(d 2^{d})). We give an asymptotically optimal analysis of this test, and show that it rejects functions that are (even only) Omega(2^{-d})-far with Omega(1)-probability (so the rejection probability is a universal constant independent of d and n). This implies a tight relationship between the (d+1)st Gowers norm of a function and its maximal correlation with degree d polynomials, when the correlation is close to 1. Our proof works by induction on n and yields a new analysis of even the classical Blum-Luby-Rubinfeld [BLR93] linearity test, for the setting of functions mapping F_2^n to F_2. The optimality follows from a tighter analysis of counterexamples to the "inverse conjecture for the Gowers norm" constructed by [GT09,LMS08]. Our result has several implications. First, it shows that the Gowers norm test is tolerant, in that it also accepts close codewords. Second, it improves the parameters of an XOR lemma for polynomials given by Viola and Wigderson [VW07]. Third, it implies a "query hierarchy" result for property testing of affine-invariant properties. That is, for every function q(n), it gives an affine-invariant property that is testable with O(q(n))-queries, but not with o(q(n))-queries, complementing an analogous result of [GKNR09] for graph properties.

math.CO↗

arXiv2008

On the Complexity of Nash Equilibria of Action-Graph Games

We consider the problem of computing Nash Equilibria of action-graph games (AGGs). AGGs, introduced by Bhat and Leyton-Brown, is a succinct representation of games that encapsulates both "local" dependencies as in graphical games, and partial indifference to other agents' identities as in anonymous games, which occur in many natural settings. This is achieved by specifying a graph on the set of actions, so that the payoff of an agent for selecting a strategy depends only on the number of agents playing each of the neighboring strategies in the action graph. We present a Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme for computing mixed Nash equilibria of AGGs with constant treewidth and a constant number of agent types (and an arbitrary number of strategies), together with hardness results for the cases when either the treewidth or the number of agent types is unconstrained. In particular, we show that even if the action graph is a tree, but the number of agent-types is unconstrained, it is NP-complete to decide the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and PPAD-complete to compute a mixed Nash equilibrium (even an approximate one); similarly for symmetric AGGs (all agents belong to a single type), if we allow arbitrary treewidth. These hardness results suggest that, in some sense, our PTAS is as strong of a positive result as one can expect.

cs.GT↗