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H. Andréka

Publications and source records attributed to H. Andréka.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Transposition of variables is hard to describe

The function $p_{xy}$ that interchanges two logical variables $x,y$ in formulas is hard to describe in the following sense. Let $F$ denote the Lindenbaum-Tarski formula-algebra of a finite-variable first order logic, endowed with $p_{xy}$ as a unary function. Each equational axiom system for the equational theory of $F$ has to contain, for each finite $n$, an equation that contains together with $p_{xy}$ at least $n$ algebraic variables, and each of the operations $\exists, =, \lor$. This solves a problem raised by Johnson [J. Symb. Logic] more than 50 years ago: the class of representable polyadic equality algebras of a finite dimension $α\ge 3$ cannot be axiomatized by adding finitely many equations to the equational theory of representable cylindric algebras of dimension $α$. Consequences for proof systems of finite-variable logic and for defining equations of polyadic equality algebras are given. The proof uses a family of nonrepresentable polyadic equality algebras ${\cal A}_n$ that are more and more nearly representable as $n$ increases: their $n$-generated subalgebras as well as their proper reducts are representable. The lattice of subvarieties of $RPEA_α$ is investigated and new open problems are asked about the interplay between the transposition operations and about generalizability of the results to infinite dimensions.

math.LO↗

Logic families

A logic family is a bunch of logics that belong together in some way. First-order logic is one of the examples. Logics organized into a structure occurs in abstract model theory, institution theory and in algebraic logic. Logic families play a role in adopting methods for investigating sentential logics to first-order like logics. We thoroughly discuss the notion of logic families as defined in the recent Universal Algebraic Logic book.

math.LO↗

Testing definitional equivalence of theories via automorphism groups

Two first-order logic theories are definitionally equivalent if and only if there is a bijection between their model classes that preserves isomorphisms and ultraproducts (Theorem 2). This is a variant of a prior theorem of van Benthem and Pearce. In Example 2, uncountably many pairs of definitionally inequivalent theories are given such that their model categories are concretely isomorphic via bijections that preserve ultraproducts in the model categories up to isomorphism. Based on these results, we settle several conjectures of Barrett, Glymour and Halvorson.

math.LO↗

A note on the submodel preservation property in fragments of first-order logic

This note contains some material promised in our earlier papers on submodel preservation and the guarded fragment, along with some information on the current status of the problems mentioned in these papers. Section 1 contains an early example of failure of Los-Tarski for finite-variable fragments with binary relations from a 1992 manuscript, with no substantial change of content. For further background to this example, Section 2 surveys a number of results concerning the submodel preservation property for various fragments of first-order logic.

math.LO↗

Two-variable logic has weak, but not strong, Beth definability

We prove that the two-variable fragment of first-order logic has the weak Beth definability property. This makes the two-variable fragment a natural logic separating the weak and the strong Beth properties since it does not have the strong Beth definability property.

math.LO↗

Varieties generated by completions

We prove that persistently finite algebras are not created by completions of algebras, in any ordered discriminator variety. A persistently finite algebra is one without infinite simple extensions. We prove that finite measurable relation algebras are all persistently finite. An application of these theorems is that the variety generated by the completions of representable relation algebras does not contain all relation algebras. This answers Problem 1.1(1) from a paper by R. Maddux in the negative. At the same time, we confirm the suggestion in that paper that the finite maximal relation algebras constructed in a joint paper by M. Frias and R. Maddux are not in the variety generated by the completions of representable relation algebras. We prove that there are continuum many varieties between the variety generated by the completions of representable relation algebras and the variety of relation algebras.

math.LO↗

Nonrepresentable relation algebras from group systems

A series of nonrepresentable relation algebras is constructed from groups. We use them to prove that there are continuum many subvarieties between the variety of representable relation algebras and the variety of coset relation algebras. We present our main construction in terms of polygroupoids.

math.LO↗

A representation theorem for measurable relation algebras

A relation algebra is called measurable when its identity is the sum of measurable atoms, and an atom is called measurable if its square is the sum of functional elements. In this paper we show that atomic measurable relation algebras have rather strong structural properties: they are constructed from systems of groups, coordinated systems of isomorphisms between quotients of the groups, and systems of cosets that are used to "shift" the operation of relative multiplication. An atomic and complete measurable relation algebra is completely representable if and only if there is a stronger coordination between these isomorphisms induced by a scaffold (the shifting cosets are not needed in this case). We also prove that a measurable relation algebra in which the associated groups are all finite is atomic.

math.LO↗

Coset relation algebras

A measurable relation algebra is a relation algebra in which the identity element is a sum of atoms that can be measured in the sense that the "size" of each such atom can be defined in an intuitive and reasonable way (within the framework of the first-order theory of relation algebras). A large class of examples of such algebras, using systems of groups and coordinated systems of isomorphisms between quotients of the groups, has been constructed. This class of group relation algebras is not large enough to exhaust the class of all measurable relation algebras. In the present article, the class of examples of measurable relation algebras is considerably extended by adding one more ingredient to the mix: systems of cosets that are used to "shift" the operation of relative multiplication. It is shown that, under certain additional hypotheses on the system of cosets, each such coset relation algebra with a shifted operation of relative multiplication is an example of a measurable relation algebra. We also show that the class of coset relation algebras does contain examples that are not representable as set relation algebras. In a later article, it is shown that the class of coset relation algebras is adequate to the task of describing all measurable relation algebras in the sense that every atomic measurable relation algebra is essentially isomorphic to a coset relation algebra.

math.LO↗

Term algebras of elementarily equivalent atom structures

We exhibit two relation algebra atom structures such that they are elementarily equivalent but their term algebras are not. This answers Problem 14.19 in the book Hirsch, R. and Hodkinson, I., "Relation Algebras by Games", North-Holland, 2002.

math.LO↗

Ultraproducts of continuous posets

It is known that nontrivial ultraproducts of complete partially ordered sets (posets) are almost never complete. We show that complete additivity of functions is preserved in ultraproducts of posets. Since failure of this property is clearly preserved by ultraproducts, this implies that complete additivity of functions is an elementary property.

math.LO↗

On Tarski's axiomatic foundations of the calculus of relations

It is shown that Tarski's set of ten axioms for the calculus of relations is independent in the sense that no axiom can be derived from the remaining axioms. It is also shown that by modifying one of Tarski's axioms slightly, and in fact by replacing the right-hand distributive law for relative multiplication with its left-hand version, we arrive at an equivalent set of axioms which is redundant in the sense that one of the axioms, namely the second involution law, is derivable from the other axioms. The set of remaining axioms is independent. Finally, it is shown that if both the left-hand and right-hand distributive laws for relative multiplication are included in the set of axioms, then two of Tarski's other axioms become redundant, namely the second involution law and the distributive law for converse. The set of remaining axioms is independent and equivalent to Tarski's axiom system.

math.LO↗

How many varieties of cylindric algebras

Cylindric algebras, or concept algebras in another name, form an interface between algebra, geometry and logic; they were invented by Alfred Tarski around 1947. We prove that there are 2 to the alpha many varieties of geometric (i.e., representable) alpha-dimensional cylindric algebras, this means that 2 to the alpha properties of definable relations of (possibly infinitary) models of first-order logic theories can be expressed by formula schemes using alpha variables, where alpha is infinite. This solves Problem 4.2 in the 1985 Henkin-Monk-Tarski monograph. For solving this problem, we had to devise a new kind of construction, which we then use to solve Problem 2.13 of the 1971 Henkin-Monk-Tarski monograph which concerns the structural description of geometric cylindric algebras. There are fewer varieties generated by locally finite dimensional cylindric algebras, and we get a characterization of these among all the 2 to the alpha varieties. As a by-product, we get a simple, natural recursive enumeration of all the equations true of geometric cylindric algebras, and this can serve as a solution to Problem 4.1 of the 1985 Henkin-Monk-Tarski monograph. All this has logical content and implications concerning ordinary first order logic with a countable number of variables.

math.LO↗

Changing a semantics: opportunism or courage?

The generalized models for higher-order logics introduced by Leon Henkin, and their multiple offspring over the years, have become a standard tool in many areas of logic. Even so, discussion has persisted about their technical status, and perhaps even their conceptual legitimacy. This paper gives a systematic view of generalized model techniques, discusses what they mean in mathematical and philosophical terms, and presents a few technical themes and results about their role in algebraic representation, calibrating provability, lowering complexity, understanding fixed-point logics, and achieving set-theoretic absoluteness. We also show how thinking about Henkin's approach to semantics of logical systems in this generality can yield new results, dispelling the impression of adhocness. This paper is dedicated to Leon Henkin, a deep logician who has changed the way we all work, while also being an always open, modest, and encouraging colleague and friend.

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Finite-variable logics do not have weak Beth definability property

We prove that n-variable logics do not have the weak Beth definability property, for all n greater than 2. This was known for n=3 (Ildikó Sain and András Simon), and for n greater than 4 (Ian Hodkinson). Neither of the previous proofs works for n=4. In this paper we settle the case of n=4, and we give a uniform, simpler proof for all n greater than 2. The case for n=2 is still open.

math.LO↗

Faster than light motion does not imply time travel

Seeing the many examples in the literature of causality violations based on faster-than- light (FTL) signals one naturally thinks that FTL motion leads inevitably to the possibility of time travel. We show that this logical inference is invalid by demonstrating a model, based on (3+1)-dimensional Minkowski spacetime, in which FTL motion is permitted (in every direction without any limitation on speed) yet which does not admit time travel. Moreover, the Principle of Relativity is true in this model in the sense that all observers are equivalent. In short, FTL motion does not imply time travel after all.

gr-qc↗