arXiv subjects

Hedyeh Beyhaghi

Publications and source records attributed to Hedyeh Beyhaghi.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Efficient Online Proportional Sampling with Applications to Smoothed Online Learning

We study the problem of efficient online proportional sampling from a high-dimensional domain under a $σ$-smoothed adversary, where the sampling distribution is induced by a dynamically evolving weight function defined over a sequence of piecewise-structured partitions. This setting captures a broad range of applications, including principal-agent games (e.g., pricing and contract design), and algorithm configuration and parameter tuning. The central challenge is maintaining an efficient data structure as the induced partition grows increasingly complex over time -- naively, the number of subregions can grow as $O(t^d)$ by round $t$ in $d$ dimensions. We design a data structure that supports efficient updates and proportional sampling while avoiding the cost of explicitly maintaining this exponential growth, where the discontinuities are structured from axis-parallel hyperplanes. Under a $σ$-smoothed adaptive adversary, we prove a tight $O(\sqrt{σT})$ bound on the depth of our data structure, and an $O(\log T)$ bound under a random-order adversary -- to our knowledge, the first such results for this class of problems. We apply this framework to online learning with piecewise-structured rewards, obtaining efficient no-regret algorithms under both full-information and bandit feedback, with provable sublinear regret guarantees.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

CGES: Confidence-Guided Early Stopping for Efficient and Accurate Self-Consistency

Large language models (LLMs) are often queried multiple times at test time, with predictions aggregated by majority vote. While effective, this self-consistency (Wang et al., 2023) strategy requires a fixed number of calls and fails when the correct answer is infrequent. We introduce Confidence-Guided Early Stopping (CGES), a Bayesian framework that forms posteriors over candidate answers and adaptively halts sampling once one answer accumulates enough posterior mass. We prove guarantees in both an ideal calibrated regime and a realistic noisy-confidence regime under a directional drift condition. Averaged over five reasoning benchmarks, CGES reduces the average number of calls by 58% on average (from 16.0 to 6.7) while matching its accuracy within 0.4 percentage points of self-consistency.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2026

Two-Sided Time-Independent Regret for Matching Markets with Limited Interviews

Two-sided matching platforms rely on preferences from both sides, yet participants can evaluate only a small fraction of potential partners. In practice, they use low-cost pre-match screening, e.g., interviews, profile views, or trial tasks, to form noisy impressions before committing to applications and offers. We study bandit learning in matching markets with interviews, modeling these interactions as queried \emph{hints}~\citep{DBLP:conf/innovations/BhaskaraGIKM23} that reveal partial preference information to both sides while constraining subsequent applications. Our framework also allows firm-side uncertainty: firms, like agents, learn their preferences and may make early hiring mistakes. To address this, we introduce strategic deferral, a firm-side action that permits temporary vacancy, corrects premature commitments, and enables decentralized learning under coarse anonymous feedback. We design algorithms for centralized and decentralized markets and show that a constant number of interviews per round suffices for horizon-independent regret, improving over the $O(\log T)$ guarantees known without interviews. Our bounds are near-optimal: the centralized guarantee is within a factor $m$ of an information-theoretic lower bound, while decentralized algorithms match it up to polynomial factors in structured markets and remain horizon-independent in general markets.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

The Secretary Problem with Predictions and a Chosen Order

We study a learning-augmented variant of the secretary problem, recently introduced by Fujii and Yoshida (2023), in which the decision-maker has access to machine-learned predictions of candidate values. The central challenge is to balance consistency and robustness: when predictions are accurate, the algorithm should select a near-optimal secretary, while under inaccurate predictions it should still guarantee a bounded competitive ratio. We consider both the classical Random Order Secretary Problem (ROSP), where candidates arrive in a uniformly random order, and a more natural learning-augmented model in which the decision-maker may choose the arrival order based on predicted values. We call this model the Chosen Order Secretary Problem (COSP), capturing scenarios such as interview schedules set in advance. We propose a new randomized algorithm applicable to both ROSP and COSP. Our method switches from fully trusting predictions to a threshold-based rule once a large prediction deviation is detected. Let $ε\in [0,1]$ denote the maximum multiplicative prediction error. For ROSP, our algorithm achieves a competitive ratio of $\max\{0.221, (1-ε)/(1+ε)\}$, improving upon the prior bound of $\max\{0.215, (1-ε)/(1+ε)\}$. For COSP, we achieve $\max\{0.262, (1-ε)/(1+ε)\}$, surpassing the $0.25$ worst-case bound for prior approaches and moving closer to the classical secretary benchmark of $1/e \approx 0.368$. These results highlight the benefit of combining predictions with arrival-order control in online decision-making.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2025

The Active and Noise-Tolerant Strategic Perceptron

We initiate the study of active learning algorithms for classifying strategic agents. Active learning is a well-established framework in machine learning in which the learner selectively queries labels, often achieving substantially higher accuracy and efficiency than classical supervised methods-especially in settings where labeling is costly or time-consuming, such as hiring, admissions, and loan decisions. Strategic classification, however, addresses scenarios where agents modify their features to obtain more favorable outcomes, resulting in observed data that is not truthful. Such manipulation introduces challenges beyond those in learning from clean data. Our goal is to design active and noise-tolerant algorithms that remain effective in strategic environments-algorithms that classify strategic agents accurately while issuing as few label requests as possible. The central difficulty is to simultaneously account for strategic manipulation and preserve the efficiency gains of active learning. Our main result is an algorithm for actively learning linear separators in the strategic setting that preserves the exponential improvement in label complexity over passive learning previously obtained only in the non-strategic case. Specifically, for data drawn uniformly from the unit sphere, we show that a modified version of the Active Perceptron algorithm [DKM05,YZ17] achieves excess error $ε$ using only $\tilde{O}(d \ln \frac{1}ε)$ label queries and incurs at most $\tilde{O}(d \ln \frac{1}ε)$ additional mistakes relative to the optimal classifier, even in the nonrealizable case, when a $\tildeΩ(ε)$ fraction of inputs have inconsistent labels with the optimal classifier. The algorithm is computationally efficient and, under these distributional assumptions, requires substantially fewer label queries than prior work on strategic Perceptron [ABBN21].

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Competitive Algorithms for Multi-Agent Ski-Rental Problems

This paper introduces a novel multi-agent ski-rental problem that generalizes the classical ski-rental dilemma to a group setting where agents incur individual and shared costs. In our model, each agent can either rent at a fixed daily cost, or purchase a pass at an individual cost, with an additional third option of a discounted group pass available to all. We consider scenarios in which agents' active days differ, leading to dynamic states as agents drop out of the decision process. To address this problem from different perspectives, we define three distinct competitive ratios: overall, state-dependent, and individual rational. For each objective, we design and analyze optimal deterministic and randomized policies. Our deterministic policies employ state-aware threshold functions that adapt to the dynamic states, while our randomized policies sample and resample thresholds from tailored state-aware distributions. The analysis reveals that symmetric policies, in which all agents use the same threshold, outperform asymmetric ones. Our results provide competitive ratio upper and lower bounds and extend classical ski-rental insights to multi-agent settings, highlighting both theoretical and practical implications for group decision-making under uncertainty.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2025

Competition Complexity in Multi-Item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity

We quantify the value of the monopoly's bargaining power in terms of competition complexity--that is, the number of additional bidders the monopoly must attract in simple auctions to match the expected revenue of the optimal mechanisms (c.f., Bulow and Klemperer, 1996, Eden et al., 2017)--within the setting of multi-item auctions. We show that for simple auctions that sell items separately, the competition complexity is $Θ(\frac{n}α)$ in an environment with $n$ original bidders under the slightly stronger assumption of $α$-strong regularity, in contrast to the standard regularity assumption in the literature, which requires $Ω(n \cdot \ln \frac{m}{n})$ additional bidders (Feldman et al., 2018). This significantly reduces the value of learning the distribution to design the optimal mechanisms, especially in large markets with many items for sale. For simple auctions that sell items as a grand bundle, we establish a constant competition complexity bound in a single-bidder environment when the number of items is small or when the value distribution has a monotone hazard rate. Some of our competition complexity results also hold when we compete against the first best benchmark (i.e., optimal social welfare).

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

New Guarantees for Learning Revenue Maximizing Menus of Lotteries and Two-Part Tariffs

We advance a recently flourishing line of work at the intersection of learning theory and computational economics by studying the learnability of two classes of mechanisms prominent in economics, namely menus of lotteries and two-part tariffs. The former is a family of randomized mechanisms designed for selling multiple items, known to achieve revenue beyond deterministic mechanisms, while the latter is designed for selling multiple units (copies) of a single item with applications in real-world scenarios such as car or bike-sharing services. We focus on learning high-revenue mechanisms of this form from buyer valuation data in both distributional settings, where we have access to buyers' valuation samples up-front, and the more challenging and less-studied online settings, where buyers arrive one-at-a-time and no distributional assumption is made about their values. We provide a suite of results with regard to these two families of mechanisms. We provide the first online learning algorithms for menus of lotteries and two-part tariffs with strong regret-bound guarantees. Since the space of parameters is infinite and the revenue functions have discontinuities, the known techniques do not readily apply. However, we are able to provide a reduction to online learning over a finite number of experts, in our case, a finite number of parameters. Furthermore, in the limited buyers type case, we show a reduction to online linear optimization, which allows us to obtain no-regret guarantees by presenting buyers with menus that correspond to a barycentric spanner. In addition, we provide algorithms with improved running times over prior work for the distributional settings. Finally, we demonstrate how techniques from the recent literature in data-driven algorithm design are insufficient for our studied problems.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Recent Developments in Pandora's Box Problem: Variants and Applications

In 1979, Weitzman introduced Pandora's box problem as a framework for sequential search with costly inspections. Recently, there has been a surge of interest in Pandora's box problem, particularly among researchers working at the intersection of economics and computation. This survey provides an overview of the recent literature on Pandora's box problem, including its latest extensions and applications in areas such as market design, decision theory, and machine learning.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Screening with Disadvantaged Agents

Motivated by school admissions, this paper studies screening in a population with both advantaged and disadvantaged agents. A school is interested in admitting the most skilled students, but relies on imperfect test scores that reflect both skill and effort. Students are limited by a budget on effort, with disadvantaged students having tighter budgets. This raises a challenge for the principal: among agents with similar test scores, it is difficult to distinguish between students with high skills and students with large budgets. Our main result is an optimal stochastic mechanism that maximizes the gains achieved from admitting ``high-skill" students minus the costs incurred from admitting ``low-skill" students when considering two skill types and $n$ budget types. Our mechanism makes it possible to give higher probability of admission to a high-skill student than to a low-skill, even when the low-skill student can potentially get higher test-score due to a higher budget. Further, we extend our admission problem to a setting in which students uniformly receive an exogenous subsidy to increase their budget for effort. This extension can only help the school's admission objective and we show that the optimal mechanism with exogenous subsidies has the same characterization as optimal mechanisms for the original problem.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Pandora's Problem with Nonobligatory Inspection: Optimal Structure and a PTAS

Weitzman introduced Pandora's box problem as a mathematical model of sequential search with inspection costs, in which a searcher is allowed to select a prize from one of $n$ alternatives. Several decades later, Doval introduced a close version of the problem, where the searcher does not need to incur the inspection cost of an alternative, and can select it uninspected. Unlike the original problem, the optimal solution to the nonobligatory inspection variant is proved to need adaptivity, and by recent work of [FLL22], finding the optimal solution is NP-hard. Our first main result is a structural characterization of the optimal policy: We show there exists an optimal policy that follows only two different pre-determined orders of inspection, and transitions from one to the other at most once. Our second main result is a polynomial time approximation scheme (PTAS). Our proof involves a novel reduction to a framework developed by [FLX18], utilizing our optimal two-phase structure. Furthermore, we show Pandora's problem with nonobligatory inspection belongs to class NP, which by using the hardness result of [FLL22], settles the computational complexity class of the problem. Finally, we provide a tight 0.8 approximation and a novel proof for committing policies [BK19] (informally, the set of nonadaptive policies) for general classes of distributions, which was previously shown only for discrete and finite distributions [GMS08].

cs.DS↗

arXiv2022

On classification of strategic agents who can both game and improve

In this work, we consider classification of agents who can both game and improve. For example, people wishing to get a loan may be able to take some actions that increase their perceived credit-worthiness and others that also increase their true credit-worthiness. A decision-maker would like to define a classification rule with few false-positives (does not give out many bad loans) while yielding many true positives (giving out many good loans), which includes encouraging agents to improve to become true positives if possible. We consider two models for this problem, a general discrete model and a linear model, and prove algorithmic, learning, and hardness results for each. For the general discrete model, we give an efficient algorithm for the problem of maximizing the number of true positives subject to no false positives, and show how to extend this to a partial-information learning setting. We also show hardness for the problem of maximizing the number of true positives subject to a nonzero bound on the number of false positives, and that this hardness holds even for a finite-point version of our linear model. We also show that maximizing the number of true positives subject to no false positive is NP-hard in our full linear model. We additionally provide an algorithm that determines whether there exists a linear classifier that classifies all agents accurately and causes all improvable agents to become qualified, and give additional results for low-dimensional data.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2022

Setting Fair Incentives to Maximize Improvement

We consider the problem of helping agents improve by setting short-term goals. Given a set of target skill levels, we assume each agent will try to improve from their initial skill level to the closest target level within reach or do nothing if no target level is within reach. We consider two models: the common improvement capacity model, where agents have the same limit on how much they can improve, and the individualized improvement capacity model, where agents have individualized limits. Our goal is to optimize the target levels for social welfare and fairness objectives, where social welfare is defined as the total amount of improvement, and fairness objectives are considered where the agents belong to different underlying populations. A key technical challenge of this problem is the non-monotonicity of social welfare in the set of target levels, i.e., adding a new target level may decrease the total amount of improvement as it may get easier for some agents to improve. This is especially challenging when considering multiple groups because optimizing target levels in isolation for each group and outputting the union may result in arbitrarily low improvement for a group, failing the fairness objective. Considering these properties, we provide algorithms for optimal and near-optimal improvement for both social welfare and fairness objectives. These algorithmic results work for both the common and individualized improvement capacity models. Furthermore, we show a placement of target levels exists that is approximately optimal for the social welfare of each group. Unlike the algorithmic results, this structural statement only holds in the common improvement capacity model, and we show counterexamples in the individualized improvement capacity model. Finally, we extend our algorithms to learning settings where we have only sample access to the initial skill levels of agents.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2021

Formal Barriers to Simple Algorithms for the Matroid Secretary Problem

Babaioff et al. [BIK2007] introduced the matroid secretary problem in 2007, a natural extension of the classic single-choice secretary problem to matroids, and conjectured that a constant-competitive online algorithm exists. The conjecture still remains open despite substantial partial progress, including constant-competitive algorithms for numerous special cases of matroids, and an $O(\log \log \text{rank})$-competitive algorithm in the general case. Many of these algorithms follow principled frameworks. The limits of these frameworks are previously unstudied, and prior work establishes only that a handful of particular algorithms cannot resolve the matroid secretary conjecture. We initiate the study of impossibility results for frameworks to resolve this conjecture. We establish impossibility results for a natural class of greedy algorithms and for randomized partition algorithms, both of which contain known algorithms that resolve special cases.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2021

The Strategic Perceptron

The classical Perceptron algorithm provides a simple and elegant procedure for learning a linear classifier. In each step, the algorithm observes the sample's position and label and updates the current predictor accordingly if it makes a mistake. However, in presence of strategic agents that desire to be classified as positive and that are able to modify their position by a limited amount, the classifier may not be able to observe the true position of agents but rather a position where the agent pretends to be. Unlike the original setting with perfect knowledge of positions, in this situation the Perceptron algorithm fails to achieve its guarantees, and we illustrate examples with the predictor oscillating between two solutions forever, making an unbounded number of mistakes even though a perfect large-margin linear classifier exists. Our main contribution is providing a modified Perceptron-style algorithm which makes a bounded number of mistakes in presence of strategic agents with both $\ell_2$ and weighted $\ell_1$ manipulation costs. In our baseline model, knowledge of the manipulation costs (i.e., the extent to which an agent may manipulate) is assumed. In our most general model, we relax this assumption and provide an algorithm which learns and refines both the classifier and its cost estimates to achieve good mistake bounds even when manipulation costs are unknown.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2021

Improved Revenue Bounds for Posted-Price and Second-Price Mechanisms

We study revenue maximization through sequential posted-price (SPP) mechanisms in single-dimensional settings with $n$ buyers and independent but not necessarily identical value distributions. We construct the SPP mechanisms by considering the best of two simple pricing rules: one that imitates the revenue optimal mchanism, namely the Myersonian mechanism, via the taxation principle and the other that posts a uniform price. Our pricing rules are rather generalizable and yield the first improvement over long-established approximation factors in several settings. We design factor-revealing mathematical programs that crisply capture the approximation factor of our SPP mechanism. In the single-unit setting, our SPP mechanism yields a better approximation factor than the state of the art prior to our work (Azar, Chiplunkar & Kaplan, 2018). In the multi-unit setting, our SPP mechanism yields the first improved approximation factor over the state of the art after over nine years (Yan, 2011 and Chakraborty et al., 2010). Our results on SPP mechanisms immediately imply improved performance guarantees for the equivalent free-order prophet inequality problem. In the position auction setting, our SPP mechanism yields the first higher-than $1-1/e$ approximation factor. In eager second-price (ESP) auctions, our two simple pricing rules lead to the first improved approximation factor that is strictly greater than what is obtained by the SPP mechanism in the single-unit setting.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2019

Pandora's Problem with Nonobligatory Inspection

Martin Weitzman's "Pandora's problem" furnishes the mathematical basis for optimal search theory in economics. Nearly 40 years later, Laura Doval introduced a version of the problem in which the searcher is not obligated to pay the cost of inspecting an alternative's value before selecting it. Unlike the original Pandora's problem, the version with nonobligatory inspection cannot be solved optimally by any simple ranking-based policy, and it is unknown whether there exists any polynomial-time algorithm to compute the optimal policy. This motivates the study of approximately optimal policies that are simple and computationally efficient. In this work we provide the first non-trivial approximation guarantees for this problem. We introduce a family of "committing policies" such that it is computationally easy to find and implement the optimal committing policy. We prove that the optimal committing policy is guaranteed to approximate the fully optimal policy within a $1-\frac1e = 0.63\ldots$ factor, and for the special case of two boxes we improve this factor to 4/5 and show that this approximation is tight for the class of committing policies.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2018

Optimal (and Benchmark-Optimal) Competition Complexity for Additive Buyers over Independent Items

The Competition Complexity of an auction setting refers to the number of additional bidders necessary in order for the (deterministic, prior-independent, dominant strategy truthful) Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism to achieve greater revenue than the (randomized, prior-dependent, Bayesian-truthful) optimal mechanism without the additional bidders. We prove that the competition complexity of $n$ bidders with additive valuations over $m$ independent items is at most $n(\ln(1+m/n)+2)$, and also at most $9\sqrt{nm}$. When $n \leq m$, the first bound is optimal up to constant factors, even when the items are i.i.d. and regular. When $n \geq m$, the second bound is optimal for the benchmark introduced in [EFFTW17a] up to constant factors, even when the items are i.i.d. and regular. We further show that, while the Eden et al. benchmark is not necessarily tight in the $n \geq m$ regime, the competition complexity of $n$ bidders with additive valuations over even $2$ i.i.d. regular items is indeed $ω(1)$. Our main technical contribution is a reduction from analyzing the Eden et al. benchmark to proving stochastic dominance of certain random variables.

cs.GT↗