arXiv subjects

Helen Margetts

Publications and source records attributed to Helen Margetts.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

AI systems out-persuade expert humans

Many societal decisions are settled by contests of persuasion. Conversational AI is a powerful new entrant in these contests, but whether it can out-persuade skilled and highly incentivized humans has remained unclear. Here, in a series of four preregistered experiments (n = 18,978 conversations from 6,923 people), we pitted AI systems against a range of human persuaders, including laypeople, winners of a separately preregistered four-round online persuasion tournament, professional canvassers, and world championship debaters. We found that AI systems were reliably more persuasive than expert humans, even when expert humans chose their issues, researched in advance, underwent hours of live, structured practice, and were incentivized with {\pounds}1,000 cash bonuses. In a follow-up study, AI's advantage persisted after experts received a coaching tool that let them practice against the AI that beat them, review their performance history, and see what AI would have said at key moments. We found converging evidence that AI's advantage stemmed from rapidly deploying larger quantities of information: after coaching, expert humans could tie an AI constrained to respond at human speeds and with human-length messages. In a final study, we show that AI's advantage extends to consequential real-world behavior: AI was nearly 3x more effective than professional canvassers from a UK fundraising firm at raising real-money donations to Save the Children. Together, these results establish that frontier AI systems out-persuade expert humans in conversation, with significant implications for political communication.

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arXiv2026

International AI Safety Report 2026

The International AI Safety Report 2026 synthesises the current scientific evidence on the capabilities, emerging risks, and safety of general-purpose AI systems. The report series was mandated by the nations attending the AI Safety Summit in Bletchley, UK. 29 nations, the UN, the OECD, and the EU each nominated a representative to the report's Expert Advisory Panel. Over 100 AI experts contributed, representing diverse perspectives and disciplines. Led by the Report's Chair, these independent experts collectively had full discretion over the report's content.

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arXiv2025

International AI Safety Report 2025: Second Key Update: Technical Safeguards and Risk Management

This second update to the 2025 International AI Safety Report assesses new developments in general-purpose AI risk management over the past year. It examines how researchers, public institutions, and AI developers are approaching risk management for general-purpose AI. In recent months, for example, three leading AI developers applied enhanced safeguards to their new models, as their internal pre-deployment testing could not rule out the possibility that these models could be misused to help create biological weapons. Beyond specific precautionary measures, there have been a range of other advances in techniques for making AI models and systems more reliable and resistant to misuse. These include new approaches in adversarial training, data curation, and monitoring systems. In parallel, institutional frameworks that operationalise and formalise these technical capabilities are starting to emerge: the number of companies publishing Frontier AI Safety Frameworks more than doubled in 2025, and governments and international organisations have established a small number of governance frameworks for general-purpose AI, focusing largely on transparency and risk assessment.

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arXiv2025

International AI Safety Report 2025: First Key Update: Capabilities and Risk Implications

Since the publication of the first International AI Safety Report, AI capabilities have continued to improve across key domains. New training techniques that teach AI systems to reason step-by-step and inference-time enhancements have primarily driven these advances, rather than simply training larger models. As a result, general-purpose AI systems can solve more complex problems in a range of domains, from scientific research to software development. Their performance on benchmarks that measure performance in coding, mathematics, and answering expert-level science questions has continued to improve, though reliability challenges persist, with systems excelling on some tasks while failing completely on others. These capability improvements also have implications for multiple risks, including risks from biological weapons and cyber attacks. Finally, they pose new challenges for monitoring and controllability. This update examines how AI capabilities have improved since the first Report, then focuses on key risk areas where substantial new evidence warrants updated assessments.

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arXiv2025

The Levers of Political Persuasion with Conversational AI

There are widespread fears that conversational AI could soon exert unprecedented influence over human beliefs. Here, in three large-scale experiments (N=76,977), we deployed 19 LLMs-including some post-trained explicitly for persuasion-to evaluate their persuasiveness on 707 political issues. We then checked the factual accuracy of 466,769 resulting LLM claims. Contrary to popular concerns, we show that the persuasive power of current and near-future AI is likely to stem more from post-training and prompting methods-which boosted persuasiveness by as much as 51% and 27% respectively-than from personalization or increasing model scale. We further show that these methods increased persuasion by exploiting LLMs' unique ability to rapidly access and strategically deploy information and that, strikingly, where they increased AI persuasiveness they also systematically decreased factual accuracy.

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arXiv2025

International AI Safety Report

The first International AI Safety Report comprehensively synthesizes the current evidence on the capabilities, risks, and safety of advanced AI systems. The report was mandated by the nations attending the AI Safety Summit in Bletchley, UK. Thirty nations, the UN, the OECD, and the EU each nominated a representative to the report's Expert Advisory Panel. A total of 100 AI experts contributed, representing diverse perspectives and disciplines. Led by the report's Chair, these independent experts collectively had full discretion over the report's content.

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arXiv2024

International Scientific Report on the Safety of Advanced AI (Interim Report)

This is the interim publication of the first International Scientific Report on the Safety of Advanced AI. The report synthesises the scientific understanding of general-purpose AI -- AI that can perform a wide variety of tasks -- with a focus on understanding and managing its risks. A diverse group of 75 AI experts contributed to this report, including an international Expert Advisory Panel nominated by 30 countries, the EU, and the UN. Led by the Chair, these independent experts collectively had full discretion over the report's content. The final report is available at arXiv:2501.17805

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arXiv2024

Evidence of a log scaling law for political persuasion with large language models

Large language models can now generate political messages as persuasive as those written by humans, raising concerns about how far this persuasiveness may continue to increase with model size. Here, we generate 720 persuasive messages on 10 U.S. political issues from 24 language models spanning several orders of magnitude in size. We then deploy these messages in a large-scale randomized survey experiment (N = 25,982) to estimate the persuasive capability of each model. Our findings are twofold. First, we find evidence of a log scaling law: model persuasiveness is characterized by sharply diminishing returns, such that current frontier models are barely more persuasive than models smaller in size by an order of magnitude or more. Second, mere task completion (coherence, staying on topic) appears to account for larger models' persuasive advantage. These findings suggest that further scaling model size will not much increase the persuasiveness of static LLM-generated messages.

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arXiv2024

AI for bureaucratic productivity: Measuring the potential of AI to help automate 143 million UK government transactions

There is currently considerable excitement within government about the potential of artificial intelligence to improve public service productivity through the automation of complex but repetitive bureaucratic tasks, freeing up the time of skilled staff. Here, we explore the size of this opportunity, by mapping out the scale of citizen-facing bureaucratic decision-making procedures within UK central government, and measuring their potential for AI-driven automation. We estimate that UK central government conducts approximately one billion citizen-facing transactions per year in the provision of around 400 services, of which approximately 143 million are complex repetitive transactions. We estimate that 84% of these complex transactions are highly automatable, representing a huge potential opportunity: saving even an average of just one minute per complex transaction would save the equivalent of approximately 1,200 person-years of work every year. We also develop a model to estimate the volume of transactions a government service undertakes, providing a way for government to avoid conducting time consuming transaction volume measurements. Finally, we find that there is high turnover in the types of services government provide, meaning that automation efforts should focus on general procedures rather than services themselves which are likely to evolve over time. Overall, our work presents a novel perspective on the structure and functioning of modern government, and how it might evolve in the age of artificial intelligence.

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arXiv2024

Who is driving the conversation? Analysing the nodality of British MPs and journalists on social media

With the rise of social media, political conversations now take place in more diffuse environments. In this context, it is not always clear why some actors, more than others, have greater influence on how discussions are shaped. To investigate the factors behind such influence, we build on nodality, a concept in political science which describes the capacity of an actor to exchange information within discourse networks. This concept goes beyond traditional network metrics that describe the position of an actor in the network to include exogenous drivers of influence (e.g. factors relating to organisational hierarchies). We study online discourse on Twitter (now X) in the UK to measure the relative nodality of two sets of policy actors - Members of Parliament (MPs) and accredited journalists - on four policy topics. We find that influence on the platform is driven by two key factors: (i) active nodality, derived from the actor's level of topic-related engagement, and (ii) inherent nodality, which is independent of the platform discourse and reflects the actor's institutional position. These findings significantly further our understanding of the origins of influence on social media platforms and suggest in which contexts influence is transferable across topics.

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arXiv2022

How can we combat online misinformation? A systematic overview of current interventions and their efficacy

The spread of misinformation is a pressing global problem that has elicited a range of responses from researchers, policymakers, civil society and industry. Over the past decade, these stakeholders have developed many interventions to tackle misinformation that vary across factors such as which effects of misinformation they hope to target, at what stage in the misinformation lifecycle they are aimed at, and who they are implemented by. These interventions also differ in how effective they are at reducing susceptibility to (and curbing the spread of) misinformation. In recent years, a vast amount of scholarly work on misinformation has become available, which extends across multiple disciplines and methodologies. It has become increasingly difficult to comprehensively map all of the available interventions, assess their efficacy, and understand the challenges, opportunities and tradeoffs associated with using them. Few papers have systematically assessed and compared the various interventions, which has led to a lack of understanding in civic and policymaking discourses. With this in mind, we develop a new hierarchical framework for understanding interventions against misinformation online. The framework comprises three key elements: Interventions that Prepare people to be less susceptible; Interventions that Curb the spread and effects of misinformation; and Interventions that Respond to misinformation. We outline how different interventions are thought to work, categorise them, and summarise the available evidence on their efficacy; offering researchers, policymakers and practitioners working to combat online misinformation both an analytical framework that they can use to understand and evaluate different interventions (and which could be extended to address new interventions that we do not describe here) and a summary of the range of interventions that have been proposed to date.

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arXiv2022

Artificial intelligence in government: Concepts, standards, and a unified framework

Recent advances in artificial intelligence (AI), especially in generative language modelling, hold the promise of transforming government. Given the advanced capabilities of new AI systems, it is critical that these are embedded using standard operational procedures, clear epistemic criteria, and behave in alignment with the normative expectations of society. Scholars in multiple domains have subsequently begun to conceptualize the different forms that AI applications may take, highlighting both their potential benefits and pitfalls. However, the literature remains fragmented, with researchers in social science disciplines like public administration and political science, and the fast-moving fields of AI, ML, and robotics, all developing concepts in relative isolation. Although there are calls to formalize the emerging study of AI in government, a balanced account that captures the full depth of theoretical perspectives needed to understand the consequences of embedding AI into a public sector context is lacking. Here, we unify efforts across social and technical disciplines by first conducting an integrative literature review to identify and cluster 69 key terms that frequently co-occur in the multidisciplinary study of AI. We then build on the results of this bibliometric analysis to propose three new multifaceted concepts for understanding and analysing AI-based systems for government (AI-GOV) in a more unified way: (1) operational fitness, (2) epistemic alignment, and (3) normative divergence. Finally, we put these concepts to work by using them as dimensions in a conceptual typology of AI-GOV and connecting each with emerging AI technical measurement standards to encourage operationalization, foster cross-disciplinary dialogue, and stimulate debate among those aiming to rethink government with AI.

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arXiv2021

An influencer-based approach to understanding radical right viral tweets

Radical right influencers routinely use social media to spread highly divisive, disruptive and anti-democratic messages. Assessing and countering the challenge that such content poses is crucial for ensuring that online spaces remain open, safe and accessible. Previous work has paid little attention to understanding factors associated with radical right content that goes viral. We investigate this issue with a new dataset ROT which provides insight into the content, engagement and followership of a set of 35 radical right influencers. It includes over 50,000 original entries and over 40 million retweets, quotes, replies and mentions. We use a multilevel model to measure engagement with tweets, which are nested in each influencer. We show that it is crucial to account for the influencer-level structure, and find evidence of the importance of both influencer- and content-level factors, including the number of followers each influencer has, the type of content (original posts, quotes and replies), the length and toxicity of content, and whether influencers request retweets. We make ROT available for other researchers to use.

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arXiv2021

Tweeting for the Cause: Network analysis of UK petition sharing

Online government petitions represent a new data-rich mode of political participation. This work examines the thus far understudied dynamics of sharing petitions on social media in order to garner signatures and, ultimately, a government response. Using 20 months of Twitter data comprising over 1 million tweets linking to a petition, we perform analyses of networks constructed of petitions and supporters on Twitter, revealing implicit social dynamics therein. We find that Twitter users do not exclusively share petitions on one issue nor do they share exclusively popular petitions. Among the over 240,000 Twitter users, we find latent support groups, with the most central users primarily being politically active "average" individuals. Twitter as a platform for sharing government petitions, thus, appears to hold potential to foster the creation of and coordination among a new form of latent support interest groups online.

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arXiv2020

HateCheck: Functional Tests for Hate Speech Detection Models

Detecting online hate is a difficult task that even state-of-the-art models struggle with. Typically, hate speech detection models are evaluated by measuring their performance on held-out test data using metrics such as accuracy and F1 score. However, this approach makes it difficult to identify specific model weak points. It also risks overestimating generalisable model performance due to increasingly well-evidenced systematic gaps and biases in hate speech datasets. To enable more targeted diagnostic insights, we introduce HateCheck, a suite of functional tests for hate speech detection models. We specify 29 model functionalities motivated by a review of previous research and a series of interviews with civil society stakeholders. We craft test cases for each functionality and validate their quality through a structured annotation process. To illustrate HateCheck's utility, we test near-state-of-the-art transformer models as well as two popular commercial models, revealing critical model weaknesses.

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arXiv2020

Detecting East Asian Prejudice on Social Media

The outbreak of COVID-19 has transformed societies across the world as governments tackle the health, economic and social costs of the pandemic. It has also raised concerns about the spread of hateful language and prejudice online, especially hostility directed against East Asia. In this paper we report on the creation of a classifier that detects and categorizes social media posts from Twitter into four classes: Hostility against East Asia, Criticism of East Asia, Meta-discussions of East Asian prejudice and a neutral class. The classifier achieves an F1 score of 0.83 across all four classes. We provide our final model (coded in Python), as well as a new 20,000 tweet training dataset used to make the classifier, two analyses of hashtags associated with East Asian prejudice and the annotation codebook. The classifier can be implemented by other researchers, assisting with both online content moderation processes and further research into the dynamics, prevalence and impact of East Asian prejudice online during this global pandemic.

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arXiv2019

Islamophobes are not all the same! A study of far right actors on Twitter

Far-right actors are often purveyors of Islamophobic hate speech online, using social media to spread divisive and prejudiced messages which can stir up intergroup tensions and conflict. Hateful content can inflict harm on targeted victims, create a sense of fear amongst communities and stir up intergroup tensions and conflict. Accordingly, there is a pressing need to better understand at a granular level how Islamophobia manifests online and who produces it. We investigate the dynamics of Islamophobia amongst followers of a prominent UK far right political party on Twitter, the British National Party. Analysing a new data set of five million tweets, collected over a period of one year, using a machine learning classifier and latent Markov modelling, we identify seven types of Islamophobic far right actors, capturing qualitative, quantitative and temporal differences in their behaviour. Notably, we show that a small number of users are responsible for most of the Islamophobia that we observe. We then discuss the policy implications of this typology in the context of social media regulation.

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arXiv2018

Does Campaigning on Social Media Make a Difference? Evidence from candidate use of Twitter during the 2015 and 2017 UK Elections

Social media are now a routine part of political campaigns all over the world. However, studies of the impact of campaigning on social platform have thus far been limited to cross-sectional datasets from one election period which are vulnerable to unobserved variable bias. Hence empirical evidence on the effectiveness of political social media activity is thin. We address this deficit by analysing a novel panel dataset of political Twitter activity in the 2015 and 2017 elections in the United Kingdom. We find that Twitter based campaigning does seem to help win votes, a finding which is consistent across a variety of different model specifications including a first difference regression. The impact of Twitter use is small in absolute terms, though comparable with that of campaign spending. Our data also support the idea that effects are mediated through other communication channels, hence challenging the relevance of engaging in an interactive fashion.

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