arXiv subjects

Ildikó Schlotter

Publications and source records attributed to Ildikó Schlotter.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Nearly Group-Separable Elections

We study the problem of computing how close a given election is to being group-separable, measuring proximity by swaps of adjacent candidates in the votes. We also consider several other domains, including caterpillar group-separable, balanced group-separable, single-peaked, and single-crossing ones. Our problem is generally intractable, but we find practical FPT algorithms parameterized by the number of candidates or swaps. For the latter case, our algorithm applies to all domains characterized by finite forbidden subelections, resolving a well-established open problem. We supplement our theoretical findings with experimental analysis.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Control and Bribery in Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates: A Complete Complexity Landscape

We study control and bribery problems for stable matchings: A central authority (the controller, resp. briber) may add agents, delete agents, delete acceptable pairs, swap two adjacent agents in some agent's preference list, or arbitrarily reorder some agent's preference list, in an instance of Stable Marriage or Stable Roommates. We extend previous work on control and bribery in stable matchings by Boehmer et al. [8]. We consider goals capturing individual and pair inclusion, stability, and uniqueness requirements: Matching a designated agent (MA), matching a designated pair (MP), realizing a stable matching consistent with a given matching (MS), making a given matching the unique stable matching (USM), or guaranteeing that a stable (resp. perfect and stable) matching exists ($\exists$SM/$\exists$PSM). We provide a unified complexity map for all non-trivial action-goal combinations in both settings, consolidating known results and extending the study to the roommates model, where stable matchings need not exist.

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arXiv2026

Individual Rationality in Constrained Hedonic Games: Friends, Enemies, and Neutrals

We study constrained coalition formation in games induced by friends, enemies, and neutrals, under the two standard refinements of additively separable preferences: friend-oriented and enemy-oriented. We ask for partitions that are individually rational (IR), while additionally requiring exactly $k$ non-empty coalitions, each satisfying a prescribed lower and upper bound on its size. Although IR alone is trivial to satisfy for any hedonic game, the size constraints make it computationally intractable to decide whether a feasible partition exists. The two models tell strikingly different stories. Under enemy-oriented preferences, the problem collapses to size-constrained graph coloring, and its complexity follows accordingly. Under friend-oriented preferences, however, the picture is far more intricate, and is governed by the enmity structure rather than the friendships. The complexity is further shaped by two factors: how strict the imposed size requirements are, and whether relationships are symmetric or asymmetric, with several cases turning out tractable in the symmetric setting but intractable once asymmetry is allowed. Charting this boundary in terms of both classical and parameterized complexity, we provide a complete understanding of which properties of the friend/enemy structure are responsible for hardness.

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arXiv2026

What Makes Majority Illusion Easy to Detect?

Majority illusion is an undesirable phenomenon in social networks in which agents incorrectly perceive a minority opinion as dominant. This can severely distort collective behavior and decision-making. We study the fundamental question of detecting whether a social network allows for a majority illusion. Formally, in the $q$-Majority Illusion problem, we ask whether there exists a binary labeling of agents in which at least a $q$-fraction of agents have the majority of neighbors with the minority label. We investigate how various structural properties of the underlying social network influence the tractability of this question, and provide a detailed map of its computational complexity.

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arXiv2026

Navigating the Complexity Landscape of Nominee Selection in Schulze Voting

We study the Possible President problem and the Necessary President problem for Schulze voting, a rule that, due to its many desirable axiomatic properties, is popular in practice. In both problems, we are given an election with the candidates partitioned into a set of parties, and we are interested in questions about a given distinguished party. In the Possible President problem, we ask whether it is possible for the parties to each nominate exactly one candidate such that the nominee of the distinguished party is a Schulze winner of the resulting election with only the nominees running. In the Necessary President problem, we ask whether the distinguished party's nominee is a Schulze winner of the resulting election, irrespective of the nomination from the other parties. Rothe and Woitaschik have shown that Possible President is NP-complete and Necessary President is coNP-complete for Schulze elections. We complement and improve their results by a more fine-grained analysis: we determine the parameterized complexity of both problems with respect to all possible parameterizations, where we consider each of three natural parameters -- the number of voters, the maximum party size, and the number of parties -- to be either a constant, a parameter, or unbounded. In particular, we obtain dichotomies regarding the number of voters for both problems.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Optimal Portfolio Compression for Priority-Proportional Clearing with Defaulting Costs

We study financial networks where banks are connected through bilateral liabilities and may default when resources are insufficient to meet obligations. We consider both the standard proportional clearing model and a priority-proportional clearing model in which banks repay creditors according to exogenously given priority classes. In such markets, portfolio compression is a process where several banks come to a netting arrangement which reduces liabilities without changing any bank's net exposure, essentially removing cycles of debt. Our goal is to understand whether portfolio compression schemes can be designed to improve clearing outcomes for a large fraction of banks. We provide a computational characterization of the benefits and limitations of compression. On the positive side, we give a polynomial-time algorithm to compute a maximal clearing outcome under priority-proportional clearing, and we show that it is possible to decide in polynomial time whether there exists a compression that limits defaults to at most one bank. On the negative side, we show that several natural optimization and decision problems are computationally intractable: deciding whether some compression can reduce the number of defaulting banks below a given threshold, or whether a specific bank can be saved from defaulting, is $\NP$-hard even in restricted settings and under proportional clearing. We further present a mixed integer linear programming (MILP) formulation that computes a compression maximizing the number of non-defaulting banks, providing a practical approach to this hard problem. Using our MILP formulation, we perform simulations on both synthetic and real-world datasets to analyze the effects of portfolio compression.

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arXiv2026

Necessary President in Elections with Parties

Consider an election where the set of candidates is partitioned into parties, and each party must choose exactly one candidate to nominate for the election held over all nominees. The Necessary President problem asks whether a candidate, if nominated, becomes the winner of the election for all possible nominations from other parties. We study the computational complexity of Necessary President for several voting rules. We show that while this problem is solvable in polynomial time for Borda, Maximin, and Copeland$^α$ for every $α\in [0,1]$, it is $\mathsf{coNP}$-complete for general classes of positional scoring rules that include $\ell$-Approval and $\ell$-Veto, even when the maximum size of a party is two. For such positional scoring rules, we show that Necessary President is $\mathsf{W}[2]$-hard when parameterized by the number of parties, but fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the number of voter types. Additionally, we prove that Necessary President for Ranked Pairs is $\mathsf{coNP}$-complete even for maximum party size two, and $\mathsf{W}[1]$-hard with respect to the number of parties; remarkably, both of these results hold even for constant number of voters.

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arXiv2025

Solving Four Open Problems about Core Stability in Altruistic Hedonic Games

Hedonic games -- at the interface of cooperative game theory and computational social choice -- are coalition formation games in which the players have preferences over the coalitions they can join. Kerkmann et al. [13] introduced altruistic hedonic games where the players' utilities depend not only on their own but also on their friends' valuations of coalitions. The complexity of the verification problem for core stability has remained open in four variants of altruistic hedonic games: namely, for the variants with average- and minimum-based "equal-treatment" and "altruistic-treatment" preferences. We solve these four open questions by proving the corresponding problems coNP-complete; our reductions rely on rather intricate gadgets in the related networks of friends.

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arXiv2025

Stable Hypergraph Matching in Unimodular Hypergraphs

We study the NP-hard Stable Hypergraph Matching (SHM) problem and its generalization allowing capacities, the Stable Hypergraph $b$-Matching (SH$b$M) problem, and investigate their computational properties under various structural constraints. Our study is motivated by the fact that Scarf's Lemma (Scarf, 1967) together with a result of Lovász (1972) guarantees the existence of a stable matching whenever the underlying hypergraph is normal. Furthermore, if the hypergraph is unimodular (i.e., its incidence matrix is totally unimodular), then even a stable $b$-matching is guaranteed to exist. However, no polynomial-time algorithm is known for finding a stable matching or $b$-matching in unimodular hypergraphs. We identify subclasses of unimodular hypergraphs where SHM and SH$b$M are tractable such as laminar hypergraphs or so-called subpath hypergraphs with bounded-size hyperedges; for the latter case, even a maximum-weight stable $b$-matching can be found efficiently. We complement our algorithms by showing that optimizing over stable matchings is NP-hard even in laminar hypergraphs. As a practically important special case of SH$b$M for unimodular hypergraphs, we investigate a tripartite stable matching problem with students, schools, and companies as agents, called the University Dual Admission problem, which models real-world scenarios in higher education admissions. Finally, we examine a superclass of subpath hypergraphs that are normal but necessarily not unimodular, namely subtree hypergraphs where hyperedges correspond to subtrees of a tree. We establish that for such hypergraphs, stable matchings can be found in polynomial time but, in the setting with capacities, finding a stable $b$-matching is NP-hard.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

The Strong Core of Housing Markets with Partial Order Preferences

We study the strong core of housing markets when agents' preferences over houses are expressed as partial orders. We provide a structural characterization of the strong core, and propose an efficient algorithm that finds an allocation in the strong core or decides that it is empty, even in the presence of forced and forbidden arcs. The algorithm satisfies the property of group-strategyproofness. Additionally, we show that certain results known for the strong core in the case when agents' preferences are weak orders can be extended to the setting with partial order preferences; among others, we show that the strong core in such housing markets satisfies the property of respecting improvements.

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arXiv2025

Candidate nomination for Condorcet-consistent voting rules

Consider elections where the set of candidates is partitioned into parties, and each party must nominate exactly one candidate. The Possible President problem asks whether some candidate of a given party can become the winner of the election for some nominations from other parties. We perform a multivariate computational complexity analysis of Possible President for a range of Condorcet-consistent voting rules, namely for Copeland$^α$ for $α\in [0,1]$ and Maximin. The parameters we study are the number of voters, the number of parties, and the maximum size of a party. For all voting rules under consideration, we obtain dichotomies based on the number of voters, classifying $\mathsf{NP}$-complete and polynomial-time solvable cases. Moreover, for each $\mathsf{NP}$-complete variant, we determine the parameterized complexity of every possible parameterization with the studied parameters as either (a) fixed-parameter tractable, (b) $\mathsf{W}[1]$-hard but in $\mathsf{XP}$, or (c) $\mathsf{paraNP}$-hard, outlining the limits of tractability for these problems.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Parameterized Algorithms for Optimal Refugee Resettlement

We study variants of the Optimal Refugee Resettlement problem where a set $F$ of refugee families need to be allocated to a set $L$ of possible places of resettlement in a feasible and optimal way. Feasibility issues emerge from the assumption that each family requires certain services (such as accommodation, school seats, or medical assistance), while there is an upper and, possibly, a lower quota on the number of service units provided at a given place. Besides studying the problem of finding a feasible assignment, we also investigate two natural optimization variants. In the first one, we allow families to express preferences over $P$, and we aim for a Pareto-optimal assignment. In a more general setting, families can attribute utilities to each place in $P$, and the task is to find a feasible assignment with maximum total utilities. We study the computational complexity of all three variants in a multivariate fashion using the framework of parameterized complexity. We provide fixed-parameter tractable algorithms for a handful of natural parameterizations, and complement these tractable cases with tight intractability results.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Parameterized Complexity of Submodular Minimization under Uncertainty

This paper studies the computational complexity of a robust variant of a two-stage submodular minimization problem that we call Robust Submodular Minimizer. In this problem, we are given $k$ submodular functions~$f_1,\dots,f_k$ over a set family~$2^V$, which represent $k$ possible scenarios in the future when we will need to find an optimal solution for one of these scenarios, i.e., a minimizer for one of the functions. The present task is to find a set $X \subseteq V$ that is close to \emph{some} optimal solution for each $f_i$ in the sense that some minimizer of~$f_i$ can be obtained from $X$ by adding/removing at most $d$ elements for a given integer $d \in \mathbb{N}$. The main contribution of this paper is to provide a complete computational map of this problem with respect to parameters~$k$ and~$d$, which reveals a tight complexity threshold for both parameters: (1) Robust Submodular Minimizer can be solved in polynomial time when $k \leq 2$, but is NP-hard if $k$ is a constant with $k \geq 3$.(2)Robust Submodular Minimizer can be solved in polynomial time when $d=0$, but is NP-hard if $d$ is a constant with $d \geq 1$. (3) Robust Submodular Minimizer is fixed-parameter tractable when parameterized by~$(k,d)$. We also show that if some submodular function $f_i$ has a polynomial number of minimizers, then the problem becomes fixed-parameter tractable when parameterized by $d$. On the other hand, the problem remains $\mathsf{W}[1]$-hard parameterized by $k$ even if each function $f_i$ has at most~$|V|$ minimizers. We remark that all our hardness results hold even if each submodular function is given by a cut function of a directed graph.

cs.DS↗

arXiv2024

The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home?

We study housing markets as introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974). We investigate the computational complexity of various questions regarding the situation of an agent $a$ in a housing market $H$: we show that it is $\mathsf{NP}$-hard to find an allocation in the core of $H$ where (i) $a$ receives a certain house, (ii) $a$ does not receive a certain house, or (iii) $a$ receives a house other than her own. We prove that the core of housing markets respects improvement in the following sense: given an allocation in the core of $H$ where agent $a$ receives a house $h$, if the value of the house owned by $a$ increases, then the resulting housing market admits an allocation in its core in which $a$ receives either $h$, or a house that $a$ prefers to $h$; moreover, such an allocation can be found efficiently. We further show an analogous result in the Stable Roommates setting by proving that stable matchings in a one-sided market also respect improvement.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Shortest two disjoint paths in conservative graphs

We consider the following problem that we call the Shortest Two Disjoint Paths problem: given an undirected graph $G=(V,E)$ with edge weights $w:E \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, two terminals $s$ and $t$ in $G$, find two internally vertex-disjoint paths between $s$ and $t$ with minimum total weight. As shown recently by Schlotter and Sebő (2022), this problem becomes NP-hard if edges can have negative weights, even if the weight function is conservative, there are no cycles in $G$ with negative total weight. We propose a polynomial-time algorithm that solves the Shortest Two Disjoint Paths problem for conservative weights in the case when the negative-weight edges form a constant number of trees in $G$.

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arXiv2023

Arborescences, Colorful Forests, and Popularity

Our input is a directed, rooted graph $G = (V \cup \{r\},E)$ where each vertex in $V$ has a partial order preference over its incoming edges. The preferences of a vertex extend naturally to preferences over arborescences rooted at $r$. We seek a popular arborescence in $G$, i.e., one for which there is no "more popular" arborescence. Popular arborescences have applications in liquid democracy or collective decision making; however, they need not exist in every input instance. The popular arborescence problem is to decide if a given input instance admits a popular arborescence or not. We show a polynomial-time algorithm for this problem, whose computational complexity was not known previously. Our algorithm is combinatorial, and can be regarded as a primal-dual algorithm. It searches for an arborescence along with its dual certificate, a chain of subsets of $E$, witnessing its popularity. In fact, our algorithm solves the more general popular common base problem in the intersection of two matroids, where one matroid is the partition matroid defined by any partition $E = \bigcup_{v\in V} δ(v)$ and the other is an arbitrary matroid on $E$ of rank $|V|$, with each $v \in V$ having a partial order over elements in $δ(v)$. We extend our algorithm to the case with forced or forbidden edges. We also study the related popular colorful forest (or more generally, the popular common independent set) problem where edges are partitioned into color classes, and the task is to find a colorful forest that is popular within the set of all colorful forests. For the case with weak rankings, we formulate the popular colorful forest polytope, and thus show that a minimum-cost popular colorful forest can be computed efficiently. By contrast, we prove that it is NP-hard to compute a minimum-cost popular arborescence, even when rankings are strict.

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arXiv2023

The popular assignment problem: when cardinality is more important than popularity

We consider a matching problem in a bipartite graph $G=(A\cup B,E)$ where nodes in $A$ are agents having preferences in partial order over their neighbors, while nodes in $B$ are objects without preferences. We propose a polynomial-time combinatorial algorithm based on LP duality that finds a maximum matching or assignment in $G$ that is popular among all maximum matchings, if there exists one. Our algorithm can also be used to achieve a trade-off between popularity and cardinality by imposing a penalty on unmatched nodes in $A$. We also provide an $O^*(|E|^k)$ algorithm that finds an assignment whose unpopularity margin is at most $k$; this algorithm is essentially optimal, since the problem is $\mathsf{NP}$-complete and $\mathsf{W}_l[1]$-hard with parameter $k$. We also prove that finding a popular assignment of minimum cost when each edge has an associated binary cost is $\mathsf{NP}$-hard, even if agents have strict preferences. By contrast, we propose a polynomial-time algorithm for the variant of the popular assignment problem with forced/forbidden edges. Finally, we present an application in the context of housing markets.

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arXiv2023

Shortest Odd Paths in Undirected Graphs with Conservative Weight Functions

We consider the Shortest Odd Path problem, where given an undirected graph $G$, a weight function on its edges, and two vertices $s$ and $t$ in $G$, the aim is to find an $(s,t)$-path with odd length and, among all such paths, of minimum weight. For the case when the weight function is conservative, i.e., when every cycle has non-negative total weight, the complexity of the Shortest Odd Path problem had been open for 20 years, and was recently shown to be NP-hard. We give a polynomial-time algorithm for the special case when the weight function is conservative and the set $E^-$ of negative-weight edges forms a single tree. Our algorithm exploits the strong connection between Shortest Odd Path and the problem of finding two internally vertex-disjoint paths between two terminals in an undirected edge-weighted graph. It also relies on solving an intermediary problem variant called Shortest Parity-Constrained Odd Path where for certain edges we have parity constraints on their position along the path. Also, we exhibit two FPT algorithms for solving Shortest Odd Path in graphs with conservative weight functions. The first FPT algorithm is parameterized by $|E^-|$, the number of negative edges, or more generally, by the maximum size of a matching in the subgraph of $G$ spanned by $E^-$. Our second FPT algorithm is parameterized by the treewidth of $G$.

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