arXiv subjects

Ilia Sucholutsky

Publications and source records attributed to Ilia Sucholutsky.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

CogGym: Towards Large-Scale Comparative Evaluation of Human and Machine Cognition

Understanding and modeling human intelligence are parallel goals shared by artificial intelligence (AI) and cognitive science. As AI systems grow increasingly capable, in what ways do model responses resemble human responses, and where do they systematically diverge? The sheer breadth and diversity of the tasks humans can perform and think about pose a challenge for scalable and rigorous comparison between humans and models. We introduce CogGym, a scalable, unified framework grounded in cognitive science for systematically comparing model and human behavior on matched experimental trials. CogGym uses a semi-automated, human-in-the-loop pipeline to standardize diverse experimental paradigms into a task-agnostic Experiment Markup Language (EML), enabling reproducible and faithful comparison at scale. For initial release, we curate and standardize 258 cognitive experiments from 100 papers that focuses on human commonsense reasoning, and evaluate 50 large language models against human responses. We find a clear scaling trend where larger and more recent AI models better reproduce human judgments. Yet AI models' improvement on such common reasoning tasks is considerably slower than the gains observed on formal-reasoning benchmarks like math and coding, and model--human fit remains well below human splithalf reliability ($R^2 = 0.93$ on text, $0.95$ on image, and $0.92$ on video) with the best models achieving $R^2 = 0.59$ on text, $0.58$ on image, and $0.43$ on video experiments. We intend for CogGym to provide a living evaluation framework that continually incorporates new cognitive science experiments to characterize where model behavior resembles human behavior, where it systematically diverges, and how those patterns change as models and experiments evolve.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

On Benchmarking Human-Like Intelligence in Machines

Recent advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) have yielded powerful computational models that, by learning from vast amounts of human-generated data, are increasingly posited as approximate models of human cognition. However, we argue that many current evaluation paradigms for AI are insufficient for assessing human-like cognitive capabilities in these models. We identify a set of key shortcomings: a lack of human-validated labels, inadequate representation of human response variability and uncertainty, and reliance on simplified and ecologically invalid tasks. We support our claims by conducting a human evaluation study on nine existing AI benchmarks, suggesting major limitations in task and label designs. To address these limitations, we propose five concrete recommendations for future AI evaluation efforts that will enable more rigorous and meaningful understanding of human-like cognitive capacities in AI models.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Human agency in initial human-AI proof formalization workflows

For centuries, human mathematicians have written proofs to substantiate their mathematical arguments; yet, the ability to automatically verify the validity of proofs has long been a challenge. Advances in AI systems' ability to generate code and engage in increasingly high-level mathematical reasoning promise to transform people's ability to formalize and thereby verify proofs. While many works focus on benchmarking the current frontier, we instead study how people use these tools and apply agency in doing so. We conduct a mixed-methods analysis into the initial impact of AI on people's formalization workflows: what people claim they want, what they see as the barriers to those visions, and how they actually use and adapt AI in practice. A qualitative survey reveals that people's preferences are diverse, but with a general desire for AI assistance in formalization that preserves high-level human control and agency over the proof discovery process. To assess how people actually engage with AI for formalization, we conduct a controlled user study in which participants formalize informal math problems and their proofs, with and without AI, across a range of mathematical problems at varying levels of difficulty and domains. Despite limitations of the tools at the time for autoformalization, participants tended to attain higher formalization accuracy when allowed access to AI tools than when formalizing on their own, with most participants flexibly choosing to use multiple different AI tools. Taken together, our work sheds light on the early stages of AI integration into formalization workflows, involving an intimate interplay of human agency and AI engagement.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Human-AI Synergy Supports Collective Creative Search

Generative AI is increasingly transforming creativity into a hybrid human-artificial process, but its impact on the quality and diversity of creative output remains unclear. We study collective creativity using a controlled word-guessing task that balances open-endedness with an objective measure of task performance. Participants attempt to infer a hidden target word, scored based on the semantic similarity of their guesses to the target, while also observing the best guess from previous players. We compare performance and outcome diversity across human-only, AI-only, and hybrid human-AI groups. Hybrid groups achieve the highest performance while preserving high diversity of guesses. Within hybrid groups, both humans and AI agents systematically adjust their strategies relative to single-agent conditions, suggesting higher-order interaction effects, whereby agents adapt to each other's presence. Although some performance benefits can be reproduced through collaboration between heterogeneous AI systems, human-AI collaboration remains superior, underscoring complementary roles in collective creativity.

cs.SI↗

arXiv2026

Selective QA over Conflicting Multi-Source Personal Memory: A Diagnostic Testbed and Method Comparison

Emerging personal AI agents are moving toward persistent, multi-source memory. This creates an evaluation problem: systems must decide how to use conflicting or incomplete evidence; they cannot just retrieve facts from one clean history. Existing benchmarks rarely show whether an error came from the evidence given to a method or from the method's conflict-resolution step. We study this as selective QA over conflicting multi-source personal memory: systems answer based on conflicting, sometimes incomplete sources, or abstain when evidence is insufficient. We develop a benchmark containing 18 question templates across 8 reasoning types, 480 personas, 4 random seeds, and 34,560 instances, with controlled source distortions and deterministic ground truth. We evaluate the performance of baselines without access to any source, access to a single source, structured fusion methods, and frontier LLMs. The best trained fusion resolver reaches 80.3% accuracy, while the strongest prompt-only LLM baseline reaches 70.0%. With abstention, the same resolver reaches 85.3% selective accuracy at 78.3% coverage and the best LLM reaches 71.0% selective accuracy at 95.4% coverage. Different models have different strengths across reasoning types. We release the data, code, cached model outputs, and data-generating process for reuse.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Cognitive offloading and the speedup illusion in human-AI interaction

Large language models (LLMs) have the potential to boost human productivity by speeding up task completion -- provided users know when to offload cognitive work to them. But we do not know if users are well-calibrated in estimating these potential time savings. We conducted a preregistered large-scale behavioral study (N = 1237) to characterize mismatches between expectations and reality, with a focus on simple cognitive tasks. While actual completion times between independent completion and AI-assisted completion did not differ, participants predicted AI to be significantly faster. The same bias was not observed when imagining help from another human participant. We identify a speedup illusion where people have accurate forecasts of independent completion times but significantly underestimate AI-assisted times. Additionally, time and effort dissociate: participants reported lower subjective effort with AI despite equivalent completion times. This suggests that completion time itself is not sufficient to characterize efficiency gains.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2026

The efficiency-gain illusion: People underestimate the rate of AI use and overestimate its benefits on simple tasks

People are increasingly turning to AI assistance for simple tasks, e.g., arithmetic, spell-check, and answering simple questions. But does AI assistance actually save users time and effort? We investigate people's propensity to use AI for cognitively simple tasks and assess whether their reliance is well-calibrated. Across three pre-registered user studies (N = 2691), we find that people frequently choose to use AI even when doing so is inefficient (i.e. provides no meaningful time or effort savings). We identify systematic miscalibration at two levels: (1) a self-estimate miscalibration where people on average believe that they are using AI less than they actually are, and (2) efficiency-gain illusions where people overestimate how much time and effort savings AI use affords. We also identify a session-level carryover effect where a participant's prior AI use leads to further AI adoption and entrenches their miscalibration about time savings. Our results shed light on the mechanisms and biases underlying people's choice of whether to use AI as well as the risk of an overreliance feedback loop.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2026

Measuring and mitigating overreliance to build human-compatible AI

Large language models (LLMs) distinguish themselves from previous technologies by functioning as collaborative ``thought partners,'' capable of engaging more fluidly in natural language on a range of tasks. As LLMs increasingly influence consequential decisions across diverse domains from healthcare to personal advice, the risk of overreliance -- relying on LLMs beyond their capabilities -- grows. This paper argues that measuring and mitigating overreliance must become central to LLM research and deployment. First, we consolidate risks from overreliance at both the individual and societal levels, including high-stakes errors, governance challenges, and cognitive deskilling. Then, we explore LLM characteristics, system design features, and user cognitive biases that together raise serious and unique concerns about overreliance on LLMs in practice. We also examine historical approaches for measuring overreliance, identifying three important gaps and proposing three promising directions to improve measurement. Finally, we propose mitigation strategies that can be pursued to ensure LLMs augment rather than undermine human capabilities.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2026

On-Policy Consistency Training Improves LLM Safety with Minimal Capability Degradation

Aligned models can misbehave in several ways: they are often sycophantic, fall victim to jailbreaks, or fail to include appropriate safety warnings. Consistency training is a promising new alignment paradigm to mitigate such failures by training invariants into the model using contrastive input pairs. Existing consistency training procedures generate the supervision signal once, offline, and use supervised fine-tuning (SFT) to update the model. Unfortunately, the resulting models tend to merely memorize the surface forms of the training distribution and thus generalize poorly and regress in their capabilities. We introduce On-Policy Consistency Training (OPCT), a new consistency training approach where the objective is computed over the model's own responses to prompts, supervised by itself conditioned on corresponding contrastive prompts. We evaluate OPCT on three safety axes: sycophancy, jailbreaking, and safety awareness. Across three model families, OPCT outperforms its SFT counterpart on all safety desiderata. It nearly halves the sycophancy rate relative to baseline (8.1% vs. 15.4%, compared to 11.2% for SFT). Under an adaptive per-target attacker, OPCT holds jailbreak defense success near 99% on held-out jailbreak behaviors, whereas SFT achieves 87% on average. On safety awareness, OPCT outperforms SFT in two out of three models, and matches it on the other. OPCT also largely avoids the capability regressions that SFT induces, such as a 28-point drop on MATH-500. Our results suggest that consistency training is best implemented as OPCT rather than as SFT, especially when generalization beyond the training distribution is desired.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2026

Medical Model Synthesis Architectures: A Case Study

Medicine is rife with high-stakes uncertainty. Doctors routinely make clinical judgments and decisions that juggle many fundamental unknowns, like predictions about what might be causing a patients' symptoms or decisions about what treatment to try next. Despite increasing interest in developing AI systems that aid or even replace doctors in clinical settings, current systems struggle with calibrated reasoning under uncertainty, and are often deeply opaque about their reasoning. We propose a framework for AI systems that can make practically useful but formally transparent clinical predictions under uncertainty. Given a clinical situation, our framework (MedMSA) uses language models to retrieve relevant prior knowledge, but constructs a formal probabilistic model to support calibrated and verifiable inferences under uncertainty. We show how an initial proof-of-concept of this framework can be used for differential diagnosis, producing an uncertainty-weighted list of potential diagnoses that could explain a patients' symptoms, and discuss future applications and directions for applying this framework more generally for safe clinical collaborations.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Improving the Efficiency of Language Agent Teams with Adaptive Task Graphs

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in teams, yet existing coordination approaches often occupy two extremes. Highly structured methods rely on fixed roles, pipelines, or task decompositions assigned a priori. In contrast, fully unstructured teams enable adaptability and exploration but suffer from inefficiencies such as error propagation, inter-agent conflicts, and wasted resources (measured in time, tokens, or file operations). We introduce Language Agent Teams for Task Evolution (LATTE), a framework for coordinating LLM teams inspired by distributed systems, where processors must operate under partial observability and communication constraints. In LATTE, a team of agents collaboratively construct and maintain a shared, evolving coordination graph which encodes sub-task dependencies, individual agent assignment, and the current state of sub-task progress. This protocol maintains consistency while empowering agents to dynamically allocate work, adapt coordination, and discover new tasks. Across multiple collaborative tasks and a variety of base models, we demonstrate how LATTE reduces token usage, wall-clock time, communication, and coordination failures (e.g. file conflicts and redundant outputs) while matching or exceeding the accuracy of standard designs including MetaGPT, decentralized teams, top-down Leader-Worker hierarchies, and static decompositions.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2026

Do Large Language Models Mentalize When They Teach?

How do LLMs decide what to teach next: by reasoning about a learner's knowledge, or by using simpler rules of thumb? We test this in a controlled task previously used to study human teaching strategies. On each trial, a teacher LLM sees a hypothetical learner's trajectory through a reward-annotated directed graph and must reveal a single edge so the learner would choose a better path if they replanned. We run a range of LLMs as simulated teachers and fit their trial-by-trial choices with the same cognitive models used for humans: a Bayes-Optimal teacher that infers which transitions the learner is missing (inverse planning), weaker Bayesian variants, heuristic baselines (e.g., reward based), and non-mentalizing utility models. In a baseline experiment matched to the stimuli presented to human subjects, most LLMs perform well, show little change in strategy over trials, and their graph-by-graph performance is similar to that of humans. Model comparison (BIC) shows that Bayes-Optimal teaching best explains most models' choices. When given a scaffolding intervention, models follow auxiliary inference- or reward-focused prompts, but these scaffolds do not reliably improve later teaching on heuristic-incongruent test graphs and can sometimes reduce performance. Overall, cognitive model fits provide insight into LLM tutoring policies and show that prompt compliance does not guarantee better teaching decisions.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Failing to Falsify: Evaluating and Mitigating Confirmation Bias in Language Models

Confirmation bias, the tendency to seek evidence that supports rather than challenges one's belief, hinders one's reasoning ability. We examine whether large language models (LLMs) exhibit confirmation bias by adapting the rule-discovery study from human psychology: given a sequence of three numbers (a "triple"), an agent engages in an interactive feedback loop where it (1) proposes a new triple, (2) receives feedback on whether it satisfies the hidden rule, and (3) guesses the rule. Across eleven LLMs of multiple families and scales, we find that LLMs exhibit confirmation bias, often proposing triples to confirm their hypothesis rather than trying to falsify it. This leads to slower and less frequent discovery of the hidden rule. We further explore intervention strategies (e.g., encouraging the agent to consider counter examples) developed for humans. We find prompting LLMs with such instruction consistently decreases confirmation bias in LLMs, improving rule discovery rates from 42% to 56% on average. Lastly, we mitigate confirmation bias by distilling intervention-induced behavior into LLMs, showing promising generalization to a new task, the Blicket test. Our work shows that confirmation bias is a limitation of LLMs in hypothesis exploration, and that it can be mitigated via injecting interventions designed for humans.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2026

Levels of Analysis for Large Language Models

Modern artificial intelligence systems, such as large language models, are increasingly powerful but also increasingly hard to understand. Recognizing this problem as analogous to the historical difficulties in understanding the human mind, we argue that methods developed in cognitive science can be useful for understanding large language models. We propose a framework for applying these methods based on the levels of analysis that David Marr proposed for studying information processing systems. By revisiting established cognitive science techniques relevant to each level and illustrating their potential to yield insights into the behavior and internal organization of large language models, we aim to provide a toolkit for making sense of these new kinds of minds.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2026

Under the Influence: Quantifying Persuasion and Vigilance in Large Language Models

With increasing integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into areas of high-stakes human decision-making, it is important to understand the risks they introduce as advisors. To be useful advisors, LLMs must sift through large amounts of content, written with both benevolent and malicious intent, and then use this information to convince a user to take a specific action. This involves two social capacities: vigilance (the ability to determine which information to use, and which to discard) and persuasion (synthesizing the available evidence to make a convincing argument). While existing work has investigated these capacities in isolation, there has been little prior investigation of how these capacities may be linked. Here, we use a simple multi-turn puzzle-solving game, Sokoban, to study LLMs' abilities to persuade and be rationally vigilant towards other LLM agents. We find that puzzle-solving performance, persuasive capability, and vigilance are dissociable capacities in LLMs. Performing well on the game does not automatically mean a model can detect when it is being misled, even if the possibility of deception is explicitly mentioned. However, LLMs do consistently modulate their token use, using fewer tokens to reason when advice is benevolent and more when it is malicious, even if they are still persuaded to take actions leading them to failure. To our knowledge, our work presents the first investigation of the relationship between persuasion, vigilance, and task performance in LLMs, and suggests that monitoring all three independently will be critical for future work in AI safety.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2026

Language Model Teams as Distributed Systems

Large language models (LLMs) are growing increasingly capable, prompting recent interest in LLM teams. Yet, despite increased deployment of LLM teams at scale, we lack a principled framework for addressing key questions such as when a team is helpful, how many agents to use, how structure impacts performance -- and whether a team is better than a single agent. Rather than designing and testing these possibilities through trial-and-error, we propose using distributed systems as a principled foundation for creating and evaluating LLM teams. We find that many of the fundamental advantages and challenges studied in distributed computing also arise in LLM teams, highlighting the rich practical insights that can come from the cross-talk of these two fields of study.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2026

Why Human Guidance Matters in Collaborative Vibe Coding

Writing code has been one of the most transformative ways for human societies to translate abstract ideas into tangible technologies. Modern AI is changing this process by enabling experts and non-experts alike to generate code without actually writing it, instead using natural language instructions or "vibe coding". While increasingly popular, the impact of vibe coding on productivity and collaboration, and the role of humans in this process, remains unclear. Here, we introduce a controlled experimental framework for studying collaborative vibe coding and use it to compare human-led, AI-led, and hybrid groups. Across 20 experiments involving 737 human participants, we show that people provide uniquely effective high-level instructions for vibe coding, whereas AI-provided instructions often result in performance collapse. We further demonstrate that hybrid systems perform best when humans lead by providing instructions while evaluation is delegated to AI. Although AI systems can rapidly optimize performance for specific tasks, our work highlights the importance of human guidance in shaping future hybrid societies.

cs.HC↗

arXiv2025

Towards Formalizing Spuriousness of Biased Datasets Using Partial Information Decomposition

Spuriousness arises when there is an association between two or more variables in a dataset that are not causally related. In this work, we propose an explainability framework to preemptively disentangle the nature of such spurious associations in a dataset before model training. We leverage a body of work in information theory called Partial Information Decomposition (PID) to decompose the total information about the target into four non-negative quantities, namely unique information (in core and spurious features, respectively), redundant information, and synergistic information. Our framework helps anticipate when the core or spurious feature is indispensable, when either suffices, and when both are jointly needed for an optimal classifier trained on the dataset. Next, we leverage this decomposition to propose a novel measure of the spuriousness of a dataset. We arrive at this measure systematically by examining several candidate measures, and demonstrating what they capture and miss through intuitive canonical examples and counterexamples. Our framework Spurious Disentangler consists of segmentation, dimensionality reduction, and estimation modules, with capabilities to specifically handle high-dimensional image data efficiently. Finally, we also perform empirical evaluation to demonstrate the trends of unique, redundant, and synergistic information, as well as our proposed spuriousness measure across $6$ benchmark datasets under various experimental settings. We observe an agreement between our preemptive measure of dataset spuriousness and post-training model generalization metrics such as worst-group accuracy, further supporting our proposition. The code is available at https://github.com/Barproda/spuriousness-disentangler.

cs.LG↗