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Ilia Sucholutsky

Publications and source records attributed to Ilia Sucholutsky.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

Towards Formalizing Spuriousness of Biased Datasets Using Partial Information Decomposition

Spuriousness arises when there is an association between two or more variables in a dataset that are not causally related. In this work, we propose an explainability framework to preemptively disentangle the nature of such spurious associations in a dataset before model training. We leverage a body of work in information theory called Partial Information Decomposition (PID) to decompose the total information about the target into four non-negative quantities, namely unique information (in core and spurious features, respectively), redundant information, and synergistic information. Our framework helps anticipate when the core or spurious feature is indispensable, when either suffices, and when both are jointly needed for an optimal classifier trained on the dataset. Next, we leverage this decomposition to propose a novel measure of the spuriousness of a dataset. We arrive at this measure systematically by examining several candidate measures, and demonstrating what they capture and miss through intuitive canonical examples and counterexamples. Our framework Spurious Disentangler consists of segmentation, dimensionality reduction, and estimation modules, with capabilities to specifically handle high-dimensional image data efficiently. Finally, we also perform empirical evaluation to demonstrate the trends of unique, redundant, and synergistic information, as well as our proposed spuriousness measure across $6$ benchmark datasets under various experimental settings. We observe an agreement between our preemptive measure of dataset spuriousness and post-training model generalization metrics such as worst-group accuracy, further supporting our proposition. The code is available at https://github.com/Barproda/spuriousness-disentangler.

cs.LG↗

Mind Your Step (by Step): Chain-of-Thought can Reduce Performance on Tasks where Thinking Makes Humans Worse

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting has become a widely used strategy for improving large language and multimodal model performance. However, it is still an open question under which settings CoT systematically reduces performance. In this paper, we seek to identify the characteristics of tasks where CoT reduces performance by drawing inspiration from cognitive psychology, focusing on six representative tasks from the psychological literature where deliberation hurts performance in humans. In three of these tasks, state-of-the-art models exhibit significant performance drop-offs with CoT (up to 36.3\% absolute accuracy for OpenAI o1-preview compared to GPT-4o), while in others, CoT effects are mixed, with positive, neutral, and negative changes. While models and humans do not exhibit perfectly parallel cognitive processes, considering cases where thinking has negative consequences for humans helps identify settings where it negatively impacts models. By connecting the literature on human verbal thinking and deliberation with evaluations of CoT, we offer a perspective for understanding the impact of inference-time reasoning.

cs.LG↗

Using LLMs to Advance the Cognitive Science of Collectives

LLMs are already transforming the study of individual cognition, but their application to studying collective cognition has been underexplored. We lay out how LLMs may be able to address the complexity that has hindered the study of collectives and raise possible risks that warrant new methods.

q-bio.NC↗

Identifying, Evaluating, and Mitigating Risks of AI Thought Partnerships

Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems have historically been used as tools that execute narrowly defined tasks. Yet recent advances in AI have unlocked possibilities for a new class of models that genuinely collaborate with humans in complex reasoning, from conceptualizing problems to brainstorming solutions. Such AI thought partners enable novel forms of collaboration and extended cognition, yet they also pose major risks-including and beyond risks of typical AI tools and agents. In this commentary, we systematically identify risks of AI thought partners through a novel framework that identifies risks at multiple levels of analysis, including Real-time, Individual, and Societal risks arising from collaborative cognition (RISc). We leverage this framework to propose concrete metrics for risk evaluation, and finally suggest specific mitigation strategies for developers and policymakers. As AI thought partners continue to proliferate, these strategies can help prevent major harms and ensure that humans actively benefit from productive thought partnerships.

cs.AI↗

Quantifying Knowledge Distillation Using Partial Information Decomposition

Knowledge distillation deploys complex machine learning models in resource-constrained environments by training a smaller student model to emulate internal representations of a complex teacher model. However, the teacher's representations can also encode nuisance or additional information not relevant to the downstream task. Distilling such irrelevant information can actually impede the performance of a capacity-limited student model. This observation motivates our primary question: What are the information-theoretic limits of knowledge distillation? To this end, we leverage Partial Information Decomposition to quantify and explain the transferred knowledge and knowledge left to distill for a downstream task. We theoretically demonstrate that the task-relevant transferred knowledge is succinctly captured by the measure of redundant information about the task between the teacher and student. We propose a novel multi-level optimization to incorporate redundant information as a regularizer, leading to our framework of Redundant Information Distillation (RID). RID leads to more resilient and effective distillation under nuisance teachers as it succinctly quantifies task-relevant knowledge rather than simply aligning student and teacher representations.

stat.ML↗

When Should We Orchestrate Multiple Agents?

Strategies for orchestrating the interactions between multiple agents, both human and artificial, can wildly overestimate performance and underestimate the cost of orchestration. We design a framework to orchestrate agents under realistic conditions, such as inference costs or availability constraints. We show theoretically that orchestration is only effective if there are performance or cost differentials between agents. We then empirically demonstrate how orchestration between multiple agents can be helpful for selecting agents in a simulated environment, picking a learning strategy in the infamous Rogers' Paradox from social science, and outsourcing tasks to other agents during a question-answer task in a user study.

cs.MA↗

Large Language Models Assume People are More Rational than We Really are

In order for AI systems to communicate effectively with people, they must understand how we make decisions. However, people's decisions are not always rational, so the implicit internal models of human decision-making in Large Language Models (LLMs) must account for this. Previous empirical evidence seems to suggest that these implicit models are accurate -- LLMs offer believable proxies of human behavior, acting how we expect humans would in everyday interactions. However, by comparing LLM behavior and predictions to a large dataset of human decisions, we find that this is actually not the case: when both simulating and predicting people's choices, a suite of cutting-edge LLMs (GPT-4o & 4-Turbo, Llama-3-8B & 70B, Claude 3 Opus) assume that people are more rational than we really are. Specifically, these models deviate from human behavior and align more closely with a classic model of rational choice -- expected value theory. Interestingly, people also tend to assume that other people are rational when interpreting their behavior. As a consequence, when we compare the inferences that LLMs and people draw from the decisions of others using another psychological dataset, we find that these inferences are highly correlated. Thus, the implicit decision-making models of LLMs appear to be aligned with the human expectation that other people will act rationally, rather than with how people actually act.

cs.CL↗

Representational Alignment Supports Effective Machine Teaching

A good teacher should not only be knowledgeable, but should also be able to communicate in a way that the student understands -- to share the student's representation of the world. In this work, we introduce a new controlled experimental setting, GRADE, to study pedagogy and representational alignment. We use GRADE through a series of machine-machine and machine-human teaching experiments to characterize a utility curve defining a relationship between representational alignment, teacher expertise, and student learning outcomes. We find that improved representational alignment with a student improves student learning outcomes (i.e., task accuracy), but that this effect is moderated by the size and representational diversity of the class being taught. We use these insights to design a preliminary classroom matching procedure, GRADE-Match, that optimizes the assignment of students to teachers. When designing machine teachers, our results suggest that it is important to focus not only on accuracy, but also on representational alignment with human learners.

cs.LG↗

What is a Number, That a Large Language Model May Know It?

Numbers are a basic part of how humans represent and describe the world around them. As a consequence, learning effective representations of numbers is critical for the success of large language models as they become more integrated into everyday decisions. However, these models face a challenge: depending on context, the same sequence of digit tokens, e.g., 911, can be treated as a number or as a string. What kind of representations arise from this duality, and what are its downstream implications? Using a similarity-based prompting technique from cognitive science, we show that LLMs learn representational spaces that blend string-like and numerical representations. In particular, we show that elicited similarity judgments from these models over integer pairs can be captured by a combination of Levenshtein edit distance and numerical Log-Linear distance, suggesting an entangled representation. In a series of experiments we show how this entanglement is reflected in the latent embeddings, how it can be reduced but not entirely eliminated by context, and how it can propagate into a realistic decision scenario. These results shed light on a representational tension in transformer models that must learn what a number is from text input.

cs.CL↗

Revisiting Rogers' Paradox in the Context of Human-AI Interaction

Humans learn about the world, and how to act in the world, in many ways: from individually conducting experiments to observing and reproducing others' behavior. Different learning strategies come with different costs and likelihoods of successfully learning more about the world. The choice that any one individual makes of how to learn can have an impact on the collective understanding of a whole population if people learn from each other. Alan Rogers developed simulations of a population of agents to study these network phenomena where agents could individually or socially learn amidst a dynamic, uncertain world and uncovered a confusing result: the availability of cheap social learning yielded no benefit to population fitness over individual learning. This paradox spawned decades of work trying to understand and uncover factors that foster the relative benefit of social learning that centuries of human behavior suggest exists. What happens in such network models now that humans can socially learn from AI systems that are themselves socially learning from us? We revisit Rogers' Paradox in the context of human-AI interaction to probe a simplified network of humans and AI systems learning together about an uncertain world. We propose and examine the impact of several learning strategies on the quality of the equilibrium of a society's 'collective world model'. We consider strategies that can be undertaken by various stakeholders involved in a single human-AI interaction: human, AI model builder, and society or regulators around the interaction. We then consider possible negative feedback loops that may arise from humans learning socially from AI: that learning from the AI may impact our own ability to learn about the world. We close with open directions into studying networks of human and AI systems that can be explored in enriched versions of our simulation framework.

cs.AI↗

Large language models surpass human experts in predicting neuroscience results

Scientific discoveries often hinge on synthesizing decades of research, a task that potentially outstrips human information processing capacities. Large language models (LLMs) offer a solution. LLMs trained on the vast scientific literature could potentially integrate noisy yet interrelated findings to forecast novel results better than human experts. To evaluate this possibility, we created BrainBench, a forward-looking benchmark for predicting neuroscience results. We find that LLMs surpass experts in predicting experimental outcomes. BrainGPT, an LLM we tuned on the neuroscience literature, performed better yet. Like human experts, when LLMs were confident in their predictions, they were more likely to be correct, which presages a future where humans and LLMs team together to make discoveries. Our approach is not neuroscience-specific and is transferable to other knowledge-intensive endeavors.

q-bio.NC↗

Getting aligned on representational alignment

Biological and artificial information processing systems form representations of the world that they can use to categorize, reason, plan, navigate, and make decisions. How can we measure the similarity between the representations formed by these diverse systems? Do similarities in representations then translate into similar behavior? If so, then how can a system's representations be modified to better match those of another system? These questions pertaining to the study of representational alignment are at the heart of some of the most promising research areas in contemporary cognitive science, neuroscience, and machine learning. In this Perspective, we survey the exciting recent developments in representational alignment research in the fields of cognitive science, neuroscience, and machine learning. Despite their overlapping interests, there is limited knowledge transfer between these fields, so work in one field ends up duplicated in another, and useful innovations are not shared effectively. To improve communication, we propose a unifying framework that can serve as a common language for research on representational alignment, and map several streams of existing work across fields within our framework. We also lay out open problems in representational alignment where progress can benefit all three of these fields. We hope that this paper will catalyze cross-disciplinary collaboration and accelerate progress for all communities studying and developing information processing systems.

q-bio.NC↗

Modulating Language Model Experiences through Frictions

Language models are transforming the ways that their users engage with the world. Despite impressive capabilities, over-consumption of language model outputs risks propagating unchecked errors in the short-term and damaging human capabilities for critical thinking in the long-term. How can we develop scaffolding around language models to curate more appropriate use? We propose selective frictions for language model experiences, inspired by behavioral science interventions, to dampen misuse. Frictions involve small modifications to a user's experience, e.g., the addition of a button impeding model access and reminding a user of their expertise relative to the model. Through a user study with real humans, we observe shifts in user behavior from the imposition of a friction over LLMs in the context of a multi-topic question-answering task as a representative task that people may use LLMs for, e.g., in education and information retrieval. We find that frictions modulate over-reliance by driving down users' click rates while minimally affecting accuracy for those topics. Yet, frictions may have unintended effects. We find marked differences in users' click behaviors even on topics where frictions were not provisioned. Our contributions motivate further study of human-AI behavioral interaction to inform more effective and appropriate LLM use.

cs.HC↗

Learning Human-like Representations to Enable Learning Human Values

How can we build AI systems that can learn any set of individual human values both quickly and safely, avoiding causing harm or violating societal standards for acceptable behavior during the learning process? We explore the effects of representational alignment between humans and AI agents on learning human values. Making AI systems learn human-like representations of the world has many known benefits, including improving generalization, robustness to domain shifts, and few-shot learning performance. We demonstrate that this kind of representational alignment can also support safely learning and exploring human values in the context of personalization. We begin with a theoretical prediction, show that it applies to learning human morality judgments, then show that our results generalize to ten different aspects of human values -- including ethics, honesty, and fairness -- training AI agents on each set of values in a multi-armed bandit setting, where rewards reflect human value judgments over the chosen action. Using a set of textual action descriptions, we collect value judgments from humans, as well as similarity judgments from both humans and multiple language models, and demonstrate that representational alignment enables both safe exploration and improved generalization when learning human values.

cs.AI↗

Adaptive Language-Guided Abstraction from Contrastive Explanations

Many approaches to robot learning begin by inferring a reward function from a set of human demonstrations. To learn a good reward, it is necessary to determine which features of the environment are relevant before determining how these features should be used to compute reward. End-to-end methods for joint feature and reward learning (e.g., using deep networks or program synthesis techniques) often yield brittle reward functions that are sensitive to spurious state features. By contrast, humans can often generalizably learn from a small number of demonstrations by incorporating strong priors about what features of a demonstration are likely meaningful for a task of interest. How do we build robots that leverage this kind of background knowledge when learning from new demonstrations? This paper describes a method named ALGAE (Adaptive Language-Guided Abstraction from [Contrastive] Explanations) which alternates between using language models to iteratively identify human-meaningful features needed to explain demonstrated behavior, then standard inverse reinforcement learning techniques to assign weights to these features. Experiments across a variety of both simulated and real-world robot environments show that ALGAE learns generalizable reward functions defined on interpretable features using only small numbers of demonstrations. Importantly, ALGAE can recognize when features are missing, then extract and define those features without any human input -- making it possible to quickly and efficiently acquire rich representations of user behavior.

cs.RO↗

Multilevel Interpretability Of Artificial Neural Networks: Leveraging Framework And Methods From Neuroscience

As deep learning systems are scaled up to many billions of parameters, relating their internal structure to external behaviors becomes very challenging. Although daunting, this problem is not new: Neuroscientists and cognitive scientists have accumulated decades of experience analyzing a particularly complex system - the brain. In this work, we argue that interpreting both biological and artificial neural systems requires analyzing those systems at multiple levels of analysis, with different analytic tools for each level. We first lay out a joint grand challenge among scientists who study the brain and who study artificial neural networks: understanding how distributed neural mechanisms give rise to complex cognition and behavior. We then present a series of analytical tools that can be used to analyze biological and artificial neural systems, organizing those tools according to Marr's three levels of analysis: computation/behavior, algorithm/representation, and implementation. Overall, the multilevel interpretability framework provides a principled way to tackle neural system complexity; links structure, computation, and behavior; clarifies assumptions and research priorities at each level; and paves the way toward a unified effort for understanding intelligent systems, may they be biological or artificial.

cs.AI↗

Building Machines that Learn and Think with People

What do we want from machine intelligence? We envision machines that are not just tools for thought, but partners in thought: reasonable, insightful, knowledgeable, reliable, and trustworthy systems that think with us. Current artificial intelligence (AI) systems satisfy some of these criteria, some of the time. In this Perspective, we show how the science of collaborative cognition can be put to work to engineer systems that really can be called ``thought partners,'' systems built to meet our expectations and complement our limitations. We lay out several modes of collaborative thought in which humans and AI thought partners can engage and propose desiderata for human-compatible thought partnerships. Drawing on motifs from computational cognitive science, we motivate an alternative scaling path for the design of thought partners and ecosystems around their use through a Bayesian lens, whereby the partners we construct actively build and reason over models of the human and world.

cs.HC↗

Characterizing Similarities and Divergences in Conversational Tones in Humans and LLMs by Sampling with People

Conversational tones -- the manners and attitudes in which speakers communicate -- are essential to effective communication. Amidst the increasing popularization of Large Language Models (LLMs) over recent years, it becomes necessary to characterize the divergences in their conversational tones relative to humans. However, existing investigations of conversational modalities rely on pre-existing taxonomies or text corpora, which suffer from experimenter bias and may not be representative of real-world distributions for the studies' psycholinguistic domains. Inspired by methods from cognitive science, we propose an iterative method for simultaneously eliciting conversational tones and sentences, where participants alternate between two tasks: (1) one participant identifies the tone of a given sentence and (2) a different participant generates a sentence based on that tone. We run 100 iterations of this process with human participants and GPT-4, then obtain a dataset of sentences and frequent conversational tones. In an additional experiment, humans and GPT-4 annotated all sentences with all tones. With data from 1,339 human participants, 33,370 human judgments, and 29,900 GPT-4 queries, we show how our approach can be used to create an interpretable geometric representation of relations between conversational tones in humans and GPT-4. This work demonstrates how combining ideas from machine learning and cognitive science can address challenges in human-computer interactions.

cs.CL↗