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Ittay Eyal

Publications and source records attributed to Ittay Eyal.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Crypto x AI, AI x Crypto: A Survey

The intersection of crypto x AI is spawning papers, products, online posts, and companies. All the surrounding buzz, though, obscures what exactly has been done, what the opportunities and challenges are, and what open questions deserve attention. This survey paper asks what AI can do for blockchain-based technologies (broadly construed as "crypto") (crypto x AI), and vice versa (AI x crypto). We systematize existing work, summarize key takeaways, highlight open research questions, and offer a perspective on pervasive industry misconceptions, concluding that AI and crypto are still in the very early stages of meaningful integration.

cs.CR

Resilient Alerting Protocols for Blockchains

Smart contracts are stateful programs deployed on blockchains; they secure over a trillion dollars in transaction value per year. High-stakes smart contracts often rely on timely alerts about external events, but prior work has not analyzed their resilience to an attacker suppressing alerts via bribery. We formalize this challenge in a cryptoeconomic setting as the \emph{alerting problem}, giving rise to a game between a bribing adversary and~$n$ rational participants, who pay a penalty if they are caught deviating from the protocol. We establish a quadratic, i.e.,~$O(n^2)$, upper bound, whereas a straightforward alerting protocol only achieves~$O(n)$ bribery cost. We present a \emph{simultaneous game} that asymptotically achieves the quadratic upper bound and thus asymptotically-optimal bribery resistance. We then present two protocols that implement our simultaneous game: The first leverages a strong network synchrony assumption. The second relaxes this strong assumption and instead takes advantage of trusted hardware and blockchain proof-of-publication to establish a timed commitment scheme. These two protocols are constant-time but incur a linear storage overhead on the blockchain. We analyze a third, \emph{sequential alerting} protocol that optimistically incurs no on-chain storage overhead, at the expense of~$O(n)$ worst-case execution time. All three protocols achieve asymptotically-optimal bribery costs, but with different resource and performance tradeoffs. Together, they illuminate a rich design space for practical solutions to the alerting problem.

cs.CR

Time Is Money: Incentivized Causal Transaction Ordering

Front-running is a subtle and persistent problem for blockchains. A blockchain is a stateful virtual machine executing instructions called transactions. Users earn rewards by publishing functional transactions essential to the system. Attackers observe these transactions and publish their own ahead of the users', seizing the reward and eroding users' incentive to publish functional transactions. Preventing front-running means enforcing causality: If an attacker receives transaction tx_A and then publishes transaction tx_B, then tx_A must be ordered before tx_B. However, this causality is only observed by the attacker. Practical systems order transactions by bid amount, so transactions willing to pay more get executed first, but this only results in a bidding war eroding users' rewards. Though numerous ordering approaches have been proposed, none achieves causality, leaving users vulnerable to front-running. We present PRECEDE, a mechanism-design approach that enforces transaction causality by removing the economic incentive to front-run. PRECEDE orders transactions by a power-weighted randomized lottery, whose winning probability grows super-linearly in the bid. The user's strategy of publishing a transaction with a deterring bid forms an equilibrium where the attacker refrains from competing. Moreover, PRECEDE prevents the prominent sandwich attack, which relies on front-running. PRECEDE can be directly deployed in any censorship-resistant blockchain with a simple change to its transaction ordering mechanism.

cs.CR

Fast Deterministically Safe Proof-of-Work Consensus

Permissionless blockchains achieve consensus while allowing unknown nodes to join and leave the system at any time. They typically come in two flavors: proof of work (PoW) and proof of stake (PoS), and both are vulnerable to attacks. PoS protocols suffer from long-range attacks, wherein attackers alter execution history at little cost, and PoW protocols are vulnerable to attackers with enough computational power to subvert execution history. PoS protocols respond by relying on external mechanisms like social consensus; PoW protocols either fall back to probabilistic guarantees, or are slow. We present Sieve-MMR, the first fully-permissionless protocol with deterministic security and constant expected latency that does not rely on external mechanisms. We obtain Sieve-MMR by porting a PoS protocol (MMR) to the PoW setting. From MMR we inherit constant expected latency and deterministic security, and proof-of-work gives us resilience against long-range attacks. The main challenge to porting MMR to the PoW setting is what we call time-travel attacks, where attackers use PoWs generated in the distant past to increase their perceived PoW power in the present. We respond by proposing Sieve, a novel algorithm that implements a new broadcast primitive we dub time-travel-resilient broadcast (TTRB). Sieve relies on a black-box, deterministic PoW primitive to implement TTRB, which we use as the messaging layer for MMR.

cs.CR

Prrr: Personal Random Rewards for Blockchain Reporting

Smart contracts, the stateful programs running on blockchains, often rely on reports. Publishers are paid to publish these reports on the blockchain. Designing protocols that incentivize timely reporting is the prevalent reporting problem. But existing solutions face a security-performance trade-off: Relying on a small set of trusted publishers introduces centralization risks, while allowing open publication results in an excessive number of reports on the blockchain. We identify the root cause of this trade-off to be the standard symmetric reward design, which treats all reports equally. We prove that no symmetric-reward mechanism can overcome the trade-off. We present Personal Random Rewards for Reporting (Prrr), a protocol that assigns random heterogeneous values to reports. We call this novel mechanism-design concept Ex-Ante Synthetic Asymmetry. To the best of our knowledge, Prrr is the first game-theoretic mechanism (in any context) that deliberately forms participant asymmetry. Prrr employs a second-price-style settlement to allocate rewards, ensuring incentive compatibility and achieving both security and efficiency. Following the protocol constitutes a Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium, robust against collusion and Sybil attacks. Prrr is applicable to numerous smart contracts that rely on timely reports.

cs.CR

MAD-DAG: Protecting Blockchain Consensus from MEV

Blockchain security is threatened by selfish mining, where a miner (operator) deviates from the protocol to increase their revenue. Selfish mining is exacerbated by adverse conditions: rushing (network propagation advantage for the selfish miner), varying block rewards due to block contents, called miner extractable value (MEV), and petty-compliant miners who accept bribes from the selfish miner. The state-of-the-art selfish-mining-resistant blockchain protocol, Colordag, does not treat these adverse conditions and was proven secure only when its latency is impractically high. We present MAD-DAG, Mutually-Assured-Destruction Directed-Acyclic-Graph, the first practical protocol to counter selfish mining under adverse conditions. MAD-DAG achieves this thanks to its novel ledger function, which discards the contents of equal-length chains competing to be the longest. We analyze selfish mining in both Colordag and MAD-DAG by modeling a rational miner using a Markov Decision Process (MDP). We obtain a tractable model for both by developing conservative reward rules that favor the selfish miner to yield an upper bound on selfish mining revenue. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first tractable model of selfish mining in a practical DAG-based blockchain. This enables us to obtain a lower bound on the security threshold, the minimum fraction of computational power a miner needs in order to profit from selfish mining. MAD-DAG withstands adverse conditions under which Colordag and Bitcoin fail, while otherwise maintaining comparable security. For example, with petty-compliant miners and high levels of block reward variability, MAD-DAG's security threshold ranges from 11% to 31%, whereas both Colordag and Bitcoin achieve 0% for all levels.

cs.CR

Elastic Restaking Networks

Many blockchain-based decentralized services require their validators (operators) to deposit stake (collateral), which is forfeited (slashed) if they misbehave. Restaking networks let validators secure multiple services by reusing stake. These networks have quickly gained traction, leveraging over \$20 billion in stake. However, restaking introduces a new attack vector where validators can coordinate to misbehave across multiple services simultaneously, extracting digital assets while forfeiting their stake only once. Previous work focused either on preventing coordinated misbehavior or on protecting services if all other services are Byzantine and might unjustly cause slashing due to bugs or malice. The first model overlooks how a single Byzantine service can collapse the network, while the second ignores shared-stake benefits. To bridge the gap, we analyze the system as a strategic game of coordinated misbehavior, when a given fraction of the services are Byzantine. We introduce elastic restaking networks, where validators can allocate portions of their stake that may cumulatively exceed their total stake, and when allocations are lost, the remaining stake stretches to cover remaining allocations. We show that elastic networks exhibit superior robustness compared to previous approaches, and demonstrate a synergistic effect where an elastic restaking network enhances its blockchain's security, contrary to community concerns of an opposite effect in existing networks. We then design incentives for tuning validators' allocations. Our elastic restaking system and incentive design have immediate practical implications for deployed restaking networks.

cs.GT

SAMM: Sharded Automated Market Maker

Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are a cornerstone of decentralized finance. They are smart contracts (stateful programs) running on blockchains. They enable virtual token exchange: traders swap tokens with the AMM for a fee, while liquidity providers supply liquidity and receive these fees. Demand for AMMs is growing rapidly, but our experiment-based estimates show that current architectures cannot meet the projected demand by 2029. This is because the execution of existing AMMs is non-parallelizable. We present SAMM, an AMM comprising multiple shards. All shards are AMMs running on the same chain, but their independence enables parallel execution. The security of SAMM, unlike in classical sharding solutions, relies on incentive compatibility. Therefore, SAMM introduces a novel fee design. Through analysis of Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE), we show that SAMM incentivizes the desired behavior: liquidity providers balance liquidity among all shards, overcoming destabilization attacks, and trades are evenly distributed. We validate our game-theoretic analysis with a simulation using real-world data. We evaluate SAMM by implementing and deploying it on local testnets of the Sui and Solana blockchains. To our knowledge, this is the first quantification of high-demand-contract performance. SAMM improves throughput by 5x and 16x, respectively, potentially more with better parallelization of the underlying blockchains. It is directly deployable, mitigating the upcoming scaling bottleneck.

cs.DC

Aegis: Tethering a Blockchain with Primary-Chain Stake

Blockchains implement decentralized monetary systems and applications. Recent advancements enable what we call tethering a blockchain to a primary blockchain, securing the tethered chain by nodes that post primary-chain tokens as collateral. The collateral ensures nodes behave as intended, until they withdraw it. Unlike a Proof of Stake blockchain which uses its own token as collateral, using primary-chain tokens shields the tethered chain from the volatility of its own token. State-of-the-art tethered blockchains either rely on centralization, or make extreme assumptions: that all communication is synchronous, that operators remain correct even post-withdrawal, or that withdrawals can be indefinitely delayed by tethered-chain failures. We prove that with partial synchrony, there is no solution to the problem. However, under the standard assumptions that communication with the primary chain is synchronous and communication among the tethered chain nodes is partially synchronous, there is a solution. We present a tethered-chain protocol called Aegis. Aegis uses references from its blocks to primary blocks to define committees, checkpoints on the primary chain to perpetuate decisions, and resets to establish new committees when previous ones become obsolete. It ensures safety at all times and rapid progress when latency among Aegis nodes is low.

cs.DC

Leveraging Bitcoin Mining Machines in Demand-Response Mechanisms to Mitigate Ramping-Induced Transients

We propose an extended demand response program, based on ancillary service for supplying flexible electricity demand. In our proposed scheme, we suggest a broader management model to control the scheduling and power consumption of Bitcoin mining machines. The main aspect that we focus on is suppressing the power ramping and related transient effects. We extend previous works on the subject, that study the impact of incorporating cryptocurrency mining machines into existing power grid, and explore the potential profit of exploiting this flexible load in the Israeli electricity market. We analyze a trend based on historical data, of increasing electricity prices and ramping costs due to the increasing penetration of renewable energy sources. We suggest an extension to the unit commitment problem from which we obtain the scheduling scheme of the Bitcoin mining machines. We use simulation and the real-world data acquired from the "Noga" grid operator to verify the proposed ancillary service and test its practical limits for reducing the ramping costs, under changing ratio of energy production from renewable sources. Out results suggests that the machine price and ratio of production from renewable sources plays a significant role in determining the profitability of the proposed demand-response program.

eess.SY

Asynchronous Authentication

A myriad of authentication mechanisms embody a continuous evolution from verbal passwords in ancient times to contemporary multi-factor authentication. Nevertheless, digital asset heists and numerous identity theft cases illustrate the urgent need to revisit the fundamentals of user authentication. We abstract away credential details and formalize the general, common case of asynchronous authentication, with unbounded message propagation time. Our model, which might be of independent interest, allows for eventual message delivery, while bounding execution time to maintain cryptographic guarantees. Given credentials' fault probabilities (e.g., loss or leak), we seek mechanisms with the highest success probability. We show that every mechanism is dominated by some Boolean mechanism -- defined by a monotonic Boolean function on presented credentials. We present an algorithm for finding approximately optimal mechanisms. Previous work analyzed Boolean mechanisms specifically, but used brute force, which quickly becomes prohibitively complex. We leverage the problem structure to reduce complexity by orders of magnitude. The algorithm is readily applicable to practical settings. For example, we revisit the common approach in cryptocurrency wallets that use a handful of high-quality credentials. We show that adding low-quality credentials improves security by orders of magnitude.

cs.CR

Gorilla: Safe Permissionless Byzantine Consensus

Nakamoto's consensus protocol works in a permissionless model and tolerates Byzantine failures, but only offers probabilistic agreement. Recently, the Sandglass protocol has shown such weaker guarantees are not a necessary consequence of a permissionless model; yet, Sandglass only tolerates benign failures, and operates in an unconventional partially synchronous model. We present Gorilla Sandglass, the first Byzantine tolerant consensus protocol to guarantee, in the same synchronous model adopted by Nakamoto, deterministic agreement and termination with probability 1 in a permissionless setting. We prove the correctness of Gorilla by mapping executions that would violate agreement or termination in Gorilla to executions in Sandglass, where we know such violations are impossible. Establishing termination proves particularly interesting, as the mapping requires reasoning about infinite executions and their probabilities.

cs.DC

Colordag: An Incentive-Compatible Blockchain

We present Colordag, a blockchain protocol where following the prescribed strategy is, with high probability, a best response as long as all miners have less than 1/2 of the mining power. We prove the correctness of Colordag even if there is an extremely powerful adversary who knows future actions of the scheduler: specifically, when agents will generate blocks and when messages will arrive. The state-of-the-art protocol, Fruitchain, is an epsilon-Nash equilibrium as long as all miners have less than 1/2 of the mining power. However, there is a simple deviation that guarantees that deviators are never worse off than they would be by following Fruitchain, and can sometimes do better. Thus, agents are motivated to deviate. Colordag implements a solution concept that we call epsilon-sure Nash equilibrium and does not suffer from this problem. Because it is an epsilon-sure Nash equilibrium, Colordag is an epsilon Nash equilibrium and with probability (1 - epsilon) is a best response.

cs.GT

Tuning PoW with Hybrid Expenditure

Proof of Work (PoW) is a Sybil-deterrence security mechanism. It introduces an external cost to a system by requiring computational effort to perform actions. However, since its inception, a central challenge was to tune this cost. Initial designs for deterring spam email and DoS attacks applied overhead equally to honest participants and attackers. Requiring too little effort did not deter attacks, whereas too much encumbered honest participation. This might be the reason it was never widely adopted. Nakamoto overcame this trade-off in Bitcoin by distinguishing desired from malicious behavior and introducing internal rewards for the former. This solution gained popularity in securing cryptocurrencies and using the virtual internally-minted tokens for rewards. However, in existing blockchain protocols the internal rewards fund (almost) the same value of external expenses. Thus, as the token value soars, so does the PoW expenditure. Bitcoin PoW, for example, already expends as much electricity as Colombia or Switzerland. This amount of resource-guzzling is unsustainable and hinders even wider adoption of these systems. In this work we present Hybrid Expenditure Blockchain (HEB), a novel PoW mechanism. HEB is a generalization of Nakamoto's protocol that enables tuning the external expenditure by introducing a complementary internal-expenditure mechanism. Thus, for the first time, HEB decouples external expenditure from the reward value. We show a practical parameter choice by which HEB requires significantly less external consumption compare to Nakamoto's protocol, its resilience against rational attackers is similar, and it retains the decentralized and permissionless nature of the system. Taking the Bitcoin ecosystem as an example, HEB cuts the electricity consumption by half.

cs.CR

Phoenix: A Formally Verified Regenerating Vault

An attacker that gains access to a cryptocurrency user's private keys can perform any operation in her stead. Due to the decentralized nature of most cryptocurrencies, no entity can revert those operations. This is a central challenge for decentralized systems, illustrated by numerous high-profile heists. Vault contracts reduce this risk by introducing artificial delay on operations, allowing abortion by the contract owner during the delay. However, the theft of a key still renders the vault unusable and puts funds at risk. We introduce Phoenix, a novel contract architecture that allows the user to restore its security properties after key loss. Phoenix takes advantage of users' ability to store keys in easily-available but less secure storage (tier-two) as well as more secure storage that is harder to access (tier-one). Unlike previous solutions, the user can restore Phoenix security after the theft of tier-two keys and does not lose funds despite losing keys in either tier. Phoenix also introduces a mechanism to reduce the damage an attacker can cause in case of a tier-one compromise. We formally specify Phoenix's required behavior and provide a prototype implementation of Phoenix as an Ethereum contract. Since such an implementation is highly sensitive and vulnerable to subtle bugs, we apply a formal verification tool to prove specific code properties and identify faults. We highlight a bug identified by the tool that could be exploited by an attacker to compromise Phoenix. After fixing the bug, the tool proved the low-level executable code's correctness.

cs.CR

MAD-HTLC: Because HTLC is Crazy-Cheap to Attack

Smart Contracts and transactions allow users to implement elaborate constructions on cryptocurrency blockchains like Bitcoin and Ethereum. Many of these constructions, including operational payment channels and atomic swaps, use a building block called Hashed Time-Locked Contract (HTLC). In this work, we distill from HTLC a specification (HTLC-Spec), and present an implementation called Mutual-Assured-Destruction Hashed Time-Locked Contract (MAD-HTLC). MAD-HTLC employs a novel approach of utilizing the existing blockchain operators, called miners, as part of the design. If a user misbehaves, MAD-HTLC incentivizes the miners to confiscate all her funds. We prove MAD-HTLC's security using the UC framework and game-theoretic analysis. We demonstrate MAD-HTLC's efficacy and analyze its overhead by instantiating it on Bitcoin's and Ethereum's operational blockchains. Notably, current miner software makes only little effort to optimize revenue, since the advantage is relatively small. However, as the demand grows and other revenue components shrink, miners are more motivated to fully optimize their fund intake. By patching the standard Bitcoin client, we demonstrate such optimization is easy to implement, making the miners natural enforcers of MAD-HTLC. Finally, we extend previous results regarding HTLC vulnerability to bribery attacks. An attacker can incentivize miners to prefer her transactions by offering high transaction fees. We demonstrate this attack can be easily implemented by patching the Bitcoin client, and use game-theoretic tools to qualitatively tighten the known cost bound of such bribery attacks in presence of rational miners. We identify bribe opportunities occurring on the Bitcoin and Ethereum main networks where a few dollars bribe could yield tens of thousands of dollars in reward (e.g., \$2 for over \$25K).

cs.CR

BDoS: Blockchain Denial of Service

Proof-of-work (PoW) cryptocurrency blockchains like Bitcoin secure vast amounts of money. Their operators, called miners, expend resources to generate blocks and receive monetary rewards for their effort. Blockchains are, in principle, attractive targets for Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks: There is fierce competition among coins, as well as potential gains from short selling. Classical DoS attacks, however, typically target a few servers and cannot scale to systems with many nodes. There have been no successful DoS attacks to date against prominent cryptocurrencies. We present Blockchain DoS (BDoS), the first incentive-based DoS attack that targets PoW cryptocurrencies. Unlike classical DoS, BDoS targets the system's mechanism design: It exploits the reward mechanism to discourage miner participation. Previous DoS attacks against PoW blockchains require an adversary's mining power to match that of all other miners. In contrast, BDoS can cause a blockchain to grind to a halt with significantly fewer resources, e.g., 21% as of March 2020 in Bitcoin, according to our empirical study. We find that Bitcoin's vulnerability to BDoS increases rapidly as the mining industry matures and profitability drops. BDoS differs from known attacks like Selfish Mining in its aim not to increase an adversary's revenue, but to disrupt the system. Although it bears some algorithmic similarity to those attacks, it introduces a new adversarial model, goals, algorithm, and game-theoretic analysis. Beyond its direct implications for operational blockchains, BDoS introduces the novel idea that an adversary can manipulate miners' incentives by proving the existence of blocks without actually publishing them.

cs.CR

Ostraka: Secure Blockchain Scaling by Node Sharding

Cryptocurrencies, implemented with blockchain protocols, promise to become a global payment system if they can overcome performance limitations. Rapidly advancing architectures improve on latency and throughput, but most require all participating servers to process all transactions. Several recent works propose to shard the system, such that each machine would only process a subset of the transactions. However, we identify a denial-of-service attack that is exposed by these solutions - an attacker can generate transactions that would overload a single shard, thus delaying processing in the entire system. Moreover, we show that in common scenarios, these protocols require most node operators to process almost all blockchain transactions. We present Ostraka, a blockchain node architecture that shards (parallelizes) the nodes themselves. We prove that replacing a unified node with an Ostraka node does not affect the security of the underlying consensus mechanism. We evaluate analytically and experimentally block propagation and processing in various settings. Ostraka allows nodes in the network to scale, without costly coordination. In our experiments, Ostraka nodes' transaction processing rate grows linearly with the addition of resources.

cs.DC