arXiv subjects

Ittay Eyal

Publications and source records attributed to Ittay Eyal.

28 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2020

Efficient MDP Analysis for Selfish-Mining in Blockchains

A proof of work (PoW) blockchain protocol distributes rewards to its participants, called miners, according to their share of the total computational power. Sufficiently large miners can perform selfish mining - deviate from the protocol to gain more than their fair share. Such systems are thus secure if all miners are smaller than a threshold size so their best response is following the protocol. To find the threshold, one has to identify the optimal strategy for miners of different sizes, i.e., solve a Markov Decision Process (MDP). However, because of the PoW difficulty adjustment mechanism, the miners' utility is a non-linear ratio function. We therefore call this an Average Reward Ratio (ARR) MDP. Sapirshtein et al.\ were the first to solve ARR MDPs by solving a series of standard MDPs that converge to the ARR MDP solution. In this work, we present a novel technique for solving an ARR MDP by solving a single standard MDP. The crux of our approach is to augment the MDP such that it terminates randomly, within an expected number of rounds. We call this Probabilistic Termination Optimization (PTO), and the technique applies to any MDP whose utility is a ratio function. We bound the approximation error of PTO - it is inversely proportional to the expected number of rounds before termination, a parameter that we control. Empirically, PTO's complexity is an order of magnitude lower than the state of the art. PTO can be easily applied to different blockchains. We use it to tighten the bound on the threshold for selfish mining in Ethereum.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2020

Multi-Party Timed Commitments

The problem of obtaining secret commitments from multiple parties and revealing them after a certain time is useful for sealed-bid auctions, games, and other applications. Existing solutions, dating back to Rivest, Shamir and Wagner, either do not scale or rely on synchrony for the commitment phase and trust of $t/n$ parties. We formalize the problem of implementing such commitments with a probabilistic delay and without the aforementioned assumptions as Multi-Party Timed Commitments (MPTC) and present a solution -- the Time-Capsule protocol. Like previous approaches, Time Capsule forms a puzzle whose solution reveals the committed values. But unlike previous solutions, no party has an advantage in solving the puzzle, and individual commitments cannot be revealed before the entire set is committed. A particular application of MPTC realizes an advancement in the study of decentralized systems. The state of the art in decentralized systems is manifested in blockchain systems that utilize Proof of Work to achieve censorship resistance. However, they are still vulnerable to frontrunning, an issue that is plaguing operational systems. By adapting Time Capsule, we allow it to be used for Proof of Work, preventing frontrunning by system operators and tuning the puzzle difficulty using the blockchain mechanism.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2019

Teechain: A Secure Payment Network with Asynchronous Blockchain Access

Blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum execute payment transactions securely, but their performance is limited by the need for global consensus. Payment networks overcome this limitation through off-chain transactions. Instead of writing to the blockchain for each transaction, they only settle the final payment balances with the underlying blockchain. When executing off-chain transactions in current payment networks, parties must access the blockchain within bounded time to detect misbehaving parties that deviate from the protocol. This opens a window for attacks in which a malicious party can steal funds by deliberately delaying other parties' blockchain access and prevents parties from using payment networks when disconnected from the blockchain. We present Teechain, the first layer-two payment network that executes off-chain transactions asynchronously with respect to the underlying blockchain. To prevent parties from misbehaving, Teechain uses treasuries, protected by hardware trusted execution environments (TEEs), to establish off-chain payment channels between parties. Treasuries maintain collateral funds and can exchange transactions efficiently and securely, without interacting with the underlying blockchain. To mitigate against treasury failures and to avoid having to trust all TEEs, Teechain replicates the state of treasuries using committee chains, a new variant of chain replication with threshold secret sharing. Teechain achieves at least a 33x higher transaction throughput than the state-of-the-art Lightning payment network. A 30-machine Teechain deployment can handle over 1 million Bitcoin transactions per second.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2018

The Gap Game

Blockchain-based cryptocurrencies secure a decentralized consensus protocol by incentives. The protocol participants, called miners, generate (mine) a series of blocks, each containing monetary transactions created by system users. As incentive for participation, miners receive newly minted currency and transaction fees paid by transaction creators. Blockchain bandwidth limits lead users to pay increasing fees in order to prioritize their transactions. However, most prior work focused on models where fees are negligible. In a notable exception, Carlsten et al. postulated in CCS'16 that if incentives come only from fees then a mining gap would form~--- miners would avoid mining when the available fees are insufficient. In this work, we analyze cryptocurrency security in realistic settings, taking into account all elements of expenses and rewards. To study when gaps form, we analyze the system as a game we call \emph{the gap game}. We analyze the game with a combination of symbolic and numeric analysis tools in a wide range of scenarios. Our analysis confirms Carlsten et al.'s postulate; indeed, we show that gaps form well before fees are the only incentive, and analyze the implications on security. Perhaps surprisingly, we show that different miners choose different gap sizes to optimize their utility, even when their operating costs are identical. Alarmingly, we see that the system incentivizes large miner coalitions, reducing system decentralization. We describe the required conditions to avoid the incentive misalignment, providing guidelines for future cryptocurrency design.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2018

Decentralization in Bitcoin and Ethereum Networks

Blockchain-based cryptocurrencies have demonstrated how to securely implement traditionally centralized systems, such as currencies, in a decentralized fashion. However, there have been few measurement studies on the level of decentralization they achieve in practice. We present a measurement study on various decentralization metrics of two of the leading cryptocurrencies with the largest market capitalization and user base, Bitcoin and Ethereum. We investigate the extent of decentralization by measuring the network resources of nodes and the interconnection among them, the protocol requirements affecting the operation of nodes, and the robustness of the two systems against attacks. In particular, we adapted existing internet measurement techniques and used the Falcon Relay Network as a novel measurement tool to obtain our data. We discovered that neither Bitcoin nor Ethereum has strictly better properties than the other. We also provide concrete suggestions for improving both systems.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2017

Teechan: Payment Channels Using Trusted Execution Environments

Blockchain protocols are inherently limited in transaction throughput and latency. Recent efforts to address performance and scale blockchains have focused on off-chain payment channels. While such channels can achieve low latency and high throughput, deploying them securely on top of the Bitcoin blockchain has been difficult, partly because building a secure implementation requires changes to the underlying protocol and the ecosystem. We present Teechan, a full-duplex payment channel framework that exploits trusted execution environments. Teechan can be deployed securely on the existing Bitcoin blockchain without having to modify the protocol. It: (i) achieves a higher transaction throughput and lower transaction latency than prior solutions; (ii) enables unlimited full-duplex payments as long as the balance does not exceed the channel's credit; (iii) requires only a single message to be sent per payment in any direction; and (iv) places at most two transactions on the blockchain under any execution scenario. We have built and deployed the Teechan framework using Intel SGX on the Bitcoin network. Our experiments show that, not counting network latencies, Teechan can achieve 2,480 transactions per second on a single channel, with sub-millisecond latencies.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2015

Bitcoin-NG: A Scalable Blockchain Protocol

Cryptocurrencies, based on and led by Bitcoin, have shown promise as infrastructure for pseudonymous online payments, cheap remittance, trustless digital asset exchange, and smart contracts. However, Bitcoin-derived blockchain protocols have inherent scalability limits that trade-off between throughput and latency and withhold the realization of this potential. This paper presents Bitcoin-NG, a new blockchain protocol designed to scale. Based on Bitcoin's blockchain protocol, Bitcoin-NG is Byzantine fault tolerant, is robust to extreme churn, and shares the same trust model obviating qualitative changes to the ecosystem. In addition to Bitcoin-NG, we introduce several novel metrics of interest in quantifying the security and efficiency of Bitcoin-like blockchain protocols. We implement Bitcoin-NG and perform large-scale experiments at 15% the size of the operational Bitcoin system, using unchanged clients of both protocols. These experiments demonstrate that Bitcoin-NG scales optimally, with bandwidth limited only by the capacity of the individual nodes and latency limited only by the propagation time of the network.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2015

Cache Serializability: Reducing Inconsistency in Edge Transactions

Read-only caches are widely used in cloud infrastructures to reduce access latency and load on backend databases. Operators view coherent caches as impractical at genuinely large scale and many client-facing caches are updated in an asynchronous manner with best-effort pipelines. Existing solutions that support cache consistency are inapplicable to this scenario since they require a round trip to the database on every cache transaction. Existing incoherent cache technologies are oblivious to transactional data access, even if the backend database supports transactions. We propose T-Cache, a novel caching policy for read-only transactions in which inconsistency is tolerable (won't cause safety violations) but undesirable (has a cost). T-Cache improves cache consistency despite asynchronous and unreliable communication between the cache and the database. We define cache-serializability, a variant of serializability that is suitable for incoherent caches, and prove that with unbounded resources T-Cache implements this new specification. With limited resources, T-Cache allows the system manager to choose a trade-off between performance and consistency. Our evaluation shows that T-Cache detects many inconsistencies with only nominal overhead. We use synthetic workloads to demonstrate the efficacy of T-Cache when data accesses are clustered and its adaptive reaction to workload changes. With workloads based on the real-world topologies, T-Cache detects 43-70% of the inconsistencies and increases the rate of consistent transactions by 33-58%.

cs.DC↗

arXiv2014

The Miner's Dilemma

An open distributed system can be secured by requiring participants to present proof of work and rewarding them for participation. The Bitcoin digital currency introduced this mechanism, which is adopted by almost all contemporary digital currencies and related services. A natural process leads participants of such systems to form pools, where members aggregate their power and share the rewards. Experience with Bitcoin shows that the largest pools are often open, allowing anyone to join. It has long been known that a member can sabotage an open pool by seemingly joining it but never sharing its proofs of work. The pool shares its revenue with the attacker, and so each of its participants earns less. We define and analyze a game where pools use some of their participants to infiltrate other pools and perform such an attack. With any number of pools, no-pool-attacks is not a Nash equilibrium. With two pools, or any number of identical pools, there exists an equilibrium that constitutes a tragedy of the commons where the pools attack one another and all earn less than they would have if none had attacked. For two pools, the decision whether or not to attack is the miner's dilemma, an instance of the iterative prisoner's dilemma. The game is played daily by the active Bitcoin pools, which apparently choose not to attack. If this balance breaks, the revenue of open pools might diminish, making them unattractive to participants.

cs.CR↗

arXiv2013

Majority is not Enough: Bitcoin Mining is Vulnerable

The Bitcoin cryptocurrency records its transactions in a public log called the blockchain. Its security rests critically on the distributed protocol that maintains the blockchain, run by participants called miners. Conventional wisdom asserts that the protocol is incentive-compatible and secure against colluding minority groups, i.e., it incentivizes miners to follow the protocol as prescribed. We show that the Bitcoin protocol is not incentive-compatible. We present an attack with which colluding miners obtain a revenue larger than their fair share. This attack can have significant consequences for Bitcoin: Rational miners will prefer to join the selfish miners, and the colluding group will increase in size until it becomes a majority. At this point, the Bitcoin system ceases to be a decentralized currency. Selfish mining is feasible for any group size of colluding miners. We propose a practical modification to the Bitcoin protocol that protects against selfish mining pools that command less than 1/4 of the resources. This threshold is lower than the wrongly assumed 1/2 bound, but better than the current reality where a group of any size can compromise the system.

cs.CR↗