arXiv subjects

J. Doyne Farmer

Publications and source records attributed to J. Doyne Farmer.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

arXiv2020

Automation and occupational mobility: A data-driven network model

The potential impact of automation on the labor market is a topic that has generated significant interest and concern amongst scholars, policymakers, and the broader public. A number of studies have estimated occupation-specific risk profiles by examining the automatability of associated skills and tasks. However, relatively little work has sought to take a more holistic view on the process of labor reallocation and how employment prospects are impacted as displaced workers transition into new jobs. In this paper, we develop a new data-driven model to analyze how workers move through an empirically derived occupational mobility network in response to automation scenarios which increase labor demand for some occupations and decrease it for others. At the macro level, our model reproduces a key stylized fact in the labor market known as the Beveridge curve and provides new insights for explaining the curve's counter-clockwise cyclicality. At the micro level, our model provides occupation-specific estimates of changes in short and long-term unemployment corresponding to a given automation shock. We find that the network structure plays an important role in determining unemployment levels, with occupations in particular areas of the network having very few job transition opportunities. Such insights could be fruitfully applied to help design more efficient and effective policies aimed at helping workers adapt to the changing nature of the labor market.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2019

A simulation of the insurance industry: The problem of risk model homogeneity

We develop an agent-based simulation of the catastrophe insurance and reinsurance industry and use it to study the problem of risk model homogeneity. The model simulates the balance sheets of insurance firms, who collect premiums from clients in return for ensuring them against intermittent, heavy-tailed risks. Firms manage their capital and pay dividends to their investors, and use either reinsurance contracts or cat bonds to hedge their tail risk. The model generates plausible time series of profits and losses and recovers stylized facts, such as the insurance cycle and the emergence of asymmetric, long tailed firm size distributions. We use the model to investigate the problem of risk model homogeneity. Under Solvency II, insurance companies are required to use only certified risk models. This has led to a situation in which only a few firms provide risk models, creating a systemic fragility to the errors in these models. We demonstrate that using too few models increases the risk of nonpayment and default while lowering profits for the industry as a whole. The presence of the reinsurance industry ameliorates the problem but does not remove it. Our results suggest that it would be valuable for regulators to incentivize model diversity. The framework we develop here provides a first step toward a simulation model of the insurance industry for testing policies and strategies for better capital management.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2019

Emergent inequality and endogenous dynamics in a simple behavioral macroeconomic model

Standard macroeconomic models assume that households are rational in the sense that they are perfect utility maximizers, and explain economic dynamics in terms of shocks that drive the economy away from the stead-state. Here we build on a standard macroeconomic model in which a single rational representative household makes a savings decision of how much to consume or invest. In our model households are myopic boundedly rational heterogeneous agents embedded in a social network. From time to time each household updates its savings rate by copying the savings rate of its neighbor with the highest consumption. If the updating time is short, the economy is stuck in a poverty trap, but for longer updating times economic output approaches its optimal value, and we observe a critical transition to an economy with irregular endogenous oscillations in economic output, resembling a business cycle. In this regime households divide into two groups: Poor households with low savings rates and rich households with high savings rates. Thus inequality and economic dynamics both occur spontaneously as a consequence of imperfect household decision making. Our work here supports an alternative program of research that substitutes utility maximization for behaviorally grounded decision making.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2018

Interpreting Economic Complexity

Two network measures known as the Economic Complexity Index (ECI) and Product Complexity Index (PCI) have provided important insights into patterns of economic development. We show that the ECI and PCI are equivalent to a spectral clustering algorithm that partitions a similarity graph into two parts. The measures are also related to various dimensionality reduction methods and can be interpreted as vectors that determine distances between nodes based on their similarity. Our results shed a new light on the ECI's empirical success in explaining cross-country differences in GDP/capita and economic growth, which is often linked to the diversity of country export baskets. In fact, countries with high (low) ECI tend to specialize in high (low) PCI products. We also find that the ECI and PCI uncover economically informative specialization patterns across US states and UK regions.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2018

Wright meets Markowitz: How standard portfolio theory changes when assets are technologies following experience curves

We consider how to optimally allocate investments in a portfolio of competing technologies using the standard mean-variance framework of portfolio theory. We assume that technologies follow the empirically observed relationship known as Wright's law, also called a "learning curve" or "experience curve", which postulates that costs drop as cumulative production increases. This introduces a positive feedback between cost and investment that complicates the portfolio problem, leading to multiple local optima, and causing a trade-off between concentrating investments in one project to spur rapid progress vs. diversifying over many projects to hedge against failure. We study the two-technology case and characterize the optimal diversification in terms of progress rates, variability, initial costs, initial experience, risk aversion, discount rate and total demand. The efficient frontier framework is used to visualize technology portfolios and show how feedback results in nonlinear distortions of the feasible set. For the two-period case, in which learning and uncertainty interact with discounting, we compare different scenarios and find that the discount rate plays a critical role.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2017

How well do experience curves predict technological progress? A method for making distributional forecasts

Experience curves are widely used to predict the cost benefits of increasing the deployment of a technology. But how good are such forecasts? Can one predict their accuracy a priori? In this paper we answer these questions by developing a method to make distributional forecasts for experience curves. We test our method using a dataset with proxies for cost and experience for 51 products and technologies and show that it works reasonably well. The framework that we develop helps clarify why the experience curve method often gives similar results to simply assuming that costs decrease exponentially. To illustrate our method we make a distributional forecast for prices of solar photovoltaic modules.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2016

The prevalence of chaotic dynamics in games with many players

We study adaptive learning in a typical p-player game. The payoffs of the games are randomly generated and then held fixed. The strategies of the players evolve through time as the players learn. The trajectories in the strategy space display a range of qualitatively different behaviors, with attractors that include unique fixed points, multiple fixed points, limit cycles and chaos. In the limit where the game is complicated, in the sense that the players can take many possible actions, we use a generating-functional approach to establish the parameter range in which learning dynamics converge to a stable fixed point. The size of this region goes to zero as the number of players goes to infinity, suggesting that complex non-equilibrium behavior, exemplified by chaos, may be the norm for complicated games with many players.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2015

How predictable is technological progress?

Recently it has become clear that many technologies follow a generalized version of Moore's law, i.e. costs tend to drop exponentially, at different rates that depend on the technology. Here we formulate Moore's law as a correlated geometric random walk with drift, and apply it to historical data on 53 technologies. We derive a closed form expression approximating the distribution of forecast errors as a function of time. Based on hind-casting experiments we show that this works well, making it possible to collapse the forecast errors for many different technologies at different time horizons onto the same universal distribution. This is valuable because it allows us to make forecasts for any given technology with a clear understanding of the quality of the forecasts. As a practical demonstration we make distributional forecasts at different time horizons for solar photovoltaic modules, and show how our method can be used to estimate the probability that a given technology will outperform another technology at a given point in the future.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2015

Taming the Basel Leverage Cycle

Effective risk control must make a tradeoff between the microprudential risk of exogenous shocks to individual institutions and the macroprudential risks caused by their systemic interactions. We investigate a simple dynamical model for understanding this tradeoff, consisting of a bank with a leverage target and an unleveraged fundamental investor subject to exogenous noise with clustered volatility. The parameter space has three regions: (i) a stable region, where the system always reaches a fixed point equilibrium; (ii) a locally unstable region, characterized by cycles and chaotic behavior; and (iii) a globally unstable region. A crude calibration of parameters to data puts the model in region (ii). In this region there is a slowly building price bubble, resembling a "Great Moderation", followed by a crash, with a period of approximately 10-15 years, which we dub the "Basel leverage cycle". We propose a criterion for rating macroprudential policies based on their ability to minimize risk for a given average leverage. We construct a one parameter family of leverage policies that allows us to vary from the procyclical policies of Basel II or III, in which leverage decreases when volatility increases, to countercyclical policies in which leverage increases when volatility increases. We find the best policy depends critically on three parameters: The average leverage used by the bank; the relative size of the bank and the fundamentalist, and the amplitude of the exogenous noise. Basel II is optimal when the exogenous noise is high, the bank is small and leverage is low; in the opposite limit where the bank is large or leverage is high the optimal policy is closer to constant leverage. We also find that systemic risk can be dramatically decreased by lowering the leverage target adjustment speed of the banks.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2015

The Intrafirm Complexity of Systemically Important Financial Institutions

In November, 2011, the Financial Stability Board, in collaboration with the International Monetary Fund, published a list of 29 "systemically important financial institutions" (SIFIs). This designation reflects a concern that the failure of any one of them could have dramatic negative consequences for the global economy and is based on "their size, complexity, and systemic interconnectedness". While the characteristics of "size" and "systemic interconnectedness" have been the subject of a good deal of quantitative analysis, less attention has been paid to measures of a firm's "complexity." In this paper we take on the challenges of measuring the complexity of a financial institution and to that end explore the use of the structure of an individual firm's control hierarchy as a proxy for institutional complexity. The control hierarchy is a network representation of the institution and its subsidiaries. We show that this mathematical representation (and various associated metrics) provides a consistent way to compare the complexity of firms with often very disparate business models and as such may provide the foundation for determining a SIFI designation. By quantifying the level of complexity of a firm, our approach also may prove useful should firms need to reduce their level of complexity either in response to business or regulatory needs. Using a data set containing the control hierarchies of many of the designated SIFIs, we find that in the past two years, these firms have decreased their level of complexity, perhaps in response to regulatory requirements.

q-fin.GN↗

arXiv2014

Beyond the square root: Evidence for logarithmic dependence of market impact on size and participation rate

We make an extensive empirical study of the market impact of large orders (metaorders) executed in the U.S. equity market between 2007 and 2009. We show that the square root market impact formula, which is widely used in the industry and supported by previous published research, provides a good fit only across about two orders of magnitude in order size. A logarithmic functional form fits the data better, providing a good fit across almost five orders of magnitude. We introduce the concept of an "impact surface" to model the impact as a function of both the duration and the participation rate of the metaorder, finding again a logarithmic dependence. We show that during the execution the price trajectory deviates from the market impact, a clear indication of non-VWAP executions. Surprisingly, we find that sometimes the price starts reverting well before the end of the execution. Finally we show that, although on average the impact relaxes to approximately 2/3 of the peak impact, the precise asymptotic value of the price depends on the participation rate and on the duration of the metaorder. We present evidence that this might be due to a herding phenomenon among metaorders.

q-fin.TR↗

arXiv2014

Why is order flow so persistent?

Order flow in equity markets is remarkably persistent in the sense that order signs (to buy or sell) are positively autocorrelated out to time lags of tens of thousands of orders, corresponding to many days. Two possible explanations are herding, corresponding to positive correlation in the behavior of different investors, or order splitting, corresponding to positive autocorrelation in the behavior of single investors. We investigate this using order flow data from the London Stock Exchange for which we have membership identifiers. By formulating models for herding and order splitting, as well as models for brokerage choice, we are able to overcome the distortion introduced by brokerage. On timescales of less than a few hours the persistence of order flow is overwhelmingly due to splitting rather than herding. We also study the properties of brokerage order flow and show that it is remarkably consistent both cross-sectionally and longitudinally.

q-fin.TR↗

arXiv2014

The dynamics of the leverage cycle

We present a simple agent-based model of a financial system composed of leveraged investors such as banks that invest in stocks and manage their risk using a Value-at-Risk constraint, based on historical observations of asset prices. The Value-at-Risk constraint implies that when perceived risk is low, leverage is high and vice versa, a phenomenon that has been dubbed pro-cyclical leverage. We show that this leads to endogenous irregular oscillations, in which gradual increases in stock prices and leverage are followed by drastic market collapses, i.e. a leverage cycle. This phenomenon is studied using simplified models that give a deeper understanding of the dynamics and the nature of the feedback loops and instabilities underlying the leverage cycle. We introduce a flexible leverage regulation policy in which it is possible to continuously tune from pro-cyclical to countercyclical leverage. When the policy is sufficiently countercyclical and bank risk is sufficiently low the endogenous oscillation disappears and prices go to a fixed point. While there is always a leverage ceiling above which the dynamics are unstable, countercyclical leverage can be used to raise the ceiling. We also study the impact on leverage cycles of direct, temporal control of the bank's riskiness via the bank's required Value-at-Risk quantile. Under such a rule the regulator relaxes the Value-at-Risk quantile following a negative stock price shock and tightens it following a positive shock. While such a policy rule can reduce the amplitude of leverage cycles, its effectiveness is highly dependent on the choice of parameters. Finally, we investigate fixed limits on leverage and show how they can control the leverage cycle.

econ.GN↗

arXiv2014

To bail-out or to bail-in? Answers from an agent-based model

Since beginning of the 2008 financial crisis almost half a trillion euros have been spent to financially assist EU member states in taxpayer-funded bail-outs. These crisis resolutions are often accompanied by austerity programs causing political and social friction on both domestic and international levels. The question of how to resolve failing financial institutions under which economic preconditions is therefore a pressing and controversial issue of vast political importance. In this work we employ an agent-based model to study the economic and financial ramifications of three highly relevant crisis resolution mechanisms. To establish the validity of the model we show that it reproduces a series of key stylized facts if the financial and real economy. The distressed institution can either be closed via a purchase & assumption transaction, it can be bailed-out using taxpayer money, or it may be bailed-in in a debt-to-equity conversion. We find that for an economy characterized by low unemployment and high productivity the optimal crisis resolution with respect to financial stability and economic productivity is to close the distressed institution. For economies in recession with high unemployment the bail-in tool provides the most efficient crisis resolution mechanism. Under no circumstances do taxpayer-funded bail-out schemes outperform bail-ins with private sector involvement.

q-fin.GN↗

arXiv2014

Leverage-induced systemic risk under Basle II and other credit risk policies

We use a simple agent based model of value investors in financial markets to test three credit regulation policies. The first is the unregulated case, which only imposes limits on maximum leverage. The second is Basle II and the third is a hypothetical alternative in which banks perfectly hedge all of their leverage-induced risk with options. When compared to the unregulated case both Basle II and the perfect hedge policy reduce the risk of default when leverage is low but increase it when leverage is high. This is because both regulation policies increase the amount of synchronized buying and selling needed to achieve deleveraging, which can destabilize the market. None of these policies are optimal for everyone: Risk neutral investors prefer the unregulated case with low maximum leverage, banks prefer the perfect hedge policy, and fund managers prefer the unregulated case with high maximum leverage. No one prefers Basle II.

q-fin.RM↗

arXiv2013

Uncertain growth and the value of the future

For environmental problems such as global warming future costs must be balanced against present costs. This is traditionally done using an exponential function with a constant discount rate, which reduces the present value of future costs. The result is highly sensitive to the choice of discount rate and has generated a major controversy as to the urgency for immediate action. We study analytically several standard interest rate models from finance and compare their properties to empirical data. From historical time series for nominal interest rates and inflation covering 14 countries over hundreds of years, we find that extended periods of negative real interest rates are common, occurring in many epochs in all countries. This leads us to choose the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck model, in which real short run interest rates fluctuate stochastically and can become negative, even if they revert to a positive mean value. We solve the model in closed form and prove that the long-run discount rate is always less than the mean; indeed it can be zero or even negative, despite the fact that the mean short term interest rate is positive. We fit the parameters of the model to the data, and find that nine of the countries have positive long run discount rates while five have negative long-run discount rates. Even if one rejects the countries where hyperinflation has occurred, our results support the low discounting rate used in the Stern report over higher rates advocated by others.

q-fin.ST↗

arXiv2013

How efficiency shapes market impact

We develop a theory for the market impact of large trading orders, which we call metaorders because they are typically split into small pieces and executed incrementally. Market impact is empirically observed to be a concave function of metaorder size, i.e., the impact per share of large metaorders is smaller than that of small metaorders. We formulate a stylized model of an algorithmic execution service and derive a fair pricing condition, which says that the average transaction price of the metaorder is equal to the price after trading is completed. We show that at equilibrium the distribution of trading volume adjusts to reflect information, and dictates the shape of the impact function. The resulting theory makes empirically testable predictions for the functional form of both the temporary and permanent components of market impact. Based on the commonly observed asymptotic distribution for the volume of large trades, it says that market impact should increase asymptotically roughly as the square root of metaorder size, with average permanent impact relaxing to about two thirds of peak impact.

q-fin.TR↗

arXiv2013

How interbank lending amplifies overlapping portfolio contagion: A case study of the Austrian banking network

In spite of the growing theoretical literature on cascades of failures in interbank lending networks, empirical results seem to suggest that networks of direct exposures are not the major channel of financial contagion. In this paper we show that networks of interbank exposures can however significantly amplify contagion due to overlapping portfolios. To illustrate this point, we consider the case of the Austrian interbank network and perform stress tests on it according to different protocols. We consider in particular contagion due to (i) counterparty loss; (ii) roll-over risk; and (iii) overlapping portfolios. We find that the average number of bankruptcies caused by counterparty loss and roll-over risk is fairly small if these contagion mechanisms are considered in isolation. Once portfolio overlaps are also accounted for, however, we observe that the network of direct interbank exposures significantly contributes to systemic risk.

q-fin.GN↗