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Jacek Miekisz

Publications and source records attributed to Jacek Miekisz.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Intrinsic noise in structured replicator dynamics modelling time delays

We construct and analyze structured replicator dynamics of the Snowdrift game. In our model, the offspring is put in juvenile compartments and then mature and join adult compartments with strategy-dependent rates. This is augmented by death rates and hence the population size is bounded. In the corresponding birth-death Markov jump process, rates of leaving juvenile compartments may be interpreted as inverses of averages of exponentially distributed time delays. We observe a novel behavior: for equal average time delays of both strategies, the frequency of cooperators in the quasi-stationary state of a stochastic dynamics is bigger than that in the corresponding stationary state of the deterministic structured replicator dynamics which is actually equal to the critical point of the original replicator equation for the Snowdrift game. In short, time delays favor cooperation in the presence of intrinsic stochastic fluctuations.

q-bio.PE↗

Typical ground states for large sets of interactions

We discuss what ground states for generic interactions look like. We note that a recent result, due to Morris, implies that the behaviour of ground-state measures for generic interactions is similar to that of generic measures. In particular, it follows from his observation that they have singular spectrum and that they are weak mixing, but not mixing.

math-ph↗

Sturmian ground states in classical lattice-gas models

We construct for the first time examples of non-frustrated, two-body, infinite-range, one-dimensional classical lattice-gas models without periodic ground-state configurations. Ground-state configurations of our models are Sturmian sequences defined by irrational rotations on the circle. We present minimal sets of forbidden patterns which define Sturmian sequences in a unique way. Our interactions assign positive energies to forbidden patterns and are equal to zero otherwise. We illustrate our construction by the well-known example of the Fibonacci sequences.

math-ph↗

Decomposing Noise in Biochemical Signalling Systems Highlights the Role of Protein Degradation

The phenomena of stochasticity in biochemical processes have been intriguing life scientists for the past few decades. We now know that living cells take advantage of stochasticity in some cases and counteract stochastic effects in others. The source of intrinsic stochasticity in biomolecular systems are random timings of individual reactions, which cumulatively drive the variability in outputs of such systems. Despite the acknowledged relevance of stochasticity in the functioning of living cells no rigorous method have been proposed to precisely identify sources of variability. In this paper we propose a novel methodology that allows us to calculate contributions of individual reactions into the variability of a system's output. We demonstrate that some reactions have dramatically different effects on noise than others. Surprisingly, in the class of open conversion systems that serve as an approximate model of signal transduction, the degradation of an output contributes half of the total noise. We also demonstrate the importance of degradation in other relevant systems and propose a degradation feedback control mechanism that has the capability of an effective noise suppression. Application of our method to some well studied biochemical systems such as: gene expression, Michaelis-Menten enzyme kinetics, and the p53 system indicates that our methodology reveals an unprecedented insight into the origins of variability in biochemical systems. For many systems an analytical decomposition is not available; therefore the method has been implemented as a Matlab package and is available from the authors upon request.

q-bio.QM↗

Ion transport through cell membrane channels

We discuss various models of ion transport through cell membrane channels. Recent experimental data shows that sizes of ion channels are compared to those of ions and that only few ions may be simultaneously in any single channel. Theoretical description of ion transport in such channels should therefore take into account interactions between ions and between ions and channel proteins. This is not satisfied by macroscopic continuum models based on Poisson-Nernst-Planck equations. More realistic descriptions of ion transport are offered by microscopic Brownian and molecular dynamics. One should also take into account a dynamical character of the channel structure. This is not yet addressed in the literature

q-bio.SC↗

Evolutionary game theory and population dynamics

Many socio-economic and biological processes can be modeled as systems of interacting individuals. The behaviour of such systems can be often described within game-theoretic models. In these lecture notes, we introduce fundamental concepts of evolutionary game theory and review basic properties of deterministic replicator dynamics and stochastic dynamics of finite populations. We discuss stability of equilibria in deterministic dynamics with migration, time-delay, and in stochastic dynamics of well-mixed populations and spatial games with local interactions. We analyze the dependence of the long-run behaviour of a population on various parameters such as the time delay, the noise level, and the size of the population.

q-bio.PE↗

Population dynamics with a stable efficient equilibrium

We propose a game-theoretic dynamics of a population of replicating individuals. It consists of two parts: the standard replicator one and a migration between two different habitats. We consider symmetric two-player games with two evolutionarily stable strategies: the efficient one in which the population is in a state with a maximal payoff and the risk-dominant one where players are averse to risk. We show that for a large range of parameters of our dynamics, even if the initial conditions in both habitats are in the basin of attraction of the risk-dominant equilibrium (with respect to the standard replication dynamics without migration), in the long run most individuals play the efficient strategy.

q-bio.PE↗

Stochastic stability in three-player games

Animal behavior and evolution can often be described by game-theoretic models. Although in many situations, the number of players is very large, their strategic interactions are usually decomposed into a sum of two-player games. Only recently evolutionarily stable strategies were defined for multi-player games and their properties analyzed (Broom et al., 1997). Here we study the long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of populations of randomly matched individuals playing symmetric three-player games. We analyze stochastic stability of equilibria in games with multiple evolutionarily stable strategies. We also show that in some games, a population may not evolve in the long run to an evolutionarily stable equilibrium.

q-bio.PE↗

Equilibrium transitions in finite populations of players

We discuss stochastic dynamics of finite populations of individuals playing games. We review recent results concerning the dependence of the long-run behavior of such systems on the number of players and the noise level. In the case of two-player games with two symmetric Nash equilibria, when the number of players increases, the population undergoes multiple transitions between its equilibria.

q-bio.PE↗

Long-run behavior of games with many players

We discuss similarities and differencies between systems of many interacting players maximizing their individual payoffs and particles minimizing their interaction energy. We analyze long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of many interacting agents in spatial and adaptive population games. We review results concerning the effect of the number of players and the noise level on the stochastic stability of Nash equilibria. In particular, we present examples of games in which when the number of players or the noise level increases, a population undergoes a transition between its equilibria.

cond-mat.stat-mech↗

Evolutionary and asymptotic stability in symmetric multi-player games

We provide a classification of symmetric three-player games with two strategies and investigate evolutionary and asymptotic stability (in the replicator dynamics) of their Nash equilibria. We discuss similarities and differences between two-player and multi-player games. In particular, we construct examples which exhibit a novel behavior not found in two-player games.

q-bio.PE↗

Stochastic stability in spatial three-player games

We discuss long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of many interacting agents. In particular, three-player spatial games are studied. The effect of the number of players and the noise level on the stochastic stability of Nash equilibria is investigated.

cond-mat.other↗

Stochastic stability in spatial games

We discuss similarities and differences between systems of interacting players maximizing their individual payoffs and particles minimizing their interaction energy. Long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of spatial games with multiple Nash equilibria is analyzed. In particular, we construct an example of a spatial game with three strategies, where stochastic stability of Nash equilibria depends on the number of players and the kind of dynamics.

cond-mat.stat-mech↗

Statistical mechanics of spatial evolutionary games

We discuss the long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of many interacting players in spatial evolutionary games. In particular, we investigate the effect of the number of players and the noise level on the stochastic stability of Nash equilibria. We discuss similarities and differences between systems of interacting players maximizing their individual payoffs and particles minimizing their interaction energy. We use concepts and techniques of statistical mechanics to study game-theoretic models. In order to obtain results in the case of the so-called potential games, we analyze the thermodynamic limit of the appropriate models of interacting particles.

cond-mat.stat-mech↗

Equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching of players

We discuss stochastic dynamics of populations of individuals playing games. Our models possess two evolutionarily stable strategies: an efficient one, where a population is in a state with the maximal payoff (fitness) and a risk-dominant one, where players are averse to risks. We assume that individuals play with randomly chosen opponents (they do not play against average strategies as in the standard replicator dynamics). We show that the long-run behavior of a population depends on its size and the mutation level.

q-bio.PE↗

Stability of evolutionarily stable strategies in discrete replicator dynamics with time delay

We construct two models of discrete-time replicator dynamics with time delay. In the social-type model, players imitate opponents taking into account average payoffs of games played some units of time ago. In the biological-type model, new players are born from parents who played in the past. We consider two-player games with two strategies and a unique mixed evolutionarily stable strategy. We show that in the first type of dynamics, it is asymptotically stable for small time delays and becomes unstable for big ones when the population oscillates around its stationary state. In the second type of dynamics, however, evolutionarily stable strategy is asymptotically stable for any size of a time delay.

q-bio.PE↗

A symmetry group of a Thue-Morse quasicrystal

We present a method of coding general self-similar structures. In particular, we construct a symmetry group of a one-dimensional Thue-Morse quasicrystal, i.e., of a nonperiodic ground state of a certain translation-invariant, exponentially decaying interaction.

cond-mat.stat-mech↗

Devil's staircase for a nonconvex interaction

We study ground-state orderings of particles in classical lattice-gas models of adsorption on crystal surfaces. In the considered models, the energy of adsorbed particles is a sum of two components, each one representing the energy of a one-dimensional lattice gas with two-body interactions in one of the two orthogonal lattice directions. This feature reduces the two-dimensional problem to a one-dimensional one. The interaction energy in each direction is repulsive and strictly convex only from distance 2 on, while its value at distance 1 can be positive or negative, but close to zero. We show that if the decay rate of the interactions is fast enough, then particles form 2-particle lattice-connected aggregates which are distributed in the same most homogeneous way as particles whose interaction is strictly convex everywhere. Moreover, despite the lack of convexity, the density of particles versus the chemical potential appears to be a fractal curve known as the complete devil's staircase.

cond-mat.stat-mech↗