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Jianan Lin

Publications and source records attributed to Jianan Lin.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Improved Metric Distortion Bounds for Deterministic Weighted-Tournament Voting Rules

We study deterministic weighted-tournament voting rules, also known as C2 rules, which use only the fraction of voters who prefer one candidate to another for each pair of candidates. Voters and candidates lie in a common but unknown metric space, and voters rank candidates by distance. The goal is to select a candidate minimizing the sum of distances to the voters, and distortion measures the worst-case approximation ratio relative to an optimal candidate. Charikar et al.~[EC 2025] introduced the Unblanketed Set rule with distortion at most $3.9312$ and proved a lower bound of $3.1128$ for deterministic C2 rules. We extend their rule to the Path-Unblanketed Set rule, which runs in polynomial time and achieves distortion at most $1+2\sqrt{2}\approx3.8284$. The rule uses paths between candidates to combine pairwise comparisons without increasing the approximation loss with the path length. With computer assistance, we prove a better upper bound of $3.3346$ for five or six candidates and a general lower bound of $3.1828$ using a construction with 17 candidates.

cs.GT↗

JoyFrontBench: Evaluating Front-End Coding Agents through Goal-Oriented Acceptance Contracts

Front-end coding agents are expected to produce applications that fulfill user goals, yet high task scores can coexist with failures in essential workflows. Evaluating these agents therefore requires an explicit distinction between partial implementation and application success. We introduce JoyFrontBench, a benchmark that makes this distinction through goal-oriented acceptance contracts. Each contract identifies core tasks and mandatory criteria before generation: a core task passes only when all mandatory criteria are satisfied and a shared completion threshold is met, while application success requires every core task to pass on the same operational artifact within a single run. Derived from practitioner requirements, JoyFrontBench comprises 100 front-end development problems, 764 tasks, and 2,596 atomic criteria, with reviewed annotations linking user goals to core tasks and evidence requirements. The evaluation framework combines evidence-grounded judgments with deterministic record auditing and fixed scoring rules, preserving graded task assessment alongside explicit core-task and application-level acceptance. We evaluate five coding models under two agent harnesses, OpenHands and OpenCode, on the 70-problem test set; the remaining 30 problems form a public set for validation and diagnostic analyses. Under OpenHands, the mean Average Task Score (ATS) across models is 87.69%, while the mean Application Success Rate (ASR) is 51.52%. Further analyses reveal changes in model rankings across harnesses and variation in application success across repeated runs. These findings highlight the limitations of aggregate task scores in characterizing application success and motivate explicit assessment of core-goal fulfillment alongside graded task performance.

cs.SE↗

Sequential Phragmén Guarantees 2-Approximate Core Stability

We study approximately stable committee selection under approval preferences, following Cheng et al.~[EC~2019] and Jiang, Munagala, and Wang~[STOC~2020]. In an approval-based committee election, $n$ voters each approve a subset of the candidates, and a committee of size $k$ is selected. A size-$k$ committee is $λ$-stable if, for every nonempty subset $T$ of candidates, the number of voters who strictly prefer $T$ is less than $λ$ times the proportional share $\frac{n|T|}{k}$. We consider sequential Phragmén, a classical polynomial-time voting rule, and prove that it always returns a $2$-stable committee. This implies that the $2$-core is always nonempty and improves upon the $3.651$-stability guarantee of Gao, Sun, and Vondrák~[EC~2026]. The guarantee also extends to weighted voters and is tight even for unweighted elections: for every $1\leλ<2$, sequential Phragmén can return a committee that is not $λ$-stable. Compared with the exact-core algorithm developed in concurrent work by Becker, Greger, and Peters~[arXiv~2026], sequential Phragmén is simpler to implement, and our proof of its $2$-stability is elementary.

cs.GT↗

SAVeR$^2$: Reasoning-based Safety Alignment for Large Reasoning Models via Verifiable Rewards

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have achieved impressive performance via explicit Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning, yet this process introduces critical safety risks. We formalize LRM safety objectives as requiring non-malicious reasoning and answers, safety consistency, and explicit intent identification. We argue that existing alignment methods suffer from poor adversarial generalization, a significant ``safety tax'' on reasoning, and unfaithful coarse-grained rewards, primarily due to their neglect of the LRM's intrinsic reasoning capabilities for safety. To address these, we propose \textbf{SAVeR$^2$}, a novel \textbf{S}afety \textbf{A}lignment method via \textbf{R}ewards with \textbf{R}easoning capability. SAVeR$^2$ decomposes the safety objective into four fine-grained verifiable reward signals and utilizes a difficulty-aware data selection strategy to stabilize training. Crucially, we introduce a reasoning-preserving gradient projection mechanism that analytically resolves conflicts between safety and reasoning gradients, effectively eliminating the safety tax. Extensive experiments on models ranging from 1.5B to 671B demonstrate that SAVeR$^2$ achieves superior safety performance and significantly lower over-refusal rates across multiple benchmarks without compromising general reasoning capabilities.

cs.AI↗

Optimality and Impossibility in Multidimensional Strategyproof Facility Location

We study facility location in multidimensional normed spaces with the objective of minimizing social cost, the sum of agents' distances to their nearest facility. A deterministic mechanism selects $k$ facility locations based on the reports of $n$ agents and is strategyproof (SP) if no agent can reduce her distance by misreporting her location. We establish optimal approximation ratios and impossibility results. For a single facility in the Euclidean plane, we prove that the optimal approximation ratios among deterministic SP mechanisms are exactly those obtained by Goel and Hann-Caruthers [SCW 2023] for the coordinate-wise median (CM): $\frac{\sqrt{2(n^2+1)}}{n+1}$ for odd $n\ge3$ and $\sqrt{2}$ for even $n\ge4$. We remove the anonymity assumption from their optimality result. However, CM is not always optimal in non-Euclidean spaces: we give an SP mechanism that minimizes social cost exactly in $\ell_\infty^d$, whereas CM has a tight uniform approximation ratio of $2$ already in the plane. We then consider two facilities in $\ell_p$ spaces with $1 2$. In the plane, no deterministic SP mechanism has a finite approximation ratio. In higher dimensions, the same impossibility holds for anonymous deterministic SP mechanisms. Finally, a reduction using distant agents and a limiting argument extends both impossibility results to every $k>2$ with $n>k$.

cs.GT↗

DeShortcut-Align: Decoupling Spurious Shortcuts for Robust Safety Alignment in Large Reasoning Models

Safety alignment of large reasoning models (LRMs) via supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and reinforcement learning (RL) often yields near-perfect safety scores, yet this apparent success comes at the cost of severe over-refusal and degraded general capabilities. Through systematic empirical analysis, we find that these failures are closely associated with the learning of spurious shortcuts rather than robust intent-sensitive safety evaluation. Specifically, we identify two dominant shortcuts: formatting shortcuts, where refusal behaviors are overly bound to structural prompt templates that frequently appear in safety alignment corpora; and lexical shortcuts, where sensitive keywords reflexively trigger refusals on benign queries. To mitigate reliance on these shortcuts, we propose DeShortcut-Align, a shortcut-decoupling alignment framework that reduces dependence on superficial cues. DeShortcut-Align operates across three coordinated stages: (1) Refusal Sensitivity Attribution, which masks input tokens to quantify their impact on the final refusal response distribution; (2) Attribution-Guided Contrastive Augmentation, which constructs benign contrastive samples using high-sensitivity tokens to mitigate lexical shortcuts; and (3) Counterfactual Consistency Regularization, which constructs template-ablated states via attention blinding to enforce decision consistency across SFT and RL, mitigating formatting shortcut dependence. Experiments on 7B and 14B models demonstrate that DeShortcut-Align significantly improves robustness against template-stripping bypass attacks (reducing performance drops by up to 72%), substantially reduces over-refusal by over 58%, and better preserves general-purpose reasoning capabilities, thereby mitigating the alignment tax commonly observed in safety training.

cs.AI↗

Nearly Complete Characterization of 2-Agent Deterministic Strategyproof Mechanisms for Single Facility Location in $L_p$ Space

We consider the problem of locating a single facility for 2 agents in $L_p$ space ($1 2$ and prove that the well-known general median mechanism will give an counter-example. Particularly, in $L_2$ (i.e., Euclidean) space with 2 agents, such a mechanism is rotation-invariant iff it is dictatorial; and such a mechanism is anonymous iff it is one of the three mechanisms in Section 4. And our tool implies that any such a mechanism has a tight lower bound of 2-approximation for maximum cost in any multi-dimensional space.

cs.GT↗

A Randomized $\frac32$-Approximation for Strategic Facility Location on a Circle

We study strategyproof mechanisms for locating a single facility on a circle so as to serve a set of strategic agents under the utilitarian social cost objective. We analyze a simple parity-dependent mechanism that randomizes between the Random Dictator (RD) mechanism and the Proportional Circle Distance (PCD) mechanism. For an odd number \(n\) of agents, this mechanism mixes RD and PCD with equal probability, as originally proposed by Rogowski and Dziubi{ń}ski (IJCAI 2025). For even \(n\), it mixes RD with a random-deletion extension of PCD, in which one agent is removed uniformly at random before PCD is applied to the remaining agents. Our main result shows that this mechanism is strategyproof and achieves an approximation ratio of \(\frac32\) for every \(n\ge 3\). This improves the \(\frac74\) upper bound of Rogowski and Dziubi{ń}ski, which applied only to odd \(n\), and extends the guarantee to even numbers of agents. Finally, we establish a computer-assisted lower bound of \(1.088187\ldots\) on the approximation ratio of any randomized strategyproof mechanism, improving on the previous lower bound of \(1.0456\) due to Meir (SAGT 2019).

cs.GT↗

A 3.1462-Competitive Algorithm for Matroid Secretary

The matroid secretary problem asks an online algorithm to select a high-weight independent set from elements arriving in uniformly random order, with immediate and irrevocable decisions. Singla (2026) recently gave a $4$-competitive algorithm for arbitrary matroids using only the number of elements and independence queries on already-arrived elements. Following his approach of maintaining a dynamically updated reference set, we introduce random deletions and a time-dependent acceptance rule, improving the competitive ratio to $C_*\approx3.1462$ in the same information model, where $C_*-\log C_*=2$. Our ordinal algorithm accepts every element of a fixed canonical optimum with probability exactly $1/C_*$ and uses $O(n^2)$ independence queries. The algorithm maintains a greedy reference solution, protects only accepted elements, and randomly deletes unaccepted reference-basis elements. A time-dependent acceptance rule makes the accepted set, conditional on the reference set, an independent thinning of its greedy basis. The resulting guarantee has a direct analytic proof.

cs.DS↗

Consistency-Robustness Tradeoffs for Strategyproof Scheduling with Predictions

We study strategyproof scheduling on \(n\) unrelated machines with predictions. Each machine is controlled by an agent with privately known processing times, while the mechanism receives a public prediction of the processing-time matrix before the agents report. The objective is to minimize the makespan subject to strategyproofness. We measure performance by consistency, the approximation guarantee for correct predictions, and robustness, the worst-case guarantee for arbitrary predictions. We introduce \textsc{EdgeSkip}, a deterministic strategyproof member of the class of job-wise weighted mechanisms. Such mechanisms allocate each job independently using prediction-dependent weights. Using a polynomial-time \(2\)-approximate reference schedule computed from the prediction and a standard tradeoff parameter, \textsc{EdgeSkip} is \(4\)-consistent and \((2n-2)\)-robust, improving on the \((6,2n)\) guarantee of Balkanski, Gkatzelis, and Tan. Without computational restrictions, \textsc{EdgeSkip} with an optimal reference schedule is \(C\)-consistent and \(\max\{n,(n-1)C/(C-1)\}\)-robust for every \(C>1\). We prove a matching information-theoretic lower bound for all job-wise weighted mechanisms, thereby determining the exact consistency--robustness tradeoff for this class. For arbitrary deterministic strategyproof mechanisms, we establish the robustness lower bound \(\max\{n,C/(C-1)\}\) for every \(C>1\). We also study an error-tolerant variant and improve upon prior guarantees. Experiments demonstrate that our mechanisms achieve good empirical performance.

cs.GT↗

Learning-Augmented Strategyproof Facility Location in $\mathbb{R}^d$ with $\ell_p$ Distances

We study learning-augmented mechanism design for locating a single facility in $\mathbb{R}^d$ to minimize the sum of the agents' $\ell_p$ distances to the facility. We analyze the coordinate-wise median with predictions (CMP) mechanism, which adds $cn$ virtual agents at a predicted optimal facility location to the $n$ reported locations and returns their coordinate-wise median. The parameter $c\in[0,1)$ represents confidence in the prediction; CMP is known to be strategyproof when both are fixed independently of the reports. We determine its approximation guarantees under correct predictions (consistency) and arbitrary predictions (robustness) in two settings. First, for $d=2$, we establish exact guarantees for every $p\in[1,+\infty]$. For $1<p<+\infty$, the consistency and robustness are respectively $\Bigl(1+\bigl(\frac{1-c}{1+c}\bigr)^{\frac{p}{p-1}}\Bigr)^{\frac{p-1}{p}}$ and $\Bigl(1+\bigl(\frac{1+c}{1-c}\bigr)^{\frac{p}{p-1}}\Bigr)^{\frac{p-1}{p}}$. We use the median condition in each coordinate to compare the mechanism's cost with the optimal cost, and establish tightness using instances with agents at only three distinct locations. Second, for $1<p<+\infty$, we obtain dimension-independent consistency and robustness upper bounds valid for every $d\ge1$. For each fixed $p$ and $c$, we construct families of instances whose ratios approach the respective upper bounds as $d\to\infty$, proving asymptotic tightness. We also establish exact guarantees for $p=1$ in every dimension and asymptotically tight bounds for $p=+\infty$. Our high-dimensional results recover the prediction-free bounds of Gravin and Jia (STOC 2025) when $c=0$ and their learning-augmented bounds in arbitrary-dimensional Euclidean spaces when $p=2$.

cs.GT↗

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Connecting Impassable Regions

We study strategyproof mechanisms for building a pathway between two regions of a line segment separated by an obstacle. Each of the $n$ agents has a private location within its region and may use either its original route to a facility or the new pathway, whose traversal cost is a fraction $k\in[0,1)$ of its length. We seek strategyproof (SP) and group-strategyproof (GSP) mechanisms that approximately minimize maximum cost or social cost. After characterizing optimal pathways for both objectives, we establish a tight deterministic maximum-cost approximation ratio of $\frac{2}{1+k}$ and a deterministic social-cost upper bound of $\frac{n}{1+k(n-1)}$, together with complementary lower bounds. Both upper bounds are achieved by GSP mechanisms. We then study randomized mechanisms under strategyproofness in expectation. A power-proportional mechanism achieves a social-cost approximation ratio at most $5$, independent of $n$ and $k$, with a tight guarantee of $3$ for this mechanism when $k=0$. We prove randomized lower bounds of $\frac{3+2k}{2+3k}$ for maximum cost and $\max\big\{1,\frac{285}{263+385k}\big\}$ for social cost, the latter for $n\ge7$. Finally, we improve several bounds for the real-line pathway model of [Chan and Wang, AAMAS 2023]. Our deterministic maximum-cost lower bound of $2$ matches the upper bound obtainable from [Qin, Fang, and Liu, COCOA 2024]. We strengthen the deterministic social-cost lower bound from $\frac32$ to $2$ under SP and to $\max\{2,n-1\}$ under GSP. For randomized social cost, we sharpen the guarantee of Chan and Wang's proportional mechanism from $6$ to $3$ and raise their lower bound from $1.02$ to $\frac{285}{263}\approx1.08365$ for $n\ge7$.

cs.GT↗

Improved Randomized Approximations for Strategic Obnoxious Facility Location

We study randomized strategyproof mechanisms for strategic obnoxious facility location on a line segment, where agents wish the facility to be located as far away from them as possible and their utility is their distance from the facility, under the social utility and minimum utility objectives. For social utility, we propose a novel randomized mechanism that breaks the previously best known \(\frac32\)-approximation of [Cheng, Yu, and Zhang, TCS 2013], achieving an approximation ratio of at most \(1.47359\). We also raise the lower bound on the approximation ratio of randomized strategyproof mechanisms from \(\frac{2}{\sqrt{3}}\approx1.15470\) [Feigenbaum et al., JAAMAS 2020] to \(\frac{105}{88}\approx1.19318\). For minimum utility, following the profile-independent approach of [Chan, Lin and Wang, AAMAS 2026], we design a simple randomized mechanism that reduces the approximation guarantee from \(\sqrt{2n}+O(1)\) to \(\sqrt n+O(1)\), where \(n\) is the number of agents. Finally, we prove that no randomized strategyproof mechanism can achieve an asymptotic approximation ratio strictly smaller than \(2\), strengthening the previous asymptotic lower bound of \(\frac32\) [Feigenbaum et al., JAAMAS 2020]. Thus, all four bounds considered in this paper strictly improve upon the corresponding previously known results.

cs.GT↗

Randomized Strategyproof Facility Location: Two Facilities and Beyond

We design and analyze randomized strategyproof mechanisms for multi-facility location under the utilitarian social-cost objective, the sum of the agents' distances to their nearest facilities. For two facilities, the Pairwise-Distance mechanism locates facilities at a pair of reported locations sampled with probability proportional to their distance. It is strategyproof on Ptolemaic spaces, including Euclidean and Hilbert spaces as special cases, and has an approximation ratio of \(4\). The resulting Hybrid-Distance mechanism is a fixed-probability mixture: it selects the classical Proportional mechanism [Lu et al., EC'10] with probability \(λ^*=\frac{5+4\sqrt3}{23}\) and Pairwise-Distance with probability $1-λ^*$. It is strategyproof on Ptolemaic spaces and has a tight approximation ratio of \(\frac{74+4\sqrt3}{23}\approx3.5186\), breaking the long-standing factor-\(4\) benchmark of [Lu et al., EC'10]. We complement the two-facility results by studying more facilities. First, for \(n\) agents and \(k=n-1\) facilities, we introduce the Inverse-Square mechanism, which omits one report with probability proportional to the inverse square of its nearest-neighbor distance and locates facilities at all remaining reports. It is strategyproof on any metric space and has an approximation ratio of \(Θ(\sqrt{n})\), improving the previous best-known ratio of \(\frac{n}{2}\) [Escoffier et al., ADT'11]. Second, for $k$ facilities on the line, we introduce the Gap-Product mechanism, which locates facilities at \(k\) reports and weights each set by the product of the gaps between consecutive selected reports. When \(k=3\), it is strategyproof and has a \(6\)-approximation, replacing the previous \(n\)-dependent guarantee [Fotakis and Tzamos, EC'13] by a constant, whereas it is not strategyproof for any \(k\ge4\).

cs.GT↗

Mechanism Design for Locating a Bridge Between Regions with Prelocated Facilities

In many urban planning projects, social planners require the construction of a bridge to connect two regions separated by obstacles such as rivers or highways. This paper studies the mechanism design problem for locating a bridge between two separate regions, each of which has been equipped with a facility. There are a set of agents located in each region and each agent has her location as private information. Once the bridge is built, the agents will go to the nearest facility to receive service and each agent's cost is the distance from her location to the nearest prelocated facility via the bridge. We investigate social cost and maximum cost under strategyproof (SP) mechanisms, with stronger notions of group-strategyproof (GSP) and strong group-strategyproof (SGSP). For the maximum cost objective, we characterize the optimal solution and show that it satisfies GSP. Under the SGSP, we propose a deterministic 3-approximation mechanism and a randomized 2-approximation mechanism, while proving a lower bound of 2 for any deterministic SGSP mechanism. For the social cost objective, we present a deterministic 3-approximation mechanism and a randomized 2-approximation mechanism that satisfy GSP. We establish lower bounds of 2 and 1.1 for deterministic and randomized SP mechanisms, respectively. Under the SGSP, the lower bound for deterministic mechanisms increases to 1 + min{m, n}, and we provide a (1 + 2 min{m, n})-approximation mechanism. For randomized mechanisms, the lower bound remains 1.1, while an upper bound of (1 + 2mn/(m+n)) is achieved.

cs.GT↗

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Euclidean Facility Location Problems under $L_p$-norm Social Cost

We study strategyproof mechanisms for eliciting agents' location preferences truthfully in the Euclidean plane $\mathbb R^2$ and locating a facility so as to minimize the $L_p$-norm social cost, defined as the $L_p$-norm of the vector of distances from the facility to the agents' preferred locations, for any $p \ge 1$. While the cases $p=1$ and $p=\infty$ have been well-studied, open questions remain about the optimal approximation ratios achievable by strategyproof mechanisms for general $p$. Our first result resolves an open question of Goel and Hann-Caruthers [Soc. Choice Welf. 2023]. They showed that the coordinate-wise median (CM) mechanism achieves an approximation ratio lying between \(2^{1-\frac{1}{p}}\) and \(2^{\frac{3}{2}-\frac{2}{p}}\) for $p\ge 2$, and they conjectured that it is exactly \(2^{1-\frac{1}{p}}\). We confirm this conjecture, and we further show that CM has a tight $\sqrt 2$-approximation for $1\le p\le 2$. Since it is previously known that the CM mechanism has the optimal approximation ratio among all deterministic anonymous strategyproof mechanisms for all $p\ge 1$, we complete the picture of deterministic mechanisms. Our second and third results demonstrate that two randomized mechanisms can yield better approximation ratios. In particular, we first consider the uniformly rotated coordinate-wise median (URCM) mechanism, and prove that, for \(1\le p<2\), its approximation ratio strictly improves over the deterministic bound \(\sqrt{2}\), while no such improvement is possible for $p\ge 2$. We then study the centroid random dictatorship mechanism that returns the average location (i.e., centroid) and the random dictatorship each with half probability, and show that its approximation ratio strictly improves over CM and URCM for every finite \(p\gtrsim 1.6\).

cs.GT↗

Hotelling-Downs with Facility Synergy: The Mall Effect

We consider a variation of the classic Hotelling-Downs model with the addition of facility synergies. Unlike in the classic model, where clients always use the facility closest to them, we study clients who prefer locations with many facilities to those with few facilities while simultaneously attempting to minimize their distance as well. We show that, in contrast with the classic model, Nash equilibria for our setting always exist, and, in fact, there always exists a Nash equilibrium such that the sum of client costs equals the cost of the optimal solution. Our main result is a bound of $\frac{225}{64}\approx 3.516$ on the Price of Anarchy for our model, showing that, although the client behavior is more complex in our model (and often more realistic depending on the application), the cost of Nash equilibrium solutions still cannot be much worse than the cost of the optimal facility placement.

cs.GT↗

Mechanism Design for Connecting Regions Under Disruptions

Man-made and natural disruptions such as planned constructions on roads, suspensions of bridges, and blocked roads by trees/mudslides/floods can often create obstacles that separate two connected regions. As a result, the traveling and reachability of agents from their respective regions to other regions can be affected. To minimize the impact of the obstacles and maintain agent accessibility, we initiate the problem of constructing a new pathway (e.g., a detour or new bridge) connecting the regions disconnected by obstacles from the mechanism design perspective. In the problem, each agent in their region has a private location and is required to access the other region. The cost of an agent is the distance from their location to the other region via the pathway. Our goal is to design strategyproof mechanisms that elicit truthful locations from the agents and approximately optimize the social or maximum cost of agents by determining locations in the regions for building a pathway. We provide a characterization of all strategyproof and anonymous mechanisms. For the social and maximum costs, we provide upper and lower bounds on the approximation ratios of strategyproof mechanisms.

cs.GT↗