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Jianan Lin

Publications and source records attributed to Jianan Lin.

23 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

Strategyproof Facility Location with Prediction: Minimizing the Maximum Cost

We study the mechanism design problem of facility location on a metric space in the learning-augmented framework, where mechanisms have access to imperfect predictions of the optimal facility locations. Our objective is to design strategyproof (SP) mechanisms that truthfully elicit agents' preferences over facility locations and, using the given prediction, select a facility location that approximately minimizes the maximum cost among all agents. In particular, we seek SP mechanisms whose approximation guarantees depend on the prediction error: they should achieve improved performance when the prediction is accurate (the property of \emph{consistency}) while still ensuring strong worst-case guarantees when the prediction is arbitrarily inaccurate (the property of \emph{robustness}). On the real line, we characterize all deterministic SP mechanisms with consistency strictly better than 2 and bounded robustness for the maximum cost. We show that any such mechanism must coincide with the MinMaxP mechanism, which returns the prediction if it lies between the two extreme agent locations and otherwise returns the agent location closest to the prediction. For any prediction error $η\ge 0$, we prove that MinMaxP achieves a $(1+\min(1, η))$-approximation and that no deterministic SP mechanism can obtain a better approximation ratio. In addition, for two-dimensional spaces with the $\ell_p$ distance, we analyze the approximation guarantees of a deterministic mechanism that applies MinMaxP independently on each coordinate, as well as a randomized mechanism that selects between two deterministic mechanisms with carefully chosen probabilities. We further extend these results to the $L_p$-norm social cost objective on the line metric and the maximum cost objective on the tree metric. Finally, we examine the group strategyproofness of the mechanisms.

cs.GT↗

Obnoxious Facility Location Problems: Strategyproof Mechanisms Optimizing $L_p$-Aggregated Utilities and Costs

We study the problem of locating a single obnoxious facility on the normalized line segment $[0,1]$ with strategic agents from a mechanism design perspective. Each agent has a preference for the undesirable location of the facility and would prefer the facility to be far away from their location. We consider the utility of the agent, defined as the distance between the agent's location and the facility location, and the cost of each agent, equal to one minus the utility. Given this standard setting of obnoxious facility location problems, our goal is to design (group) strategyproof mechanisms to elicit agent locations truthfully and determine facility location approximately optimizing the $L_p$-aggregated utility and cost objectives, which generalizes the $L_p$-norm ($p\ge 1$) of the agents' utilities and agents' costs to any $p \in [-\infty, \infty]$, respectively. We establish upper and lower bounds on the approximation ratios of deterministic and randomized (group) strategyproof mechanisms for maximizing the $L_p$-aggregated utilities or minimizing the $L_p$-aggregated costs across the range of \(p\)-values. While there are gaps between upper and lower bounds for randomized mechanisms, our bounds for deterministic mechanisms are tight.

cs.GT↗

FedAU2: Attribute Unlearning for User-Level Federated Recommender Systems with Adaptive and Robust Adversarial Training

Federated Recommender Systems (FedRecs) leverage federated learning to protect user privacy by retaining data locally. However, user embeddings in FedRecs often encode sensitive attribute information, rendering them vulnerable to attribute inference attacks. Attribute unlearning has emerged as a promising approach to mitigate this issue. In this paper, we focus on user-level FedRecs, which is a more practical yet challenging setting compared to group-level FedRecs. Adversarial training emerges as the most feasible approach within this context. We identify two key challenges in implementing adversarial training-based attribute unlearning for user-level FedRecs: i) mitigating training instability caused by user data heterogeneity, and ii) preventing attribute information leakage through gradients. To address these challenges, we propose FedAU2, an attribute unlearning method for user-level FedRecs. For CH1, we propose an adaptive adversarial training strategy, where the training dynamics are adjusted in response to local optimization behavior. For CH2, we propose a dual-stochastic variational autoencoder to perturb the adversarial model, effectively preventing gradient-based information leakage. Extensive experiments on three real-world datasets demonstrate that our proposed FedAU2 achieves superior performance in unlearning effectiveness and recommendation performance compared to existing baselines.

cs.IR↗

TOFA: Training-Free One-Shot Federated Adaptation for Vision-Language Models

Efficient and lightweight adaptation of pre-trained Vision-Language Models (VLMs) to downstream tasks through collaborative interactions between local clients and a central server is a rapidly emerging research topic in federated learning. Existing adaptation algorithms are typically trained iteratively, which incur significant communication costs and increase the susceptibility to potential attacks. Motivated by the one-shot federated training techniques that reduce client-server exchanges to a single round, developing a lightweight one-shot federated VLM adaptation method to alleviate these issues is particularly attractive. However, current one-shot approaches face certain challenges in adapting VLMs within federated settings: (1) insufficient exploitation of the rich multimodal information inherent in VLMs; (2) lack of specialized adaptation strategies to systematically handle the severe data heterogeneity; and (3) requiring additional training resource of clients or server. To bridge these gaps, we propose a novel Training-free One-shot Federated Adaptation framework for VLMs, named TOFA. To fully leverage the generalizable multimodal features in pre-trained VLMs, TOFA employs both visual and textual pipelines to extract task-relevant representations. In the visual pipeline, a hierarchical Bayesian model learns personalized, class-specific prototype distributions. For the textual pipeline, TOFA evaluates and globally aligns the generated local text prompts for robustness. An adaptive weight calibration mechanism is also introduced to combine predictions from both modalities, balancing personalization and robustness to handle data heterogeneity. Our method is training-free, not relying on additional training resources on either the client or server side. Extensive experiments across 9 datasets in various federated settings demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed TOFA method.

cs.AI↗

Mechanism Design for Extending the Accessibility of Facilities

We study a variation of facility location problems (FLPs) that aims to improve the accessibility of agents to the facility within the context of mechanism design without money. In such a variation, agents have preferences on the ideal locations of the facility on a real line, and the facility's location is fixed in advance where (re)locating the facility is not possible due to various constraints (e.g., limited space and construction costs). To improve the accessibility of agents to facilities, existing mechanism design literature in FLPs has proposed to structurally modify the real line (e.g., by adding a new interval) or provide shuttle services between two points when structural modifications are not possible. In this paper, we focus on the latter approach and propose to construct an accessibility range to extend the accessibility of the facility. In the range, agents can receive accommodations (e.g., school buses, campus shuttles, or pickup services) to help reach the facility. Therefore, the cost of each agent is the distance from their ideal location to the facility (possibility) through the range. We focus on designing strategyproof mechanisms that elicit true ideal locations from the agents and construct accessibility ranges (intervals) to approximately minimize the social cost or the maximum cost of agents. For both social and maximum costs, we design group strategyproof mechanisms with asymptotically tight bounds on the approximation ratios.

cs.GT↗