arXiv subjects

John McDermid

Publications and source records attributed to John McDermid.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Guidance on the Safety Assurance of Autonomous Systems in Complex Environments (SACE)

Autonomous systems (AS) are systems that have the capability to take decisions free from direct human control. AS are increasingly being considered for adoption for applications where their behaviour may cause harm, such as when used for autonomous driving, medical applications or in domestic environments. For such applications, being able to ensure and demonstrate (assure) the safety of the operation of the AS is crucial for their adoption. This can be particularly challenging where AS operate in complex and changing real-world environments. Establishing justified confidence in the safety of AS requires the creation of a compelling safety case. This document introduces a methodology for the Safety Assurance of Autonomous Systems in Complex Environments (SACE). SACE comprises a set of safety case patterns and a process for (1) systematically integrating safety assurance into the development of the AS and (2) for generating the evidence base for explicitly justifying the acceptable safety of the AS.

cs.SE↗

arXiv2026

International AI Safety Report 2026

The International AI Safety Report 2026 synthesises the current scientific evidence on the capabilities, emerging risks, and safety of general-purpose AI systems. The report series was mandated by the nations attending the AI Safety Summit in Bletchley, UK. 29 nations, the UN, the OECD, and the EU each nominated a representative to the report's Expert Advisory Panel. Over 100 AI experts contributed, representing diverse perspectives and disciplines. Led by the Report's Chair, these independent experts collectively had full discretion over the report's content.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2025

International AI Safety Report 2025: Second Key Update: Technical Safeguards and Risk Management

This second update to the 2025 International AI Safety Report assesses new developments in general-purpose AI risk management over the past year. It examines how researchers, public institutions, and AI developers are approaching risk management for general-purpose AI. In recent months, for example, three leading AI developers applied enhanced safeguards to their new models, as their internal pre-deployment testing could not rule out the possibility that these models could be misused to help create biological weapons. Beyond specific precautionary measures, there have been a range of other advances in techniques for making AI models and systems more reliable and resistant to misuse. These include new approaches in adversarial training, data curation, and monitoring systems. In parallel, institutional frameworks that operationalise and formalise these technical capabilities are starting to emerge: the number of companies publishing Frontier AI Safety Frameworks more than doubled in 2025, and governments and international organisations have established a small number of governance frameworks for general-purpose AI, focusing largely on transparency and risk assessment.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2025

International AI Safety Report 2025: First Key Update: Capabilities and Risk Implications

Since the publication of the first International AI Safety Report, AI capabilities have continued to improve across key domains. New training techniques that teach AI systems to reason step-by-step and inference-time enhancements have primarily driven these advances, rather than simply training larger models. As a result, general-purpose AI systems can solve more complex problems in a range of domains, from scientific research to software development. Their performance on benchmarks that measure performance in coding, mathematics, and answering expert-level science questions has continued to improve, though reliability challenges persist, with systems excelling on some tasks while failing completely on others. These capability improvements also have implications for multiple risks, including risks from biological weapons and cyber attacks. Finally, they pose new challenges for monitoring and controllability. This update examines how AI capabilities have improved since the first Report, then focuses on key risk areas where substantial new evidence warrants updated assessments.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2025

Milestone Determination for Autonomous Railway Operation

In the field of railway automation, one of the key challenges has been the development of effective computer vision systems due to the limited availability of high-quality, sequential data. Traditional datasets are restricted in scope, lacking the spatio temporal context necessary for real-time decision-making, while alternative solutions introduce issues related to realism and applicability. By focusing on route-specific, contextually relevant cues, we can generate rich, sequential datasets that align more closely with real-world operational logic. The concept of milestone determination allows for the development of targeted, rule-based models that simplify the learning process by eliminating the need for generalized recognition of dynamic components, focusing instead on the critical decision points along a route. We argue that this approach provides a practical framework for training vision agents in controlled, predictable environments, facilitating safer and more efficient machine learning systems for railway automation.

cs.CV↗

arXiv2025

Unravelling Responsibility for AI

It is widely acknowledged that we need to establish where responsibility lies for the outputs and impacts of AI-enabled systems. This is important to achieve justice and compensation for victims of AI harms, and to inform policy and engineering practice. But without a clear, thorough understanding of what "responsibility" means, deliberations about where responsibility lies will be, at best, unfocused and incomplete and, at worst, misguided. Furthermore, AI-enabled systems exist within a wider ecosystem of actors, decisions, and governance structures, giving rise to complex networks of responsibility relations. To address these issues, this paper presents a conceptual framework of responsibility, accompanied with a graphical notation and general methodology for visualising these responsibility networks and for tracing different responsibility attributions for AI. Taking the three-part formulation "Actor A is responsible for Occurrence O," the framework unravels the concept of responsibility to clarify that there are different possibilities of who is responsible for AI, senses in which they are responsible, and aspects of events they are responsible for. The notation allows these permutations to be represented graphically. The methodology enables users to apply the framework to specific scenarios. The aim is to offer a foundation to support stakeholders from diverse disciplinary backgrounds to discuss and address complex responsibility questions in hypothesised and real-world cases involving AI. The work is illustrated by application to a fictitious scenario of a fatal collision between a crewless, AI-enabled maritime vessel in autonomous mode and a traditional, crewed vessel at sea.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Insights from Railway Professionals: Rethinking Railway assumptions regarding safety and autonomy

This study investigates how railway professionals perceive safety as a concept within rail, with the intention to help inform future technological developments within the industry. Through a series of interviews with drivers, route planners,and administrative personnel, the research explores the currentstate of safety practices, the potential for automation and the understanding of the railway as a system of systems. Key findings highlight a cautious attitude towards automation, a preference for assistive technologies, and a complex understanding of safety that integrates human, systematic and technological factors. The study also addresses the limitations of transferring automotive automation technologies to railways and the need for a railway-specific causation model to better evaluate and enhance safety in an evolving technological landscape. This study aims to bridge thegap between contemporary research and practical applications, contributing to the development of more effective safety metrics.

cs.HC↗

arXiv2025

The BIG Argument for AI Safety Cases

We present our Balanced, Integrated and Grounded (BIG) argument for assuring the safety of AI systems. The BIG argument adopts a whole-system approach to constructing a safety case for AI systems of varying capability, autonomy and criticality. Firstly, it is balanced by addressing safety alongside other critical ethical issues such as privacy and equity, acknowledging complexities and trade-offs in the broader societal impact of AI. Secondly, it is integrated by bringing together the social, ethical and technical aspects of safety assurance in a way that is traceable and accountable. Thirdly, it is grounded in long-established safety norms and practices, such as being sensitive to context and maintaining risk proportionality. Whether the AI capability is narrow and constrained or general-purpose and powered by a frontier or foundational model, the BIG argument insists on a systematic treatment of safety. Further, it places a particular focus on the novel hazardous behaviours emerging from the advanced capabilities of frontier AI models and the open contexts in which they are rapidly being deployed. These complex issues are considered within a wider AI safety case, approaching assurance from both technical and sociotechnical perspectives. Examples illustrating the use of the BIG argument are provided throughout the paper.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2025

The case for delegated AI autonomy for Human AI teaming in healthcare

In this paper we propose an advanced approach to integrating artificial intelligence (AI) into healthcare: autonomous decision support. This approach allows the AI algorithm to act autonomously for a subset of patient cases whilst serving a supportive role in other subsets of patient cases based on defined delegation criteria. By leveraging the complementary strengths of both humans and AI, it aims to deliver greater overall performance than existing human-AI teaming models. It ensures safe handling of patient cases and potentially reduces clinician review time, whilst being mindful of AI tool limitations. After setting the approach within the context of current human-AI teaming models, we outline the delegation criteria and apply them to a specific AI-based tool used in histopathology. The potential impact of the approach and the regulatory requirements for its successful implementation are then discussed.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

International AI Safety Report

The first International AI Safety Report comprehensively synthesizes the current evidence on the capabilities, risks, and safety of advanced AI systems. The report was mandated by the nations attending the AI Safety Summit in Bletchley, UK. Thirty nations, the UN, the OECD, and the EU each nominated a representative to the report's Expert Advisory Panel. A total of 100 AI experts contributed, representing diverse perspectives and disciplines. Led by the report's Chair, these independent experts collectively had full discretion over the report's content.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2024

Upstream and Downstream AI Safety: Both on the Same River?

Traditional safety engineering assesses systems in their context of use, e.g. the operational design domain (road layout, speed limits, weather, etc.) for self-driving vehicles (including those using AI). We refer to this as downstream safety. In contrast, work on safety of frontier AI, e.g. large language models which can be further trained for downstream tasks, typically considers factors that are beyond specific application contexts, such as the ability of the model to evade human control, or to produce harmful content, e.g. how to make bombs. We refer to this as upstream safety. We outline the characteristics of both upstream and downstream safety frameworks then explore the extent to which the broad AI safety community can benefit from synergies between these frameworks. For example, can concepts such as common mode failures from downstream safety be used to help assess the strength of AI guardrails? Further, can the understanding of the capabilities and limitations of frontier AI be used to inform downstream safety analysis, e.g. where LLMs are fine-tuned to calculate voyage plans for autonomous vessels? The paper identifies some promising avenues to explore and outlines some challenges in achieving synergy, or a confluence, between upstream and downstream safety frameworks.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2024

Safety Analysis of Autonomous Railway Systems: An Introduction to the SACRED Methodology

As the railway industry increasingly seeks to introduce autonomy and machine learning (ML), several questions arise. How can safety be assured for such systems and technologies? What is the applicability of current safety standards within this new technological landscape? What are the key metrics to classify a system as safe? Currently, safety analysis for the railway reflects the failure modes of existing technology; in contrast, the primary concern of analysis of automation is typically average performance. Such purely statistical approaches to measuring ML performance are limited, as they may overlook classes of situations that may occur rarely but in which the function performs consistently poorly. To combat these difficulties we introduce SACRED, a safety methodology for producing an initial safety case and determining important safety metrics for autonomous systems. The development of SACRED is motivated by the proposed GoA-4 light-rail system in Berlin.

cs.SE↗

arXiv2023

What's my role? Modelling responsibility for AI-based safety-critical systems

AI-Based Safety-Critical Systems (AI-SCS) are being increasingly deployed in the real world. These can pose a risk of harm to people and the environment. Reducing that risk is an overarching priority during development and operation. As more AI-SCS become autonomous, a layer of risk management via human intervention has been removed. Following an accident it will be important to identify causal contributions and the different responsible actors behind those to learn from mistakes and prevent similar future events. Many authors have commented on the "responsibility gap" where it is difficult for developers and manufacturers to be held responsible for harmful behaviour of an AI-SCS. This is due to the complex development cycle for AI, uncertainty in AI performance, and dynamic operating environment. A human operator can become a "liability sink" absorbing blame for the consequences of AI-SCS outputs they weren't responsible for creating, and may not have understanding of. This cross-disciplinary paper considers different senses of responsibility (role, moral, legal and causal), and how they apply in the context of AI-SCS safety. We use a core concept (Actor(A) is responsible for Occurrence(O)) to create role responsibility models, producing a practical method to capture responsibility relationships and provide clarity on the previously identified responsibility issues. Our paper demonstrates the approach with two examples: a retrospective analysis of the Tempe Arizona fatal collision involving an autonomous vehicle, and a safety focused predictive role-responsibility analysis for an AI-based diabetes co-morbidity predictor. In both examples our primary focus is on safety, aiming to reduce unfair or disproportionate blame being placed on operators or developers. We present a discussion and avenues for future research.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2023

A Principles-based Ethics Assurance Argument Pattern for AI and Autonomous Systems

An assurance case is a structured argument, typically produced by safety engineers, to communicate confidence that a critical or complex system, such as an aircraft, will be acceptably safe within its intended context. Assurance cases often inform third party approval of a system. One emerging proposition within the trustworthy AI and autonomous systems (AI/AS) research community is to use assurance cases to instil justified confidence that specific AI/AS will be ethically acceptable when operational in well-defined contexts. This paper substantially develops the proposition and makes it concrete. It brings together the assurance case methodology with a set of ethical principles to structure a principles-based ethics assurance argument pattern. The principles are justice, beneficence, non-maleficence, and respect for human autonomy, with the principle of transparency playing a supporting role. The argument pattern, shortened to the acronym PRAISE, is described. The objective of the proposed PRAISE argument pattern is to provide a reusable template for individual ethics assurance cases, by which engineers, developers, operators, or regulators could justify, communicate, or challenge a claim about the overall ethical acceptability of the use of a specific AI/AS in a given socio-technical context. We apply the pattern to the hypothetical use case of an autonomous robo-taxi service in a city centre.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2022

Safety Assessment for Autonomous Systems' Perception Capabilities

Autonomous Systems (AS) are increasingly proposed, or used, in Safety Critical (SC) applications. Many such systems make use of sophisticated sensor suites and processing to provide scene understanding which informs the AS' decision-making. The sensor processing typically makes use of Machine Learning (ML) and has to work in challenging environments, further the ML-algorithms have known limitations,e.g., the possibility of false-negatives or false-positives in object classification. The well-established safety-analysis methods developed for conventional SC systems are not well-matched to AS, ML, or the sensing systems used by AS. This paper proposes an adaptation of well-established safety-analysis methods to address the specifics of perception-systems for AS, including addressing environmental effects and the potential failure-modes of ML, and provides a rationale for choosing particular sets of guidewords, or prompts, for safety-analysis. It goes on to show how the results of the analysis can be used to inform the design and verification of the AS and illustrates the new method by presenting a partial analysis of a road vehicle. Illustrations in the paper are primarily based on optical sensing, however the paper discusses the applicability of the method to other sensing modalities and its role in a wider safety process addressing the overall capabilities of AS.

eess.SY↗

arXiv2022

The Role of Explainability in Assuring Safety of Machine Learning in Healthcare

Established approaches to assuring safety-critical systems and software are difficult to apply to systems employing ML where there is no clear, pre-defined specification against which to assess validity. This problem is exacerbated by the "opaque" nature of ML where the learnt model is not amenable to human scrutiny. Explainable AI (XAI) methods have been proposed to tackle this issue by producing human-interpretable representations of ML models which can help users to gain confidence and build trust in the ML system. However, little work explicitly investigates the role of explainability for safety assurance in the context of ML development. This paper identifies ways in which XAI methods can contribute to safety assurance of ML-based systems. It then uses a concrete ML-based clinical decision support system, concerning weaning of patients from mechanical ventilation, to demonstrate how XAI methods can be employed to produce evidence to support safety assurance. The results are also represented in a safety argument to show where, and in what way, XAI methods can contribute to a safety case. Overall, we conclude that XAI methods have a valuable role in safety assurance of ML-based systems in healthcare but that they are not sufficient in themselves to assure safety.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2021

A Framework for Assurance of Medication Safety using Machine Learning

Medication errors continue to be the leading cause of avoidable patient harm in hospitals. This paper sets out a framework to assure medication safety that combines machine learning and safety engineering methods. It uses safety analysis to proactively identify potential causes of medication error, based on expert opinion. As healthcare is now data rich, it is possible to augment safety analysis with machine learning to discover actual causes of medication error from the data, and to identify where they deviate from what was predicted in the safety analysis. Combining these two views has the potential to enable the risk of medication errors to be managed proactively and dynamically. We apply the framework to a case study involving thoracic surgery, e.g. oesophagectomy, where errors in giving beta-blockers can be critical to control atrial fibrillation. This case study combines a HAZOP-based safety analysis method known as SHARD with Bayesian network structure learning and process mining to produce the analysis results, showing the potential of the framework for ensuring patient safety, and for transforming the way that safety is managed in complex healthcare environments.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2020

Enhancing Covid-19 Decision-Making by Creating an Assurance Case for Simulation Models

Simulation models have been informing the COVID-19 policy-making process. These models, therefore, have significant influence on risk of societal harms. But how clearly are the underlying modelling assumptions and limitations communicated so that decision-makers can readily understand them? When making claims about risk in safety-critical systems, it is common practice to produce an assurance case, which is a structured argument supported by evidence with the aim to assess how confident we should be in our risk-based decisions. We argue that any COVID-19 simulation model that is used to guide critical policy decisions would benefit from being supported with such a case to explain how, and to what extent, the evidence from the simulation can be relied on to substantiate policy conclusions. This would enable a critical review of the implicit assumptions and inherent uncertainty in modelling, and would give the overall decision-making process greater transparency and accountability.

cs.CY↗