Searcharxiv⌕ Search

arXiv subjects

Jon Kleinberg

Publications and source records attributed to Jon Kleinberg.

At least 55 records · Page 3Linked to original sources

What's in a Niche? Migration Patterns in Online Communities

Broad topics in online platforms represent a type of meso-scale between individual user-defined communities and the whole platform; they typically consist of related communities that address different facets of a shared topic. Users often engage with the topic by moving among the communities within a single category. We find that there are strong regularities in the aggregate pattern of user migration, in that the communities comprising a topic can be ordered in a partial order such that there is more migration in the direction defined by the partial order than against it. Ordered along this overall direction, we find that communities in aggregate become smaller, less toxic, and more linguistically distinctive, suggesting a picture consistent with specialization. We study directions defined not just in the movement of users but also by the movement of URLs and by the direction of mentions from one community to another; each of these produces a consistent direction, but the directions all differ from each other. We show how, collectively, these distinct trends help organize the structure of large online topics and compare our findings across both Reddit and Wikipedia and in simulations.

cs.SI↗

Calibrated Recommendations for Users with Decaying Attention

Recommendation systems capable of providing diverse sets of results are a focus of increasing importance, with motivations ranging from fairness to novelty and other aspects of optimizing user experience. One form of diversity of recent interest is calibration, the notion that personalized recommendations should reflect the full distribution of a user's interests, rather than a single predominant category -- for instance, a user who mainly reads entertainment news but also wants to keep up with news on the environment and the economy would prefer to see a mixture of these genres, not solely entertainment news. Existing work has formulated calibration as a subset selection problem; this line of work observes that the formulation requires the unrealistic assumption that all recommended items receive equal consideration from the user, but leaves as an open question the more realistic setting in which user attention decays as they move down the list of results. In this paper, we consider calibration with decaying user attention under two different models. In both models, there is a set of underlying genres that items can belong to. In the first setting, where items are represented by fine-grained mixtures of genre percentages, we provide a $(1-1/e)$-approximation algorithm by extending techniques for constrained submodular optimization. In the second setting, where items are coarsely binned into a single genre each, we surpass the $(1-1/e)$ barrier imposed by submodular maximization and give a $2/3$-approximate greedy algorithm. Our work thus addresses the problem of capturing ordering effects due to decaying attention, allowing for the extension of near-optimal calibration from recommendation sets to recommendation lists.

cs.DS↗

Equilibria, Efficiency, and Inequality in Network Formation for Hiring and Opportunity

Professional networks -- the social networks among people in a given line of work -- can serve as a conduit for job prospects and other opportunities. Here we propose a model for the formation of such networks and the transfer of opportunities within them. In our theoretical model, individuals strategically connect with others to maximize the probability that they receive opportunities from them. We explore how professional networks balance connectivity, where connections facilitate opportunity transfers to those who did not get them from outside sources, and congestion, where some individuals receive too many opportunities from their connections and waste some of them. We show that strategic individuals are over-connected at equilibrium relative to a social optimum, leading to a price of anarchy for which we derive nearly tight asymptotic bounds. We also show that, at equilibrium, individuals form connections to those who provide similar benefit to them as they provide to others. Thus, our model provides a microfoundation in professional networking contexts for the fundamental sociological principle of homophily, that "similarity breeds connection," which in our setting is realized as a form of status homophily based on alignment in individual benefit. We further explore how, even if individuals are a priori equally likely to receive opportunities from outside sources, equilibria can be unequal, and we provide nearly tight bounds on how unequal they can be. Finally, we explore the ability for online platforms to intervene to improve social welfare and show that natural heuristics may result in adverse effects at equilibrium. Our simple model allows for a surprisingly rich analysis of coordination problems in professional networks and suggests many directions for further exploration.

cs.GT↗

A comprehensive generalization of the Friendship Paradox to weights and attributes

The Friendship Paradox is a simple and powerful statement about node degrees in a graph (Feld 1991). However, it only applies to undirected graphs with no edge weights, and the only node characteristic it concerns is degree. Since many social networks are more complex than that, it is useful to generalize this phenomenon, if possible, and a number of papers have proposed different generalizations. Here, we unify these generalizations in a common framework, retaining the focus on undirected graphs and allowing for weighted edges and for numeric node attributes other than degree to be considered, since this extension allows for a clean characterization and links to the original concepts most naturally. While the original Friendship Paradox and the Weighted Friendship Paradox hold for all graphs, considering non-degree attributes actually makes the extensions fail around 50% of the time, given random attribute assignment. We provide simple correlation-based rules to see whether an attribute-based version of the paradox holds. In addition to theory, our simulation and data results show how all the concepts can be applied to synthetic and real networks. Where applicable, we draw connections to prior work to make this an accessible and comprehensive paper that lets one understand the math behind the Friendship Paradox and its basic extensions.

cs.SI↗

Designing Skill-Compatible AI: Methodologies and Frameworks in Chess

Powerful artificial intelligence systems are often used in settings where they must interact with agents that are computationally much weaker, for example when they work alongside humans or operate in complex environments where some tasks are handled by algorithms, heuristics, or other entities of varying computational power. For AI agents to successfully interact in these settings, however, achieving superhuman performance alone is not sufficient; they also need to account for suboptimal actions or idiosyncratic style from their less-skilled counterparts. We propose a formal evaluation framework for assessing the compatibility of near-optimal AI with interaction partners who may have much lower levels of skill; we use popular collaborative chess variants as model systems to study and develop AI agents that can successfully interact with lower-skill entities. Traditional chess engines designed to output near-optimal moves prove to be inadequate partners when paired with engines of various lower skill levels in this domain, as they are not designed to consider the presence of other agents. We contribute three methodologies to explicitly create skill-compatible AI agents in complex decision-making settings, and two chess game frameworks designed to foster collaboration between powerful AI agents and less-skilled partners. On these frameworks, our agents outperform state-of-the-art chess AI (based on AlphaZero) despite being weaker in conventional chess, demonstrating that skill-compatibility is a tangible trait that is qualitatively and measurably distinct from raw performance. Our evaluations further explore and clarify the mechanisms by which our agents achieve skill-compatibility.

cs.AI↗

Language Generation in the Limit

Although current large language models are complex, the most basic specifications of the underlying language generation problem itself are simple to state: given a finite set of training samples from an unknown language, produce valid new strings from the language that don't already appear in the training data. Here we ask what we can conclude about language generation using only this specification, without further assumptions. In particular, suppose that an adversary enumerates the strings of an unknown target language L that is known only to come from one of a possibly infinite list of candidates. A computational agent is trying to learn to generate from this language; we say that the agent generates from L in the limit if after some finite point in the enumeration of L, the agent is able to produce new elements that come exclusively from L and that have not yet been presented by the adversary. Our main result is that there is an agent that is able to generate in the limit for every countable list of candidate languages. This contrasts dramatically with negative results due to Gold and Angluin in a well-studied model of language learning where the goal is to identify an unknown language from samples; the difference between these results suggests that identifying a language is a fundamentally different problem than generating from it.

cs.DS↗

Modeling reputation-based behavioral biases in school choice

A fundamental component in the theoretical school choice literature is the problem a student faces in deciding which schools to apply to. Recent models have considered a set of schools of different selectiveness and a student who is unsure of their strength and can apply to at most $k$ schools. Such models assume that the student cares solely about maximizing the quality of the school that they attend, but experience suggests that students' decisions are also influenced by a set of behavioral biases based on reputational effects: a subjective reputational benefit when admitted to a selective school, whether or not they attend; and a subjective loss based on disappointment when rejected. Guided by these observations, and inspired by recent behavioral economics work on loss aversion relative to expectations, we propose a behavioral model by which a student chooses schools to balance these behavioral effects with the quality of the school they attend. Our main results show that a student's choices change in dramatic ways when these reputation-based behavioral biases are taken into account. In particular, where a rational applicant spreads their applications evenly, a biased student applies very sparsely to highly selective schools, such that above a certain threshold they apply to only an absolute constant number of schools even as their budget of applications grows to infinity. Consequently, a biased student underperforms a rational student even when the rational student is restricted to a sufficiently large upper bound on applications and the biased student can apply to arbitrarily many. Our analysis shows that the reputation-based model is rich enough to cover a range of different ways that biased students cope with fear of rejection, including not just targeting less selective schools, but also occasionally applying to schools that are too selective, compared to rational students.

cs.GT↗

Arbitrariness and Social Prediction: The Confounding Role of Variance in Fair Classification

Variance in predictions across different trained models is a significant, under-explored source of error in fair binary classification. In practice, the variance on some data examples is so large that decisions can be effectively arbitrary. To investigate this problem, we take an experimental approach and make four overarching contributions: We: 1) Define a metric called self-consistency, derived from variance, which we use as a proxy for measuring and reducing arbitrariness; 2) Develop an ensembling algorithm that abstains from classification when a prediction would be arbitrary; 3) Conduct the largest to-date empirical study of the role of variance (vis-a-vis self-consistency and arbitrariness) in fair binary classification; and, 4) Release a toolkit that makes the US Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) datasets easily usable for future research. Altogether, our experiments reveal shocking insights about the reliability of conclusions on benchmark datasets. Most fair binary classification benchmarks are close-to-fair when taking into account the amount of arbitrariness present in predictions -- before we even try to apply any fairness interventions. This finding calls into question the practical utility of common algorithmic fairness methods, and in turn suggests that we should reconsider how we choose to measure fairness in binary classification.

cs.LG↗

The Moderating Effect of Instant Runoff Voting

Instant runoff voting (IRV) has recently gained popularity as an alternative to plurality voting for political elections, with advocates claiming a range of advantages, including that it produces more moderate winners than plurality and could thus help address polarization. However, there is little theoretical backing for this claim, with existing evidence focused on case studies and simulations. In this work, we prove that IRV has a moderating effect relative to plurality voting in a precise sense, developed in a 1-dimensional Euclidean model of voter preferences. We develop a theory of exclusion zones, derived from properties of the voter distribution, which serve to show how moderate and extreme candidates interact during IRV vote tabulation. The theory allows us to prove that if voters are symmetrically distributed and not too concentrated at the extremes, IRV cannot elect an extreme candidate over a moderate. In contrast, we show plurality can and validate our results computationally. Our methods provide new frameworks for the analysis of voting systems, deriving exact winner distributions geometrically and establishing a connection between plurality voting and stick-breaking processes.

cs.MA↗

On the Relationship Between Relevance and Conflict in Online Social Link Recommendations

In an online social network, link recommendations are a way for users to discover relevant links to people they may know, thereby potentially increasing their engagement on the platform. However, the addition of links to a social network can also have an effect on the level of conflict in the network -- expressed in terms of polarization and disagreement. To this date, however, we have very little understanding of how these two implications of link formation relate to each other: are the goals of high relevance and conflict reduction aligned, or are the links that users are most likely to accept fundamentally different from the ones with the greatest potential for reducing conflict? Here we provide the first analysis of this question, using the recently popular Friedkin-Johnsen model of opinion dynamics. We first present a surprising result on how link additions shift the level of opinion conflict, followed by explanation work that relates the amount of shift to structural features of the added links. We then characterize the gap in conflict reduction between the set of links achieving the largest reduction and the set of links achieving the highest relevance. The gap is measured on real-world data, based on instantiations of relevance defined by 13 link recommendation algorithms. We find that some, but not all, of the more accurate algorithms actually lead to better reduction of conflict. Our work suggests that social links recommended for increasing user engagement may not be as conflict-provoking as people might have thought.

cs.SI↗

From Graphs to Hypergraphs: Hypergraph Projection and its Remediation

We study the implications of the modeling choice to use a graph, instead of a hypergraph, to represent real-world interconnected systems whose constituent relationships are of higher order by nature. Such a modeling choice typically involves an underlying projection process that maps the original hypergraph onto a graph, and is common in graph-based analysis. While hypergraph projection can potentially lead to loss of higher-order relations, there exists very limited studies on the consequences of doing so, as well as its remediation. This work fills this gap by doing two things: (1) we develop analysis based on graph and set theory, showing two ubiquitous patterns of hyperedges that are root to structural information loss in all hypergraph projections; we also quantify the combinatorial impossibility of recovering the lost higher-order structures if no extra help is provided; (2) we still seek to recover the lost higher-order structures in hypergraph projection, and in light of (1)'s findings we propose to relax the problem into a learning-based setting. Under this setting, we develop a learning-based hypergraph reconstruction method based on an important statistic of hyperedge distributions that we find. Our reconstruction method is evaluated on 8 real-world datasets under different settings, and exhibits consistently good performance. We also demonstrate benefits of the reconstructed hypergraphs via use cases of protein rankings and link predictions.

cs.LG↗

The Challenge of Understanding What Users Want: Inconsistent Preferences and Engagement Optimization

Online platforms have a wealth of data, run countless experiments and use industrial-scale algorithms to optimize user experience. Despite this, many users seem to regret the time they spend on these platforms. One possible explanation is misaligned incentives: platforms are not optimizing for user happiness. We suggest the problem runs deeper, transcending the specific incentives of any particular platform, and instead stems from a mistaken foundational assumption: To understand what users want, platforms look at what users do. Yet research has demonstrated, and personal experience affirms, that we often make choices in the moment that are inconsistent with what we actually want. In this work, we develop a model of media consumption where users have inconsistent preferences. We consider a platform which simply wants to maximize user utility, but only observes user engagement. We show how our model of users' preference inconsistencies produces phenomena that are familiar from everyday experience, but difficult to capture in traditional user interaction models. A key ingredient in our model is a formulation for how platforms determine what to show users: they optimize over a large set of potential content (the content manifold) parametrized by underlying features of the content. Whether improving engagement improves user welfare depends on the direction of movement in the content manifold: for certain directions of change, increasing engagement makes users less happy, while in other directions, increasing engagement makes users happier. We characterize the structure of content manifolds for which increasing engagement fails to increase user utility. By linking these effects to abstractions of platform design choices, our model thus creates a theoretical framework and vocabulary in which to explore interactions between design, behavioral science, and social media.

cs.SI↗

Content Moderation and the Formation of Online Communities: A Theoretical Framework

We study the impact of content moderation policies in online communities. In our theoretical model, a platform chooses a content moderation policy and individuals choose whether or not to participate in the community according to the fraction of user content that aligns with their preferences. The effects of content moderation, at first blush, might seem obvious: it restricts speech on a platform. However, when user participation decisions are taken into account, its effects can be more subtle $\unicode{x2013}$ and counter-intuitive. For example, our model can straightforwardly demonstrate how moderation policies may increase participation and diversify content available on the platform. In our analysis, we explore a rich set of interconnected phenomena related to content moderation in online communities. We first characterize the effectiveness of a natural class of moderation policies for creating and sustaining stable communities. Building on this, we explore how resource-limited or ideological platforms might set policies, how communities are affected by differing levels of personalization, and competition between platforms. Our model provides a vocabulary and mathematically tractable framework for analyzing platform decisions about content moderation.

cs.DS↗

Strategic Evaluation: Subjects, Evaluators, and Society

A broad current application of algorithms is in formal and quantitative measures of murky concepts -- like merit -- to make decisions. When people strategically respond to these sorts of evaluations in order to gain favorable decision outcomes, their behavior can be subjected to moral judgments. They may be described as 'gaming the system' or 'cheating,' or (in other cases) investing 'honest effort' or 'improving.' Machine learning literature on strategic behavior has tried to describe these dynamics by emphasizing the efforts expended by decision subjects hoping to obtain a more favorable assessment -- some works offer ways to preempt or prevent such manipulations, some differentiate 'gaming' from 'improvement' behavior, while others aim to measure the effort burden or disparate effects of classification systems. We begin from a different starting point: that the design of an evaluation itself can be understood as furthering goals held by the evaluator which may be misaligned with broader societal goals. To develop the idea that evaluation represents a strategic interaction in which both the evaluator and the subject of their evaluation are operating out of self-interest, we put forward a model that represents the process of evaluation using three interacting agents: a decision subject, an evaluator, and society, representing a bundle of values and oversight mechanisms. We highlight our model's applicability to a number of social systems where one or two players strategically undermine the others' interests to advance their own. Treating evaluators as themselves strategic allows us to re-cast the scrutiny directed at decision subjects, towards the incentives that underpin institutional designs of evaluations. The moral standing of strategic behaviors often depend on the moral standing of the evaluations and incentives that provoke such behaviors.

cs.CY↗

On the Actionability of Outcome Prediction

Predicting future outcomes is a prevalent application of machine learning in social impact domains. Examples range from predicting student success in education to predicting disease risk in healthcare. Practitioners recognize that the ultimate goal is not just to predict but to act effectively. Increasing evidence suggests that relying on outcome predictions for downstream interventions may not have desired results. In most domains there exists a multitude of possible interventions for each individual, making the challenge of taking effective action more acute. Even when causal mechanisms connecting the individual's latent states to outcomes is well understood, in any given instance (a specific student or patient), practitioners still need to infer -- from budgeted measurements of latent states -- which of many possible interventions will be most effective for this individual. With this in mind, we ask: when are accurate predictors of outcomes helpful for identifying the most suitable intervention? Through a simple model encompassing actions, latent states, and measurements, we demonstrate that pure outcome prediction rarely results in the most effective policy for taking actions, even when combined with other measurements. We find that except in cases where there is a single decisive action for improving the outcome, outcome prediction never maximizes "action value", the utility of taking actions. Making measurements of actionable latent states, where specific actions lead to desired outcomes, considerably enhances the action value compared to outcome prediction, and the degree of improvement depends on action costs and the outcome model. This analysis emphasizes the need to go beyond generic outcome prediction in interventional settings by incorporating knowledge of plausible actions and latent states.

cs.LG↗

Reconciling the accuracy-diversity trade-off in recommendations

In recommendation settings, there is an apparent trade-off between the goals of accuracy (to recommend items a user is most likely to want) and diversity (to recommend items representing a range of categories). As such, real-world recommender systems often explicitly incorporate diversity separately from accuracy. This approach, however, leaves a basic question unanswered: Why is there a trade-off in the first place? We show how the trade-off can be explained via a user's consumption constraints -- users typically only consume a few of the items they are recommended. In a stylized model we introduce, objectives that account for this constraint induce diverse recommendations, while objectives that do not account for this constraint induce homogeneous recommendations. This suggests that accuracy and diversity appear misaligned because standard accuracy metrics do not consider consumption constraints. Our model yields precise and interpretable characterizations of diversity in different settings, giving practical insights into the design of diverse recommendations.

cs.IR↗

Node-based Generalized Friendship Paradox fails

The Friendship Paradox--the principle that "your friends have more friends than you do"--is a combinatorial fact about degrees in a graph; but given that many web-based social activities are correlated with a user's degree, this fact has been taken more broadly to suggest the empirical principle that "your friends are also more active than you are." This Generalized Friendship Paradox, the notion that any attribute positively correlated with degree obeys the Friendship Paradox, has been established mathematically in a network-level version that essentially aggregates uniformly over all the edges of a network. Here we show, however, that the natural node-based version of the Generalized Friendship Paradox--which aggregates over nodes, not edges--may fail, even for degree-attribute correlations approaching 1. Whether this version holds depends not only on degree-attribute correlations, but also on the underlying network structure and thus can't be said to be a universal phenomenon. We establish both positive and negative results for this node-based version of the Generalized Friendship Paradox and consider its implications for social-network data.

cs.SI↗

Models of fairness in federated learning

In many real-world situations, data is distributed across multiple self-interested agents. These agents can collaborate to build a machine learning model based on data from multiple agents, potentially reducing the error each experiences. However, sharing models in this way raises questions of fairness: to what extent can the error experienced by one agent be significantly lower than the error experienced by another agent in the same coalition? In this work, we consider two notions of fairness that each may be appropriate in different circumstances: "egalitarian fairness" (which aims to bound how dissimilar error rates can be) and "proportional fairness" (which aims to reward players for contributing more data). We similarly consider two common methods of model aggregation, one where a single model is created for all agents (uniform), and one where an individualized model is created for each agent. For egalitarian fairness, we obtain a tight multiplicative bound on how widely error rates can diverge between agents collaborating (which holds for both aggregation methods). For proportional fairness, we show that the individualized aggregation method always gives a small player error that is upper bounded by proportionality. For uniform aggregation, we show that this upper bound is guaranteed for any individually rational coalition (where no player wishes to leave to do local learning).

cs.CY↗