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José Correa

Publications and source records attributed to José Correa.

17 recordsLinked to original sources

About a ball removal process on bins

We consider a basic balls-and-bins question in which you have to distribute $n$ balls into $k$ bins. Then, round by round, a ball is removed from a non-empty bin chosen uniformly at random. The process ends when a single non-empty bin remains. The goal is to minimize the expected number of remaining balls. An open problem posed by Will Ma asks whether the initial assignment that minimizes the expected number of remaining balls is one that is as balanced as possible. Using a coupling argument, we answer this conjecture positively, and we discuss the case of non-uniform choice among the non-empty bins.

math.PR↗

Threshold Dynamics and Correlated Prophet Inequalities

Prophet inequalities have become a central tool for analyzing the performance of online algorithms. However, most existing results assume that input random variables are independent, which limits their applicability. Motivated by this gap, we study prophet inequalities under two correlation models induced by a latent state of the world variable $Z$. In the common-base model, the algorithm observes the sequence $Z+X_1,\dots,Z+X_n$. We analyze single-threshold algorithms with the constraint that they always accept the final item, guaranteeing a reward of at least $Z$. When $Z$ is chosen adversarially, we characterize the optimal deterministic algorithm of this form, achieving a competitive ratio of $0.381$. We then show that randomizing improves the guarantee to $0.4$. By a minimax argument, the same ratio is achievable when $Z$ is random. We depart from standard techniques by establishing a stronger lower bound of $0.41$ and an upper bound of $0.475$, ruling out the possibility that this class of algorithms attains the $1/2$ ratio known for independent inputs. The core technical contribution is a new analytical framework that captures the reward dynamics of single-threshold algorithms. We introduce a differential equation characterizing the expected reward of a threshold in the worst-case instance, parameterized by the distribution of the maximum. This equation admits a closed-form and unifies known single-threshold prophet inequalities, yielding a simple threshold-optimality condition applicable to the common-base model. Finally, we study the common-scale model, where inputs take the form $Z\cdot X_1,\dots,Z\cdot X_n$. We show that this minimal multiplicative correlation yields strong impossibility results: no algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio exceeding $1/n$.

cs.GT↗

The Increasing Gap Dynamics in a General Spatial Matching Model

We study a representation of a problem that appears in numerous transport systems: $N$ servers distributed over a given space (e.g., cars on an urban network), receive random requests from arriving users who get assigned to the closest server, after which this server is replaced by a new one at a random location. We show that this creates a negative feedback loop, which we call \textit{Increasing Gap Dynamics} (IGD): when a server is assigned a spatial gap forms, which is more likely to attract new users that further widen the gap. The simplest version of our model is a one-dimensional circle, for which we derive analytical results showing that the system converges to an inefficient equilibrium, worse than both balanced and fully random distributions of servers. We prove that an optimal assignment policy always matches the user to one of its two neighbouring servers so that long gaps tend to widen. Hence, the IGD persists even when assigning optimally rather than greedily. In two dimensions, the appearance of the IGD is illustrated through simulations on a square region. Finally, simulations of a proper ride-hailing system using real data from Manhattan confirms that the IGD arises and that it is responsible for the appearance of the well-known Wild Goose Chase.

math.OC↗

The Role of Commitment in Optimal Stopping

We investigate the role of commitment in optimal stopping by studying all the variants between Prophet Inequality (PI) and Pandora's Box (PB). Both problems deal with a set of variables drawn from known distributions. In PI the gambler observes an adversarial order of these variables with the goal of selecting one that maximizes the expected value against a prophet who knows the exact values realized. The gambler has to irrevocably decide at each step whether to select the value or discard it (commitment). On the other hand, in PB the gambler selects the order of inspecting the variables and for each pays an observation cost to see the actual value realized, aiming to choose one to maximize the net cost of the value chosen minus the observation cost paid. The gambler in PB can return and select any variable already seen (no commitment). For all the variants between these problems that arise by changing parameters such as (1) commitment (2) observation cost (3) order selection, we concisely summarize the known results and fill the gaps of variants not yet studied. We also uncover connections to Ski-Rental, a classic online algorithm problem.

cs.DS↗

Posted Pricing and Competition in Large Markets

Posted price mechanisms are prevalent in allocating goods within online marketplaces due to their simplicity and practical efficiency. We explore a fundamental scenario where buyers' valuations are independent and identically distributed, focusing specifically on the allocation of a single unit. Inspired by the rapid growth and scalability of modern online marketplaces, we investigate optimal performance guarantees under the assumption of a significantly large market. We show a large market benefit when using fixed prices, improving the known guarantee of $1-1/e\approx 0.632$ to $0.712$. We then study the case of selling $k$ identical units, and we prove that the optimal fixed price guarantee approaches $1-1/\sqrt{2k π}$, which implies that the large market advantage vanishes as $k$ grows. We use real-world auction data to test our fixed price policies in the large market regime. Next, under the large market assumption, we show that the competition complexity for the optimal posted price mechanism is constant, and we identify precise scaling factors for the number of bidders that enable it to match benchmark performance. Remarkably, our findings break previously established worst-case impossibility results, underscoring the practical robustness and efficiency of posted pricing in large-scale marketplaces.

cs.GT↗

New Combinatorial Insights for Monotone Apportionment

The apportionment problem constitutes a fundamental problem in democratic societies: How to distribute a fixed number of seats among a set of states in proportion to the states' populations? This--seemingly simple--task has led to a rich literature and has become well known in the context of the US House of Representatives. In this paper, we connect the design of monotone apportionment methods to classic problems from discrete geometry and combinatorial optimization and explore the extent to which randomization can enhance proportionality. We first focus on the well-studied family of stationary divisor methods, which satisfy the strong population monotonicity property, and show that this family produces only a slightly superlinear number of different outputs as a function of the number of states. While our upper and lower bounds leave a small gap, we show that--surprisingly--closing this gap would solve a long-standing open problem from discrete geometry, known as the complexity of $k$-levels in line arrangements. The main downside of divisor methods is their violation of the quota axiom, i.e., every state should receive $\lfloor q_i\rfloor$ or $\lceil q_i\rceil$ seats, where $q_i$ is the proportional share of the state. As we show that randomizing over divisor methods can only partially overcome this issue, we propose a relaxed version of divisor methods in which the total number of seats may slightly deviate from the house size. By randomizing over them, we can simultaneously satisfy population monotonicity, quota, and ex-ante proportionality. Finally, we turn our attention to quota-compliant methods that are house-monotone, i.e., no state may lose a seat when the house size is increased. We provide a polyhedral characterization based on network flows, which implies a simple description of all ex-ante proportional randomized methods that are house-monotone and quota-compliant.

cs.GT↗

Proportionality in Multiple Dimensions to Design Electoral Systems

How to elect the representatives in legislative bodies is a question that every modern democracy has to answer. This design task has to consider various elements so as to fulfill the citizens' expectations and contribute to the maintenance of a healthy democracy. The notion of proportionality, in that the support of a given idea in the house should be nearly proportional to its support in the general public, lies at the core of this design task. In the last decades, demographic aspects beyond political support have been incorporated by requiring that they are also fairly represented in the body, giving rise to a multidimensional version of the apportionment problem. In this work, we provide an axiomatic justification for a recently proposed notion of multidimensional proportionality and extend it to encompass two relevant constraints often used in electoral systems: a threshold on the number of votes that a list needs in order to be eligible and the election of the most-voted candidate in each district. We then build upon these results to design methods based on multidimensional proportionality. We use the Chilean Constitutional Convention election (May 15-16, 2021) results as a testing ground -- where the dimensions are given by political lists, districts, and genders -- and compare the apportionment obtained under each method according to three criteria: proportionality, representativeness, and voting power. While local and global methods exhibit a natural trade-off between local and global proportionality, including the election of most-voted candidates on top of methods based on 3-dimensional proportionality allows us to incorporate both notions while ensuring higher levels of representativeness and a balanced voting power.

cs.GT↗

Monotone Randomized Apportionment

Apportionment is the act of distributing the seats of a legislature among political parties (or states) in proportion to their vote shares (or populations). A famous impossibility by Balinski and Young (2001) shows that no apportionment method can be proportional up to one seat (quota) while also responding monotonically to changes in the votes (population monotonicity). Grimmett (2004) proposed to overcome this impossibility by randomizing the apportionment, which can achieve quota as well as perfect proportionality and monotonicity -- at least in terms of the expected number of seats awarded to each party. Still, the correlations between the seats awarded to different parties may exhibit bizarre non-monotonicities. When parties or voters care about joint events, such as whether a coalition of parties reaches a majority, these non-monotonicities can cause paradoxes, including incentives for strategic voting. In this paper, we propose monotonicity axioms ruling out these paradoxes, and study which of them can be satisfied jointly with Grimmett's axioms. Essentially, we require that, if a set of parties all receive more votes, the probability of those parties jointly receiving more seats should increase. Our work draws on a rich literature on unequal probability sampling in statistics (studied as dependent randomized rounding in computer science). Our main result shows that a sampling scheme due to Sampford (1967) satisfies Grimmett's axioms and a notion of higher-order correlation monotonicity.

cs.GT↗

Dynamic pricing with Bayesian updates from online reviews

When launching new products, firms face uncertainty about market reception. Online reviews provide valuable information not only to consumers but also to firms, allowing firms to adjust the product characteristics, including its selling price. In this paper, we consider a pricing model with online reviews in which the quality of the product is uncertain, and both the seller and the buyers Bayesianly update their beliefs to make purchasing & pricing decisions. We model the seller's pricing problem as a basic bandits' problem and show a close connection with the celebrated Catalan numbers, allowing us to efficiently compute the overall future discounted reward of the seller. With this tool, we analyze and compare the optimal static and dynamic pricing strategies in terms of the probability of effectively learning the quality of the product.

cs.LG↗

The Competition Complexity of Prophet Inequalities

We study the classic single-choice prophet inequality problem through a resource augmentation lens. Our goal is to bound the $(1-\varepsilon)$-competition complexity of different types of online algorithms. This metric asks for the smallest $k$ such that the expected value of the online algorithm on $k$ copies of the original instance, is at least a $(1-\varepsilon)$-approximation to the expected offline optimum on a single copy. We show that block threshold algorithms, which set one threshold per copy, are optimal and give a tight bound of $k = Θ(\log \log 1/\varepsilon)$. This shows that block threshold algorithms approach the offline optimum doubly-exponentially fast. For single threshold algorithms, we give a tight bound of $k = Θ(\log 1/\varepsilon)$, establishing an exponential gap between block threshold algorithms and single threshold algorithms. Our model and results pave the way for exploring resource-augmented prophet inequalities in combinatorial settings. In line with this, we present preliminary findings for bipartite matching with one-sided vertex arrivals, as well as in XOS combinatorial auctions. Our results have a natural competition complexity interpretation in mechanism design and pricing applications.

cs.GT↗

Trading Prophets

In this work we initiate the study of buy-and-sell prophet inequalities. We start by considering what is arguably the most fundamental setting. In this setting the online algorithm observes a sequence of prices one after the other. At each time step, the online algorithm can decide to buy and pay the current price if it does not hold the item already; or it can decide to sell and collect the current price as a reward if it holds the item. We show that for i.i.d. prices a single-threshold online algorithm achieves at least $1/2$ of the expected profit of the optimal offline algorithm and we prove that this is optimal. For non-i.i.d. prices in random order, where prices are no longer independent, we give a single-threshold online algorithm that achieves at least a $1/16$ fraction of the expected profit of the optimal offline algorithm. We also show that for this setting no online algorithm can yield a better than $1/3$ approximation, and thus establish a formal separation from the i.i.d. case. On the other hand, we present a threshold-based online algorithm for this setting that yields a $1/2-o(1)$ approximation. For non-i.i.d. prices no approximation is possible. We use the results for these base cases to solve a variety of more complex settings. For instance, we show a $1/2-o(1)$ approximation for settings where prices are affiliated and the online algorithm has only access to a single sample. We also extend our upper and lower bounds for the single item case to $k$ items, and thus in particular show that it is impossible to achieve $1-o(1)$ approximations. For the budgeted version, where fractions of an item can be bought, and gains can be reinvested, we show a constant-factor approximation to the optimal offline algorithm's growth rate. In a setting with $k$ item types and price streams, we achieve a $Ω(1/k)$ approximation for the unit-capacity case, which is optimal.

cs.DS↗

Long term behavior of dynamic equilibria in fluid queuing networks

A fluid queuing network constitutes one of the simplest models in which to study flow dynamics over a network. In this model we have a single source-sink pair and each link has a per-time-unit capacity and a transit time. A dynamic equilibrium (or equilibrium flow over time) is a flow pattern over time such that no flow particle has incentives to unilaterally change its path. Although the model has been around for almost fifty years, only recently results regarding existence and characterization of equilibria have been obtained. In particular the long term behavior remains poorly understood. Our main result in this paper is to show that, under a natural (and obviously necessary) condition on the queuing capacity, a dynamic equilibrium reaches a steady state (after which queue lengths remain constant) in finite time. Previously, it was not even known that queue lengths would remain bounded. The proof is based on the analysis of a rather non-obvious potential function that turns out to be monotone along the evolution of the equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that the steady state is characterized as an optimal solution of a certain linear program. When this program has a unique solution, which occurs generically, the long term behavior is completely predictable. On the contrary, if the linear program has multiple solutions the steady state is more difficult to identify as it depends on the whole temporal evolution of the equilibrium.

cs.GT↗

Optimal Revenue Guarantees for Pricing in Large Markets

Posted price mechanisms (PPM) constitute one of the predominant practices to price goods in online marketplaces and their revenue guarantees have been a central object of study in the last decade. We consider a basic setting where the buyers' valuations are independent and identically distributed and there is a single unit on sale. It is well-known that this setting is equivalent to the so-called i.i.d. prophet inequality, for which optimal guarantees are known and evaluate to 0.745 in general (equivalent to a PPM with dynamic prices) and $1 - 1/e \approx 0.632$ in the fixed threshold case (equivalent to a fixed price PPM). In this paper we consider an additional assumption, namely, that the underlying market is very large. This is modeled by first fixing a valuation distribution F and then making the number of buyers grow large, rather than considering the worst distribution for each possible market size. In this setting Kennedy and Kertz [Ann. Probab. 1991] breaks the 0.745 fraction achievable in general with a dynamic threshold policy. We prove that this large market benefit continue to hold when using fixed price PPMs, and show that the guarantee of 0.632 actually improves to 0.712. We then move to study the case of selling k identical units and we prove that the revenue gap of the fixed price PPM approaches $1-1/\sqrt{ 2kπ}$. As this bound is achievable without the large market assumption, we obtain the somewhat surprising result that the large market advantage vanishes as $k$ grows.

math.OC↗

Sample-driven optimal stopping: From the secretary problem to the i.i.d. prophet inequality

We take a unifying approach to single selection optimal stopping problems with random arrival order and independent sampling of items. In the problem we consider, a decision maker (DM) initially gets to sample each of $N$ items independently with probability $p$, and can observe the relative rankings of these sampled items. Then, the DM faces the remaining items in an online fashion, observing the relative rankings of all revealed items. While scanning the sequence the DM makes irrevocable stop/continue decisions and her reward for stopping the sequence facing the item with rank $i$ is $Y_i$. The goal of the DM is to maximize her reward. We start by studying the case in which the values $Y_i$ are known to the DM, and then move to the case in which these values are adversarial. For the former case, we write the natural linear program that captures the performance of an algorithm, and take its continuous limit. We prove a structural result about this continuous limit, which allows us to reduce the problem to a relatively simple real optimization problem. We establish that the optimal algorithm is given by a sequence of thresholds $t_1\le t_2\le\cdots$ such that the DM should stop if seeing an item with current ranking $i$ after time $t_i$. Additionally we are able to recover several classic results in the area such as those for secretary problem and the minimum ranking problem. For the adversarial case, we obtain a similar linear program with an additional stochastic dominance constraint. Using the same machinery we are able to pin down the optimal competitive ratios for all values of $p$. Notably, we prove that as $p$ approaches 1, our guarantee converges linearly to 0.745, matching that of the i.i.d.~prophet inequality. Also interesting is the case $p=1/2$, where our bound evaluates to $0.671$, which improves upon the state of the art.

cs.GT↗

Unknown I.I.D. Prophets: Better Bounds, Streaming Algorithms, and a New Impossibility

A prophet inequality states, for some $α\in[0,1]$, that the expected value achievable by a gambler who sequentially observes random variables $X_1,\dots,X_n$ and selects one of them is at least an $α$ fraction of the maximum value in the sequence. We obtain three distinct improvements for a setting that was first studied by Correa et al. (EC, 2019) and is particularly relevant to modern applications in algorithmic pricing. In this setting, the random variables are i.i.d. from an unknown distribution and the gambler has access to an additional $βn$ samples for some $β\geq 0$. We first give improved lower bounds on $α$ for a wide range of values of $β$; specifically, $α\geq(1+β)/e$ when $β\leq 1/(e-1)$, which is tight, and $α\geq 0.648$ when $β=1$, which improves on a bound of around $0.635$ due to Correa et al. (SODA, 2020). Adding to their practical appeal, specifically in the context of algorithmic pricing, we then show that the new bounds can be obtained even in a streaming model of computation and thus in situations where the use of relevant data is complicated by the sheer amount of data available. We finally establish that the upper bound of $1/e$ for the case without samples is robust to additional information about the distribution, and applies also to sequences of i.i.d. random variables whose distribution is itself drawn, according to a known distribution, from a finite set of known candidate distributions. This implies a tight prophet inequality for exchangeable sequences of random variables, answering a question of Hill and Kertz (Contemporary Mathematics, 1992), but leaves open the possibility of better guarantees when the number of candidate distributions is small, a setting we believe is of strong interest to applications.

cs.DS↗

The Secretary Problem with Independent Sampling

In the secretary problem we are faced with an online sequence of elements with values. Upon seeing an element we have to make an irrevocable take-it-or-leave-it decision. The goal is to maximize the probability of picking the element of maximum value. The most classic version of the problem is that in which the elements arrive in random order and their values are arbitrary. However, by varying the available information, new interesting problems arise. Also the case in which the arrival order is adversarial instead of random leads to interesting variants that have been considered in the literature. In this paper we study both the random order and adversarial order secretary problems with an additional twist. The values are arbitrary, but before starting the online sequence we independently sample each element with a fixed probability $p$. The sampled elements become our information or history set and the game is played over the remaining elements. We call these problems the random order secretary problem with $p$-sampling (ROS$p$ for short) and the adversarial order secretary problem with $p$-sampling (AOS$p$ for short). Our main result is to obtain best possible algorithms for both problems and all values of $p$. As $p$ grows to 1 the obtained guarantees converge to the optimal guarantees in the full information case. In the adversarial order setting, the best possible algorithm turns out to be a simple fixed threshold algorithm in which the optimal threshold is a function of $p$ only. In the random order setting we prove that the best possible algorithm is characterized by a fixed sequence of time thresholds, dictating at which point in time we should start accepting a value that is both a maximum of the online sequence and has a given ranking within the sampled elements.

cs.GT↗

The Two-Sided Game of Googol and Sample-Based Prophet Inequalities

The secretary problem or the game of Googol are classic models for online selection problems that have received significant attention in the last five decades. We consider a variant of the problem and explore its connections to data-driven online selection. Specifically, we are given $n$ cards with arbitrary non-negative numbers written on both sides. The cards are randomly placed on $n$ consecutive positions on a table, and for each card, the visible side is also selected at random. The player sees the visible side of all cards and wants to select the card with the maximum hidden value. To this end, the player flips the first card, sees its hidden value and decides whether to pick it or drop it and continue with the next card. We study algorithms for two natural objectives. In the first one, as in the secretary problem, the player wants to maximize the probability of selecting the maximum hidden value. We show that this can be done with probability at least $0.45292$. In the second one, similar to the prophet inequality, the player maximizes the expectation of the selected hidden value. We show a guarantee of at least $0.63518$ with respect to the expected maximum hidden value. Our algorithms result from combining three basic strategies. One is to stop whenever we see a value larger than the initial $n$ visible numbers. The second one is to stop the first time the last flipped card's value is the largest of the currently $n$ visible numbers in the table. And the third one is similar to the latter but it additionally requires that the last flipped value is larger than the value on the other side of its card. We apply our results to the prophet secretary problem with unknown distributions, but with access to a single sample from each distribution. Our guarantee improves upon $1-1/e$ for this problem, which is the currently best known guarantee and only works for the i.i.d. case.

cs.DS↗