arXiv subjects

Joseph Y. Halpern

Publications and source records attributed to Joseph Y. Halpern.

At least 73 records · Page 4Linked to original sources

arXiv2016

Decentralised Norm Monitoring in Open Multi-Agent Systems

We consider the problem of detecting norm violations in open multi-agent systems (MAS). We show how, using ideas from scrip systems, we can design mechanisms where the agents comprising the MAS are incentivised to monitor the actions of other agents for norm violations. The cost of providing the incentives is not borne by the MAS and does not come from fines charged for norm violations (fines may be impossible to levy in a system where agents are free to leave and rejoin again under a different identity). Instead, monitoring incentives come from (scrip) fees for accessing the services provided by the MAS. In some cases, perfect monitoring (and hence enforcement) can be achieved: no norms will be violated in equilibrium. In other cases, we show that, while it is impossible to achieve perfect enforcement, we can get arbitrarily close; we can make the probability of a norm violation in equilibrium arbitrarily small. We show using simulations that our theoretical results hold for multi-agent systems with as few as 1000 agents---the system rapidly converges to the steady-state distribution of scrip tokens necessary to ensure monitoring and then remains close to the steady state.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2015

A Symbolic Logic with Concrete Bounds for Cryptographic Protocols

We present a formal logic for quantitative reasoning about security properties of network protocols. The system allows us to derive concrete security bounds that can be used to choose key lengths and other security parameters. We provide axioms for reasoning about digital signatures and random nonces, with security properties based on the concrete security of signature schemes and pseudorandom number generators (PRG). The formal logic supports first-order reasoning and reasoning about protocol invariants, taking concrete security bounds into account. Proofs constructed in our logic also provide conventional asymptotic security guarantees because of the way that concrete bounds accumulate in proofs. As an illustrative example, we use the formal logic to prove an authentication property with concrete bounds of a signature-based challenge-response protocol.

cs.LO↗

arXiv2015

Appropriate Causal Models and the Stability of Causation

Causal models defined in terms of structural equations have proved to be quite a powerful way of representing knowledge regarding causality. However, a number of authors have given examples that seem to show that the Halpern-Pearl (HP) definition of causality gives intuitively unreasonable answers. Here it is shown that, for each of these examples, we can give two stories consistent with the description in the example, such that intuitions regarding causality are quite different for each story. By adding additional variables, we can disambiguate the stories. Moreover, in the resulting causal models, the HP definition of causality gives the intuitively correct answer. It is also shown that, by adding extra variables, a modification to the original HP definition made to deal with an example of Hopkins and Pearl may not be necessary. Given how much can be done by adding extra variables, there might be a concern that the notion of causality is somewhat unstable. Can adding extra variables in a "conservative" way (i.e., maintaining all the relations between the variables in the original model) cause the answer to the question "Is X=x a cause of Y=y" to alternate between "yes" and "no"? It is shown that we can have such alternation infinitely often, but if we take normality into consideration, we cannot. Indeed, under appropriate normality assumptions. adding an extra variable can change the answer from "yes" to "no", but after that, it cannot cannot change back to "yes".

cs.AI↗

arXiv2015

On the Non-Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Games with Resource-Bounded Players

We consider sequences of games $\mathcal{G}=\{G_1,G_2,\ldots\}$ where, for all $n$, $G_n$ has the same set of players. Such sequences arise in the analysis of running time of players in games, in electronic money systems such as Bitcoin and in cryptographic protocols. Assuming that one-way functions exist, we prove that there is a sequence of 2-player zero-sum Bayesian games $\mathcal{G}$ such that, for all $n$, the size of every action in $G_n$ is polynomial in $n$, the utility function is polynomial computable in $n$, and yet there is no polynomial-time Nash equilibrium, where we use a notion of Nash equilibrium that is tailored to sequences of games. We also demonstrate that Nash equilibrium may not exist when considering players that are constrained to perform at most $T$ computational steps in each of the games $\{G_i\}_{i=1}^{\infty}$. These examples may shed light on competitive settings where the availability of more running time or faster algorithms lead to a "computational arms race", precluding the existence of equilibrium. They also point to inherent limitations of concepts such "best response" and Nash equilibrium in games with resource-bounded players.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2015

Minimizing Regret in Dynamic Decision Problems

The menu-dependent nature of regret-minimization creates subtleties when it is applied to dynamic decision problems. Firstly, it is not clear whether \emph{forgone opportunities} should be included in the \emph{menu}, with respect to which regrets are computed, at different points of the decision problem. If forgone opportunities are included, however, we can characterize when a form of dynamic consistency is guaranteed. Secondly, more subtleties arise when sophistication is used to deal with dynamic inconsistency. In the full version of this paper, we examine, axiomatically and by common examples, the implications of different menu definitions for sophisticated, regret-minimizing agents.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2015

Why Bother With Syntax?

This short note discusses the role of syntax vs. semantics and the interplay between logic, philosophy, and language in computer science and game theory.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2015

Computational Extensive-Form Games

We define solution concepts appropriate for computationally bounded players playing a fixed finite game. To do so, we need to define what it means for a \emph{computational game}, which is a sequence of games that get larger in some appropriate sense, to represent a single finite underlying extensive-form game. Roughly speaking, we require all the games in the sequence to have essentially the same structure as the underlying game, except that two histories that are indistinguishable (i.e., in the same information set) in the underlying game may correspond to histories that are only computationally indistinguishable in the computational game. We define a computational version of both Nash equilibrium and sequential equilibrium for computational games, and show that every Nash (resp., sequential) equilibrium in the underlying game corresponds to a computational Nash (resp., sequential) equilibrium in the computational game. One advantage of our approach is that if a cryptographic protocol represents an abstract game, then we can analyze its strategic behavior in the abstract game, and thus separate the cryptographic analysis of the protocol from the strategic analysis.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2015

A Modification of the Halpern-Pearl Definition of Causality

The original Halpern-Pearl definition of causality [Halpern and Pearl, 2001] was updated in the journal version of the paper [Halpern and Pearl, 2005] to deal with some problems pointed out by Hopkins and Pearl [2003]. Here the definition is modified yet again, in a way that (a) leads to a simpler definition, (b) handles the problems pointed out by Hopkins and Pearl, and many others, (c) gives reasonable answers (that agree with those of the original and updated definition) in the standard problematic examples of causality, and (d) has lower complexity than either the original or updated definitions.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2015

The Truth Behind the Myth of the Folk Theorem

We study the problem of computing an $ε$-Nash equilibrium in repeated games. Earlier work by Borgs et al. [2010] suggests that this problem is intractable. We show that if we make a slight change to their model---modeling the players as polynomial-time Turing machines that maintain state ---and make some standard cryptographic hardness assumptions (the existence of public-key encryption), the problem can actually be solved in polynomial time. Our algorithm works not only for games with a finite number of players, but also for constant-degree graphical games. As Nash equilibrium is a weak solution concept for extensive form games, we additionally define and study an appropriate notion of a subgame-perfect equilibrium for computationally bounded players, and show how to efficiently find such an equilibrium in repeated games (again, making standard cryptographic hardness assumptions).

cs.GT↗

arXiv2015

An Introduction to Logics of Knowledge and Belief

This chapter provides an introduction to some basic concepts of epistemic logic, basic formal languages, their semantics, and proof systems. It also contains an overview of the handbook, and a brief history of epistemic logic and pointers to the literature.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2014

Cooperative Equilibrium: A solution predicting cooperative play

Nash equilibrium (NE) assumes that players always make a best response. However, this is not always true; sometimes people cooperate even it is not a best response to do so. For example, in the Prisoner's Dilemma, people often cooperate. Are there rules underlying cooperative behavior? In an effort to answer this question, we propose a new equilibrium concept: perfect cooperative equilibrium (PCE), and two related variants: max-PCE and cooperative equilibrium. PCE may help explain players' behavior in games where cooperation is observed in practice. A player's payoff in a PCE is at least as high as in any NE. However, a PCE does not always exist. We thus consider α-PCE, where α takes into account the degree of cooperation; a PCE is a 0-PCE. Every game has a Pareto-optimal max-PCE (M-PCE); that is, an α-PCE for a maximum α. We show that M-PCE does well at predicting behavior in quite a few games of interest. We also consider cooperative equilibrium (CE), another generalization of PCE that takes punishment into account. Interestingly, all Pareto-optimal M-PCE are CE. We prove that, in 2-player games, a PCE (if it exists), a M-PCE, and a CE can all be found in polynomial time using bilinear programming. This is a contrast to Nash equilibrium, which is PPAD complete even in 2-player games [Chen, Deng, and Teng 2009]. We compare M-PCE to the coco value [Kalai and Kalai 2009], another solution concept that tries to capture cooperation, both axiomatically and in terms of an algebraic characterization, and show that the two are closely related, despite their very different definitions.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2014

Sequential Equilibrium in Computational Games

We examine sequential equilibrium in the context of computational games, where agents are charged for computation. In such games, an agent can rationally choose to forget, so issues of imperfect recall arise. In this setting, we consider two notions of sequential equilibrium. One is an ex ante notion, where a player chooses his strategy before the game starts and is committed to it, but chooses it in such a way that it remains optimal even off the equilibrium path. The second is an interim notion, where a player can reconsider at each information set whether he is doing the "right" thing, and if not, can change his strategy. The two notions agree in games of perfect recall, but not in games of imperfect recall. Although the interim notion seems more appealing, \fullv{Halpern and Pass [2011] argue that there are some deep conceptual problems with it in standard games of imperfect recall. We show that the conceptual problems largely disappear in the computational setting. Moreover, in this setting, under natural assumptions, the two notions coincide.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2014

Cause, Responsibility, and Blame: oA Structural-Model Approach

A definition of causality introduced by Halpern and Pearl, which uses structural equations, is reviewed. A more refined definition is then considered, which takes into account issues of normality and typicality, which are well known to affect causal ascriptions. Causality is typically an all-or-nothing notion: either A is a cause of B or it is not. An extension of the definition of causality to capture notions of degree of responsibility and degree of blame, due to Chockler and Halpern, is reviewed. For example, if someone wins an election 11-0, then each person who votes for him is less responsible for the victory than if he had won 6-5. Degree of blame takes into account an agent's epistemic state. Roughly speaking, the degree of blame of A for B is the expected degree of responsibility of A for B, taken over the epistemic state of an agent. Finally, the structural-equations definition of causality is compared to Wright's NESS test.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2014

Algorithmic Rationality: Game Theory with Costly Computation

We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer hold. Nevertheless, we can use the framework to provide psychologically appealing explanations of observed behavior in well-studied games (such as finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma and rock-paper-scissors). Furthermore, we provide natural conditions on games sufficient to guarantee that equilibria exist.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2014

The Computational Complexity of Structure-Based Causality

Halpern and Pearl introduced a definition of actual causality; Eiter and Lukasiewicz showed that computing whether X=x is a cause of Y=y is NP-complete in binary models (where all variables can take on only two values) and\ Sigma_2^P-complete in general models. In the final version of their paper, Halpern and Pearl slightly modified the definition of actual cause, in order to deal with problems pointed by Hopkins and Pearl. As we show, this modification has a nontrivial impact on the complexity of computing actual cause. To characterize the complexity, a new family D_k^P, k= 1, 2, 3, ..., of complexity classes is introduced, which generalizes the class DP introduced by Papadimitriou and Yannakakis (DP is just D_1^P). %joe2 %We show that the complexity of computing causality is $\D_2$-complete %under the new definition. Chockler and Halpern \citeyear{CH04} extended the We show that the complexity of computing causality under the updated definition is $D_2^P$-complete. Chockler and Halpern extended the definition of causality by introducing notions of responsibility and blame. The complexity of determining the degree of responsibility and blame using the original definition of causality was completely characterized. Again, we show that changing the definition of causality affects the complexity, and completely characterize it using the updated definition.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2014

Translucent Players: Explaining Cooperative Behavior in Social Dilemmas

In the last few decades, numerous experiments have shown that humans do not always behave so as to maximize their material payoff. Cooperative behavior when non-cooperation is a dominant strategy (with respect to the material payoffs) is particularly puzzling. Here we propose a novel approach to explain cooperation, assuming what Halpern and Pass (2013) call "translucent players". Typically, players are assumed to be "opaque", in the sense that a deviation by one player does not affect the strategies used by other players. But a player may believe that if he switches from one strategy to another, the fact that he chooses to switch may be visible to the other players. For example, if he chooses to defect in Prisoner's Dilemma, the other player may sense his guilt. We show that by assuming translucent players, we can recover many of the regularities observed in human behavior in well-studied games such as Prisoner's Dilemma, Traveler's Dilemma, Bertrand Competition, and the Public Goods game.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2014

An Equilibrium Analysis of Scrip Systems

A game-theoretic model of scrip (artificial currency) systems is analyzed. It is shown that relative entropy can be used to characterize the distribution of agent wealth when all agents use threshold strategies---that is, they volunteer to do work iff they have below a threshold amount of money. Monotonicity of agents' best-reply functions is used to show that scrip systems have pure strategy equilibria where all agents use threshold strategies. An algorithm is given that can compute such an equilibrium and the resulting distribution of wealth.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2014

Updating Sets of Probabilities

There are several well-known justifications for conditioning as the appropriate method for updating a single probability measure, given an observation. However, there is a significant body of work arguing for sets of probability measures, rather than single measures, as a more realistic model of uncertainty. Conditioning still makes sense in this context--we can simply condition each measure in the set individually, then combine the results--and, indeed, it seems to be the preferred updating procedure in the literature. But how justified is conditioning in this richer setting? Here we show, by considering an axiomatic account of conditioning given by van Fraassen, that the single-measure and sets-of-measures cases are very different. We show that van Fraassen's axiomatization for the former case is nowhere near sufficient for updating sets of measures. We give a considerably longer (and not as compelling) list of axioms that together force conditioning in this setting, and describe other update methods that are allowed once any of these axioms is dropped.

cs.AI↗