arXiv subjects

Katherine M. Collins

Publications and source records attributed to Katherine M. Collins.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

CogGym: Towards Large-Scale Comparative Evaluation of Human and Machine Cognition

Understanding and modeling human intelligence are parallel goals shared by artificial intelligence (AI) and cognitive science. As AI systems grow increasingly capable, in what ways do model responses resemble human responses, and where do they systematically diverge? The sheer breadth and diversity of the tasks humans can perform and think about pose a challenge for scalable and rigorous comparison between humans and models. We introduce CogGym, a scalable, unified framework grounded in cognitive science for systematically comparing model and human behavior on matched experimental trials. CogGym uses a semi-automated, human-in-the-loop pipeline to standardize diverse experimental paradigms into a task-agnostic Experiment Markup Language (EML), enabling reproducible and faithful comparison at scale. For initial release, we curate and standardize 258 cognitive experiments from 100 papers that focuses on human commonsense reasoning, and evaluate 50 large language models against human responses. We find a clear scaling trend where larger and more recent AI models better reproduce human judgments. Yet AI models' improvement on such common reasoning tasks is considerably slower than the gains observed on formal-reasoning benchmarks like math and coding, and model--human fit remains well below human splithalf reliability ($R^2 = 0.93$ on text, $0.95$ on image, and $0.92$ on video) with the best models achieving $R^2 = 0.59$ on text, $0.58$ on image, and $0.43$ on video experiments. We intend for CogGym to provide a living evaluation framework that continually incorporates new cognitive science experiments to characterize where model behavior resembles human behavior, where it systematically diverges, and how those patterns change as models and experiments evolve.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

On Benchmarking Human-Like Intelligence in Machines

Recent advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) have yielded powerful computational models that, by learning from vast amounts of human-generated data, are increasingly posited as approximate models of human cognition. However, we argue that many current evaluation paradigms for AI are insufficient for assessing human-like cognitive capabilities in these models. We identify a set of key shortcomings: a lack of human-validated labels, inadequate representation of human response variability and uncertainty, and reliance on simplified and ecologically invalid tasks. We support our claims by conducting a human evaluation study on nine existing AI benchmarks, suggesting major limitations in task and label designs. To address these limitations, we propose five concrete recommendations for future AI evaluation efforts that will enable more rigorous and meaningful understanding of human-like cognitive capacities in AI models.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Human agency in initial human-AI proof formalization workflows

For centuries, human mathematicians have written proofs to substantiate their mathematical arguments; yet, the ability to automatically verify the validity of proofs has long been a challenge. Advances in AI systems' ability to generate code and engage in increasingly high-level mathematical reasoning promise to transform people's ability to formalize and thereby verify proofs. While many works focus on benchmarking the current frontier, we instead study how people use these tools and apply agency in doing so. We conduct a mixed-methods analysis into the initial impact of AI on people's formalization workflows: what people claim they want, what they see as the barriers to those visions, and how they actually use and adapt AI in practice. A qualitative survey reveals that people's preferences are diverse, but with a general desire for AI assistance in formalization that preserves high-level human control and agency over the proof discovery process. To assess how people actually engage with AI for formalization, we conduct a controlled user study in which participants formalize informal math problems and their proofs, with and without AI, across a range of mathematical problems at varying levels of difficulty and domains. Despite limitations of the tools at the time for autoformalization, participants tended to attain higher formalization accuracy when allowed access to AI tools than when formalizing on their own, with most participants flexibly choosing to use multiple different AI tools. Taken together, our work sheds light on the early stages of AI integration into formalization workflows, involving an intimate interplay of human agency and AI engagement.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Generation and Evaluation in the Human Invention Process through the Lens of Game Design

The human ability to learn rules and solve problems has been a central concern of cognitive science research since the field's earliest days. But we do not just follow rules and solve problems given to us by others: we modify those rules, create new problems, and set new goals and tasks for ourselves and others. Arguably, even more than rule following and problem solving, human intelligence is about creatively breaking and stretching the rules, changing the game, and inventing new problems worth thinking about. Creating a good rule or a good problem depends not just on the ideas one can think up but on how one evaluates such proposals. Here, we study invention through the lens of game design. We focus particularly on the early stages of novice, "everyday" game creation, where the stakes are low. We draw on a dataset of over 450 human created games, created by participants who saw an initial seed set of two-player grid-based strategy games. We consider two different cognitive mechanisms that may be at work during the early processes of intuitive game invention: an associative proposal based on previous games one has seen and compute-bounded model-based evaluation that an everyday game creator may use to refine their initial draft proposals. In our preliminary work, we conduct a model-based analysis of how people invented new games based on prior experience and find that generated games are best described by a model which incorporates model-based estimates of game quality at a population level. Our work points to how human invention is based not only on what people propose, but how they evaluate and offers a computational toolkit to scale empirical studies of model-based simulation in open-ended human innovation.

cs.HC↗

arXiv2026

Human-AI Synergy Supports Collective Creative Search

Generative AI is increasingly transforming creativity into a hybrid human-artificial process, but its impact on the quality and diversity of creative output remains unclear. We study collective creativity using a controlled word-guessing task that balances open-endedness with an objective measure of task performance. Participants attempt to infer a hidden target word, scored based on the semantic similarity of their guesses to the target, while also observing the best guess from previous players. We compare performance and outcome diversity across human-only, AI-only, and hybrid human-AI groups. Hybrid groups achieve the highest performance while preserving high diversity of guesses. Within hybrid groups, both humans and AI agents systematically adjust their strategies relative to single-agent conditions, suggesting higher-order interaction effects, whereby agents adapt to each other's presence. Although some performance benefits can be reproduced through collaboration between heterogeneous AI systems, human-AI collaboration remains superior, underscoring complementary roles in collective creativity.

cs.SI↗

arXiv2026

People use fast and flat simulation to reason about new games

Games have long been a microcosm for studying planning and reasoning in both natural and artificial intelligence (AI), often focusing on expert-level or even super-human play. But real life also pushes human intelligence along a different frontier, requiring people to flexibly navigate decision-making problems that they have never thought about before. Here, we use novice gameplay to study how people reason about new problem settings. Through a series of large-scale behavioral studies with over 1000 participants and 121 two-player strategic board games (almost all novel to our participants), we show that people are systematic and adaptively rational in how they play a game for the first time, or evaluate a game (e.g., how fair or how fun it is likely to be) before they have played it even once. We explain these capacities via a computational cognitive model that we call the 'Intuitive Gamer', a model based on mechanisms of fast and flat (depth-limited) goal-directed probabilistic simulation. Our work offers new insights into how people rapidly evaluate, act, and make suggestions when encountering novel problems, and could inform the design of more flexible and human-like AI systems that can determine not just how to solve new tasks, but whether a task is worth thinking about at all.

q-bio.NC↗

arXiv2026

A Matter of Interest: Understanding Interestingness of Math Problems in Humans and Language Models

The evolution of mathematics is shaped importantly by interestingness: researchers choose which problems to pursue, and students choose which problems to engage with, based on expectations of interest and challenge. As AI systems, particularly large language models (LLMs) that operate flexibly over natural language and formal mathematics, are increasingly used in mathematics research and education, it becomes crucial to characterize how closely their judgments align with people from different mathematical backgrounds. We study whether LLMs align with human interestingness judgments by comparing LLM ratings with those of two populations, crowdsourced participants with college math experience and International Math Olympiad competitors. Although many LLMs broadly agree with human notions of interestingness, they largely fail to match the distribution of human judgments. They also weakly align with why humans find problems interesting, with low correlation to human-selected rationales. Finally, we evaluate LLMs' ability to generate interesting problems and find that, after filtering for validity, LLMs are able to generate engaging problems. We conclude with takeaways, including the need for multi-LLM human-AI collaborative systems, that highlight both the promise and current limits of LLMs as partners in mathematical reasoning.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Cognitive offloading and the speedup illusion in human-AI interaction

Large language models (LLMs) have the potential to boost human productivity by speeding up task completion -- provided users know when to offload cognitive work to them. But we do not know if users are well-calibrated in estimating these potential time savings. We conducted a preregistered large-scale behavioral study (N = 1237) to characterize mismatches between expectations and reality, with a focus on simple cognitive tasks. While actual completion times between independent completion and AI-assisted completion did not differ, participants predicted AI to be significantly faster. The same bias was not observed when imagining help from another human participant. We identify a speedup illusion where people have accurate forecasts of independent completion times but significantly underestimate AI-assisted times. Additionally, time and effort dissociate: participants reported lower subjective effort with AI despite equivalent completion times. This suggests that completion time itself is not sufficient to characterize efficiency gains.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2026

The efficiency-gain illusion: People underestimate the rate of AI use and overestimate its benefits on simple tasks

People are increasingly turning to AI assistance for simple tasks, e.g., arithmetic, spell-check, and answering simple questions. But does AI assistance actually save users time and effort? We investigate people's propensity to use AI for cognitively simple tasks and assess whether their reliance is well-calibrated. Across three pre-registered user studies (N = 2691), we find that people frequently choose to use AI even when doing so is inefficient (i.e. provides no meaningful time or effort savings). We identify systematic miscalibration at two levels: (1) a self-estimate miscalibration where people on average believe that they are using AI less than they actually are, and (2) efficiency-gain illusions where people overestimate how much time and effort savings AI use affords. We also identify a session-level carryover effect where a participant's prior AI use leads to further AI adoption and entrenches their miscalibration about time savings. Our results shed light on the mechanisms and biases underlying people's choice of whether to use AI as well as the risk of an overreliance feedback loop.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2026

Measuring and mitigating overreliance to build human-compatible AI

Large language models (LLMs) distinguish themselves from previous technologies by functioning as collaborative ``thought partners,'' capable of engaging more fluidly in natural language on a range of tasks. As LLMs increasingly influence consequential decisions across diverse domains from healthcare to personal advice, the risk of overreliance -- relying on LLMs beyond their capabilities -- grows. This paper argues that measuring and mitigating overreliance must become central to LLM research and deployment. First, we consolidate risks from overreliance at both the individual and societal levels, including high-stakes errors, governance challenges, and cognitive deskilling. Then, we explore LLM characteristics, system design features, and user cognitive biases that together raise serious and unique concerns about overreliance on LLMs in practice. We also examine historical approaches for measuring overreliance, identifying three important gaps and proposing three promising directions to improve measurement. Finally, we propose mitigation strategies that can be pursued to ensure LLMs augment rather than undermine human capabilities.

cs.CY↗

arXiv2026

Evaluating Language Models' Evaluations of Games

Reasoning is not just about solving problems -- it is also about evaluating which problems are worth solving at all. Evaluations of artificial intelligence (AI) systems primarily focused on problem solving, historically by studying how models play games such as chess and Go. In this paper, we advocate for a new paradigm that assesses AI systems' evaluation of games. First, we introduce a formalism for evaluating such evaluations. We then leverage a large-scale dataset of over 100 novel board games and over 450 human judgments to compare evaluations produced by modern language and reasoning models against those of people and symbolic computational agents. We consider two kinds of evaluative queries: assessing the payoff (or fairness) and the funness of games. These queries span two dimensions relevant to the design of evaluations of AI evaluations: how complex a query is to compute and how difficult a query is to quantify. Our results show that reasoning models are generally more aligned to people in their evaluations of games than non-reasoning language models. However, we observe a non-monotonic relationship: as models get closer to game-theoretic optimal, their fit to human data weakens. We also observe more "jaggedness" across models for assessing funness, in line with the greater difficulty of quantifying this query. Across queries and games, reasoning models show highly variable and unpredictable resource usage when assessing queries, pointing to the importance of imbuing more resource-rational meta-reasoning in language and reasoning models.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2026

How do people watch AI-generated videos of physical scenes?

The growing prevalence of realistic AI-generated videos on media platforms increasingly blurs the line between fact and fiction, eroding public trust. Understanding how people watch AI-generated videos offers a human-centered perspective for improving AI detection and guiding advancements in video generation. However, existing studies have not investigated human gaze behavior in response to AI-generated videos of physical scenes. Here, we collect and analyze the eye movements from 40 participants during video understanding and AI detection tasks involving a mix of real-world and AI-generated videos. We find that given the high realism of AI-generated videos, gaze behavior is driven less by the video's actual authenticity and more by the viewer's perception of its authenticity. Our results demonstrate that the mere awareness of potential AI generation may alter media consumption from passive viewing into an active search for anomalies.

cs.HC↗

arXiv2026

Medical Model Synthesis Architectures: A Case Study

Medicine is rife with high-stakes uncertainty. Doctors routinely make clinical judgments and decisions that juggle many fundamental unknowns, like predictions about what might be causing a patients' symptoms or decisions about what treatment to try next. Despite increasing interest in developing AI systems that aid or even replace doctors in clinical settings, current systems struggle with calibrated reasoning under uncertainty, and are often deeply opaque about their reasoning. We propose a framework for AI systems that can make practically useful but formally transparent clinical predictions under uncertainty. Given a clinical situation, our framework (MedMSA) uses language models to retrieve relevant prior knowledge, but constructs a formal probabilistic model to support calibrated and verifiable inferences under uncertainty. We show how an initial proof-of-concept of this framework can be used for differential diagnosis, producing an uncertainty-weighted list of potential diagnoses that could explain a patients' symptoms, and discuss future applications and directions for applying this framework more generally for safe clinical collaborations.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2026

Improving the Efficiency of Language Agent Teams with Adaptive Task Graphs

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in teams, yet existing coordination approaches often occupy two extremes. Highly structured methods rely on fixed roles, pipelines, or task decompositions assigned a priori. In contrast, fully unstructured teams enable adaptability and exploration but suffer from inefficiencies such as error propagation, inter-agent conflicts, and wasted resources (measured in time, tokens, or file operations). We introduce Language Agent Teams for Task Evolution (LATTE), a framework for coordinating LLM teams inspired by distributed systems, where processors must operate under partial observability and communication constraints. In LATTE, a team of agents collaboratively construct and maintain a shared, evolving coordination graph which encodes sub-task dependencies, individual agent assignment, and the current state of sub-task progress. This protocol maintains consistency while empowering agents to dynamically allocate work, adapt coordination, and discover new tasks. Across multiple collaborative tasks and a variety of base models, we demonstrate how LATTE reduces token usage, wall-clock time, communication, and coordination failures (e.g. file conflicts and redundant outputs) while matching or exceeding the accuracy of standard designs including MetaGPT, decentralized teams, top-down Leader-Worker hierarchies, and static decompositions.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2026

Under the Influence: Quantifying Persuasion and Vigilance in Large Language Models

With increasing integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into areas of high-stakes human decision-making, it is important to understand the risks they introduce as advisors. To be useful advisors, LLMs must sift through large amounts of content, written with both benevolent and malicious intent, and then use this information to convince a user to take a specific action. This involves two social capacities: vigilance (the ability to determine which information to use, and which to discard) and persuasion (synthesizing the available evidence to make a convincing argument). While existing work has investigated these capacities in isolation, there has been little prior investigation of how these capacities may be linked. Here, we use a simple multi-turn puzzle-solving game, Sokoban, to study LLMs' abilities to persuade and be rationally vigilant towards other LLM agents. We find that puzzle-solving performance, persuasive capability, and vigilance are dissociable capacities in LLMs. Performing well on the game does not automatically mean a model can detect when it is being misled, even if the possibility of deception is explicitly mentioned. However, LLMs do consistently modulate their token use, using fewer tokens to reason when advice is benevolent and more when it is malicious, even if they are still persuaded to take actions leading them to failure. To our knowledge, our work presents the first investigation of the relationship between persuasion, vigilance, and task performance in LLMs, and suggests that monitoring all three independently will be critical for future work in AI safety.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2026

Language Model Teams as Distributed Systems

Large language models (LLMs) are growing increasingly capable, prompting recent interest in LLM teams. Yet, despite increased deployment of LLM teams at scale, we lack a principled framework for addressing key questions such as when a team is helpful, how many agents to use, how structure impacts performance -- and whether a team is better than a single agent. Rather than designing and testing these possibilities through trial-and-error, we propose using distributed systems as a principled foundation for creating and evaluating LLM teams. We find that many of the fundamental advantages and challenges studied in distributed computing also arise in LLM teams, highlighting the rich practical insights that can come from the cross-talk of these two fields of study.

cs.MA↗

arXiv2026

AI Gamestore: Scalable, Open-Ended Evaluation of Machine General Intelligence with Human Games

Rigorously evaluating machine intelligence against the broad spectrum of human general intelligence has become increasingly important and challenging in this era of rapid technological advance. Conventional AI benchmarks typically assess only narrow capabilities in a limited range of human activity. Most are also static, quickly saturating as developers explicitly or implicitly optimize for them. We propose that a more promising way to evaluate human-like general intelligence in AI systems is through a particularly strong form of general game playing: studying how and how well they play and learn to play \textbf{all conceivable human games}, in comparison to human players with the same level of experience, time, or other resources. We define a "human game" to be a game designed by humans for humans, and argue for the evaluative suitability of this space of all such games people can imagine and enjoy -- the "Multiverse of Human Games". Taking a first step towards this vision, we introduce the AI GameStore, a scalable and open-ended platform that uses LLMs with humans-in-the-loop to synthesize new representative human games, by automatically sourcing and adapting standardized and containerized variants of game environments from popular human digital gaming platforms. As a proof of concept, we generated 100 such games based on the top charts of Apple App Store and Steam, and evaluated seven frontier vision-language models (VLMs) on short episodes of play. The best models achieved less than 10\% of the human average score on the majority of the games, and especially struggled with games that challenge world-model learning, memory and planning. We conclude with a set of next steps for building out the AI GameStore as a practical way to measure and drive progress toward human-like general intelligence in machines.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2025

Data for Mathematical Copilots: Better Ways of Presenting Proofs for Machine Learning

The datasets and benchmarks commonly used to train and evaluate the mathematical capabilities of AI-based mathematical copilots (primarily large language models) exhibit several shortcomings and misdirections. These range from a restricted scope of mathematical complexity to limited fidelity in capturing aspects beyond the final, written proof (e.g. motivating the proof, or representing the thought processes leading to a proof). These issues are compounded by a dynamic reminiscent of Goodhart's law: as benchmark performance becomes the primary target for model development, the benchmarks themselves become less reliable indicators of genuine mathematical capability. We systematically explore these limitations and contend that enhancing the capabilities of large language models, or any forthcoming advancements in AI-based mathematical assistants (copilots or ``thought partners''), necessitates a course correction both in the design of mathematical datasets and the evaluation criteria of the models' mathematical ability. In particular, it is necessary for benchmarks to move beyond the existing result-based datasets that map theorem statements directly to proofs, and instead focus on datasets that translate the richer facets of mathematical research practice into data that LLMs can learn from. This includes benchmarks that supervise the proving process and the proof discovery process itself, and we advocate for mathematical dataset developers to consider the concept of "motivated proof", introduced by G. Pólya in 1949, which can serve as a blueprint for datasets that offer a better proof learning signal, alleviating some of the mentioned limitations.

cs.LG↗