arXiv subjects

Luke Marris

Publications and source records attributed to Luke Marris.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

arXiv2026

Paradoxes of Game Theoretic Equilibria and Price of Anarchy

For decades, static solution concepts (Nash, Correlated, and Coarse Correlated Equilibria) and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) have formed the bedrock of algorithmic game theory, with no-regret learning proving fast convergence to such game-theoretic equilibria. We show that reducing multi-agent learning to static equilibrium and black-box regret analysis obscures underlying dynamic disequilibrium and game theoretic bounds. First, interior Nash equilibria lack $C^1$ vector field information, meaning agents cannot distinguish aligned from strictly opposing incentives. Inheriting this geometry, the worst-case pure Nash equilibria dictating robust PoA bounds manifest as topologically unstable strict saddles, and in canonical congestion games, as global repellers supported on almost everywhere strictly dominated strategies. Anchoring efficiency guarantees to these unstable states causes algebraic sensitivity; we prove that accommodating all strictly positive affine costs renders the PoA unbounded. Furthermore, projecting learning trajectories onto the discrete simplex of correlated play systematically accommodates non-rationalizable behavior. Evaluating dynamics via Coarse Correlated Equilibria or proximal refinements fails to preclude strictly dominated strategies. Moreover, optimal $O(1/T)$ swap-regret minimization does not preclude macroscopic turbulence, manifesting as chaotic limit sets even in minimal games. Finally, we examine the non-atomic limit of congestion games. Though considered highly stable with tight sub-linear $\Theta(p/\ln p)$ PoA bounds (where $p$ is the polynomial degree), we prove that under discrete-time learning, the unique equilibrium destabilizes into Li-Yorke chaos and global attractors whose time-averaged inefficiency degrades exponentially as $2^p$. These results necessitate re-evaluating worst-case equilibrium frameworks for dynamically grounded metrics.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2026

Deep Incentive Design with Differentiable Equilibrium Blocks

Automated design of multi-agent interactions with desirable equilibrium outcomes is inherently difficult due to the computational hardness, non-uniqueness, and instability of the resulting equilibria. In this work, we propose the use of game-agnostic differentiable equilibrium blocks (DEBs) as modules in a novel, differentiable framework to address a wide variety of incentive design problems from economics and computer science. We call this framework deep incentive design (DID). To validate our approach, we examine three diverse, challenging incentive design tasks: contract design, machine scheduling, and inverse equilibrium problems. For each task, we train a single neural network using a unified pipeline and DEB. This architecture solves the full distribution of problem instances, parameterized by a context, handling all games across a wide range of scales (from two to sixteen actions per player).

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Gemini 2.5: Pushing the Frontier with Advanced Reasoning, Multimodality, Long Context, and Next Generation Agentic Capabilities

In this report, we introduce the Gemini 2.X model family: Gemini 2.5 Pro and Gemini 2.5 Flash, as well as our earlier Gemini 2.0 Flash and Flash-Lite models. Gemini 2.5 Pro is our most capable model yet, achieving SoTA performance on frontier coding and reasoning benchmarks. In addition to its incredible coding and reasoning skills, Gemini 2.5 Pro is a thinking model that excels at multimodal understanding and it is now able to process up to 3 hours of video content. Its unique combination of long context, multimodal and reasoning capabilities can be combined to unlock new agentic workflows. Gemini 2.5 Flash provides excellent reasoning abilities at a fraction of the compute and latency requirements and Gemini 2.0 Flash and Flash-Lite provide high performance at low latency and cost. Taken together, the Gemini 2.X model generation spans the full Pareto frontier of model capability vs cost, allowing users to explore the boundaries of what is possible with complex agentic problem solving.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2025

Re-evaluating Open-ended Evaluation of Large Language Models

Evaluation has traditionally focused on ranking candidates for a specific skill. Modern generalist models, such as Large Language Models (LLMs), decidedly outpace this paradigm. Open-ended evaluation systems, where candidate models are compared on user-submitted prompts, have emerged as a popular solution. Despite their many advantages, we show that the current Elo-based rating systems can be susceptible to and even reinforce biases in data, intentional or accidental, due to their sensitivity to redundancies. To address this issue, we propose evaluation as a 3-player game, and introduce novel game-theoretic solution concepts to ensure robustness to redundancy. We show that our method leads to intuitive ratings and provide insights into the competitive landscape of LLM development.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2025

Deviation Ratings: A General, Clone-Invariant Rating Method

Many real-world multi-agent or multi-task evaluation scenarios can be naturally modelled as normal-form games due to inherent strategic (adversarial, cooperative, and mixed motive) interactions. These strategic interactions may be agentic (e.g. players trying to win), fundamental (e.g. cost vs quality), or complementary (e.g. niche finding and specialization). In such a formulation, it is the strategies (actions, policies, agents, models, tasks, prompts, etc.) that are rated. However, the rating problem is complicated by redundancy and complexity of N-player strategic interactions. Repeated or similar strategies can distort ratings for those that counter or complement them. Previous work proposed ``clone invariant'' ratings to handle such redundancies, but this was limited to two-player zero-sum (i.e. strictly competitive) interactions. This work introduces the first N-player general-sum clone invariant rating, called deviation ratings, based on coarse correlated equilibria. The rating is explored on several domains including LLMs evaluation.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Convex Markov Games: A New Frontier for Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning

Behavioral diversity, expert imitation, fairness, safety goals and others give rise to preferences in sequential decision making domains that do not decompose additively across time. We introduce the class of convex Markov games that allow general convex preferences over occupancy measures. Despite infinite time horizon and strictly higher generality than Markov games, pure strategy Nash equilibria exist. Furthermore, equilibria can be approximated empirically by performing gradient descent on an upper bound of exploitability. Our experiments reveal novel solutions to classic repeated normal-form games, find fair solutions in a repeated asymmetric coordination game, and prioritize safe long-term behavior in a robot warehouse environment. In the prisoner's dilemma, our algorithm leverages transient imitation to find a policy profile that deviates from observed human play only slightly, yet achieves higher per-player utility while also being three orders of magnitude less exploitable.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Visualizing 2x2 Normal-Form Games: twoxtwogame LaTeX Package

Normal-form games with two players, each with two strategies, are the most studied class of games. These so-called 2x2 games are used to model a variety of strategic interactions. They appear in game theory, economics, and artificial intelligence research. However, there lacks tools for describing and visualizing such games. This work introduces a LaTeX package for visualizing 2x2 games. This work has two goals: first, to provide high-quality tools and vector graphic visualizations, suitable for scientific publications. And second, to help promote standardization of names and representations of 2x2 games. The LaTeX package, twoxtwogame, is maintained on GitHub and mirrored on CTAN, and is available under a permissive Apache 2 license.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

NfgTransformer: Equivariant Representation Learning for Normal-form Games

Normal-form games (NFGs) are the fundamental model of strategic interaction. We study their representation using neural networks. We describe the inherent equivariance of NFGs -- any permutation of strategies describes an equivalent game -- as well as the challenges this poses for representation learning. We then propose the NfgTransformer architecture that leverages this equivariance, leading to state-of-the-art performance in a range of game-theoretic tasks including equilibrium-solving, deviation gain estimation and ranking, with a common approach to NFG representation. We show that the resulting model is interpretable and versatile, paving the way towards deep learning systems capable of game-theoretic reasoning when interacting with humans and with each other.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Approximating the Core via Iterative Coalition Sampling

The core is a central solution concept in cooperative game theory, defined as the set of feasible allocations or payments such that no subset of agents has incentive to break away and form their own subgroup or coalition. However, it has long been known that the core (and approximations, such as the least-core) are hard to compute. This limits our ability to analyze cooperative games in general, and to fully embrace cooperative game theory contributions in domains such as explainable AI (XAI), where the core can complement the Shapley values to identify influential features or instances supporting predictions by black-box models. We propose novel iterative algorithms for computing variants of the core, which avoid the computational bottleneck of many other approaches; namely solving large linear programs. As such, they scale better to very large problems as we demonstrate across different classes of cooperative games, including weighted voting games, induced subgraph games, and marginal contribution networks. We also explore our algorithms in the context of XAI, providing further evidence of the power of the core for such applications.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2024

Steering Language Models with Game-Theoretic Solvers

Mathematical models of interactions among rational agents have long been studied in game theory. However these interactions are often over a small set of discrete game actions which is very different from how humans communicate in natural language. To bridge this gap, we introduce a framework that allows equilibrium solvers to work over the space of natural language dialogue generated by large language models (LLMs). Specifically, by modelling the players, strategies and payoffs in a "game" of dialogue, we create a binding from natural language interactions to the conventional symbolic logic of game theory. Given this binding, we can ask existing game-theoretic algorithms to provide us with strategic solutions (e.g., what string an LLM should generate to maximize payoff in the face of strategic partners or opponents), giving us predictors of stable, rational conversational strategies. We focus on three domains that require different negotiation strategies: scheduling meetings, trading fruit and debate, and evaluate an LLM's generated language when guided by solvers. We see that LLMs that follow game-theory solvers result in dialogue generations that are less exploitable than the control (no guidance from solvers), and the language generated results in higher rewards, in all negotiation domains. We discuss future implications of this work, and how game-theoretic solvers that can leverage the expressivity of natural language can open up a new avenue of guiding language research.

cs.CL↗

arXiv2024

Neural Population Learning beyond Symmetric Zero-sum Games

We study computationally efficient methods for finding equilibria in n-player general-sum games, specifically ones that afford complex visuomotor skills. We show how existing methods would struggle in this setting, either computationally or in theory. We then introduce NeuPL-JPSRO, a neural population learning algorithm that benefits from transfer learning of skills and converges to a Coarse Correlated Equilibrium (CCE) of the game. We show empirical convergence in a suite of OpenSpiel games, validated rigorously by exact game solvers. We then deploy NeuPL-JPSRO to complex domains, where our approach enables adaptive coordination in a MuJoCo control domain and skill transfer in capture-the-flag. Our work shows that equilibrium convergent population learning can be implemented at scale and in generality, paving the way towards solving real-world games between heterogeneous players with mixed motives.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2023

Evaluating Agents using Social Choice Theory

We argue that many general evaluation problems can be viewed through the lens of voting theory. Each task is interpreted as a separate voter, which requires only ordinal rankings or pairwise comparisons of agents to produce an overall evaluation. By viewing the aggregator as a social welfare function, we are able to leverage centuries of research in social choice theory to derive principled evaluation frameworks with axiomatic foundations. These evaluations are interpretable and flexible, while avoiding many of the problems currently facing cross-task evaluation. We apply this Voting-as-Evaluation (VasE) framework across multiple settings, including reinforcement learning, large language models, and humans. In practice, we observe that VasE can be more robust than popular evaluation frameworks (Elo and Nash averaging), discovers properties in the evaluation data not evident from scores alone, and can predict outcomes better than Elo in a complex seven-player game. We identify one particular approach, maximal lotteries, that satisfies important consistency properties relevant to evaluation, is computationally efficient (polynomial in the size of the evaluation data), and identifies game-theoretic cycles.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2023

Approximating Nash Equilibria in Normal-Form Games via Stochastic Optimization

We propose the first loss function for approximate Nash equilibria of normal-form games that is amenable to unbiased Monte Carlo estimation. This construction allows us to deploy standard non-convex stochastic optimization techniques for approximating Nash equilibria, resulting in novel algorithms with provable guarantees. We complement our theoretical analysis with experiments demonstrating that stochastic gradient descent can outperform previous state-of-the-art approaches.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Equilibrium-Invariant Embedding, Metric Space, and Fundamental Set of $2\times2$ Normal-Form Games

Equilibrium solution concepts of normal-form games, such as Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria, describe the joint strategy profiles from which no player has incentive to unilaterally deviate. They are widely studied in game theory, economics, and multiagent systems. Equilibrium concepts are invariant under certain transforms of the payoffs. We define an equilibrium-inspired distance metric for the space of all normal-form games and uncover a distance-preserving equilibrium-invariant embedding. Furthermore, we propose an additional transform which defines a better-response-invariant distance metric and embedding. To demonstrate these metric spaces we study $2\times2$ games. The equilibrium-invariant embedding of $2\times2$ games has an efficient two variable parameterization (a reduction from eight), where each variable geometrically describes an angle on a unit circle. Interesting properties can be spatially inferred from the embedding, including: equilibrium support, cycles, competition, coordination, distances, best-responses, and symmetries. The best-response-invariant embedding of $2\times2$ games, after considering symmetries, rediscovers a set of 15 games, and their respective equivalence classes. We propose that this set of game classes is fundamental and captures all possible interesting strategic interactions in $2\times2$ games. We introduce a directed graph representation and name for each class. Finally, we leverage the tools developed for $2\times2$ games to develop game theoretic visualizations of large normal-form and extensive-form games that aim to fingerprint the strategic interactions that occur within.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Generative Adversarial Equilibrium Solvers

We introduce the use of generative adversarial learning to compute equilibria in general game-theoretic settings, specifically the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in pseudo-games, and its specific instantiation as the competitive equilibrium (CE) in Arrow-Debreu competitive economies. Pseudo-games are a generalization of games in which players' actions affect not only the payoffs of other players but also their feasible action spaces. Although the computation of GNE and CE is intractable in the worst-case, i.e., PPAD-hard, in practice, many applications only require solutions with high accuracy in expectation over a distribution of problem instances. We introduce Generative Adversarial Equilibrium Solvers (GAES): a family of generative adversarial neural networks that can learn GNE and CE from only a sample of problem instances. We provide computational and sample complexity bounds, and apply the framework to finding Nash equilibria in normal-form games, CE in Arrow-Debreu competitive economies, and GNE in an environmental economic model of the Kyoto mechanism.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2023

Combining Tree-Search, Generative Models, and Nash Bargaining Concepts in Game-Theoretic Reinforcement Learning

Opponent modeling methods typically involve two crucial steps: building a belief distribution over opponents' strategies, and exploiting this opponent model by playing a best response. However, existing approaches typically require domain-specific heurstics to come up with such a model, and algorithms for approximating best responses are hard to scale in large, imperfect information domains. In this work, we introduce a scalable and generic multiagent training regime for opponent modeling using deep game-theoretic reinforcement learning. We first propose Generative Best Respoonse (GenBR), a best response algorithm based on Monte-Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) with a learned deep generative model that samples world states during planning. This new method scales to large imperfect information domains and can be plug and play in a variety of multiagent algorithms. We use this new method under the framework of Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO), to automate the generation of an \emph{offline opponent model} via iterative game-theoretic reasoning and population-based training. We propose using solution concepts based on bargaining theory to build up an opponent mixture, which we find identifying profiles that are near the Pareto frontier. Then GenBR keeps updating an \emph{online opponent model} and reacts against it during gameplay. We conduct behavioral studies where human participants negotiate with our agents in Deal-or-No-Deal, a class of bilateral bargaining games. Search with generative modeling finds stronger policies during both training time and test time, enables online Bayesian co-player prediction, and can produce agents that achieve comparable social welfare and Nash bargaining score negotiating with humans as humans trading among themselves.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2022

Turbocharging Solution Concepts: Solving NEs, CEs and CCEs with Neural Equilibrium Solvers

Solution concepts such as Nash Equilibria, Correlated Equilibria, and Coarse Correlated Equilibria are useful components for many multiagent machine learning algorithms. Unfortunately, solving a normal-form game could take prohibitive or non-deterministic time to converge, and could fail. We introduce the Neural Equilibrium Solver which utilizes a special equivariant neural network architecture to approximately solve the space of all games of fixed shape, buying speed and determinism. We define a flexible equilibrium selection framework, that is capable of uniquely selecting an equilibrium that minimizes relative entropy, or maximizes welfare. The network is trained without needing to generate any supervised training data. We show remarkable zero-shot generalization to larger games. We argue that such a network is a powerful component for many possible multiagent algorithms.

cs.LG↗

arXiv2022

Game Theoretic Rating in N-player general-sum games with Equilibria

Rating strategies in a game is an important area of research in game theory and artificial intelligence, and can be applied to any real-world competitive or cooperative setting. Traditionally, only transitive dependencies between strategies have been used to rate strategies (e.g. Elo), however recent work has expanded ratings to utilize game theoretic solutions to better rate strategies in non-transitive games. This work generalizes these ideas and proposes novel algorithms suitable for N-player, general-sum rating of strategies in normal-form games according to the payoff rating system. This enables well-established solution concepts, such as equilibria, to be leveraged to efficiently rate strategies in games with complex strategic interactions, which arise in multiagent training and real-world interactions between many agents. We empirically validate our methods on real world normal-form data (Premier League) and multiagent reinforcement learning agent evaluation.

cs.GT↗