arXiv subjects

Makoto Yokoo

Publications and source records attributed to Makoto Yokoo.

41 records · Page 3Linked to original sources

arXiv2017

Distributed Constraint Problems for Utilitarian Agents with Privacy Concerns, Recast as POMDPs

Privacy has traditionally been a major motivation for distributed problem solving. Distributed Constraint Satisfaction Problem (DisCSP) as well as Distributed Constraint Optimization Problem (DCOP) are fundamental models used to solve various families of distributed problems. Even though several approaches have been proposed to quantify and preserve privacy in such problems, none of them is exempt from limitations. Here we approach the problem by assuming that computation is performed among utilitarian agents. We introduce a utilitarian approach where the utility of each state is estimated as the difference between the reward for reaching an agreement on assignments of shared variables and the cost of privacy loss. We investigate extensions to solvers where agents integrate the utility function to guide their search and decide which action to perform, defining thereby their policy. We show that these extended solvers succeed in significantly reducing privacy loss without significant degradation of the solution quality.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2016

Utilitarian Distributed Constraint Optimization Problems

Privacy has been a major motivation for distributed problem optimization. However, even though several methods have been proposed to evaluate it, none of them is widely used. The Distributed Constraint Optimization Problem (DCOP) is a fundamental model used to approach various families of distributed problems. As privacy loss does not occur when a solution is accepted, but when it is proposed, privacy requirements cannot be interpreted as a criteria of the objective function of the DCOP. Here we approach the problem by letting both the optimized costs found in DCOPs and the privacy requirements guide the agents' exploration of the search space. We introduce Utilitarian Distributed Constraint Optimization Problem (UDCOP) where the costs and the privacy requirements are used as parameters to a heuristic modifying the search process. Common stochastic algorithms for decentralized constraint optimization problems are evaluated here according to how well they preserve privacy. Further, we propose some extensions where these solvers modify their search process to take into account their privacy requirements, succeeding in significantly reducing their privacy loss without significant degradation of the solution quality.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2016

DisCSPs with Privacy Recast as Planning Problems for Utility-based Agents

Privacy has traditionally been a major motivation for decentralized problem solving. However, even though several metrics have been proposed to quantify it, none of them is easily integrated with common solvers. Constraint programming is a fundamental paradigm used to approach various families of problems. We introduce Utilitarian Distributed Constraint Satisfaction Problems (UDisCSP) where the utility of each state is estimated as the difference between the the expected rewards for agreements on assignments for shared variables, and the expected cost of privacy loss. Therefore, a traditional DisCSP with privacy requirements is viewed as a planning problem. The actions available to agents are: communication and local inference. Common decentralized solvers are evaluated here from the point of view of their interpretation as greedy planners. Further, we investigate some simple extensions where these solvers start taking into account the utility function. In these extensions we assume that the planning problem is further restricting the set of communication actions to only the communication primitives present in the corresponding solver protocols. The solvers obtained for the new type of problems propose the action (communication/inference) to be performed in each situation, defining thereby the policy.

cs.AI↗

arXiv2013

A Dynamic Programming Model for Determining Bidding Strategies in Sequential Auctions: Quasi-linear Utility and Budget Constraints

In this paper, we develop a new method for finding an optimal biddingstrategy in sequential auctions, using a dynamic programming technique. Theexisting method assumes that the utility of a user is represented in anadditive form. Thus, the remaining endowment of money must be explicitlyrepresented in each state, and the calculation of the optimal biddingstrategy becomes time-consuming when the initial endowment of money mbecomes large.In this paper, we develop a new problem formalization that avoids explicitlyrepresenting the remaining endowment, by assuming the utility of a user canbe represented in a quasi-linear form, and representing the payment as astate-transition cost. Experimental evaluations show that we can obtainmore than an m-fold speed-up in the computation time. Furthermore, we havedeveloped a method for obtaining a semi-optimal bidding strategy underbudget constraints, and have experimentally confirmed the efficacy of thismethod.

cs.GT↗

arXiv2011

False-name-proof Mechanisms for Hiring a Team

We study the problem of hiring a team of selfish agents to perform a task. Each agent is assumed to own one or more elements of a set system, and the auctioneer is trying to purchase a feasible solution by conducting an auction. Our goal is to design auctions that are truthful and false-name-proof, meaning that it is in the agents' best interest to reveal ownership of all elements (which may not be known to the auctioneer a priori) as well as their true incurred costs. We first propose and analyze a false-name-proof mechanism for the special case where each agent owns only one element in reality, but may pretend that this element is in fact a set of multiple elements. We prove that its frugality ratio is bounded by $2^n$, which, up to constants, matches a lower bound of $Ω(2^n)$ for all false-name-proof mechanisms in this scenario. We then propose a second mechanism for the general case in which agents may own multiple elements. It requires the auctioneer to choose a reserve cost a priori, and thus does not always purchase a solution. In return, it is false-name-proof even when agents own multiple elements. We experimentally evaluate the payment (as well as social surplus) of the second mechanism through simulation.

cs.GT↗