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Mark Braverman

Publications and source records attributed to Mark Braverman.

At least 19 recordsLinked to original sources

Parity and Pattern Detection in Permutation Streams

Consider a permutation of $[n]$ whose values arrive one at a time. We resolve two questions about the space needed to decide natural properties of such input: First, computing the parity of the permutation requires $\Theta(n)$ bits, even with randomization and constant error, and a constant number of passes. Second, every permutation pattern of length three can be detected deterministically in one pass using $O(\log n)$ bits. Together with the 2026 lower bounds of Berendsohn, this completes the classification of fixed permutation patterns; The optimal space complexity is $\Theta(\log n)$ for monotone patterns and patterns of length at most three, and $\Theta(n)$ for every other pattern. As a consequence, we observe that we can verify BST traversals in streaming with logarithmic memory.

cs.DS

Measuring Intelligence Beyond Human Scale

How can we measure intelligence beyond human capability? Human-authored benchmarks saturate, and above human capability, examiners may not know which tasks are both hard and verifiable. We argue that this difficulty is inherent to absolute-scale evaluation and propose a new paradigm based on relative measurement in which models generate public challenges that separate other systems. Aggregating these outcomes yields an adversarial psychometric rating system that can scale with the systems being measured. We describe practical protocols that reduce incentives for private-information attacks, support judge-free adjudication, and naturally scale with agent capabilities. We instantiate the framework across verifiable and open-ended, non-verifiable domains, illustrating how model-generated evaluation can continue to measure systems beyond the human frontier.

cs.AI

Hardness of Approximate Hylland-Zeckhauser Equilibria

In this paper, we investigate the computational hardness of finding fractional allocations to unit-demand players using competitive equilibria from equal incomes (CEEI), where we allow a small constant error in players' response to market prices (also known as an approximate Hylland-Zeckhauser equilibrium). We show that assuming the $\mathbf{(\varepsilon,\delta)}$-Generalized Circuits problem is PPAD-hard (the "PCP-for-PPAD" conjecture), finding an approximate HZ equilibrium is also PPAD-hard. This result provides additional motivation for trying to prove the PCP-for-PPAD conjecture as a tool for obtaining robust computational hardness results about markets. Further, we introduce a natural restriction on approximate HZ equilibria, where players' bundles may still only be approximately optimal given the prices, but may not contain positive-price items for which the player has zero utility. We show unconditionally that there exists a constant $\epsilon$ such that finding a restricted $\epsilon$-HZ equilibrium is PPAD-hard.

cs.GT

RubiConv -- Efficient Boundary-Respecting Convolutions

Convolutional architectures have emerged as powerful alternatives to Transformers for sequence modeling. The primary advantage is that they offer improved theoretical sequence length complexity by leveraging the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT). However, this theoretical improvement does not always meaningfully land in practice. One critical obstacle is that applying standard FFTs is not amenable to the large-scale training pipeline wherein data is packed from different sources into a single sequence for hardware efficiency. Indeed, standard FFT algorithms are not easily amenable to document packing. Existing workarounds suffer from severe inefficiencies, crippling the practical performance of convolutional architectures. We close this gap with RubiConv, a novel algorithm for performing hardware-efficient, boundary-respecting convolutions on packed sequences. Extensive experiments show that RubiConv achieves significant speedups over both attention and standard FFT-based baselines. This work makes the theoretical efficiency of long convolutional models a practical reality for large-scale, real-world data packing.

cs.LG

AI Alignment via Incentives and Correction

We study AI alignment through the lens of law-and-economics models of deterrence and enforcement. In these models, misconduct is not treated as an external failure, but as a strategic response to incentives: an actor weighs the gain from violation against the probability of detection and the severity of punishment. We argue that the same logic arises naturally in agentic AI pipelines. A solver may benefit from producing a persuasive but incorrect answer, hiding uncertainty, or exploiting spurious shortcuts, while an auditor or verifier must decide whether costly monitoring is worthwhile. Alignment is therefore a fixed-point problem: stronger penalties may deter solver misbehavior, but they can also reduce the auditor's incentive to inspect, since auditing then mainly incurs cost on a population that appears increasingly aligned. This perspective also changes what should count as a post-training signal. Standard feedback often attaches reward to the final answer alone, but a solver-auditor pipeline exposes the full correction event: whether the solver erred, whether the auditor inspected, whether the error was caught, and whether oversight incentives remained active. We formalize this interaction in a two-agent model in which a principal chooses rewards over joint correction outcomes, inducing both solver behavior and auditor monitoring. Reward design is therefore a bilevel optimization problem: rewards are judged not by their immediate semantic meaning, but by the behavioral equilibrium they induce. We propose a bandit-based outer-loop procedure for searching over reward profiles using noisy interaction feedback. Experiments on an LLM coding pipeline show that adaptive reward profiles can maintain useful oversight pressure and improve principal-aligned outcomes relative to static hand-designed rewards, including a substantial reduction in hallucinated incorrect attempts.

cs.LG

Learning from Equivalence Queries, Revisited

Modern machine learning systems, such as generative models and recommendation systems, often evolve through a cycle of deployment, user interaction, and periodic model updates. This differs from standard supervised learning frameworks, which focus on loss or regret minimization over a fixed sequence of prediction tasks. Motivated by this setting, we revisit the classical model of learning from equivalence queries, introduced by Angluin (1988). In this model, a learner repeatedly proposes hypotheses and, when a deployed hypothesis is inadequate, receives a counterexample. Under fully adversarial counterexample generation, however, the model can be overly pessimistic. In addition, most prior work assumes a \emph{full-information} setting, where the learner also observes the correct label of the counterexample, an assumption that is not always natural. We address these issues by restricting the environment to a broad class of less adversarial counterexample generators, which we call \emph{symmetric}. Informally, such generators choose counterexamples based only on the symmetric difference between the hypothesis and the target. This class captures natural mechanisms such as random counterexamples (Angluin and Dohrn, 2017; Bhatia, 2021; Chase, Freitag, and Reyzin, 2024), as well as generators that return the simplest counterexample according to a prescribed complexity measure. Within this framework, we study learning from equivalence queries under both full-information and bandit feedback. We obtain tight bounds on the number of learning rounds in both settings and highlight directions for future work. Our analysis combines a game-theoretic view of symmetric adversaries with adaptive weighting methods and minimax arguments.

cs.LG

Stronger core results with multidimensional prices

We study one-sided matchings with endowments in the absence of money. It is well-known that a competitive equilibrium may not always exist and that the strong core may be empty in this setting [Hylland and Zeckhauser, 1979]. We propose a generalization of competitive equilibria that associates each item with a multi-dimensional price. We show that this solution concept always exists and resides within the rejective core [Konovalov, 2005]. Rejective core stability is strictly stronger than weak core stability: allocations in the rejective core are elements of the weak core, but the opposite is not true. Moreover, we show that the rejective core always converges to the set of competitive equilibria with multi-dimensional prices as the economy grows, demonstrating core convergence in a setting without non-satiation.

cs.GT

An Analytical Approach to Parallel Repetition via CSP Inverse Theorems

Let $\mathcal{G}$ be a $k$-player game with value $<1$, whose query distribution is such that no marginal on $k-1$ players admits a non-trivial Abelian embedding. We show that for every $n\geq N$, the value of the $n$-fold parallel repetition of $\mathcal{G}$ is $$ \text{val}(\mathcal{G}^{\otimes n}) \leq \frac{1}{\underbrace{\log\log\cdots\log}_{C\text{ times}} n}, $$ where $N=N(\mathcal{G})$ and $1\leq C\leq k^{O(k)}$ are constants. As a consequence, we obtain a parallel repetition theorem for all $3$-player games whose query distribution is pairwise-connected. Prior to our work, only inverse Ackermann decay bounds were known for such games [Ver96]. As additional special cases, we obtain a unified proof for all known parallel repetition theorems, albeit with weaker bounds: (1) A new analytic proof of parallel repetition for all 2-player games [Raz98, Hol09, DS14]. (2) A new proof of parallel repetition for all $k$-player playerwise connected games [DHVY17, GHMRZ22]. (3) Parallel repetition for all $3$-player games (in particular $3$-XOR games) whose query distribution has no non-trivial Abelian embedding into $(\mathbb{Z}, +)$ [BKM23c, BBKLM25]. (4) Parallel repetition for all 3-player games with binary inputs [HR20, GHMRZ21, GHMRZ22, GMRZ22].

cs.CC

Undirected Multicast Network Coding Gaps via Locally Decodable Codes

The network coding problem asks whether data throughput in a network can be increased using coding (compared to treating bits as commodities in a flow). While it is well-known that a network coding advantage exists in directed graphs, the situation in undirected graphs is much less understood -- in particular, despite significant effort, it is not even known whether network coding is helpful at all for unicast sessions. In this paper we study the multi-source multicast network coding problem in undirected graphs. There are $k$ sources broadcasting each to a subset of nodes in a graph of size $n$. The corresponding combinatorial problem is a version of the Steiner tree packing problem, and the network coding question asks whether the multicast coding rate exceeds the tree-packing rate. We give the first super-constant bound to this problem, demonstrating an example with a coding advantage of $\Omega(\log k)$. In terms of graph size, we obtain a lower bound of $2^{\tilde{\Omega}(\sqrt{\log \log n})}$. We also obtain an upper bound of $O(\log n)$ on the gap. Our main technical contribution is a new reduction that converts locally-decodable codes in the low-error regime into multicast coding instances. This gives rise to a new family of explicitly constructed graphs, which may have other applications.

cs.CC

A New Benchmark for Online Learning with Budget-Balancing Constraints

The adversarial Bandit with Knapsack problem is a multi-armed bandits problem with budget constraints and adversarial rewards and costs. In each round, a learner selects an action to take and observes the reward and cost of the selected action. The goal is to maximize the sum of rewards while satisfying the budget constraint. The classical benchmark to compare against is the best fixed distribution over actions that satisfies the budget constraint in expectation. Unlike its stochastic counterpart, where rewards and costs are drawn from some fixed distribution (Badanidiyuru et al., 2018), the adversarial BwK problem does not admit a no-regret algorithm for every problem instance due to the "spend-or-save" dilemma (Immorlica et al., 2022). A key problem left open by existing works is whether there exists a weaker but still meaningful benchmark to compare against such that no-regret learning is still possible. In this work, we present a new benchmark to compare against, motivated both by real-world applications such as autobidding and by its underlying mathematical structure. The benchmark is based on the Earth Mover's Distance (EMD), and we show that sublinear regret is attainable against any strategy whose spending pattern is within EMD $o(T^2)$ of any sub-pacing spending pattern. As a special case, we obtain results against the "pacing over windows" benchmark, where we partition time into disjoint windows of size $w$ and allow the benchmark strategies to choose a different distribution over actions for each window while satisfying a pacing budget constraint. Against this benchmark, our algorithm obtains a regret bound of $\tilde{O}(T/\sqrt{w}+\sqrt{wT})$. We also show a matching lower bound, proving the optimality of our algorithm in this important special case. In addition, we provide further evidence of the necessity of the EMD condition for obtaining a sublinear regret.

cs.LG

Practical Secure Delegated Linear Algebra with Trapdoored Matrices

Most heavy computation occurs on servers owned by a second party. This reduces data privacy, resulting in interest in data-oblivious computation, which typically severely degrades performance. Secure and fast delegated computation is particularly important for linear algebra, which comprises a large fraction of total computation and is best run on highly specialized hardware often accessible only through the cloud. We state the natural efficiency and security desiderata for fast and data-oblivious delegated linear algebra. We demonstrate the existence of \textit{Trapdoored-Matrix} families based on an LPN assumption, and provide a scheme for secure delegated matrix-matrix and matrix-vector multiplication based on the existence of trapdoored matrices. We achieve sublinear overhead for the server, dramatically reduced computation for the client, and various practical advantages over previous protocols.

cs.CR

Tight Analyses of Ordered and Unordered Linear Probing

Linear-probing hash tables have been classically believed to support insertions in time $\Theta(x^2)$, where $1 - 1/x$ is the load factor of the hash table. Recent work by Bender, Kuszmaul, and Kuszmaul (FOCS'21), however, has added a new twist to this story: in some versions of linear probing, if the \emph{maximum} load factor is at most $1 - 1/x$, then the \emph{amortized} expected time per insertion will never exceed $x \log^{O(1)} x$ (even in workloads that operate continuously at a load factor of $1 - 1/x$). Determining the exact asymptotic value for the amortized insertion time remains open. In this paper, we settle the amortized complexity with matching upper and lower bounds of $\Theta(x \log^{1.5} x)$. Along the way, we also obtain tight bounds for the so-called path surplus problem, a problem in combinatorial geometry that has been shown to be closely related to linear probing. We also show how to extend Bender et al.'s bounds to say something not just about ordered linear probing (the version they study) but also about classical linear probing, in the form that is most widely implemented in practice.

cs.DS

Optimality of Frequency Moment Estimation

Estimating the second frequency moment of a stream up to $(1\pm\varepsilon)$ multiplicative error requires at most $O(\log n / \varepsilon^2)$ bits of space, due to a seminal result of Alon, Matias, and Szegedy. It is also known that at least $\Omega(\log n + 1/\varepsilon^{2})$ space is needed. We prove an optimal lower bound of $\Omega\left(\log \left(n \varepsilon^2 \right) / \varepsilon^2\right)$ for all $\varepsilon = \Omega(1/\sqrt{n})$. Note that when $\varepsilon>n^{-1/2 + c}$, where $c>0$, our lower bound matches the classic upper bound of AMS. For smaller values of $\varepsilon$ we also introduce a revised algorithm that improves the classic AMS bound and matches our lower bound.

cs.DS

Parallel Repetition for $3$-Player XOR Games

In a $3$-$\mathsf{XOR}$ game $\mathcal{G}$, the verifier samples a challenge $(x,y,z)\sim \mu$ where $\mu$ is a probability distribution over $\Sigma\times\Gamma\times\Phi$, and a map $t\colon \Sigma\times\Gamma\times\Phi\to\mathcal{A}$ for a finite Abelian group $\mathcal{A}$ defining a constraint. The verifier sends the questions $x$, $y$ and $z$ to the players Alice, Bob and Charlie respectively, receives answers $f(x)$, $g(y)$ and $h(z)$ that are elements in $\mathcal{A}$ and accepts if $f(x)+g(y)+h(z) = t(x,y,z)$. The value, $\mathsf{val}(\mathcal{G})$, of the game is defined to be the maximum probability the verifier accepts over all players' strategies. We show that if $\mathcal{G}$ is a $3$-$\mathsf{XOR}$ game with value strictly less than $1$, whose underlying distribution over questions $\mu$ does not admit Abelian embeddings into $(\mathbb{Z},+)$, then the value of the $n$-fold repetition of $\mathcal{G}$ is exponentially decaying. That is, there exists $c=c(\mathcal{G})>0$ such that $\mathsf{val}(\mathcal{G}^{\otimes n})\leq 2^{-cn}$. This extends a previous result of [Braverman-Khot-Minzer, FOCS 2023] showing exponential decay for the GHZ game. Our proof combines tools from additive combinatorics and tools from discrete Fourier analysis.

cs.CC

New Philosopher Inequalities for Online Bayesian Matching, via Pivotal Sampling

We study the polynomial-time approximability of the optimal online stochastic bipartite matching algorithm, initiated by Papadimitriou et al. (EC'21). Here, nodes on one side of the graph are given upfront, while at each time $t$, an online node and its edge weights are drawn from a time-dependent distribution. The optimal algorithm is $\textsf{PSPACE}$-hard to approximate within some universal constant. We refer to this optimal algorithm, which requires time to think (compute), as a philosopher, and refer to polynomial-time online approximations of the above as philosopher inequalities. The best known philosopher inequality for online matching yields a $0.652$-approximation. In contrast, the best possible prophet inequality, or approximation of the optimum offline solution, is $0.5$. Our main results are a $0.678$-approximate algorithm and a $0.685$-approximation for a vertex-weighted special case. Notably, both bounds exceed the $0.666$-approximation of the offline optimum obtained by Tang, Wu, and Wu (STOC'22) for the vertex-weighted problem. Building on our algorithms and the recent black-box reduction of Banihashem et al. (SODA'24), we provide polytime (pricing-based) truthful mechanisms which $0.678$-approximate the social welfare of the optimal online allocation for bipartite matching markets. Our online allocation algorithm relies on the classic pivotal sampling algorithm (Srinivasan FOCS'01, Gandhi et al. J.ACM'06), along with careful discarding to obtain negative correlations between offline nodes. Consequently, the analysis boils down to examining the distribution of a weighted sum $X$ of negatively correlated Bernoulli variables, specifically lower bounding its mass below a threshold, $\mathbb{E}[\min(1,X)]$, of possible independent interest. Interestingly, our bound relies on an imaginary invocation of pivotal sampling.

cs.DS

A New Information Complexity Measure for Multi-pass Streaming with Applications

We introduce a new notion of information complexity for multi-pass streaming problems and use it to resolve several important questions in data streams. In the coin problem, one sees a stream of $n$ i.i.d. uniform bits and one would like to compute the majority with constant advantage. We show that any constant pass algorithm must use $\Omega(\log n)$ bits of memory, significantly extending an earlier $\Omega(\log n)$ bit lower bound for single-pass algorithms of Braverman-Garg-Woodruff (FOCS, 2020). This also gives the first $\Omega(\log n)$ bit lower bound for the problem of approximating a counter up to a constant factor in worst-case turnstile streams for more than one pass. In the needle problem, one either sees a stream of $n$ i.i.d. uniform samples from a domain $[t]$, or there is a randomly chosen needle $\alpha \in[t]$ for which each item independently is chosen to equal $\alpha$ with probability $p$, and is otherwise uniformly random in $[t]$. The problem of distinguishing these two cases is central to understanding the space complexity of the frequency moment estimation problem in random order streams. We show tight multi-pass space bounds for this problem for every $p < 1/\sqrt{n \log^3 n}$, resolving an open question of Lovett and Zhang (FOCS, 2023); even for $1$-pass our bounds are new. To show optimality, we improve both lower and upper bounds from existing results. Our information complexity framework significantly extends the toolkit for proving multi-pass streaming lower bounds, and we give a wide number of additional streaming applications of our lower bound techniques, including multi-pass lower bounds for $\ell_p$-norm estimation, $\ell_p$-point query and heavy hitters, and compressed sensing problems.

cs.CC

Parallel Repetition of k-Player Projection Games

We study parallel repetition of k-player games where the constraints satisfy the projection property. We prove exponential decay in the value of a parallel repetition of projection games with value less than 1.

cs.CC

Welfare Distribution in Two-sided Random Matching Markets

We study the welfare structure in two-sided large random matching markets. In the model, each agent has a latent personal score for every agent on the other side of the market and her preferences follow a logit model based on these scores. Under a contiguity condition, we provide a tight description of stable outcomes. First, we identify an intrinsic fitness for each agent that represents her relative competitiveness in the market, independent of the realized stable outcome. The intrinsic fitness values correspond to scaling coefficients needed to make a latent mutual matrix bi-stochastic, where the latent scores can be interpreted as a-priori probabilities of a pair being matched. Second, in every stable (or even approximately stable) matching, the welfare or the ranks of the agents on each side of the market, when scaled by their intrinsic fitness, have an approximately exponential empirical distribution. Moreover, the average welfare of agents on one side of the market is sufficient to determine the average on the other side. Overall, each agent's welfare is determined by a global parameter, her intrinsic fitness, and an extrinsic factor with exponential distribution across the population.

econ.TH