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Mark Braverman

Publications and source records attributed to Mark Braverman.

At least 37 records · Page 2Linked to original sources

A New Information Complexity Measure for Multi-pass Streaming with Applications

We introduce a new notion of information complexity for multi-pass streaming problems and use it to resolve several important questions in data streams. In the coin problem, one sees a stream of $n$ i.i.d. uniform bits and one would like to compute the majority with constant advantage. We show that any constant pass algorithm must use $Ω(\log n)$ bits of memory, significantly extending an earlier $Ω(\log n)$ bit lower bound for single-pass algorithms of Braverman-Garg-Woodruff (FOCS, 2020). This also gives the first $Ω(\log n)$ bit lower bound for the problem of approximating a counter up to a constant factor in worst-case turnstile streams for more than one pass. In the needle problem, one either sees a stream of $n$ i.i.d. uniform samples from a domain $[t]$, or there is a randomly chosen needle $α\in[t]$ for which each item independently is chosen to equal $α$ with probability $p$, and is otherwise uniformly random in $[t]$. The problem of distinguishing these two cases is central to understanding the space complexity of the frequency moment estimation problem in random order streams. We show tight multi-pass space bounds for this problem for every $p < 1/\sqrt{n \log^3 n}$, resolving an open question of Lovett and Zhang (FOCS, 2023); even for $1$-pass our bounds are new. To show optimality, we improve both lower and upper bounds from existing results. Our information complexity framework significantly extends the toolkit for proving multi-pass streaming lower bounds, and we give a wide number of additional streaming applications of our lower bound techniques, including multi-pass lower bounds for $\ell_p$-norm estimation, $\ell_p$-point query and heavy hitters, and compressed sensing problems.

cs.CC↗

Parallel Repetition of k-Player Projection Games

We study parallel repetition of k-player games where the constraints satisfy the projection property. We prove exponential decay in the value of a parallel repetition of projection games with value less than 1.

cs.CC↗

Welfare Distribution in Two-sided Random Matching Markets

We study the welfare structure in two-sided large random matching markets. In the model, each agent has a latent personal score for every agent on the other side of the market and her preferences follow a logit model based on these scores. Under a contiguity condition, we provide a tight description of stable outcomes. First, we identify an intrinsic fitness for each agent that represents her relative competitiveness in the market, independent of the realized stable outcome. The intrinsic fitness values correspond to scaling coefficients needed to make a latent mutual matrix bi-stochastic, where the latent scores can be interpreted as a-priori probabilities of a pair being matched. Second, in every stable (or even approximately stable) matching, the welfare or the ranks of the agents on each side of the market, when scaled by their intrinsic fitness, have an approximately exponential empirical distribution. Moreover, the average welfare of agents on one side of the market is sufficient to determine the average on the other side. Overall, each agent's welfare is determined by a global parameter, her intrinsic fitness, and an extrinsic factor with exponential distribution across the population.

econ.TH↗

Parallel Repetition for the GHZ Game: Exponential Decay

We show that the value of the $n$-fold repeated GHZ game is at most $2^{-Ω(n)}$, improving upon the polynomial bound established by Holmgren and Raz. Our result is established via a reduction to approximate subgroup type questions from additive combinatorics.

cs.CC↗

Rounding via Low Dimensional Embeddings

A regular graph $G = (V,E)$ is an $(\varepsilon,γ)$ small-set expander if for any set of vertices of fractional size at most $\varepsilon$, at least $γ$ of the edges that are adjacent to it go outside. In this paper, we give a unified approach to several known complexity-theoretic results on small-set expanders. In particular, we show: 1. Max-Cut: we show that if a regular graph $G = (V,E)$ is an $(\varepsilon,γ)$ small-set expander that contains a cut of fractional size at least $1-δ$, then one can find in $G$ a cut of fractional size at least $1-O\left(\fracδ{\varepsilonγ^6}\right)$ in polynomial time. 2. Improved spectral partitioning, Cheeger's inequality and the parallel repetition theorem over small-set expanders. The general form of each one of these results involves square-root loss that comes from certain rounding procedure, and we show how this can be avoided over small set expanders. Our main idea is to project a high dimensional vector solution into a low-dimensional space while roughly maintaining $\ell_2^2$ distances, and then perform a pre-processing step using low-dimensional geometry and the properties of $\ell_2^2$ distances over it. This pre-processing leverages the small-set expansion property of the graph to transform a vector valued solution to a different vector valued solution with additional structural properties, which give rise to more efficient integral-solution rounding schemes.

cs.CC↗

Improved Monotonicity Testers via Hypercube Embeddings

We show improved monotonicity testers for the Boolean hypercube under the $p$-biased measure, as well as over the hypergrid $[m]^n$. Our results are: 1. For any $p\in (0,1)$, for the $p$-biased hypercube we show a non-adaptive tester that makes $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{n}/\varepsilon^2)$ queries, accepts monotone functions with probability $1$ and rejects functions that are $\varepsilon$-far from monotone with probability at least $2/3$. 2. For all $m\in\mathbb{N}$, we show an $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{n}m^3/\varepsilon^2)$ query monotonicity tester over $[m]^n$. We also establish corresponding directed isoperimetric inequalities in these domains. Previously, the best known tester due to Black, Chakrabarty and Seshadhri had $Ω(n^{5/6})$ query complexity. Our results are optimal up to poly-logarithmic factors and the dependency on $m$. Our proof uses a notion of monotone embeddings of measures into the Boolean hypercube that can be used to reduce the problem of monotonicity testing over an arbitrary product domains to the Boolean cube. The embedding maps a function over a product domain of dimension $n$ into a function over a Boolean cube of a larger dimension $n'$, while preserving its distance from being monotone; an embedding is considered efficient if $n'$ is not much larger than $n$, and we show how to construct efficient embeddings in the above mentioned settings.

cs.CC↗

Understanding Influence Functions and Datamodels via Harmonic Analysis

Influence functions estimate effect of individual data points on predictions of the model on test data and were adapted to deep learning in Koh and Liang [2017]. They have been used for detecting data poisoning, detecting helpful and harmful examples, influence of groups of datapoints, etc. Recently, Ilyas et al. [2022] introduced a linear regression method they termed datamodels to predict the effect of training points on outputs on test data. The current paper seeks to provide a better theoretical understanding of such interesting empirical phenomena. The primary tool is harmonic analysis and the idea of noise stability. Contributions include: (a) Exact characterization of the learnt datamodel in terms of Fourier coefficients. (b) An efficient method to estimate the residual error and quality of the optimum linear datamodel without having to train the datamodel. (c) New insights into when influences of groups of datapoints may or may not add up linearly.

cs.LG↗

Empirical Characteristics of Affordable Care Act Risk Transfer Payments

Under the Affordable Care Act (ACA), insurers cannot engage in medical underwriting and thus face perverse incentives to engage in risk selection and discourage low-value patients from enrolling in their plans. One ACA program intended to reduce the effects of risk selection is risk adjustment. Under a risk adjustment program, insurers with less healthy enrollees receive risk transfer payments from insurers with healthier enrollees. Our goal is to understand the elements driving risk transfers. First, the distribution of risk transfers should be based on random health shocks, which are unpredictable events that negatively affect health status. Second, risk transfers could be influenced by factors unique to each insurer, such as certain plans attracting certain patients, the extent to which carriers engage in risk selection, and the degree of upcoding. We create a publicly available dataset using Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services data that includes insurer risk transfer payments, costs, and premiums for the 2014-2017 benefit years. Using this dataset, we find that the empirical distribution of risk transfer payments is not consistent with the lack of risk selection as measured by the ACA risk transfer formula. Over all states included in our dataset, at least 60% of the volume of transfers cannot be accounted for by a purely normal model. Because we find that it is very unlikely that risk transfer payments are caused solely by random shocks that reflect health events of the population, our work raises important questions about the causes of heterogeneity in risk transfers.

cs.CY↗

Optimal Short-Circuit Resilient Formulas

We consider fault-tolerant boolean formulas in which the output of a faulty gate is short-circuited to one of the gate's inputs. A recent result by Kalai et al. (FOCS 2012) converts any boolean formula into a resilient formula of polynomial size that works correctly if less than a fraction $1/6$ of the gates (on every input-to-output path) are faulty. We improve the result of Kalai et al., and show how to efficiently fortify any boolean formula against a fraction $1/5$ of short-circuit gates per path, with only a polynomial blowup in size. We additionally show that it is impossible to obtain formulas with higher resilience and sub-exponential growth in size. Towards our results, we consider interactive coding schemes when noiseless feedback is present; these produce resilient boolean formulas via a Karchmer-Wigderson relation. We develop a coding scheme that resists up to a fraction $1/5$ of corrupted transmissions in each direction of the interactive channel. We further show that such a level of noise is maximal for coding schemes with sub-exponential blowup in communication. Our coding scheme takes a surprising inspiration from Blockchain technology.

cs.DS↗

Max-Weight Online Stochastic Matching: Improved Approximations Against the Online Benchmark

In this paper, we study max-weight stochastic matchings on online bipartite graphs under both vertex and edge arrivals. We focus on designing polynomial time approximation algorithms with respect to the online benchmark, which was first considered by Papadimitriou, Pollner, Saberi, and Wajc [EC'21]. In the vertex arrival version of the problem, the goal is to find an approximate max-weight matching of a given bipartite graph when the vertices in one part of the graph arrive online in a fixed order with independent chances of failure. Whenever a vertex arrives we should decide, irrevocably, whether to match it with one of its unmatched neighbors or leave it unmatched forever. There has been a long line of work designing approximation algorithms for different variants of this problem with respect to the offline benchmark (prophet). Papadimitriou et al., however, propose the alternative online benchmark and show that considering this new benchmark allows them to improve the 0.5 approximation ratio, which is the best ratio achievable with respect to the offline benchmark. They provide a 0.51-approximation algorithm which was later improved to 0.526 by Saberi and Wajc [ICALP'21]. The main contribution of this paper is designing a simple algorithm with a significantly improved approximation ratio of (1-1/e) for this problem. We also consider the edge arrival version in which, instead of vertices, edges of the graph arrive in an online fashion with independent chances of failure. Designing approximation algorithms for this problem has also been studied extensively with the best approximation ratio being 0.337 with respect to the offline benchmark. This paper, however, is the first to consider the online benchmark for the edge arrival version of the problem. For this problem, we provide a simple algorithm with an approximation ratio of 0.5 with respect to the online benchmark.

cs.DS↗

Statistically Near-Optimal Hypothesis Selection

Hypothesis Selection is a fundamental distribution learning problem where given a comparator-class $Q=\{q_1,\ldots, q_n\}$ of distributions, and a sampling access to an unknown target distribution $p$, the goal is to output a distribution $q$ such that $\mathsf{TV}(p,q)$ is close to $opt$, where $opt = \min_i\{\mathsf{TV}(p,q_i)\}$ and $\mathsf{TV}(\cdot, \cdot)$ denotes the total-variation distance. Despite the fact that this problem has been studied since the 19th century, its complexity in terms of basic resources, such as number of samples and approximation guarantees, remains unsettled (this is discussed, e.g., in the charming book by Devroye and Lugosi `00). This is in stark contrast with other (younger) learning settings, such as PAC learning, for which these complexities are well understood. We derive an optimal $2$-approximation learning strategy for the Hypothesis Selection problem, outputting $q$ such that $\mathsf{TV}(p,q) \leq2 \cdot opt + \eps$, with a (nearly) optimal sample complexity of~$\tilde O(\log n/ε^2)$. This is the first algorithm that simultaneously achieves the best approximation factor and sample complexity: previously, Bousquet, Kane, and Moran (COLT `19) gave a learner achieving the optimal $2$-approximation, but with an exponentially worse sample complexity of $\tilde O(\sqrt{n}/ε^{2.5})$, and Yatracos~(Annals of Statistics `85) gave a learner with optimal sample complexity of $O(\log n /ε^2)$ but with a sub-optimal approximation factor of $3$.

cs.LG↗

Optimization-friendly generic mechanisms without money

The goal of this paper is to develop a generic framework for converting modern optimization algorithms into mechanisms where inputs come from self-interested agents. We focus on aggregating preferences from $n$ players in a context without money. Special cases of this setting include voting, allocation of items by lottery, and matching. Our key technical contribution is a new meta-algorithm we call \apex (Adaptive Pricing Equalizing Externalities). The framework is sufficiently general to be combined with any optimization algorithm that is based on local search. We outline an agenda for studying the algorithm's properties and its applications. As a special case of applying the framework to the problem of one-sided assignment with lotteries, we obtain a strengthening of the 1979 result by Hylland and Zeckhauser on allocation via a competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI). The [HZ79] result posits that there is a (fractional) allocation and a set of item prices such that the allocation is a competitive equilibrium given prices. We further show that there is always a reweighing of the players' utility values such that running unit-demand VCG with reweighed utilities leads to a HZ-equilibrium prices. Interestingly, not all HZ competitive equilibria come from VCG prices. As part of our proof, we re-prove the [HZ79] result using only Brouwer's fixed point theorem (and not the more general Kakutani's theorem). This may be of independent interest.

cs.GT↗

The gradient complexity of linear regression

We investigate the computational complexity of several basic linear algebra primitives, including largest eigenvector computation and linear regression, in the computational model that allows access to the data via a matrix-vector product oracle. We show that for polynomial accuracy, $Θ(d)$ calls to the oracle are necessary and sufficient even for a randomized algorithm. Our lower bound is based on a reduction to estimating the least eigenvalue of a random Wishart matrix. This simple distribution enables a concise proof, leveraging a few key properties of the random Wishart ensemble.

cs.LG↗

New Separations Results for External Information

We obtain new separation results for the two-party external information complexity of boolean functions. The external information complexity of a function $f(x,y)$ is the minimum amount of information a two-party protocol computing $f$ must reveal to an outside observer about the input. We obtain the following results: 1. We prove an exponential separation between external and internal information complexity, which is the best possible; previously no separation was known. 2. We prove a near-quadratic separation between amortized zero-error communication complexity and external information complexity for total functions, disproving a conjecture of \cite{Bravermansurvey}. 3. We prove a matching upper showing that our separation result is tight.

cs.CC↗

Prior-free Dynamic Mechanism Design With Limited Liability

We study the problem of repeatedly auctioning off an item to one of $k$ bidders where: a) bidders have a per-round individual rationality constraint, b) bidders may leave the mechanism at any point, and c) the bidders' valuations are adversarially chosen (the prior-free setting). Without these constraints, the auctioneer can run a second-price auction to "sell the business" and receive the second highest total value for the entire stream of items. We show that under these constraints, the auctioneer can attain a constant fraction of the "sell the business" benchmark, but no more than $2/e$ of this benchmark. In the course of doing so, we design mechanisms for a single bidder problem of independent interest: how should you repeatedly sell an item to a (per-round IR) buyer with adversarial valuations if you know their total value over all rounds is $V$ but not how their value changes over time? We demonstrate a mechanism that achieves revenue $V/e$ and show that this is tight.

cs.GT↗

Tiered Random Matching Markets: Rank is Proportional to Popularity

We study the stable marriage problem in two-sided markets with randomly generated preferences. We consider agents on each side divided into a constant number of "soft tiers", which intuitively indicate the quality of the agent. Specifically, every agent within a tier has the same public score, and agents on each side have preferences independently generated proportionally to the public scores of the other side. We compute the expected average rank which agents in each tier have for their partners in the men-optimal stable matching, and prove concentration results for the average rank in asymptotically large markets. Furthermore, we show that despite having a significant effect on ranks, public scores do not strongly influence the probability of an agent matching to a given tier of the other side. This generalizes results of [Pittel 1989] which correspond to uniform preferences. The results quantitatively demonstrate the effect of competition due to the heterogeneous attractiveness of agents in the market, and we give the first explicit calculations of rank beyond uniform markets.

cs.GT↗

Optimal tiling of the Euclidean space using symmetric bodies

What is the least surface area of a symmetric body $B$ whose $\mathbb{Z}^n$ translations tile $\mathbb{R}^n$? Since any such body must have volume $1$, the isoperimetric inequality implies that its surface area must be at least $Ω(\sqrt{n})$. Remarkably, Kindler et al.\ showed that for general bodies $B$ this is tight, i.e.\ that there is a tiling body of $\mathbb{R}^n$ whose surface area is $O(\sqrt{n})$. In theoretical computer science, the tiling problem is intimately to the study of parallel repetition theorems (which are an important component in PCPs), and more specifically in the question of whether a "strong version" of the parallel repetition theorem holds. Raz showed, using the odd cycle game, that strong parallel repetition fails in general, and subsequently these ideas were used in order to construct non-trivial tilings of $\mathbb{R}^n$. In this paper, motivated by the study of a symmetric parallel repetition, we consider the symmetric variant of the tiling problem in $\mathbb{R}^n$. We show that any symmetric body that tiles $\mathbb{R}^n$ must have surface area at least $Ω(n/\sqrt{\log n})$, and that this bound is tight, i.e.\ that there is a symmetric tiling body of $\mathbb{R}^n$ with surface area $O(n/\sqrt{\log n})$. We also give matching bounds for the value of the symmetric parallel repetition of Raz's odd cycle game. Our result suggests that while strong parallel repetition fails in general, there may be important special cases where it still applies.

cs.CC↗

The Role of Randomness and Noise in Strategic Classification

We investigate the problem of designing optimal classifiers in the strategic classification setting, where the classification is part of a game in which players can modify their features to attain a favorable classification outcome (while incurring some cost). Previously, the problem has been considered from a learning-theoretic perspective and from the algorithmic fairness perspective. Our main contributions include 1. Showing that if the objective is to maximize the efficiency of the classification process (defined as the accuracy of the outcome minus the sunk cost of the qualified players manipulating their features to gain a better outcome), then using randomized classifiers (that is, ones where the probability of a given feature vector to be accepted by the classifier is strictly between 0 and 1) is necessary. 2. Showing that in many natural cases, the imposed optimal solution (in terms of efficiency) has the structure where players never change their feature vectors (the randomized classifier is structured in a way, such that the gain in the probability of being classified as a 1 does not justify the expense of changing one's features). 3. Observing that the randomized classification is not a stable best-response from the classifier's viewpoint, and that the classifier doesn't benefit from randomized classifiers without creating instability in the system. 4. Showing that in some cases, a noisier signal leads to better equilibria outcomes -- improving both accuracy and fairness when more than one subpopulation with different feature adjustment costs are involved. This is interesting from a policy perspective, since it is hard to force institutions to stick to a particular randomized classification strategy (especially in a context of a market with multiple classifiers), but it is possible to alter the information environment to make the feature signals inherently noisier.

cs.LG↗